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Abstract 
This thesis examines the last years of the Walpole ministry. It attempts to shed light on the 
inner workings of that ministry through an examination of its foreign policy, exploring the 
origins and impact of the 1739 war with Spain. This dissertation is the only extended 
modem study of the Anglo-Spanish diplomacy in these years. It is the only work to give 
adequate consideration both to the varying influence of British domestic pressures and to 
Spanish concerns. The thesis attempts to treat Spain's negotiations as variable, contingent 
on chance and on personalities, as well as on certain intractable beliefs and principles. 
Events are viewed largely from the perspective of the centre, the handful of leading 
ministers and diplomats who discussed and made political and diplomatic decisions. The 
personalities of ministers both in Spain and England, their interactions and rivalries and 
their differing views, are important to understanding how diplomacy worked. Though 
concentrating mainly on such interactions, and particularly the growing rivalry between 
Newcastle and Walpole, the thesis tries to show how influential others were. The inner 
circle of British ministers was preoccupied with the voice of those `without doors', and 
public opinion set limits to diplomacy even in Spain. The domestic context of British 
foreign policy included also a developing popular patriotism. 
The thesis contends that the Walpole ministry nearly succeeded in procuring a genuine 
commercial peace with Spain, and that the reasons for failure did not arise exclusively 
from domestic political clamour. Royal prestige and individual ministerial personalitites, in 
both countries, affected the outcome at least as much. The full explanation of a complex 
breakdown can only be found in a close attention to the chronology of negotiation. The 
thesis is therefore mainly chronological in form. In each chapter, though, an attempt is 
made to take up relevant themes and develop them with a less strict regard to chronology. 
Some issues, such as the role of monarchy, and of public opinion, the press campaign and 
Opposition tactics, the contribution of the South Sea Company, recur. 
V 
Introduction 
This is a study of the last years of the Walpole ministry. It attempts to shed light on the 
inner workings of that ministry through an examination of its foreign policy. Specifically, 
it explores the origins and, briefly at least, the impact of the war with Spain which began 
in October 1739. This thesis can claim to be the only extended modern study of the 
Anglo-Spanish diplomacy in these years. ' It is the only study to attempt to give adequate 
consideration both to the varying influence of British domestic pressures and to the 
influence of Spanish concerns. The usual treatment of Spain has been both perfunctory 
and static. I attempt to treat Spain's part in the negotiations and frictions of these years as 
being variable, contingent on chance and on personalities, as well as on certain intractable 
beliefs and principles. 
For the most part, I tell the story of events from the perspective of the centre, that is, of 
the handful of people who discussed and made political and diplomatic decisions. This 
included the King, but largely excluded even the handful of best-known Opposition 
politicians of the day. However familiar their names, and however assiduous they were in 
fomenting opposition in the press and in both Houses of Parliament, they did not have 
access to favour or power. To some extent of course this view of how politics worked is 
distorted by the enormously uneven survival of manuscripts: historians view national 
politics and diplomacy through the letters and working papers of the male landed elite, for 
the most part. And among the elite, the greatest volume of surviving materials is that 
generated by the winners in the contest for power, the men who enjoyed the offices and 
made the decisions. 
Some features of these extant records are unlikely to be misleading, however. In 
particular, the dominance of politics and diplomacy, in every country in Europe, by a 
comparatively small group of men of high social standing, often of similar outlook and 
education, gave great significance to individual attitudes and decisions. In examining high 
An earlier short discussion can be found in P. L. Woodfine, `The Anglo-Spanish War of 
1739', in The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe (1987), ed. J. M. Black, pp. 185- 
209. 
politics one is constantly struck by the importance of chance and of personality. A 
contemporary observer summarised the position well: 
Those who are with` the Curtain can only conjecture on these matters, & 
those within know that all political Cases are very problematical, a death 
unexpected - the Change of a Minister - or even that of a Prince's humour is 
enough to change the scene. 2 
I have tried to reconstruct the real workings of diplomacy, rather than presenting it simply 
as a series of formal demands exchanged between entities labelled as countries. The inner 
history of negotiation, insofar as we can recover it, was composed of meetings and 
discussions, frictions and arguments. One must not forget dinners. The draft of a treaty of 
marriage between Princess Mary and Prince Frederick of Hesse-Cassel was finalised, 
perhaps appropriately, over dinner at Sir Robert Walpole' s3 Less fittingly, when the 
declaration of war with Spain was discussed by the cabinet, the occasion was also begun 
by a dinner. This was a meal shared by old political partners, and furnished by the fruits of 
Sir Robert Walpole's office as Ranger of Richmond New Park. Lord Hardwicke was 
invited to dine with Sir Robert and the Duke of Newcastle `upon a New Park Turkey, & 
we will have a Cabinet at 7 o'clock in the Evening'. 4 It was possible for the lines between 
sociability and business to be blurred, even for participants. The `War Council' dined at 
Sir Robert's in July 1739, but the significance of the invitation was lost on John Potter, 
Archbishop of Canterbury: `his Grace not perceiving we mett upon Business, slipt away 
after dinner, unknown to every body, before our Business began'. 5 This social dimension 
to the high politics of this period cannot be fully recovered from archives, but it was an 
important element in what really happened, and needs to be borne in mind. The 
personalities of ministers both in Spain and England, their interactions and rivalries and 
their differing views, are important to understanding how diplomacy worked. 
By concentrating mainly on such interactions, and on those who made the decisions, I do 
not at all mean to imply that others were not influential. The world role of the country 
2 BL Add Ms 35396, f. 16, Philip Yorke to Rev. Thomas Birch, 10 September (OS) 1741. 
3 BL Add Ms 35586, f. 129, Harrington to Hardwicke, 25 October (OS) 1738. 
4 BL Add Ms 35406, f. 154, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 18 September (OS) 1739. 
T. J. McCann (ed), The Correspondence of the Dukes of Richmond and Newcastle 1724- 
1750, Sussex Record Society, 73, (1984), p. 28, Newcastle to Richmond, 26 July (OS) 
1739. 
2 
was of interest to people far removed from Westminster, and it was one of the 
peculiarities of the eighteenth-century British state, with its responsive politics and 
rapidly-growing culture of print, that they had ways of making their views felt. It is clear 
that in all its deliberations, over informal political dinners and in formal sessions of the 
Cabinet or Council of Regency, the inner circle of British ministers was preoccupied with 
the voice of those `without doors'. They did not always understand the depth of the 
feeling they sensed in the mobs of London or the proxy `mob' voice of the London 
opposition press. They certainly disparaged the motives and the intelligence behind it, but 
in general they overrated this feeling rather than otherwise. Two examples, from the 
beginning and end of the period which is studied here, will suffice. In January 1737, Lord 
Chancellor Hardwicke bemoaned to the Duke of Newcastle the way in which George II 
was delayed in returning from his beloved Hanover. This was due simply to adverse 
winds, but `ye Multitude' were nonetheless inflamed. Hardwicke's answer was the very 
essence of managerial politics; `For God's sake think of striking out some popular 
Measure this Winter in order to conciliate men's minds, & put them in good humour'. ' 
Five years later, after Walpole had fallen from power, and when the war he had so resisted 
was in its third year, the same cry was still heard. Lord Bath, who as William Pulteney had 
been for so long the `Patriot' voice of public discontents, wrote to Hardwicke in exactly 
the same vein. There was a real need, he said, for some popular stroke of victory in 
Europe to keep the public happy, and it must come before the next session of Parliament. 7 
My aim has been, as far as possible, to give an appropriate weight to this domestic 
context of foreign policy. 8 The widest context is that of the nation, taking account of its 
heritage of the `Revolution Settlement' and divided political allegiances, and all that 
marked it out from or made it similar to Continental Europe. ' This context would include 
6 BL Add Ms 32794, f. 17, Hardwicke to Newcastle, 9 January (OS) 1737. 
BL Add Ms 35407, if. 144-5, Bath to Hardwicke, 20 September (OS) 1742. 
8A different kind of research project, exploiting far more local evidence, would have been 
needed to carry out this agenda fully. Not long after I began work on this topic, there was 
a call by Linda Colley for a study of foreign policy in this period which would `enrich our 
understanding of power and social relations at home': `The Politics of Eighteenth Century 
British History', Journal of British Studies, 25,4, October 1986, pp. 359-79; quotation p. 
376. Alas, mine is not that study. 
9A challenging discussion of the need to take in contemporary continental developments is 
J. M. Black, `Britain and the Continent 1688-1815. Convergence or Divergence? ', British 
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also a developing popular patriotism and belief in empire. For a long time historians have 
been under the spell of a paradox, expounded in what was possibly the most widely read 
history book of its day. Sir John Seeley claimed that the most important, and at the same 
time the least noticed, feature of the eighteenth century was its overseas expansion. `We 
seem, as it were, to have conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of 
mind. ' 10 This idea has been refuted in recent years by work on warfare and its complex 
effects on the societies which gear themselves towards it, and on the drive to acquire 
imperial possessions. " The process was far from absent minded. The ideal study of this 
period would be one which explored this full context and examined the whole range of 
foreign policy. Jeremy Black has recently given such an account of British foreign policy 
after the War of American Independence. 12 Within the confines of this short thesis, 
though, I have had to narrow the focus only to relations between Britain and Spain, and 
could only acknowledge some of these wider issues, while concentrating on those 
elements of the domestic context that bore most directly on the inner circle of ministers, 
Though telling the story of these years largely from government sources, I do not wish to 
imply that the ministers were always right, and their opponents always wrong. Neither 
side had a monopoly of virtue, either political or personal. Both sides acted at times out of 
self-interest. One of the leaders of the City campaign against Walpole's corruption, 
Alderman Willimot, was, as a member of Parliament, the chairman of the committee for 
stamping out the illegal export of wool to Ireland. At the same time, he insured the ships 
involved in that trade at double premiums; `Such was the impudence of selfishness and the 
Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies, 15,1992, pp. 145-9. The theme is explored over 
a much longer timescale in idem, Convergence or Divergence? Britain and the Continent 
(1994). 
10 J. R. Seeley, The Expansion of England (1883, ed. J. Gross 1971), p. 12. Perhaps the 
clearest recent restatement of this idea can be found in P. Langford, A Polite and 
Commercial People: England 1727-1783 (1989), pp. 171-4. 
11 E. g. J. Brewer, The Sinews of Power: war, money and the English State, 1688-1783 
(1989); an incisive article, breaking new ground, is K. Wilson, `Empire of Virtue. The 
imperial project and Hanoverian culture, c. 1720-1785', in An Imperial State at War. 
Britain from 1689 to 1815, ed. L. Stone (1994), pp. 128-164. All the essays in this 
valuable collection have insights to add. 
12 J. M. Black, British Foreign Policy in an Age of Revolutions 1783-1793 (1994); see 
especially chap. 10, `The Domestic Context of Foreign Policy'. 
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excess of corruption', said one friend of the ministry. 13 Perhaps the most glaring instance, 
for contemporaries, of political self-interest was the conduct of William Pulteney, who led 
the campaign against placemen, and for government on a broad bottom of Tory and Whig 
patriots. The Tories always feared that Pulteney would desert them, for reasons pointed 
out by a ministerial poet; `Place is the aim - when freedom is the cry'. 
14 When finally 
Walpole fell, Pulteney deserted his allies the Tories, failed either to impeach Walpole or 
introduce a Place Bill, and was bought off with a title, the Earldom of Bath; `exalted like 
Enoch, never to be heard of more'. '5 On the government side, too, place and personal 
interest were inseparable from political outlook and belief. The Duke of Newcastle wrote 
in revealing terms to solicit a vacant living, in his friend Lord Hardwicke's gift, for one 
worthy candidate, the Master of Queens' College, Cambridge; `Mr. Sedgewick has all ye 
good Qualities, a man can have, & amongst ye rest Master of a College, where there is 
not one Tory'. 16 The places provided by Sir Robert Walpole for his own family and 
connections were notorious, and he was duly belaboured for them in the debate over the 
motion for his removal in February 1741.17 But this was the pattern of public life at this 
time, and not only in Britain. When a packet of eighteen letters to Spanish noblemen was 
intercepted at the beginning of the war, the contents were found to run almost entirely on 
ecclesiastical preferment. 18 Neither ministers nor their opponents can be expected to be 
purer than the standards of their age. As even a highly moral Victorian historian expressed 
it; `political conduct must be judged in the light of political history'. 19 Equally, both sides 
held principles to which they adhered more or less consistently, and which cannot simply 
be dismissed. 
13 BL Add Ms 9200, f. 71, Journal of the Rev. Henry Etough, 1740. 
14 [T. Newcomb], A Supplement to a late Excellent Poem entitled Are these Things so? 
(1740), p. 15. Pulteney was rumoured on more than one occasion to be certainly quitting 
the Tories; see e. g. BL Add Ms 51390, Charles Hanbury-Williams to Stephen Fox, 12 
October (OS) 1739. 
is BL Add Ms 51390, f. 33, Charles Hanbury-Williams to Stephen Fox, [late June/early 
July] 1742. The Conduct of the Late and Present M-ry Compared (1742), p. 19. 
16 BL Add Ms 35406, f. 35, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 31 July (OS) 1738. 
17 W. Coxe, Memoirs of the Life and Administration of Sir Robert Walpole Earl of Orford 
(2nd. ed., 4 Vols. 1816), III, pp. 172-210. 
is BL Add Ms 37032, List, if. 236-40. 
19 J. Morley, Walpole (1899), p. 120. 
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I shall be trying to tell the story of the last years of a long-serving administration, which, 
like all such organisations, made mistakes. No leading minister can control politics for 
over twenty years without having made misjudgements which might in other 
circumstances have been fatal to his survival. The furore over such issues as Wood's 
halfpence and the Excise crisis, and the very real watershed of the change of monarchs in 
1727, show that Walpole had no divine right to power. He was vulnerable to opposition 
and survived through his own consummate skills in human and parliamentary 
management, through the self-interest of a powerful landed class kept compliant by low 
taxation, through a careful avoidance of confrontational policies, and through the support 
of the King. Yet, crucially, by the late 1730s it was no longer possible for Walpole to 
override opposition and survive. The principles and the policies of the Walpole ministry 
were, perhaps, as consistent as it is reasonable to expect in human affairs. No essential 
change can be detected in the last five or six years of that long administration. But the 
leading ministers, blunted by long turns at the wheel of state, failed to see the changing 
weather and the pattern of the rising waves. Walpole personally lost some of his touch. 
The deaths of his first and second wives in short order in 1737-8, his repeated illnesses 
and the loss of friends, must have done something to blunt his perceptions of people and 
issues. Certainly he underrated the strength and the appeal of the Opposition clamour of 
these years. His diplomacy was sensible and moderate, but the climate of politics was such 
that moderation was not always possible. The ministry was divided, too; rocked by 
disagreements over policy and by the clash of ambitions. The Duke of Newcastle was 
increasingly determined to step out from beneath the shadow of Walpole, and had his own 
pressing financial problems which made him harder than usual to work with. These 
internal dissensions cannot be separated from the pursuit of foreign policy, since they 
were the actual context in which every foreign letter was received, and every new policy 
statement discussed. 
Diplomacy is perhaps always most likely to succeed when it can work in relative isolation 
from domestic pressures. It is possible to negotiate arcane agreements in congresses or 
summits, even ones which in the long run might be potentially damaging, so long as they 
do not seize the attention of any sizeable interest group, or become identified with any 
principle perceived as significant. Such a principle, at the time in British history with 
which this thesis is concerned, was freedom from search; the liberty to sail and trade 
unmolested on all the seas of the world. Diplomacy fails most readily when it is hinged 
6 
upon domestic politics, or swivels on such a slender post as royal and/or national honour. 
This was the case of Britain and Spain in the late 1730s, when sensible negotiations about 
Caribbean trade and smuggling were like a well-made door, rendered useless through 
having its hinges wrenched by the fear of making concessions. With just a very little more 
luck, the hinges might have worked and the door might have fitted. Had Spain carried out 
the provisions of the Convention of the Pardo in 1739, it is hard to see how the British 
Opposition could have found a way to push the ministry into war, or to have made any 
great political capital out of an inglorious but pragmatic success in commercial 
negotiation. 
In seeking to explain the breakdown of these negotiations, and the pressures which led to 
it, I have tried as far as possible to avoid theories and generalisation, and to stay close to 
the detail of specific events and prevailing ideas. I have used quotation extensively to give 
a feeling for the real concerns, and the actual voice of the people involved. If their 
outlook is to be understood, it must be by respecting their own way of viewing and 
explaining the world. Their distinctive voices are a part of that pattern of perceptions, and 
a part of the pleasure of eighteenth century study for those who have caught the 
enthusiasm for it. I hope, even in a thesis whose readership might never reach double 
figures, to share with the reader some of that pleasure. 
The bulk of the thesis is mainly chronological in form, true to the intention to relate the 
story of developments in their real sequence, and attended by all the accidents and clashes 
which occurred, month by month. In each chapter, though, an attempt is made to take up 
relevant themes and develop them with a less strict regard to chronology. Some issues, 
such as the role of monarchy, and of public opinion, the press campaign and Opposition 
tactics, the contribution of the South Sea Company, recur time and again in the diplomacy 
of these years, and so recur in several of my chapters. To give a complete treatment of 
them at the first mention would strain the chronological framework, involve considerable 
repetition of factual narrative, and make the dissertation more difficult to read. The 
coverage of the chapters, taking the more chronological chapters first, is briefly as 
follows. 
The crisis over Spanish attacks on British ships in the Caribbean, `depredations', which 
flared up in 1737, is laid out in chapter 3. In that chapter I also examine the press 
campaign against the ministry, and the wider context of conflict in the Indies, as well as 
7 
the Opposition tactics of various kinds designed to increase public discontent. Chapter 4 
surveys the protests, beginning in November 1737, made by Newcastle about 
depredations and explores the limits placed upon diplomatic action of this kind, 
particularly examining the role of monarchy and the problems of ministerial divisions. 
Chapter 5 looks at developments to the summer of 1738, particularly focussing on the 
agitation in Britain over seamen being held as `slaves' by the Spaniards, and ending with 
the introduction of a new scheme of compromise, the Stert plan. Chapter 6 follows the 
fortunes of that plan, and the varied diplomatic considerations which ministers had to 
keep in view: public opinion, Jacobite hopes, the postures and possible reactions of both 
France and Spain. It closes by exploring the unreasonable dreams of the British public 
about Spanish treasure and painless conquest. Chapter 7 traces the negotiations leading to 
the final signing of the Convention of the Pardo in January 1739, and the breakdown of 
trust and cooperation which led to its failure by June of that year. Particular themes are 
those which have been touched on earlier; the damaging contribution of the South Sea 
Company, the mounting pressure of public opinion, cabinet divisions and the delicacy and 
complexity of negotiating with the Spanish court. Chapter 8 surveys the planning for war, 
and the final rupture within the ministry between the (peaceful) Walpole and (warlike) 
Newcastle camps. It includes a brief consideration of the impact of the war on the 
ministry, and on party politics. 
To introduce this chronological treatment, two chapters of a more purely thematic kind 
are provided. In chapter 2 the Walpole ministry in its later years is anatomised; its position 
in relation to the Opposition and the press, and the various members of the government in 
their relationships with one another and with the all-important monarch. Since this 
dissertation is primarily about the ministry in the specific sphere of foreign policy, chapter 
1 begins by offering an outline of the workings of diplomacy at this time. It considers the 
ministerial personnel, both British and Spanish, the diplomats on both sides, and the 
systems of intelligence gathering, as well as the particular obstacle of the inflexible 
Spanish doctrine of imperial monopoly. 
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Chapter 1 The Mechanisms of Diplomacy 
In the life of any long-serving political administration there comes a time when luck 
deserts those who have always been secure. The actual causes of failure may seem slight - 
Walpole was forced from office in February 1742 by his failure to win the votes he needed 
in the committee on disputed elections' - but they are only the symptoms of an underlying 
condition. Seasoned ministers seem to fall victim to a change in the political weather, or 
possibly they lose the ability to read the warning signs which earlier they would have 
responded to and survived. Perhaps in some such way the veterans of the Walpole 
ministry were over-confident in the late 1730s. Their long hold on power, their secure 
entry to the royal closet, their large corps of supporters, made more loyal by obligations 
or places, and the slim resources of even their most talented and well-connected 
opponents all gave good grounds for confidence. 2 But in diplomacy ministers had to work 
through a complex network of practices and of individuals, which it is the intention of this 
chapter to explore, and which made political life unpredictable. They had also to respond 
to the demands of other countries, with their own priorities and problems, as well as to 
the pressures of opinion at home. Both abroad and at home, during these last years of 
Walpole's long hold on power, there began to appear the storm clouds that would darken 
and draw together, and finally fill the sky. 
Looking around the European horizon, diplomats and ministers broadly began the year of 
1737 in optimistic vein. It was natural for those involved in foreign policy to look both at 
the patterns of international relations and at the leading personalities of that sphere. 
When the British government considered the coming year they had some reason on both 
counts to expect a quiet period in diplomacy. The War of Polish Succession, from which 
W. A. Speck, "`"The Most Corrupt Council in Christendom"; decisions on controverted 
elections, 1702-1742, in Party and Management in Parliament, 1660-1784 (1984), cd. 
C. Jones, pp. 116-9. 
2 L. Colley, In Defiance of Oligarchy. The Tory Party 1714-60 (1982), pp. 222-23; H. T. 
Dickinson, 'Popular Politics in the Age of Walpole', & E. Cruickshanks, `The Political 
Management of Sir Robert Walpole 1720-42', in Britain in the Age of Walpole (1984), 
ed. J. M. Black; Idem, Robert Walpole and the Nature of Politics in early Eighteenth 
century England (1990); Idem, The Politics of Britain 1688-1800 (1993). 
Walpole had stayed aloof, was still absorbing the diplomatic efforts of those who fought 
it, though hostilities had ended in 1735. France had signed a preliminary peace treaty with 
Austria in October 1735, but its allies, Spain and Savoy, were dissatisfied with the shares 
which they were to get of Austrian territory in Italy. Troops were still only slowly being 
withdrawn from the Empire and Tuscany during 1737, and the final peace treaty was 
signed only on 2 May (NS) 1738. France and the Empire were preoccupied also with 
negotiating a general accord, in which others were invited to share. Spain and Portugal 
were in the last stages of a prolonged negotiation of their differences, and one which 
should have had the effect of stabilising Anglo-Spanish relations, as the Portuguese were 
the traditional allies of Britain. In the meantime, the Habsburgs were already being drawn 
into their ultimately disastrous share in the Russian war against the Ottoman Empire, and 
would be far from trying to cause unrest in Western Europe. Even though the long 
Franco-British alliance of 1716-1731 was over, and though Walpole's refusal to join the 
War of Polish Succession (1733-35) had harmed Britain with her allies and given the 
initiative to France, the benefits of peace were still felt. 3 It was true that Spain and France 
were linked by the Family Compact, a secret treaty of November 1733, which involved 
such specific common objectives as the regaining of Gibraltar, and French support for 
Queen Elizabeth's claims in Italy. The leading British ministers had known the full detail 
of the Compact within six months, and had discussed it fully. ` Though the common 
sympathies of the two powers were clear, the ministry relied on the French to act 
cautiously and consult their own interests before those of anyone, even Spain. Jeremy 
Black has argued that Franco-Spanish solidarity at this time can be questioned, though to 
some extent Britain's non-involvement in the Polish Succession war led the Bourbon 
powers to have a lower opinion of British strength. 5 The French were now in a dominant 
position in Europe, a fact of which French ministers were keenly aware, but they were the 
less likely to exploit it in a warlike way as the leading minister, the aged Cardinal Fleury, 
3A full and lucid discussion of Walpole's policy objectives, richly supported by archival 
research, is P. Vaucher, Robert Walpole et la Politique de Fleury (1731-1742) (1924); a 
scholarly modem summary is J. M. Black, British Foreign Policy in the Age of Walpole 
(1985). 
4 Wolterton (Walpole) Mss, Political Tracts (unfoliated), papers of Keene and Ossorio, 
discussed in meetings 22,24,25 & 28 June (OS) 1734. 
s J. M. Black, The Rise of the European Powers 1679-1793 (1990), pp. 99-101; idem, A 
System ofAmbition? British Foreign Policy 1660-1793 (1991), pp. 162-4. 
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was pacific and cautious. His favourite talk was of a balance of power in Europe, based 
on `a firm Union between England and France'. 6 
The cardinal enjoyed the full confidence of Louis XV, despite the challenge of the aspiring 
Garde des Sceaux and Secretary of State for foreign affairs, Germain-Louis Chauvelin, 
there was every sign that he would enjoy that confidence until his death. Even after the 
dismissal of Chauvelin in 1737, his faction remained in existence at court, and between 
1739 and 1742 Louis XV was still occasionally tempted to recall that active and anti- 
Austrian minister. 7 Fleury's unwavering insistence on supremacy, which Chauvelin had 
unwisely ignored, was still strong enough to beat off the challenge of the fallen minister's 
remaining supporters, and even as late as 1742 he succeeded in having Louis XV 
renounce the Chauvelin party. This tenacity in the cardinal, who took office in 1726, at 
the age of 73, was truly remarkable, as was his longevity (he died finally on 23 January 
(NS) 1743), but contemporaries were right not to take either for granted. After his death 
the prospects of a peace would probably diminish sharply, which accounts for the 
preoccupation of diplomats with the (often exaggerated) fragility of his health. ' Britain's 
ambassador in Madrid, Benjamin Keene, commented sardonically on the number of 
couriers arriving there from the Spanish envoy in Paris; `every turn His Eminency takes in 
his bed, gives M. de la Mina an occasion of sending a Messenger to his Court'. 9 Fleury's 
appetite, attention span, hand-shaking, eye brightness and even bowel movements all 
figured in the formal correspondence of aristocratic diplomats: news of his bouts of 
diarrhoea spread solemnly yet with great rapidity around Europe. 10 Not the least appeal of 
Fleury for the Walpole ministry was the only faint encouragement which he gave to the 
6 BL Add Ms 32796, f. 275, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 20 December (NS) 1737. 
The best discussion of Fleury's control of policy and patronage in these years is P. R. 
Campbell, `The Conduct of Politics in France in the Time of Cardinal Fleury', 
unpublished Ph. D. thesis, London, 1985, part three. On Chauvelin, see especially pp. 208- 
223. 
S P. Vaucher, Robert Walpole et la Politique de Fleury (1731-1742) (1924), pp. 256-59. 
George II in July 1738 saw Fleury as `almost gone' and likely to be imposed upon by 
those around him; PRO SP 78/218, f. 372, Newcastle to Waldegrave, 31 July (OS) 1738. 
9 BL Add Ms 32799, f. 197, Keene to Couraud, 27 October (NS) 1738. 
10 Some examples among very many: PRO SP 107/21, (unfoliated), A. Pared to Fitzgerald, 
11 March (NS) 1738; PRO SP 78/218, f. 122, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 31 May (NS) 
1738; PRO SP 78/219, f. 40, same to same, 6 September (NS) 1738. 
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Pretender, `James III'. He regularly assured the British envoy in Paris, Lord Waldegrave, 
that it was no part of French policy to encourage hopes of a Jacobite restoration. " The 
Cardinal often dashed the hopes of the Jacobites, putting the interests of France before 
any of their schemes. Closely quizzed by Waldegrave, he insisted: 
Je leur suis suspect, for I have constantly told them, that I never would have 
anything to do with their Affairs; and farther, that were he otherwise inclined, 
he knew France could not make any Attempt in the Pretender's Favour 
without engaging all Europe in a War, which he had sufficiently shewn not to 
be his Intention. 12 
As late as September 1742 Fleury was still assuring the British ambassador that, though 
dissatisfied with the British, `car vous nous traites comme des Negres', he would never 
encourage the Jacobites. " The Pretender himself knew how slim his hopes of Fleury 
were, and saw the meaning of such snubs as the Cardinal's refusing an audience to his 
agent O'Brien. Military assistance was not likely `considering the timidity of his temper, 
wch. age & sickness naturally augments, tho' I am persuaded he wishes me & my Cause 
very well in his heart. 14 This view of the case was shared by Waldegrave, who saw and 
talked with Fleury regularly: 
I do not believe the Cardinal, unless we were at open War with France, would 
give in to all the trifling Jacobite Schemes the Court of Spain might be 
proposing to him, but I am firmly of opinion, from the knowledge I have of 
His Excy's way of thinking, that nobody would go greater lengths to help the 
Pretender than ye Cardinal, were he satisfied of a probability of success in an 
undertaking of this Nature. is 
It was one more uncertainty in an uncertain world, but so long as Fleury lived there was 
some warrant, in the caution of old age, for Walpole's confidence in the Cardinal's 
disposition. This confidence grew when, on 20 February (NS) 1737, Fleury engineered 
the disgrace of his over-ambitious subordinate, Chauvelin, who was exiled to his estates at 
E. g. BL Add Ms 32794, f. 301, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 3 August (NS) 1737,; BL Add 
Ms 32798, if. 69-70, same to same, 31 May (NS) 1738. 
12 PRO SP 78/218, f. 216 Waldegrave to Newcastle, 31 May (NS) 1738. 
13 PRO SP 78/227B, f. 374, Thompson to Newcastle, 11 September (NS) 1742,. 
14 PRO SP 78/219, f. 8, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 20 August (NS) 1738; Windsor RA 
Stuart Mss, 206/62, `James III' to Duke of Ormonde, 22 April (NS) 1738. 
's BL Add Ms 32801, f. 12, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 5 June (NS)1738. 
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Grosbois and banned from court and from politics. The British ambassador in Spain, 
Benjamin Keene, at once exulted that the fall of Chauvelin, who was as much against 
Britain as he was against Austria, made a provocative Bourbon policy less likely. The 
French ambassador in Madrid, Count Vaulgrenant, had lately worked against British 
interests, but: 
I always attributed it to the Inspirations of that smooth Enemy of ours at 
Grosbois; where, I hope, he will rot and rust for ever. I only wish that he was 
charged with the Cardinal's years, that His Eminency, who is my Hero, might 
be freed from that burthen, and live for the good of Mankind. 16 
His replacement, Michel Amelot de Chaillou, Marquess of Gournay, was relatively untried 
and certainly less aggressive in foreign policy, as well as being less likely to challenge 
Fleury for the control of affairs. " The danger of an active all-powerful minister seemed 
diminished. The cardinal confided to Waldegrave that he saw no need, after his own 
death, of a prime Minister such as he had been; the King could and would exert himself, 
with the aid of lesser ministers. '8 The importance which ministers placed upon the 
personnel of foreign departments of state can be seen from the efforts which Walpole and 
Newcastle made to discredit Chauvelin's deputy, Pecquet. A justification of Chauvelin's 
conduct was published in London, and Fleury was very anxious to know who had written 
it. 19 Walpole obtained from the printer the original manuscript, in the hand of Pecquet's 
clerk, which was duly sent underhand to Fleury, so as to lead to Pecquet's dismissal. The 
Duke of Newcastle was clear about the problem; 
as long, as He continues in the Bureau, let the Cardinal's Intentions be never 
so good, all the Instructions, that go from the Office to their foreign 
Ministers, will have a Tincture of Chauvelin's Politicks. 20 
In general, though, the Duke was undisguisedly relieved; `In all probability the Cardinal 
will by this change be intirely master of his own views and designs, which for some time 
16 BL Add Ms 32794, f. 168, Keene to Waldegrave, 11 March (NS) 1737. 
17 On Amelot, see Campbell, `The Conduct of Politics in France', pp. 250-1. 
18 BL Add Ms 32794, f. 218, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 28 March (NS) 1737. 
19 BL Add Ms 32796, f. 56, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 7 November (NS) 1737. 
20 BL Add Ms 32796, if. 331-33, Newcastle to Waldegrave, 30 December (OS) 1737. 
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before he had not been'. 21 This was favourable to Britain as there was some reason for 
Waldegrave to believe in the Cardinal's dissatisfaction with both the Empire and Spain, 
and his reliance on the more straightforward and consistent dealing of the British 
ministers; `he almost allowed England to have more Virtue and Honour than any other 
Nation'. 22 
In Spain, a similar watershed was marked by the death on 3 November (NS) 1736 of the 
ambitious and confrontational minister Don Jose Patino y Rosales. This bustling politician 
was the man responsible for the revival of the Spanish navy from January 1717, when he 
was appointed Intendente General de Marina. A firm advocate of centralisation and 
rationalisation, he promoted economic recovery and became Philip V's most trusted 
adviser. 23 In 1726 Patifto became Secretary of the Office of the Indies, as well as naval 
minister, and in 1732 he became Secretary of State and Chief Minister of the Crown, 
dying in office. 24 Since Patino had been in charge of all branches of the government, he 
was a troublesome adversary. At the same time, he was able to get things done when 
complaints were made to him. As with Fleury, on his death, no single minister seemed 
likely to be in this position. Keene summarised the change, eight months after Patifio's 
death: 
The difference between the present Systeme and that in the time of the late 
Mr. Patino, consists in that the cryes of the Publick were then against the too 
great authority reposed in the hands of one person, and that at present it is 
difficult to know whether there is any delegated authority, and if there be, in 
what hands it is lodged. 25 
21 BL Add Ms 32794, f. 175, Newcastle to Keene, 3 March (OS) 1737. 
22 PRO SP 78/217, f. 1, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 11 January (NS) 1738. 
23 A convenient summary of his career is J. O. McLachlan, Trade and Peace with Old Spain 
1667-1750 (1940), pp. 146-154; Appendix, `Patiflo and the Economic Development of the 
Spanish Empire'. 
24 J. Lynch, Bourbon Spain 1700-1808 (1989), pp. 90-97; F. Abbad & D. Ozanam, Les 
Intendants Espagnols du XVIIIe Siecle (1992), p. 151; T. Egido Lopez, Opinion Publica 
y Oposicion al Poder en la Espana del Siglo XV71I (1713-1759) (1971), pp. 159-91. 
25 BL Add Ms 32795, f. 138, Keene to Newcastle, 8 July (NS) 1737. 
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Both George II and Keene foresaw obstruction from this cause. 26 So, however, did the 
Pretender, who depended on a minister willing to take big risks and arouse the cardinal to 
action. He wrote in 1738: `I take it to be a great loss to me in this juncture that there is no 
first Minister in Spain'. 27 Patino's most probable successor as Secretary of State, Don 
Sebastian de la Quadra, was altogether milder and more accommodating. 28 La Quadra, in 
Keene's view, was `an honest, timid, indolent man, who being diffident of his own force, 
did not sollicit his Employment, and now he is in it, does not take upon himself the least 
imaginable without positive orders from their Catholick Majesties'. This honest 
mediocrity of talent did not make him popular in Spain, where he attracted satiric attacks, 
as an ungifted protege of the hated Patifio. 30 Unlike Pati11o he did not head the other most 
important offices of state. Everything passed through his hands, and he could be very 
touchy on procedural questions, but he took no pleasure in the power of decision-making. 
La Quadra, who took twenty-one years to work his way to the leading post of 
government, was a representative product of a Spanish system which favoured long 
service and thorough knowledge of routine. The personnel of the office of the Secretary 
of State generally joined the service young and rose slowly, filling dead men's shoes. 
Since no Secretary of State other than Patiflo, and very few subordinates in the office, 
ever actually went abroad, it is not surprising that initiative in foreign affairs was stifled. 31 
La Quadra's favoured role was to usher paperwork in and out of the royal closet, making 
as few suggestions and taking as little responsibility as possible. Even as time passed, and 
la Quadra's confidence grew, he never took any resolution for which he might be blamed 
by his royal master. In particular he would do nothing which appeared to abate the royal 
dignity or power. By early 1739, when the fateful Convention of the Pardo was being 
26 BL Add Ms 32796, if. 119-20, Newcastle to Keene, 4 November (OS) 1737; ibid, if. 
239-40, Keene to Newcastle, 13 December (NS) 1737. 
27 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 207/8, James to Ormonde, May 21 (NS) 1738. 
28 D. McKay & H. M. Scott, The Rise of the Great Powers (1985), pp. 145-148; BL Add Ms 
32794, if. 150-151, Waldegrave to Keene, Paris, 28 February (NS) 1737. 
2' BL Add Ms 32796, f. 239, Keene to Newcastle, 13 December (NS) 1737. 
30 T. Egido Lopez, Opinion Publica y Oposicion al Poder en la Esparta del Siglo XVIII 
(1713-1759) (1971), pp. 175-6. 
31 D. Ozanam, `La Diplomacia de los Primeros Borbones (1714-1759)', Cuadernos de 
Investigaci6n Hist6rica, 6,1982, p. 175. 
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negotiated, la Quadra had fallen under the influence of the scheming Don Casimiro 
Ustariz, chief secretary in the War Office. At a time when the utmost good faith and 
flexibility was needed to bring the Spanish monarchs into new paths, Keene found la 
Quadra `more dull and stubborn than I could well conceive'. 32 
The main British fear in 1737 was that la Quadra might lose ground to more forceful and 
threatening ministers. This was particularly likely as he was of common birth, and 
resented by courtiers of noble blood. In general terms, the reign of Philip V has been seen 
as bringing about the primacy of the despacho, the cabinet council, at the expense of the 
traditional councils led by the grandees, and the lowly origins of la Quadra pointed up this 
trend very clearly. 33 In July 1738 he was appointed Counsellor of State, the most 
distinguished post in the kingdom and a singular honour since he was now the only 
member of the Council. 34 Since Keene had paid attentions to La Quadra when he was in 
more humble circumstances, he was now able to draw on a fund of goodwill. 35 It was an 
unexpected dividend, however, and in January 1737 Keene was expecting birth to prevail 
over merit, and thought that the Duke of Montemar was likely to become Minister of 
War, `and insensibly engross the other branches of the Government into his own hands' 36 
Another noble minister, ultimately squeezed out in the manoeuvring of these years, was 
the Marquis of Torrenueva. His sixty-five word full title alone does something to explain 
the delays of Spanish bureaucracy. 37 Due to the inexperience of the ministers, as much as 
any malice, Geraldino was for a while in 1737 sending reports direct to Torrenueva, 
32 PRO SP 94/133 (unfoliated) and BL Add Ms 32800, f. 14, Keene to Newcastle, 13 
January (NS) 1739; on Ustariz's power in appointments and favour, BL Add Ms 32801, 
if. 23-4, Keene to Newcastle, 9 June (NS) 1739. 
33 Lynch, Bourbon Spain, p. 66. 
3' BL Add Ms 32798, ff. 205-6, Keene to Newcastle, 7 July (NS) 1738. 
33 PRO SP 94/131(unfoliated), La Quadra to Keene, 22 July (NS) 1738. 
36 BL Add Ms 32794, f. 2, Keene to Newcastle, 14 January (NS) 1737. 
37 `Don Matheo Pablo Diaz de Labandero Marques de Torrenueva, Cavallero del Orden de 
Santiago, Veynte y quatro perpetuo dela Ciudad de Sevilla; Alguacil Mayor del tribunal 
dela Inquisicion dela misma Ciudad; Del Conselo de S. M. su secretario de Estado, y del 
Despacho delas Negoziaciones de Indias, Marina, y Hazienda; Superintendente general de 
Verotas generales, con el manejo, y distribucion de Caudales dela Dl. Hazienda'; BL Add 
Ms 33007, f. 109, a passport signed at Madrid, 21 May (NS) 1737. 
16 
which made the latter seem like the principal figure in the problems of the West Indies. 8 
The hierarchy did not seem to be entirely settled, and Keene continued to be wary in case 
the Spanish court should `take a sudden resolution to look out for brisker Jockeys to push 
on our Mule ). 39 
Changes at the lesser level of diplomatic representatives could also make a difference to 
the prospects of understanding between countries. Envoys abroad were the spokesmen 
and personal representatives of their own courts, men of considerable influence in those 
days of slow communications. As such their character, their standing and their contacts 
could be of vital importance. They also supplied regular news of all kinds from the courts 
where they were, and acted as the chief interpreters to their ministers at home of the 
country in which they were posted. And not only to their ministers, but to their 
sovereigns. Newcastle told Waldegrave; `Your Letters in your own Hand, I generally 
shew to our Master, who is mightily pleased with them, if you have any thing to write, 
which Nobody should see, enclose it in a bitt of Paper by itself . 
40 Their regular weekly 
letters were expected to be a better guide than the newspapers or published gazettes. 4' 
Many of them became highly acute interpreters of the court, and the capital, to which they 
were accredited. In general, though, they were not knowledgeable about the rest of the 
country in which they resided. The Dutch ambassador to England, Hop, was unusual in 
moving so far outside London as Norfolk, where the main thing that he saw was Sir 
Robert Walpole's magnificent Palladian house, Houghton Hall. 42 
Fortunately for Britain, the key post in Madrid was held by an ambassador of rare talent, 
Benjamin Keene, one of the few commoners to hold such a prestigious diplomatic post. 43 
38 BL Add Ms 32796, f 12-14, Keene to Newcastle, 14 October (NS) 1737; ibid, f. 115, 
Newcastle to Keene, 4 November (OS) 1737. 
39 BL Add Ms 32794, f. 169, Keene to Waldegrave, 11 March (NS) 1737. 
40 BL Add Ms 9176, f. 37, Newcastle to Waldegrave, 27 February (OS) 1740. 
41 Frederick William of Prussia reproved his envoy for offering to send him a regular 
Gazette, telling him that his own letters should make it unnecessary. Of course, for 
Frederick William, the three guineas per quarter subscription was a significant objection. 
PRO SP 107/23 (unfoliated), Frederick William to Andrie, 27 January (NS) 1739. 
42 PRO SP 107/31 (unfoliated), Hop to Fagel, 11 August (NS) 1739. 
43 P. Yorke, The Life and Correspondence of Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, Lord High 
Chancellor of Great Britain (1913; repr 1977), Vol 1, esp. chaps. X& XVIII; R. Lodge 
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It was always difficult to fill the important but dreary embassy in Madrid. In 1729 
Harrington had to be given a peerage to be enticed back there in order to conclude the 
Treaty' of Seville, and in the mid-1760s William Eden regularly referred to the Spanish 
posting as an `exile to that horrid Siberia'. " Though he was far more at ease in the 
language and ways of Spain than was usual among diplomats, Keene still felt the 
confinement of his landlocked court, with its difficult communications and stifling social 
etiquette. He needed to hear from his diplomatic correspondents, he said, `to keep me 
from turning a perfect mope'. 45 Whenever he could, a sympathetic Robert Trevor sent 
Keene books with which to solace his exile in his `inland inaccessible residence'. 46 As a 
commoner, however, and even though he was highly valued by Sir Robert Walpole, 
Keene could rely on few more tangible comforts. George II resolutely turned his face 
against advancement for him, and the coveted KB was given only in 1754, three years 
before his death. Despite the significance of his posting, Keene was not even given the 
status and emoluments of a full Ambassador. From 1734 to 1739 he served as Envoy 
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, the second diplomatic rank. 47 He begged in 1738 to be 
made Ambassador and Plenipotentiary, mainly for the sake of the extra money, and rested 
his case on equal pay for equal work; `His Majesty's Equity will engage Him to 
recompense his servants who are in the same Employments in an equal Manner'. 48 As 
George II had no such scruples, Keene served out his time in Madrid still conscious of 
being neglected and undervalued; `scarce a single word of pecuniary Comfort has been 
mentioned to me to support my Burden, so little is our Situation here either known or 
considered at Home'. 49 Despite his periodic forlorn complaints, Keene, with great skill, 
(ed), The Private Correspondence of Sir Benjamin Keene (1933); R. Lodge, `Sir 
Benjamin Keene, K. B.: A Study in Anglo-Spanish Relations in the Earlier Part of the 
Eighteenth Century', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4 ser., XV, 1932, pp. 
1-43. 
44 Horn, British Diplomatic Service, pp. 21,90,93. 
as BL Add Ms 32796, f. 272, Keene to Lord Tyrawly, 27 December (NS) 1737. 
46 BL Add Ms 32799, f. 329, Trevor to Keene, 18 December (NS) 1738. 
47 D. B. Horn, British Diplomatic Representatives 1689-1789, Camden 3 series Vol XLVI 
(1932), p. 134. 
48 PRO SP 94/131 (unfoliated), Keene to Newcastle, 13 October (NS) 1738. 
49 PRO SP 94/133 (unfoliated), Keene to Couraud, 9 June (NS) 1739. 
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served both Britain and the South Sea Company which the Spanish court so hated, 
without forfeiting the esteem of the Spanish monarchs. In 1749 he was greeted back by 
their Catholic Majesties like an old friend. " 
In Paris, Lord Waldegrave enjoyed for a time even sunnier favours. He stood well with 
George II, and with Fleury, through whom he enjoyed access to Louis XV. In one 
particularly striking incident, which Waldegrave did not fail to report, and gloss, to 
Newcastle, Louis singled him out at a hunt for special conversation, and made him a 
present of game, the first instance of its kind. 5' He was made a Knight of the Garter in 
February 173 8.52 Though Waldegrave undoubtedly was active in collecting and passing 
on news and intelligence, his letters do not give the same sense as Keene's of an active 
and skilled negotiator. Horace Walpole believed that most of Waldegrave's credit at his 
court arose from the fact that Fleury found him easy and tractable. 53 Certainly his 
usefulness to Britain fell away at a crucial time due to his increasing illness during 1740. 
In September, Newcastle was so worried that the ambassador's asthmatic condition might 
be affecting business that he had his secretary write to Waldegrave's secretary to ask him, 
in confidence, to supply any deficiencies. 54 Waldegrave returned to England soon 
afterwards and left behind him in Paris a deputy in Anthony Thompson who, whatever his 
skills, did not have, as he said himself, the length of purse and the level of social contacts 
to flesh out the ambassador's full range of duties. 55 
Horace Walpole himself was on excellent terms with the cardinal, having been a 
successful ambassador to Paris between 1724 and 1730. Even his enemy Hervey 
50 BL Add Ms 43441, if. 72-3, Keene to Castres, 20 February (NS) 1749. 
s' BL Add Ms 32796, f. 266, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 18 September (NS) 1737. 
32 Rumour had credited him before then with the senior order, of Knight Companion of the 
Bath; CUL Ch (H) Corresp 2706, Waldegrave to Sir Robert Walpole, 29 August (NS) 
1737. 
53 Fourteenth Report of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts (1895), 
Manuscripts of the Earl of Buckinghamshire et al (Trevor Mss), p. 28, H. Walpole to 
Trevor, 17 April (OS) 1739. 
5' PRO SP 78/224, f. 62, Stone to Thompson, 15 September (OS) 1740. 
55 PRO SP 78/224, f. 93, Thompson to Stone, 5 (October NS) 1740; Keene to Castres, 15 
November (OS) 1740, f. 9. 
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conceded that; `in France it must be owned, by the interest he had in the Cardinal, he did 
England service'. 36 He was clearly more bustling, and less emollient, than Waldegrave in 
his embassy at The Hague from 1734 to 1739. He was also somewhat slovenly in his 
appearance, outspoken to a fault, and without the breeding and rank which would 
normally accompany his post as ambassador. Hervey's picture is a satire, not a portrait, 
yet he could hardly have written as he did if Horace were a model - or even a normal - 
diplomat: 
He was a very disagreeable man in company, noisy, overbearing, affecting to 
be always jocose, and thoroughly the mauvais plaisant; as unbred in his 
dialect as in his apparel, and as ill bred in his discourse as in his behaviour and 
gestures; with no more of the look than the habits of a gentleman. 57 
Horace did not succeed in persuading the States General to take a vigorous stand over the 
depredations issue, and to support Britain, but it must be doubted if any mere ambassador 
could have coaxed that divided body out of its lucrative neutrality. As Trevor commented, 
`no News, nor Events seem capable of making this People mend their pace'. 58 All 
observers agreed that he was likely to achieve little, however noisily he strove for 
action. 59 `M. Horace Walpole se donne bien du mouvement en Hollande, mais on croit 
generalement que ses efforts n'aboutiront pas a grande chose. '60 It is a comment that 
might unkindly be applied to the rest of his work as a diplomat. Certainly he wrote 
voluminously on the state of affairs in Europe and was an assiduous correspondent. He 
seems to have viewed himself almost as equivalent to a Secretary of State, using his post 
at The Hague to review and question decisions and to peer very closely into the business 
of all the leading British representatives at foreign courts. All foreign envoys kept in touch 
with one another, but Horace added a dimension of authority which only his relationship 
56 R. Sedgwick (ed) John, Lord Hervey. Some Materials towards Memoirs of the Reign of 
King George 11(1931), Vol 1, p. 284. 
S' Hervey, Memoirs, Vol 1, p. 285. An example of his causing offence by striving 
unreasonably for precedence in ceremonial matters is in BL Add Ms 32796, f. 251, 
Waldegrave to Newcastle, 16 December (NS)1737. 
s$ BL Add Ms 32801, f. 8, Trevor to Keene, 4 June (NS) 1739. 
59 `Je doute qu'il y fasse autant de besogne que de bruit', commented one diplomat; CUL Ch 
(H) Corresp, 2885, la Ville to Chavigny, 23 June (NS) 1739. 
60 PRO SP 107/27 (unfoliated), Gastaldi to Prince Cantemir, 13 July (NS) 1739. 
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to Sir Robert could have warranted 61 He certainly used his visits to England and his 
frequent correspondence to offer advice on foreign policy, even in detail. 62 Horace was 
active in diplomacy and in the foreign policy discussions of the inner cabinet, and in that 
sense he was one of the welter of influences which bore upon the ministry in these years. 
But, while the course of negotiation with Spain would have been very much harder 
without Keene in Madrid, it is not clear that things would have been very different had 
someone else filled the posts at The Hague and Paris. 
The Spanish envoys could also be vital to the harmony between the two nations. The 
Spanish diplomatic network was weaker than that of other large powers. Representation 
abroad was slowly built up under Philip from only ten embassies in 1715 to fourteen by 
1737.63 The choice of these diplomats charged with reviving Spain's influence was shaped 
above all by the ambitions for her sons of Queen Elizabeth. She favoured representatives 
who would push forward her Italian schemes, which explains why of the diplomatic 
representatives appointed by Philip V, over half were foreign: four Jacobites, two 
Dutchmen, one Fleming and fifteen Italians, three of them from the Queen's own land of 
Parma. ' Diplomatic training, as elsewhere in Europe, was minimal, and the post of 
ambassador was usually either the final honour for a nobleman at the end of his service to 
the crown, or a stage in a varied career of military and administrative service. Despite 
these factors, the general standard of Spain's diplomatic representation has been judged to 
have been better in Philip's reign than in the later century, and at least comparable to that 
of contemporary European powers. 65 In June 1737 the Spanish ambassador in London, 
the Count of Montijo, was made President of the Council of the Indies, a post in which he 
could be expected to have an influence on the colonial disputes between Britain and 
Spain. In July Montijo left England, to the regret of Newcastle and the King. " His insider 
61 E. g. BL Add Ms 32795, if. 190,246-7,361-2, H. Walpole to Keene, 1 August, 2& 26 
September (NS) 1737. 
62 E. g. his advice on the instructions to be given to Waldegrave, approved by the Lord 
Chancellor; BL Add Ms 32797, f. 204, Hardwicke to Newcastle, 22 March (OS) 1737. 
63 Ozanam, `La Diplomacia de los Primeros Borbones', p. 178. 
64 Ibid., pp. 182-3. 
65 Ibid., pp. 183-4. 
66 The formal correspondence between Montijo and Newcastle, and George II's letter on the 
occasion to Felipe V, are in BL Add Ms 32795, f 182-187. 
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knowledge of London politics was useful to Spain, allowing him to interpret to his court 
the nature of political rivalries within the ministry. "' But it was of possible use to Britain 
too to have him in a position to influence policy. He was seen to be broadly in favour of 
an accommodation and a friend to Britain, though on the other hand he was believed to 
have grievances against the South Sea Company. "' Montijo's successor in London was 
Thomas Fitzgerald, an Irishman in the Spanish service, usually known as Don Tomas 
Geraldino. For months before Montijo's eventual departure, Geraldino had been the 
successor favoured by the British court. Keene banked on Geraldino's `more plain and 
solid way of thinking', contrasting him with the protege of Patiro and Torrenueva, Don 
Joseph Quintana, `the most abstract and metaphysical negotiator upon matters of 
Commerce that can be imagined'. 69 
Quintana had been, with the later Marquess of Torrenueva, appointed under the Treaty of 
Seville as a commissioner for settling British merchant claims against Spain. 70 Keene, who 
with Arthur Stert and John Goddard, was one of the British commissioners then, had 
ample experience of Quintana's style of negotiation. The two men met later as the 
plenipotentiaries charged with implementing the Convention of Pardo. At the critical 
juncture of March 1739 Quintana was drawn away from this work to replace Torrenueva 
as Secretary of the Indies. The breakdown of Anglo-Spanish relations must have owed 
something to this individual, of whom Keene said; `a more difficult, tenacious disputant 
never was met with, starting and stumbling at the most trivial Punctillios imaginable' 7' 
Contemporaries were well aware of the need to have the most helpful individuals in 
positions of influence. Queen Caroline urged Keene to manage and humour Montemar, 
while wishing for the predominance of la Quadra. She believed, though, that nothing 
would do more to promote good relations between the two crowns `than the fixing Don 
67 On his double influence as minister and ex-ambassador, BL Add Ms 32797, f. 332, Keene 
to Newcastle, 7 May (NS) 1738; his knowledge of the ministry is evident in his August 
1738 comments on the war hawks in the inner cabinet, W. Coxe, Memoirs of the Life and 
Administration of Sir Robert Walpole Earl of Orford (1798), III, p. 509. 
68 BL Add Ms 32795, if. 94-5, Keene to Newcastle, 17 June (NS) 1737. 
69 BL Add Ms 32794, f. 284, Keene to Newcastle, 7 April (NS) 1737. 
70 D. C. Seco Serrano (ed), Memorias Politicas y Militares para servir de Continuacion a 
los 'Comentarios' del Marques de San Felipe (1957), pp. 480-1. 
71 BL Add Ms 32800, f. 174, Keene to Newcastle, 9 March (NS) 1739. 
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Thomas Geraldino here', a belief endorsed by both Newcastle and Walpole. 72 Effective 
diplomatic representation could make a big difference to the day-to-day workings of 
international relations. In contrast to the shrewd and sociable Geraldino, the Spanish 
envoy to France, the Marquess de la Mina, `behaves like a true Spaniard, is liked by 
nobody, and lives alone', regarded by his fellow diplomats as `a queer one'. 73 One of la 
Mina's few active moves was to involve himself in the cabals trying to restore Chauvelin 
to power. Waldegrave believed this meddling would `certainly never be forgot nor 
forgiven', and for several years Cardinal Fleury was less obliging towards Spain than he 
might have been with a more agreeable ambassador fixed in Paris. 74 
Foreign envoys breathed a hothouse air, engaged in formal intercourse, levees and boring 
attendance in antechambers for large parts of the week, dining and gossiping, then 
plunging into furious correspondence on post days. 75 Intrigue and suspicion were natural 
in such a world. When a casket of private papers belonging to the French ambassador in 
Madrid, de Vaulgrenant, went missing, rumour credited Keene with a coup. When the 
theft was brought home to the French embassy laundress, the printed gazettes simply 
made her Keene's accomplice. 76 A few months later Vaulgrenant had to leave Spain under 
a cloud, having been caught rifling through papers left by their Catholic Majesties in an 
" antechamber. That a nobleman of long diplomatic experience could take such a risk 
highlights the prevailing belief that even small scraps of information could be vital. This 
explains the very considerable resources devoted to producing ciphers for safe 
communication, and conversely to the interception and deciphering of diplomatic 
n PRO SP 94/129 (unfoliated), Newcastle to Keene, 13 January (OS) 1737; PRO SP 
98/129 (unfoliated), same to same, 3 March (OS) 1737. 
73 BL Add Ms 32794, f. 234, Waldegrave to Keene, 2 April (NS) 1737; BL Add Ms 32795, 
f. 399, same to same, 7 October (NS) 1737. 
74 BL Add Ms 32802, f. 8, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 21 January (NS) 1740. 
's A full picture of the life is given in D. B. Horn, The British Diplomatic Service, 1689- 
1789 (1961); a fascinating study of the preceding age, much of it applicable to these 
years, is W. J. Roosen, The Age of Louis XIV The Rise of Modern Diplomacy (1976); 
several valuable chapters can be found in R. Hatton & M. S. Anderson (eds), Studies in 
Diplomatic History (1970); J. M. Black, The Rise of the European Powers 1679-1793 
(1990), section 5, is an incisive survey. 
76 BL Add Ms 32794, f. 170, Keene to Trevor, 11 March (NS) 1737. 
77 BL Add Ms 32797, if. 95-6, Keene to Newcastle, 24 February (NS) 1738. 
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correspondence. British ministers saw many of the letters which passed to and from 
almost every foreign envoy in London. The bulky volumes which survive in the Public 
Record Office and the more partial survivals in Sir Robert Walpole's papers in Cambridge 
University Library reveal just how successful Britain was in this activity. No doubt this 
stemmed from the zeal with which Walpole spent money on tracing the movements and 
plans of the Jacobites at home and abroad . 
79 When Spain began to arm in February 1737, 
for example, Walpole at once had to know whether this was in support of the Pretender. 
On the fall of Chauvelin, who had intrigued with the agents of `James III', Waldegrave 
was urged to use the Cardinal's revulsion for his rival to discover more about the Jacobite 
schemes. When Sir William Wyndham merely met Bolingbroke at Amiens, the fullest 
information was at once demanded from French informants. 79 Some English Jacobites 
explained the despondency and inaction of their fellows by the `violence of George II and 
the vigilance of Walpole'. 8° 
The Hanoverian regime enjoyed a substantial advantage in the skilled system of 
intelligence gathering in Hanover itself, a combination which gave Britain formidable 
advantages. 81 Hanover benefitted from lying on the main mail routes through northern 
Europe, the letter interception services at Celle and Nienburg being particularly fruitfu1.82 
78 P. Fritz, The English Ministers and Jacobitism between the Rebellions of 1715 and 1745 
(1975), despite the dates in its title, deals with an earlier period but offers a valuable 
survey. The diplomatic correspondence of the period is full of references to Jacobite 
activity and the movements of the leading personnel. See, e. g., the eagerness to obtain 
details of the movements of the Chevalier and the subsequent cabinet discussion of various 
intelligence reports in: BL Add Ms 32802, f. 25, Newcastle to Waldegrave, 22 January 
(OS) 1740; BL Add Ms 33004, if. 25-26, Cabinet minutes, 24 January (OS) 1740. 
Waldegrave constantly pursued Jacobite information in Paris, e. g.: BL Add Ms 32798, f. 
72, Waldegrave to Andrew Stone, 31 May (NS) 1738; 1bid if. 95-100, Waldegrave to 
Newcastle, 3 June (NS) 1738. 
79 BL Add Ms 32794, f. 105, Waldegrave to Keene, 5 February (NS) 1737; Ibid, f. 139, 
Keene to Waldegrave, 18 February (NS) 1737; Ibid, if. 236-37, Newcastle to 
Waldegrave, 24 March (NS) 1737; BL Add Ms 32796, f. 330, same to same, 30 
December (OS) 1737. 
80 Windsor RA Stuart Mss 222/33, Sempill to James III, 2 May (OS) 1740. 
81 K. Ellis, `The Administrative Connections between Britain and Hanover', Journal of the 
Society ofArchivists III, 1969, pp. 556-66. 
82 U. Dann, `Hanover and Great Britain 1740-1760', unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Oxford 
1980, p. 5. 
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The decryption of intercepted and ciphered correspondence (in several languages) was 
organised under the aegis of the Secret Office of the Post Office. At the time with which 
this study deals, there was a team of four decipherers, with varying lengths of service. The 
junior three were Anthony Corbiere (from 1719), John Lampe (from 1729) and Philip 
Zolman, German translator (from 1735). They were led by the extraordinarily successful 
Rev. Edward Willes, engaged in the office from 1716 to his death in 1773, and whose 
special services earned him in 1743 the Bishopric of Bath and Wells. The Deciphering 
Branch was an almost perfect example of how successful eighteenth-century nepotism 
could be. Willes converted his department into a family business, bringing in three of his 
sons, who in turn brought in three nephews. When the branch was abolished in 1844, it 
was two members of the Willes family who were made redundant. 83 Despite the small 
staff, and the necessarily limited time which they had to open, copy, decipher and translate 
a great volume of letters, there are comparatively few examples of failure to crack a code, 
or even of any significant delay. 84 
This expertise was important in a world in which all powers were assumed to open 
diplomatic mails. The Hessian envoy in London dared not trust the mails entering 
Sweden, though no doubt he imagined (wrongly) that his letters would at least leave 
England unopened. 83 Frederick William of Prussia had his London envoy send his 
accounts, not to the court, but under cover to a merchant, Splitgerber, a subterfuge which 
does not seem to have given the Secret Office any trouble. 86 Diplomats did what they 
could to help in this secret traffic. Keene in 1738 sent, by messenger Moss, copies and 
translations of two original letters, both in figures and deciphered; `they may possibly 
serve to discover the Spanish Cypher'. 87 The vigilance of the Walpole government as to 
83 K. Ellis, The Post Office in the Eighteenth century. A Study in Administrative History 
(1958), pp. 67,128-31. 
84 Some parts of one Portuguese cipher could not be made out: PRO SP 107/21 (unfoliated), 
Guedes to Azevedo, 11 January (NS) 1738; a very showy Spanish cipher was discovered 
at once; PRO SP 107/22 (unfoliated), Geraldino to la Mina, 19 May (NS) 1738; a new 
Prussian cipher was marked `not yet discover'd' in PRO SP 107/25 (unfoliated), Andrie 
to King of Prussia, 13 March (NS) 1739. 
85 PRO SP 107/32 (unfoliated), Alt to Calokhoff, 21 August (OS) 1739. 
86 PRO SP 107/24 (unfoliated), King of Prussia to Andrie, 3 February (NS) 1739. 
87 BL Add Ms 32798, f. 256, Keene to Newcastle, 2 August (NS) 1738. 
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Jacobitism made it doubly important for the Pretender to employ secure agents, 
messengers and codes. He told his agent in Paris; `As to the Cipher, I am glad you find 
that of Lord Marischals in good order. It is a short, but pretty good, one, so let us, if you 
please, make use of it for the time coming'. 88 The French diplomatic service took care to 
give each overseas envoy his own cipher, and sometimes several, which limited the 
damage done by any successful code-breaking, but could make communications 
confusing. 89 The British service seems to have relied heavily on the 1734 cipher, a 
sophisticated numeral code. It consisted of eight large folio sheets, four of an alphabetical 
word list with numeral equivalents, and four of a numeral list giving words, for the 
purposes of encoding and decoding. Together with blank numbers ('nulls') to be inserted 
randomly, certain numbers which abridged preceding words, and other devices to increase 
its unpredictability, it made a secure code which does not appear to have been broken by 
other powers. 90 
British diplomacy enjoyed a double advantage, then, in having secure communications and 
excellent decipherment services. There was no doubt a droll pleasure to be gained from 
the transcription en clair of so many letters whose authors were congratulating 
themselves on the security of their ciphers. Frederick William told Andrie in a letter, duly 
deciphered, of June 1739 that he need no longer send his letters under cover to 
merchants, but could use `vos chiffres, qui sont assez bons pour qu'on n'en aye pas a 
craindre le dechiffrement sans clef'. 91 The clerk deciphering this message must have 
88 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 206/15, James III to Kelly, 10 April (NS) 1738. 
89 When the French discovered that the British had cracked one cipher, it was promptly 
changed; BL Add Ms 32802, f. 209, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 30 October (NS) 1740. 
But when a French representative at The Hague wished to use one of his several ciphers, 
he had first to write asking to be sent the first numbers of one of them, to show him which 
he should employ; PRO SP 107/21 (unfoliated), De la Ville to Cambis, 4 April (NS) 
1738. 
90 The printed version of this foreign office cipher which was given to Horace Walpole 
survives in a loose-bound volume in the Wolterton papers, and was circulated to all the 
eleven key ambassadors in that year. When Waldegrave was ordered in 1740 to liaise with 
Admiral Norris over the crucial question of French fleet movements he had an extra copy 
of the 1734 cipher sent to him by messenger; BL Add Ms 32802, f. 162, Newcastle to 
Waldegrave, 15 July (OS) 1740, to be opened by self. For other similar cipher systems, 
see BL Add Ms 9082, Coxe Papers, V, ff. 1-42. 
91 PRO SP 107/28 (unfoliated), King of Prussia to Andrie, 9 June (NS) 1739. 
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enjoyed the task. More solid advantages than this amusement were certainly gained from 
decipherment. In late September 1739, on the eve of war, and when it was critical to 
know whether or not France really intended to enter hostilities on behalf of Spain, the 
French envoy's letters were a vital source of reassurance. Cambis flattered himself in one 
intercepted letter with the idea that his whole conduct since arriving in Britain was giving 
the ministers there a false impression of French readiness for war. He concluded, as if 
expressly for the pleasure of Willes and his team, with urging Fenelon to imitate him in 
using a safe cipher for all such sensitive information. 92 In 1742, intercepts of Swedish 
material provided valuable economic and diplomatic intelligence, at a time when Sweden 
might have joined with France in the war. 93 
The use of direct informants, it was believed, could confer crucial advantages. Occasional 
chance sources appeared, some of them rather dubious. Limpus, a mail robber imprisoned 
in Calais in July 1738, sought escape from his troubles by offering to reveal to the French 
the methods of British letter-opening. 94 Of the intelligence which poured upon ministers in 
all countries, only a little could be entirely discounted, but that of the criminals and the 
cranks could most safely be ignored. It is unlikely for example that Admiral Wager took 
much trouble over the document marked `prophecy', which warned in August 1738 of an 
invasion by `three Potent Princes' through Milford Haven, and a battle in Delamere 
Forest. 95 What ministers wanted was perhaps more banal but certainly more reliable 
everyday information. To get it, all European governments probably tried to suborn 
informants within rival courts. In February 1738 the French ambassador at St. James's 
began to cultivate a young man who could provide useful information. 97 Later that year 
Horace Walpole managed to recruit a spy in the camp of the Pretender in Rome. A cipher 
was supplied to him, and elaborate arrangements made with families in Amsterdam, 
92 PRO SP 107/32 (unfoliated), Cambis to Fenelon, 22 September (NS) 1739. 
93 E. g. BL Add Ms 22,539, if. 1-15, Gyllenborg to Wasenberg, 27 April (NS) 1742, 
Laumary to Amelot, 4 May (NS) 1742, de Tessin to de Wasenberg, 19 May (NS) 1742. 
94 PRO SP 78/218, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 29 July (NS) 1738. 
'S BL Add Ms 19030, f. 376. 
96 The subject is rather dismissively treated in D. B. Horn, The British Diplomatic Service 
1689-1789 (1961), chap XIV. 
91 PRO SP 107/21 (unfoliated), Amelot to Cambis, 19 February (NS) 1738. 
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Rotterdam and Leyden who would receive letters ostensibly about commerce, with the 
real information concealed in the enciphered passages. 98 This was a friend of the 
Pretender's family, but such informants were not normally of any very high standing. They 
seem usually to have been drawn from the ranks of the indispensable clerks, copyists and 
minor officials who generally lacked the social rank necessary to climb higher in 
government service. 9 Such men performed prodigious labours of translation and 
transcription, and could accumulate a considerable knowledge of the workings of policy 
at their courts. Their work was as tedious as it was underpaid; `perhaps the sole 
profession in the world which is so dull', was the plaintive summary of one French 
bureaucrat. 1°° Not surprisingly, some could be found who would use their daily 
paperwork as a source of income. 
Regular informants were what was sought, even if they might have little to offer other 
than rumour or reports of the health and temper of important people. Officials at court, in 
however humble a station, had chances also to hear gossip or indiscreet discussions which 
might be of service to foreign powers, and the cosmopolitan nature of courts increased 
such opportunities. In 1739 the Swiss-born Prussian envoy in London, Andrie, cultivated 
a compatriot, George II's valet de chambre De la Chaux. The valet used his best address 
to win information and opinions from the King, though the work of the Deciphering 
Branch put his master on the alert from the outset. "' Mixed national and religious 
loyalties no doubt explained in a similar way the act of the courier, employed by 
Waldegrave, who supplied at least one letter to the agents of the Pretender. 102 In Catholic 
courts especially, priests had opportunities to observe and deduce which could tempt 
them to profit from their knowledge, or simply to gossip. In December 1738, Waldegrave 
98 HMC, Fourteenth Report (Trevor Mss), pp. 20,21,22, H. Walpole to Trevor, 25 July, 8 
& 11 August (OS) 1738. 
99 E. g. Guyot in Paris, and the many minor `friends' mentioned by British diplomats: BL 
Add Ms 32801, if. 356-8, Newcastle to Waldegrave, December 27 (OS) 1739. 
10° Quoted in D. C. Baxter, `Pension Expectations of the French Military Commis', in 
Adapting to Conditions. War and Society in the Eighteenth century ed. M. Ultee 
(Alabama 1986), p. 131. 
101 PRO SP 107/25 (unfoliated), Andrie to King of Prussia, 16 March (OS) 1739; PRO SP 
107/32 (unfoliated), King to Andrie, 5 September (NS) 1739. 
102 Windsor RA Stuart Mss 208/72, George Robinson to James III, 13 July (OS) 1738. 
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got news of the proposed French-Spanish double marriage from an indiscretion of the 
Jesuit confessor to the Marchioness de la Mina, wife of the Spanish ambassador in Paris. 
He told the news to the Countess of Corzana, who told it to a Sicilian abbe who happened 
to be one of the British ambassador's leading persons of confidence. 103 The Sicilian (or 
the younger abbe, for there were two of them in his pay, Caracciolo and Platania) had 
been banned from Spain by Queen Elizabeth, and was a good example of the expatriate 
who needed to make a living for himself where he could. Don Jose Caracciolo was a 
native of Palermo, and despite laying claim to a cousin who was a Sicilian baron and later 
Senator, he did not have enough influence on his side to be sure of a comfortable career. 
In return for long service to Waldegrave and to Horace Walpole (as well as to various 
French ministers) he hoped for the exertion of their influence in his old age, to find him an 
abbey or a sinecure. 104 Meanwhile he earned his relatively modest allowance of 300 Louis 
d'or a year by giving intelligence from both France and Spain, where he still had 
numerous contacts. los 
The abbe was not betraying his own country, or strictly spying, but was providing 
information and evaluations of diplomacy (some of them exceptionally acute) for an 
influential friend who rewarded him with a pension. This behaviour was within the norms 
of relationships of patronage at the time. Black has argued that developing links with such 
courtiers, ministers and diplomats was a valuable way of obtaining information. Such 
personal ties need not involve simply a cynical sale of information: `Sometimes these 
"agents of influence" were rewarded financially, but in general they cannot be regarded as 
spies gained by bribery'. 106 Since the world of diplomacy was made up of relatively small 
groups of educated men, of similar rank or at least background, and without formal 
professional training, it is not surprising that they often indulged in very free conversation, 
or that they sometimes entered into financial arrangements for providing information more 
103 PRO SP 78/219, if. 280-86, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 24 December (NS) 1738. 
104 See the sequence of Caracciolo's letters to Horace Walpole in the Wolterton (Walpole) 
Mss, 29 June (NS) 1754 to 19 April (NS) 1755. 
105 See, e. g. PRO SP 78/221, f. 252, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 9 November (NS) 1739; 
PRO SP 78/222, if. 3-5, same to same, 13 January (NS) 1740; PRO SP 78/227A, f. 126, 
Thompson to Newcastle, 2 May (NS) 1742. 
106 J. M. Black, `British Intelligence and the Mid-Eighteenth century Crisis', Intelligence and 
National Security 2,1987, p. 221. 
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systematically. This gossipping class of people could be rendered more discreet. Keene 
lamented that under la Quadra's uncommunicative regime despatches from England were 
known to none of his friends, `though in Mr. Patiflo's time I should have already had an 
account of it from half his acquaintance'. 107 Full discretion, though, could be maintained 
only by special efforts, such as those of the obsessively secretive Frederick II of Prussia, 
or of the wary Fleury. The Cardinal seems to have assured the secrecy of his court, and 
kept in touch with political intrigues at home, by employing numerous spies, `who keep 
every body much upon the Reserve'. '08 
Despite this watchfulness, the French court could be penetrated. From 1735 Britain paid 
handsomely for the services of a quite senior insider in the French ministry, a premier 
commis in the foreign office, Francois Bussy. Waldegrave in 1735 had gained the services 
of Bussy, a vain man with expensive tastes, to pass on intelligence under the code name 
101.109 This was espionage in the grand manner, with `document drops', secret 
assignations, false diplomatic instructions given to preserve 101's `cover', and messages 
smuggled in snuffboxes. "" Bussy was rapacious, and exploited his position cleverly. In a 
note typical of many, Waldegrave commented; `My Friend is very craving, and pretends 
to be more apprehensive than ever of being found out; but as the Quarter Day 
approaches, he takes Courage'. "' He knew how to use crises as levers with which to 
prise open the coffers of Walpole's secret service funds. Early in 1739, with an impending 
Franco-Spanish marriage compact and treaty under discussion, he would say nothing 
without a gratification of 50,000 livres (£2,300), and in August 1741 he was given a 
107 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 201, Keene to Newcastle, 31 March (NS) 1738. 
108 PRO SP 78/219, f. 117, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 8 October (NS) 1738. 
109 BL Add Ms 32788, if. 241-2, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 2 August (NS) 1735. 
Waldegrave promised not to write down Bussy's name, even in cipher; ibid. f. 359, same 
to same, August 27 (NS) 1735; see also comment on Bussy in BL Add Ms 32799, f. 15, 
same to same, 20 August (NS) 1738. Full details of 101's service and exorbitant 
payments can be found in BL Add Ms 32802, if. 155-6, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 7 July 
(NS) 1740. 
10 BL Add Ms 32798, if. 29-30, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 24 May (NS) 1738; BL Add Ms 
32800, f. 362, Newcastle to Waldegrave, 8 May (OS) 1739; PRO SP 36/56, if. 109-10, 
Newcastle to Harrington, 12 June (OS) 1741; BL Add Ms 32802, f. 245, Newcastle to 
Thompson, 13 August (OS) 1741. 
III BL Add Ms 32798, f. 235, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 1 August (NS) 1738. 
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gratuity of £1,000 for news of French military dispositions, designs on Hanover and 
intentions in support of the Bavarian candidate for the Austrian Empire. He seems fully to 
have deserved Waldegrave's exasperated comment; `surely there is not a more brazen- 
faced wretch'. 112 He was also often unreliable - his leaks of dubious information grew 
noticeably towards his payment days - and his reports were scrutinised very closely. In 
April 1737 he gave Walpole the project of a definitive treaty between France and Austria, 
which he claimed had come to him from Vienna after his arrival in England. Newcastle 
was convinced that no courier could have reached him without the ministry's knowledge, 
which increased mistrust of his news. 113 In September, George II directed Walpole `to say 
a word or two, to 101, upon the ridiculous Account, He sent, relating to Govr. Mathew; 
for which there is not the least Foundation'. "4 Despite these weaknesses, and the need to 
check his information against that supplied by lesser agents in the French service, Bussy 
did give a kind of security and confidence to English councils with regard to France. 
In Madrid, Keene did his best to recruit informants who could give him early insights into 
the thinking of the court, and especially any developments in the Bourbon alliance of 
France and Spain. One such `private friend' received a monthly pension amounting to 
£600 a year, half as much again as the salary of a Regius Professor of modern history in 
that year. '15 Keene's `particular friend', a recently promoted clerk whose department dealt 
with the Empire, was paid a similar sum in return for details of letters passing between 
Spain and Vienna. 116 Despite these large payments, Keene was taken completely by 
surprise in early 1738 when Waldegrave's spies in Paris first discovered a treaty of 
marriage between Don Carlos and the King of Poland's eldest daughter. Rather lamely, he 
had to fall back on the credit of his having known that a Princess of Saxony was on the 
list of possible brides, when only four people in the whole Spanish court knew this. 117 This 
112 BL Add Ms 32800, if. 53-54,112-15, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 29 January (NS) 1739, 
Newcastle to Waldegrave, 1 February (OS) 1739. 
113 BL Add Ms 32794, f. 296, Newcastle to Waldegrave, 1 April (OS) 1737. 
114 BL Add Ms 32795, f. 280, Newcastle to Waldegrave, 12 September (OS) 1737. 
"s W. A. Shaw (ed), Calendar of Treasury Books and Papers, 1735-1738 (1900), p. 581. 
116 BL Add Ms 32794, f. 285, Keene to Newcastle, 6 April (NS) 1737. 
117 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 12, Newcastle to Keene, 7 January (OS) 1738; ibid, f. 95, Keene to 
Newcastle, 24 February (NS) 1737. 
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may have been insider knowledge, but it was hardly very useful. Much of what such spies 
provided was either unreliable or unimportant. Keene consoled Waldegrave when two of 
his minor informants in Spain were arrested; `if you knew these sources of Intelligence as 
well as I do, you would not look upon the loss of them to be very considerable'. "' There 
were occasions when spies gave satisfaction, though possibly never in proportion to their 
cost. In August 1737, Keene managed to obtain the secret instructions being sent to la 
Mina in Paris about the then current negotiations for a new general treaty. It was certainly 
useful to be privy to la Mina's letter bag, and to know what were Spain's real intentions 
behind the public screen of diplomacy. 119 When orders were sent to the Council of the 
Indies in May 1738, Keene saw them before Montijo himself. In the same month, a new 
informant offered to reveal the name of the `person of confidence' in England who was 
passing on information to the Spaniards. 120 More useful still, at the outbreak of the war 
with Spain, 101 was able to lay open a plan by Maurepas to enter into correspondence 
with various opposition leaders in Britain. The agent was M. Silhouette, an India 
Company merchant provided with a cipher for his correspondence with Maurepas, and 
with letters of introduction to Bathurst, Pulteney and Wyndham. 121 
Whether or not informers gave value for money, diplomats could hardly avoid cultivating 
them. It is difficult however to see the constant recourse to espionage as more than a very 
expensive form of insurance against being taken by surprise. Though Walpole placed a 
value upon the intelligence from Madrid, Waldegrave was sceptical: 
I have been acquainted with the Friends and their Intelligences for some 
years, but I have not yet been able to find out any great advantage from them: 
I know some People think otherwise, but this is still entre nous. 1 
"$ BL Add Ms 32795, f. 259, Keene to Waldegrave, 16 September (NS) 1737. 
19 In this case, Spain intended not to be a contracting party, but was willing to come into 
such an agreement later: `Su Majestad respondio que no entendia entrar en este Tratado, 
como pane contractante, pero que estaba pronto a hacerlo como adherente. ' BL Add Ms 
32795, f. 213, Keene to Newcastle, 12 August (NS) 1737. 
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Some months into the war with Spain, the great issue of national security was whether or 
not France would soon join the war. At such a time, any intelligence was eagerly sought. 
Horace Walpole was getting letters from a French informant, the value of which he could 
not judge, but he was willing to risk paying too much for them; `I am not for grudging a 
little money for the meanest intelligence at this juncture'. '23 As to the use of active spies, 
working in the field, this seems to have been a last resort, and more usually employed in 
wartime. They were always less likely than people who lived and worked on the spot to 
be able to furnish information of any value in diplomacy. A merchant seaman or roving 
agent might be able to count warships at anchor or estimate troop numbers. The French 
used their fishing fleets to reconnoitre and sound Torbay and sent ships scouting for 
information in Western Scotland, as well as sounding the Clyde. 124 Travellers and 
merchants provided such intelligence as came their way, none more smartly than the 
patriotic Birmingham chapman who overheard treason being talked in Brussels, and 
purloined the papers of those concerned while they were drunk. 125 The diplomatic 
couriers were well placed to give such information, travelling huge distances and enjoying 
diplomatic protection. King's Messenger Dryver discreetly used a telescope in late 1740 
to spy out French naval preparations in the channel ports. 126 
But more sophisticated information could rarely be gained by these means. Reports from 
agents on the spot and with time and money to spend were required. Of course, this was 
all the more necessary in the case of Spain, where normal diplomatic channels no longer 
operated after the outbreak of war. In June 1740 Newcastle was furious at having been 
caught out by the unexpected sailing of the Cadiz fleet. Desperate for full intelligence of 
Spanish naval movements, he chivvied Waldegrave to get it: 
For Godsake, think of some Method of knowing immediately, whenever they 
stir. Could not you have some French, Italian, Portugal, or Spanish Spy, in 
'23 HMC Fourteenth Report, Trevor Mss, p. 38, H. Walpole to Trevor, 11 January (OS) 
1740. 
124 BL Add Ms 32692, if. 106-7, A. Fortye to Newcastle, 3 July (OS) 1739; Informations of 
July 1739 in CUL Ch (H) Corresp, 2902,2903,2905. 
'u HMC, Fourteenth Report (Trevor Mss), pp. 75-76, Trevor to Walpole, 22 August (NS) 
1741. 
126 PRO SP 78/224, f. 88, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 4 October (NS) 1740. 
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every Spanish Port, where they have any Ships. Money will do any Thing with 
those Nations, and it must not be spared upon this Occasion. 127 
More directly, ministers could send spies of their own abroad. On the first outbreak of 
war, various agents were procured. At the simplest level, though very effective, was 
sending a man among the sailors' wives at Calais, to discover whether their husbands 
expected to be sent home and the fleet stood down. 128 Waldegrave sent a spy to St. Malo, 
at 200 louis d'or including expenses, and despatched a M. Desgoutes, described as a very 
clever man, well known to Thomas Pelham, to Toulon for three or four months at 300 
louis d'or plus whatever gratification he might earn in this more hazardous venture. 129 In 
the following summer, Waldegrave at last found a suitable person to be established in 
Bayonne and correspond from there. On his way, he was to spy into San Sebastian, 
Bilbao and all along the coast of Galicia to Ferrol. Recommended to the ambassador by a 
wealthy Protestant merchant in Paris, the agent was the brother of a considerable banker 
in Paris, and would use the `cover' of trade. His payment would be 50 Louis d'or a month, 
with 200 in advance. The money was drawn, `at two usances as usual', on Walpole, 
through whom this secret service money always came. 130 In the same month Admiral 
Wager sent Captain Thomas Cole into France, via Guernsey, on a reconnaissance mission 
to check the French fleet in Rochelle, Brest, Port Louis and L'Orient. He was then to spy 
out the Spanish naval ports, and Wager was confident that he would provide better 
information than that provided by the consuls in Portugal. 131 Cole was a specially trusted 
agent, though, who had been sent into France and Spain in the previous summer to 
estimate the size and location of their forces and was sent to spy in Ferrol the following 
year. 132 Not everyone, perhaps, shared Wager's confidence in Cole. The Hardwicke copy 
of his report is endorsed by that knowledgeable antiquarian, the second Lord Hardwicke; 
127 PRO SP 78/223, f. 112, Newcastle to Waldegrave, 12 June (OS) 1740. 
128 PRO SP 36/50, f. 333, Richard Hall to Andrew Stone, 20 April (OS) 1740. 
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131 BL Add Ms 19030, if. 463-65, Wager to Dobree, 16 October (OS) 1739. 
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Ms 28133, f 13-14, Norris Journal, 18 June (OS) 1740. 
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`I believe this paper to be of no better authority than Captain Cole's, a notorious spy and 
Picarot. He got a livelihood at last by being agent for bills in Parliament. ' 133 
Other picarots put themselves forward when war loosened the purse strings. Henry 
Colpoys offered himself for hire in October 1740, claiming to speak French like a native 
and passable Spanish, as well as being able to draw plans of fortifications. He was 
employed by Walpole. 134 A French officer and inventor, highly disobliged by his own 
government's cavalier treatment of his genius, approached Waldegrave to sell him the 
secret of a bullet which would infallibly set a ship on fire, in a broadside of 30 guns. Even 
this improbable proposal was entertained, in order to keep from the French the merest 
slim possibility of a military advantage. 135 A disgruntled ex-officer of the French East 
India Company, hoping to recommend himself for service in England, went as `a man of 
confidence' for Waldegrave to Brest, L'Orient and Rochefort in early 1741.136 Horace 
Walpole in September 1739 was approached by yet another disgruntled foreigner, M. de 
Merveilleux, `a sensible person formerly employed by France in Swisserland' who had lost 
his pension from the French government. Merveilleux offered to go into Italy and use his 
extensive acquaintance among the cardinals on Britain's behalf. Horace urged Sir Robert 
to employ this Swiss agent, despite the mistrust of George II. The King had turned the 
same man down the previous year on account of his treatment of `poor Manning' and 
because he had converted to Catholicism years earlier, to get into French pay. Dismissing 
these quibbles, Horace urged: 
We may indeed be deceived by him; and give him money to enable him to goe 
thither, and then hear no more of him, as we have been served by others, but 
there is noe defense against that, the time is coming, and I think very near, 
that mony must be hazarded to know the Motions of the Pretender, and if out 
of two or three more that may be employed one only is able to give us 
intelligence, the mony is well employ'd... nobody can answer for the Fidelity 
of Persons employ'd in such work as this is, untill they have been tryed. 137 
133 BL Add Ms 35893, f. 44. 
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Horace's tolerance of Merveilleux's part in the `very disagreeable affair' of Manning is a 
little surprising, since this was nothing less than an attempt, on the public highway, to 
assassinate the English ambassador to Switzerland. 138 Those who pursued the grand 
design seem to have been comparatively little concerned with the fate of the lesser actors. 
One victim whose fate caused a certain stir was the messenger Major Sinclair, returning 
from Stockholm to Constantinople when he was murdered, literally cut in pieces, and all 
his papers stolen. `Cet accident desagreable' was the comment of one Swedish 
diplomat. 139 At least as much interest was shown in the skills of the four Russians 
suspected of the deed. Some time afterwards, all the stolen mail was returned in the postal 
packet from Hamburg, the diplomatic letters all having been opened and resealed 'd'une 
maniere assez peu habile pour ces sortes d'occasions'. 140 
All of these more or less covert and more or less skilful resources made up the supply of 
intelligence to ministers and diplomats seeking to understand the shifting patterns of 
politics. It was important, though, for those involved to see also what lay in front of their 
face, and not only the arcane or expensively purchased information. What could be just as 
useful as the leaks from informants was the indiscreet or sometimes merely open talk of 
ministers and diplomats themselves. On the same day in December 1737 that Newcastle 
denied all knowledge of a prisoner, Wall, recently arrived from the Caribbean, Geraldino 
had only to ask the other Secretary of State, Lord Harrington, to be told all that he 
needed to know. 141 In November 1740 the Pretender's agent in Paris spoke freely to Lord 
Waldegrave's secretary, Anthony Thompson, temporarily in charge'of the embassy there, 
and was given full details of the advice being sent to England in the diplomatic mail. '42 
British diplomats had thus to be constantly alert to unbuttoned talk, as well as 
intelligence, to rumours and to changes of personnel in their volatile world of veiled 
intentions. It was their role to judge personalities, to cultivate `friends' at every level, and 
138 PRO SP 107/24 (unfoliated), Andri6 to King of Prussia, 27 February (NS) 1739. 
139 Quotation PRO SP 107/29 (unfoliated), Wasenberg to King of Sweden, 10 July (NS) 
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to be alert to even the smallest hints that would confer on them an advantage in this 
secretive and competitive profession. 143 
It was at least equally necessary, too, to understand the patterns of open diplomacy. The 
most effective players in the diplomatic game could see the significance of the longer term 
patterns and policies of rival powers. This applied especially to the stubborn dynastic 
politics of Spain. The Spanish Bourbon dynasty had a deep-rooted determination, which 
Keene along with all other diplomats seems to have underestimated, to assert its rights in 
its American possessions, and to use them to bolster the sagging economy of peninsular 
Spain. The eighteenth century has been depicted by Spanish historians as the age of the 
`flight to America'. 144 The policy of the Bourbon rulers was to revive Spain's economy 
and rebuild its power. This could only be done by a determined exploitation of the 
country's unique resource, the produce of its American colonies. Without their monopoly 
of American commerce, the wealth and power of peninsular Spain could never be revived. 
Spanish ministers had always to be careful that in smoothing over the resentments of the 
British (and French, and Dutch) they did not make concessions which might be fatal to the 
preservation of their ideal of exclusive trade. The perennial difficulties in the way of 
realising this cherished trading doctrine in no way lessened its status for successive 
generations of Spanish ministers. 145 
The loose and inconsistent enforcement of this monopoly, however, served to prevent 
diplomatic observers from feeling any sense of foreboding. Intercepted Spanish diplomatic 
letters made it clear that His Catholic Majesty was serious in wanting to prevent future 
143 There is an illuminating discussion of this in Roosen, Age of Louis XIV, chapter VI. 
144 `No en vano, el siglo XVIII viene siendo considerado como el siglo de la vuelta a 
America'; A. Garcia-Baquero Gonzalez, Cadiz y el Atlantico (1717-1778), Tomo 1, 
Sevilla 1976, p. 90. The following summary is largely based on this excellent account of 
Spanish colonial policy. The administrative context of Bourbon economic policy is 
exhaustively analysed in M. Artola (ed), La economia espafola al Final del Antiguo 
Regimen (1982), Vol N, Instituciones, especially pp. 107-265. Volume III, Comercio y 
Colonias (1982), Parte 1, has valuable comment on the Atlantic trade, but goes no further 
than 1730. 
las 'El hecho de que en la präctica la defensa de este derecho constituyese siempre un ideal 
dificilmente realizable no fue obstäculo para que en el piano juridico fuese täcitamente 
aceptada por todos los estados contemporäneos que jamäs pusieron en duda su 
legitimidad. ' Gonzalez, Cadiz y el Atlantico, p. 94. 
37 
clashes in the Indies. 146 The most serious potential conflict was over British 
encroachments in Georgia, a settlement which was resented by both France and Spain, yet 
there seemed reason to feel confident of peace even there. The financial and military 
problems of Spain, which Patino's energies had only begun to affect, certainly made it 
seem impossible that the Spanish court should be aggressively minded. Keene remarked 
`... that, unless every one here agrees to impose upon himself, Spain was never in a worse 
condition to attack us than at present. ' 147 Rumours of a Spanish armament were 
circulating in the early months of the year, but Keene discovered that the arms were more 
likely to be for a project to drive the Danes out of an island which they had near Cuba: 
My Intelligence comes from a good Hand; and the Person I employed to 
make this discovery tells me, we need not fear the Spaniards breaking with us 
in that Part of the World. 149 
There were other good portents, although these mostly proved illusory. The Marquis of 
Mari, a man for whom Keene had done favours, and who expected to be appointed Vice- 
Admiral of Spain, promised the British ambassador that early steps would be taken to 
license armateurs more scrupulously, patents to be given only to `people of good 
Circumstances and reputation'. Two weeks later, Keene learned that Mari was given his 
office only as one of a junta of three, and was unable to make good his promises. 149 
These were minor blemishes, though, in a time of ease and confidence. The personnel of 
the world of diplomacy, from highest minister to lowliest `friend', were as favourable to 
peace as they had been for years. Agreements and resolutions of disputes seemed to be 
the order of the day. Queen Elizabeth was in raptures to have an accord signed between 
Spain and Portugal, skilfully brokered by Keene, who was himself delighted `to see an 
End put to the most shaggy piece of Work we ever had upon our arms'. 150 Newcastle was 
confident that the Portuguese affair was as good as over. He intended soon, with 
146 E. g. PRO SP 94/206, f. 11, Torrenueva to Geraldino, 2 December (NS) 1737. 
147 BL Add Ms 32796, f. 37, Keene to Newcastle, 28 October (NS) 1737. 
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Walpole, `to see, if we cannot strike out some Expedient, for regulating, or putting into a 
Way of being regulated, all Disputes with the South Sea Company'. '5' Not surprisingly, 
Keene reported that he was in better health than for two years past, and was able to bask 
in the warmth of some unusually cordial congratulations from his own court. 152 Even the 
subsequent breakdown of the agreement over the minutiae of paperwork merely gave him 
the chance to demonstrate his calmness and moderation, bringing down personal 
messages of congratulation from the King. 153 Sure signs that Britain's envoys abroad had 
time on their hands can be seen in their letters in the Spring of 1737. Complaints about 
their long service and lack of recognition alternate with gossip about personalities and 
comment on the latest books and plays. Lord Tyrawley, the envoy in Portugal, playfully 
commented; `I hope somebody will devaliser this Courier that they may see the 
Importance of our Correspondence'. '54 The barometer of European politics seemed set 
fair, though deceptively so. The pressures of London merchants, allied with the 
manoeuvrings of the South Sea Company, were soon to give envoys abroad more 
important themes of correspondence than news of books and laments about slow 
promotion. The peace was soon to be broken. In October 1737, though, Keene was still 
reporting from Madrid that there was `not the least thing stirring' and that `we are here in 
the greatest tranquillity imaginable'. '55 
's' PRO SP 98/129 (unfoliated), Newcastle to Keene, 3 March (OS) 1737. 
152 BL Add Ms 32794, f. 116, Keene to Newcastle, 8 February (NS) 1737; ibid, f. 286, 
Newcastle to Keene, 28 March (OS) 1737. 
153 BL Add Ms 32795, f. 81, Waldegrave to Keene, 4 June (NS) 1737; ibid, f. 85, Newcastle 
to Keene, 26 May (OS) 1737. 
154 BL Add Ms 32794, if. 212-13, Keene to Waldegrave, 25 March (NS) 1737; ibid., f. 314, 
Waldegrave to Keene, 17 April (NS) 1737; ibid., f. 336, Tyrawley to Keene. 
Iss BL Add Ms 32795, if. 387,390, Keene to Couraud, 6 October (NS) 1737, Keene to H. 
Walpole, 7 October (NS) 1737. 
39 
Chapter 2 Cabinet and Country 
At home, similarly, politics in early 1737 seemed relatively tranquil. H. T. Dickinson notes; 
`From 1734 to 1736 the Opposition despaired and Walpole seemed at the height of his 
political career'. ' He had forged a ministry which was experienced and loyal, he enjoyed 
the support of the King, and he had proved so durable as to be the despair of his 
opponents. To understand how that powerful position could be eroded, one needs to look 
at the inner workings of the ministry, and the character and interactions of its leading 
figures. This chapter attempts to provide some of that necessary context, examining the 
role of the King, the main personnel of the ministry, and the frictions between them which 
would grow markedly as the dispute with Spain progressed. It will also look briefly at the 
domestic opposition with which ministers had to contend, including its popular 
manifestations, which impinged on the world of high politics a great deal in these years. 
This theme will be further explored below, especially in chapters four and five. Popular 
opposition, especially in London, reached riotous proportions during 1738, yet in the year 
before that there was little sign of a serious challenge to the government. 
Walpole indeed seemed to be in a very favourable position. He had survived his major 
crisis of support over the Excise in 1733-4, and had markedly scaled down his spending 
on direct press propaganda. The London Gazette was by this time a mere official organ, a 
slipshod compilation of basic diplomatic and domestic news. 2 Genuine pro-government 
journalism, after July 1735, was confined to the Daily Gazetteer, which replaced the 
previous London Journal, Free Briton, and Daily Courant. 3 The government writers put 
I H. T. Dickinson, Walpole and the Whig Supremacy (1973), p. 176. 
2 G. C. Gibbs, `Govenunent and the English Press, 1695 to the Middle of the Eighteenth 
Century', in Too Mighty to be Free. Censorship and the Press in Britain and the 
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Author/Publisher Relations during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, eds. R. 
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J. M. Black; L. Hanson, Government and the Press, 1695-1763 (1936); W. T. Laprade, 
forward a philosophy which has been shown to be varied, but weighted towards securing 
society from its anarchic impulses, and stressing the virtues of stable authority. 4 
Opposition writers pressed home the charge of corruption at every opportunity, and put 
forward a vision of society as perfectible under pure and patriotic leadership. The 
government's apologists, by contrast, stressed the fallibility of human nature and the need 
for restraining government. The opponents themselves must be corrupt, or why should 
they wish to disrupt the best practical form of administration which had been devised by 
human prudence? This was a point which gained some force from the behaviour of 
leading Opposition members such as Carteret and Pulteney after Walpole's fall. Despite 
the underrated cogency of these views, it must be conceded that there are few signs of 
development in the argument for the defence of Walpole's ministry after the mid-1730s. ' 
The pro-Walpole writers seem to have carried on playing through their basically defensive 
repertoire of arguments. Faced with a new impetus given by depredations, and appeals to 
history and national greatness, it was not to be enough, but for some time after the 1734 
election the underlying weakness did not show up. Walpole was still using the resources 
of Government also to monitor and control his opponents. 
Like foreign envoys, Opposition politicians could expect to have their mail opened by the 
Secret Office. Chesterfield commented on the ministry's letter-opening and fears of plots 
during the Excise crisis. 6 Pulteney went to the lengths of using a coney cart to write to his 
wife, to `avoid Post Master Lord Lovel's sagacity'. At times, in his awareness of 
surveillance, he sounded a note of impotent defiance: 
If you hear any news send it me without reserve, never mind their opening 
letters at the Post Office, but bid them kiss your ---- whatever discovery they 
Public Opinion and Politics in Eighteenth Century England to the Fall of Walpole 
(1936). 
° S. Targett, `Government and Ideology during the Age of Whig Supremacy: the Political 
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6 BL Add Ms 22626, if. 103-4, Chesterfield to Lady Suffolk, 17 August (OS) 1733. 
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make, it will only confirm them, in what they must have known, that you and 
I agree in having the most contemptible Opinion of our present Ministers (I 
write it at full length) that is possible, and that we do not care a groat what 
they know or think of us. 7 
The ministry was no less vigilant in curtailing the liberties of the Opposition press and 
their down-at-heel publishers. Two Acts made life more difficult for opponents of the 
administration. The spring 1738 ban on the reporting of the proceedings of Parliament 
seems to have been an uncontentious measure, all Members being concerned about the 
breaches of their privilege caused by the monthly journal writers! Since the press was so 
partisan, it is unlikely that debates were accurately reported, even if Johnson's celebrated 
and sweeping comments on his own experience as a parliamentary reporter cannot be 
taken as the literal truth. 9 Speck has found, in comparing press treatment of the elections 
of 1705 and 1734 that the newspapers were so partisan as to be no guide at all to the facts 
of what went on. 1° The Craftsman was moved in 1739 to protest that the Parliamentary 
reporting of the last several years had been mostly invention: the London Magazine was 
bad, and the Gentleman's Magazine intolerable. " 
The Licensing Act which came into force on 24 June (OS) 1737 was introduced under the 
obscure guise of an amendment to an Act concerning vagrants and strolling interval 
players. It was, however, a major departure and introduced prior censorship of new stage 
productions through the scrutiny of the Lord Chamberlain. 12 This law was expressly 
designed to ban popular successes associated in the public mind with the `Boy Patriots' 
7 BL Add Ms 22628, f. 71, Pulteney to Hon. George Berkeley, 21 September (OS) 1734; 
]bid, f. 74, same to same, 10 November (OS) 1735. 
Journal of the House of Lords, XXV, 20 May (OS) 1738, p. 265; P. D. G. Thomas, The 
House of Commons in the Eighteenth Century (1971), p. 136; W. T. Laprade, Public 
Opinion and Politics in Eighteenth Century England (1936; repr. 1971), pp. 395-9. 
9 B. B. Hoover, Samuel Johnson's Parliamentary Reporting (1953), p. 129, Appendix II. 
10 W. A. Speck, `Politics and the Press', in The Press in English Society from the 
Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Centuries (1986), ed. M. Harris & A. Lee, pp. 47-63. 
William Cobbett, who made a close comparative study, said that from 10 February (OS) 
1737 the Gentleman's Magazine debates are copied, even down to printers' errors, from 
the London Magazine: Cobbett, Parliamentary History of England, X, (1812), preface. 
11 Craftsman, 17 November (OS) 1739. 
12 Journal of the House of Lords, XXV, 21 May (OS) 1737, p. 148. 
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led by Lyttelton and Pitt, plays such as Fielding's Pasquin of 1736. Indeed, a character in 
that play, the Queen of Common Sense, gave her name to the new journal Common 
Sense, begun in February 1737, and financed by Fielding's Opposition friends Lyttelton 
and Chesterfield. 13 At least in London, the impetus of opposition was being regained. The 
final straw for the ministry was Fielding's comedy The Historical Register for the Year 
1736, published in May 1737. Battestin summarises its impact: `The brashest of all his 
political dramas, it was precisely the opportunity Walpole wanted, a play that would put 
Parliament in a mood to place the theatres under restraint. 14 In June 1737 the Craftsman 
produced a flurry of forceful attacks on the licensing Bill, and the ministry's response was 
prompt. The 2 July issue of the paper was stopped, and its printer Henry Haines 
imprisoned for libel. " On 30 July the Craftsman led on the issue of its treatment, 
picturing it as an instance of the ministerial tyranny against which they so often warned: 
The publication of it was not only stopt for a Week, and several Persons 
taken up and detained in Custody for an unusual Time, without any 
Examinations but the Shop Books and other Accounts, nay even the 
Advertisements for the Week, were likewise seiz'd, and the House, where the 
Paper was printed, shut up by the Messengers. 
Though this was the last legal prosecution of the paper, it was not the last time that the 
government employed the arbitrary tactics denounced by the Craftsman. Printers and 
distributors were detained and intimidated, and the powerful King's Messengers seized 
papers and broke up presses. 16 One scholar has recently insisted that the government was 
always within its legal rights, and indeed that it applied the laws of seditious libel with 
`careful and conspicuous discipline'. " But one does not need to be a Wilkes to find the 
scope of the seditious libel laws rather wide. '8 The ministry exerted pressure in a way 
13 M. C. Battestin, with R. Battestin, Henry Fielding: AL fe (1989), p. 198. 
14 Ibid., pp. 192-203,215-3 1; quotation p. 217. 
's E. L. Avery & A. H. Scouten, `The Opposition to Sir Robert Walpole, 1737-1739', 
English Historical Review, LXXXII, 1968, pp. 331-36. 
16 P. L. Woodfine, `Government Harassment of the Press in the Late 1730s', Journal of 
Newspaper & Periodical History V, 2, Spring 1989, pp. 20-34. 
17 S. Targett, `Sir Robert Walpole's Newspapers 1722-1742: propaganda and politics in the 
age of whig supremacy', unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Cambridge, 1991, p. 79. 
18 The subject is admirably treated in M. A. Thomson, The Secretaries of State 1681-1782 
(1932), pp. 112-26. 
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familiar at least as far back as the reign of Queen Anne. 19 A decade later, it was still a 
matter of remark, when the printer and publisher of the Remembrancer were taken up, 
`that the messenger used them with uncommon civility, touched nothing of their papers, 
presses, or effects, and took their words for their surrendering themselves the next 
morning'. 20 Despite the vaunted protections of the Revolution Settlement, and the popular 
ideas of the ancient liberties of the Anglo-Saxon race, governments still enjoyed, and 
used, robust powers to cow their critics. 
Criticism among the people at large was relatively muted in the late 1730s. The traditional 
idea of Walpole's supremacy as a `pudding time' may have had some force in these years, 
though it must also be qualified by the regular outbreaks of rioting in many parts of 
England and Wales. Between 1733 and 1736 alone, there were riots over the proposed 
Excise tax, over the 1734 general election, over turnpikes, the London theatre, immigrant 
Irish labourers and restrictions on the sale of gin. It is hard to make a clear political 
pattern, though, out of these events. For the mass of the people, certainly, the decade of 
the 1730s was perhaps the most prosperous of the century. 21 It was also a time of 
unusually clement weather, with few severe frosts, low snowfall and favourable harvests, 
until the pattern was dramatically reversed in 1739 and 1740. These benefits may have 
limited political unrest as, before 1738, they certainly seem to have restricted disputes in 
19 J. M. Black, The English Press in the Eighteenth Century (1987), pp. 157-62. 
20 H. P. Wyndham (ed), The Diary of the late George Bubb Dodington (1784), p. 13. 
21 B. R. Mitchell & P. Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics (1962), pp. 482-490; 
E. A. Wrigley & R. S. Schofield, The Population History of England 1541-1871 (1981), 
pp. 312-13, Appendix 9 pp. 638-41; D. Woodward, `Wage Rates and Living Standards in 
Pre-Industrial England', Past & Present, 91,1981; D. Hay, `War, Dearth and Theft in the 
Eighteenth Century', Past & Present, 95,1982; N. F. R. Crafts, `British Economic 
Growth, 1700-1850: Some Difficulties of Interpretation', Explorations in Economic 
History, 24,1987; K. D. M. Snell, Annals of the Labouring Poor: Social Change and 
Agrarian England, 1660-1900 (1985), pp. 23-5. 
22 G. Manley, `Central England temperatures: monthly means 1659 to 1973', Quarterly 
Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society 1974,100, pp. 394,402; W. G. Hoskins, 
`Harvest Fluctuations and English Economic History, 1620-1759, Agricultural History 
Review, XVI, 1968, pp. 16,23,31; M. G. Pearson, `Snowstorms in Scotland - 1729 to 
1830', Weather, 31,1976, pp. 390-94; H. H. Lamb, Climate, history and the modern 
world (1982), p. 233; R. S. Bradley & P. D. Jones (eds), Climate since A. D. 1500 (1992), 
pp. 135-8,653. I am grateful to my Geography colleague, Dr. Lance Tufnell, for his 
advice on this point. 
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agriculture and trade 23 Importantly, too, no political issue had given rise to any rallying 
cry of similar power to the slogan `no Excise'. This was almost embarrassingly evident in 
the way in which opposition writers actually kept reviving that earlier slogan in the most 
inappropriate circumstances. Even when depredations furnished a new agenda, the 
Craftsman still pressed the emotive word into service: `as some domestick Projectors had 
taken it into their Heads to excise Us at home, so the Spaniards have thought fit to play 
the same Game abroad. The strained parallel soon found its way into an opposition 
ballad in which `Don Diego' says to Walpole; `You Excise them on Land, I'll Excise them 
at Sea'24 The opposition seemed to be in the doldrums, still repeating the trusty old 
slogans but with little to offer other than general hints and abuse of the ministry. 
The leading figures among the opposition had lost heart and become less active after their 
election defeat of 1734.25 William Pulteney in November 1735 announced his resolution 
to fatigue himself less in Parliament once he had recovered from illness, telling his 
correspondent; `you may have perceived this resolution arising in me for some years, it is 
in vain to struggle against universal Corruption, and I am quite weary of the 
Opposition. '26 This theme was a recurrent one in Pulteney's correspondence, and never 
more emphatically than in December 1736: 
I hope to be able to attend the House next sessions, but not with such 
assiduity as I have formerly done: why should I risque the doing myself any 
harm, When I know how vain it is to expect to do any good. You that have 
been a long time out of this Country, can have no notion how wicked and 
Corrupt we are grown; were I to tell you of half the Rogueries come to my 
knowledge, you would be astonished, and yet I dare say I don't know of half 
that are practised in one little spot of Ground only, you may easily guess 
where I mean. 27 
23 C. R. Dobson, Masters and Journeymen. A Prehistory of Industrial Relations 1717-1800 
(1980), pp. 155-6; J. V. Beckett, `Stability in Politics and Society 1680-1750', in Britain 
in the First Age of Party, 1680-1750 (1987), ed. C. Jones. 
24 Craftsman 25 March (OS) 1738; The Negotiators. Or, Don Diego brought to Reason 
(1738), copy in PRO SP 36/56, part 2, f. 336. 
25 P. Langford, The Excise Crisis (1975). 
26 BL Add Ms 22628 f. 73, Pulteney to Hon. George Berkeley, 10 November (OS) 1735. 
27 BL Add Ms 4806, f. 178, Pulteney to Swift, 21 Dec (OS) 1736. 
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A year later, Lord Bathurst was writing to Swift in even more apocalyptic tones, 
proposing to retire to a farm in Derbyshire and there await the deluge. 28 Opposition 
patronage of and interest in the press was at a low point and the leading figure and 
philosopher of opposition in the early 1730s, Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, was 
living abroad and taking little interest in current political tactics. 29 Lady Bolingbroke 
called on Cardinal Fleury in November, and Fleury gave a reassuring account to the 
British Ambassador Lord Waldegrave: 
She told him, that her Husband was quite retired and meddled no more with 
Politicks; That he had no thoughts of going to England... For he was neither 
ambitious of getting into Publick Business in England, nor were his Friends 
there ever likely to be employed. 30 
Between 1737 and 1742 the hopes and the prospects of the opposition were revived by 
such issues as depredations, Britons who never will be slaves, and the call to pit the 
mighty British navy against Spanish cowardice and deceit . 
31 This was the climax of the 
prolonged joint Whig and Tory opposition to Walpole. Country Whigs, and independents 
of various kinds generally took their stand on the issue of Court corruption and 
dependency, which Walpole was held to personify. Samuel Sandys, nicknamed the 
`motion maker' for his constant calls for a full enquiry into all Walpole's misdeeds, was 
the most extreme of them. Some leading Opposition Whigs were ambitious to replace 
Walpole in office, and several of them, such as John, Lord Carteret, William Pulteney and 
Philip, Lord Chesterfield, were former rivals ousted by Walpole. A mounting body of 
opposition in the ports and rapidly growing towns of the country found the Walpole 
ministry unsympathetic to their trade and interests. 32 Tory opponents, led by the able and 
28 BL Add Ms 4806, f. 197, Bathurst to Swift, 6 Dec (OS) 1737. 
29 A spirited but biassed account of the opposition press and its personalities is given in an 
anonymous ms pamphlet of c. 1739, in CUL Ch (H) Mss P 73/441-15. The best account 
of Bolingbroke is still H. T. Dickinson, Bolingbroke (1970). 
30 BL Add Ms 32796, f. 70, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 12 November (NS) 1737. 
31 P. L. Woodfine, `Ideas of naval power and the conflict with Spain, 1737-1742', in The 
British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century (1988), eds. J. M. 
Black & P. L. Woodfme, pp. 72-3. 
32 N. Rogers, Whigs and Cities. Popular Politics In the Age of Walpole and Pitt (1989) is a 
magisterial exploration of this assertiveness of commerce. P. Borsay, The English Urban 
Renaissance: Culture and Society in the Provincial Town, 1660-1770 (1989) gives an 
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generally respected William Wyndham, ranged from independents concerned with pure 
government to unreconcilable Jacobites such as William Shippen and Sir Watkin Williams 
Wynn. 33 These disparate groups were given a kind of unity by the Patriot name which was 
increasingly promoted in the late 1730s. Based on the ideas of Bolingbroke, the Patriot 
persona was one which could be adopted by a wide range of opponents. It involved 
essentially putting the country before all private or party interests, calling for an extinction 
of party labels and for a form of government based only on an uncorrupt commitment to 
the general interest. 4 The reality was that party allegiances persisted underneath the 
Patriot covering. Benjamin Keene summarised the newly-formed Pelham administration in 
the autumn of 1743; `I believe the scheme is to content both your Patriotical Whigs that 
have been taken into the Administration and the old stock as far as possible, that we may 
reduce the opposition to be a mere Jacobitical one joyned perhaps with some malicious 
35 and some honest but deluded Persons, for Party consists of all'. 
All the Whig Opposition groups, and some Tories, found a natural home in the 
`reversionary interest', since if Walpole was supported and kept in place by George II he 
was certain to be turned out by George's successor. The wait need not be long, since 
George II was in his fifty-fifth year in 1737, and though George I had lived to the age of 
sixty-seven this was by no means usual (Queen Anne had not reached fifty, William had 
died at fifty-two, and Mary at thirty-two). George hated his heir, Prince Frederick, who 
heartily returned the compliment and had no qualms about setting himself up as a rival 
eloquent account of the transformation of the buildings and social life of such towns. One 
might perhaps challenge the extent to which a fairly uniform `urban system', with the 
larger towns as its `flagships' (p. 311), really existed. Fast-growing specialist textile 
towns such as Bradford, Halifax and Huddersfield seem to have had scant interest in civic 
buildings other than Cloth Halls. P. J. Corfield, The Impact of English Towns 1700-1800 
(1982) is still a valuable survey, nicely weighted towards the drab realities of economic 
life. 
33 An outstanding piece of pioneering research into the organisation and functioning of the 
Tory party is L. Colley, In Defiance of Oligarchy: The Tory Party 1714-60 (1982), 
though Colley does tend to overstate the possibilities of office open to the Tories. 
3' A valuable examination of the ideas and language of the loose Patriot coalition is R. 
Harris, A Patriot Press. National Politics and the London Press in the 1740s (1993), pp. 
48-83. 
35 BL Add Ms 43441, Keene to Castres, 16 September (OS) 1743. 
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political patron, and an alternative model of monarch. Despite a weak, ungrateful and 
vindictive character, he was plausible on public occasions, and had the shrewdness to 
cultivate the London crowds and to promote ideas which had considerable resonance with 
ministerial opponents. Bolingbroke's ideas of the Patriot King were incorporated into 
Frederick's carefully fostered public image. The Prince was loudly applauded in 
September 1737 for his behaviour in the royal box on the opening night of the revival of 
Addison's anti-ministerial drama, Cato. The audience burst into pointed applause, which 
the Prince stood and returned, at the words; `When vice prevails, and impious men bear 
sway, the post of honour is a private station'. 36 Also important to the Prince's self- 
presentation was a respect for commerce and the power of the City of London. He 
assured them on one occasion that he would never (as Walpole had famously done) call 
them beggars. 37 
This complex Opposition coalition applied a lot of pressure on the ministry through the 
troublesome electors of the cities of London and Westminster. 38 Two of the London MPs 
were important figures in this campaign, and had been the leaders of the successful City 
opposition to the Excise in 1733-4. Sir John Barnard was Lord Mayor in 1737-8, a High 
36 Hervy, Memoirs, III, p. 839. For Frederick's popular heroics in directing the fire fighting 
at the Temple, ibid., II, pp. 643-4. On the Catonic perspective, R. Browning, Political 
and Constitutional Ideas of the Court Whigs (1982), pp. 1-10. 
37 Hervey, Memoirs, III, p. 837. Frederick and his consort Augusta can be seen, for 
example, in the last plate of Hogarth's series Industry and Idleness, Exemplified in the 
Conduct of Two Fellow Apprentices (1747). They look benignly on the jubilant crowds 
from the balcony of the King's Head (sic), while the virtuous son of trade, Francis 
Goodchild, becomes Lord Mayor. A more favourable estimate (though an inconclusive 
one) of Frederick's character can be found in C. H. Gerrard, `The Patriot Opposition to Sir 
Robert Walpole: A Study of Politics and Party, 1725-1742', unpublished D. Phil. thesis, 
Oxford, 1986, pp. 52-7. 
38 L. Sutherland, `The City of Landon in Eighteenth Century Politics', in Essays Presented 
to Sir Lewis Namier (1956), eds. R. Pares & A. J. P. Taylor; A. J. Henderson, London and 
the National Government, 1721-1742 (1945); H. Horwitz, `Party in a civic context: 
London from the Exclusion Crisis to the fall of Walpole', in Britain in the First Age of 
Party 1680-1750 (1987), ed. C. Jones; S. R. Varey, `The Craftsman 1726-1752. An 
Historical and Critical Account', unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Cambridge 1977, 
especially chap 5; M. Harris, `The London Newspaper Press c. 1725-1746', unpublished 
Ph. D. dissertation, London 1973, especially chaps vii & viii; N. Rogers, `Resistance to 
Oligarchy: the City Opposition to Walpole and his Successors, 1725-47, in London in 
the Age of Reform (1977), ed. J. Stevenson. 
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Church Tory and well-to-do wine merchant. He was the scourge of the elite of moneyed 
men and companies who were the privileged mainstay of government financial policies. 
Micajah Perry, a tobacco merchant, had been prominent in opposition since the furore 
over Spanish depredations in the late 1720s, and was unlikely to miss the chance of 
renewed attacks on this issue during his Lord Mayoralty in 1738-9.39 The Opposition 
mounted an orchestrated series of protests in leading towns as well as mounting a revival 
of journalistic criticism of the ministry through the press and pamphlets. 40 Their 
parliamentary tactics included critical debates and votes, and the ill-conceived mass 
abstention to which they resorted in 1739.41 
The influence on the King's Ministers of the campaign `out of doors' was greatest at 
certain peak times of the year. The most stressful part of the political calendar came in the 
few months after Christmas when it was usual to hold the sessions of Parliament. Foreign 
envoys were well aware of the rhythms of the ministerial year. As the Portuguese 
ambassador in Paris wrote to his London counterpart; `whilst the Cat's away, the Mice 
may play, I mean, Whilst the Parliament does not sit'. 42 January to May was the usual 
period in which was concentrated the challenge of a parliamentary sitting: in 1737 
(because of the King's stay in Hanover) the dates of the session, unusually, ran from 1 
February to 21 June. During a session the Ministry could normally expect to meet 
sustained opposition only when it introduced specific contentious measures involving set 
39 The best summaries of each man can be found in the excellent entries in Sedgwick, House 
of Commons; Barnard in Vol. 1, pp. 435-37, Perry in Vol. 2, pp. 341-42. 
40 S. R. Varey, `The Craftsman 1726-1752. An Historical and Critical Account', 
unpublished PhD dissertation, Cambridge, 1977, especially chapter 5; M. Harris, The 
London Newspaper Press c. 1725-1746', unpublished PhD dissertation, London 1973, 
especially chapters vii & viii; M. Harris, London Newspapers in the Age of Walpole: A 
Study in the Origins of the Modern English Press (1987); G. A. Cranfield, `The London 
Evening Post, 1727-1744: a Study in the Development of the Political Press', Historical 
Journal, VI, 1 (1963), pp. 20-37. 
41 On the campaign's various dimensions, see: N. Rogers, Whigs and Cities. Popular 
Politics in the Age of Walpole and Pitt (1989), passim; Colley, In Defiance of Oligarchy; 
P. L. Woodfme, `The Anglo-Spanish War of 1739' in The Origins of War in Early 
Modern Europe, ed. J. M. Black (1987); N. Rogers, `Resistance to Oligarchy: the City 
Opposition to Walpole and his Successors, 1725-47', in London in the Age of Reform 
(1977), ed. J. Stevenson. 
42 PRO SP 107/22 (unfoliated), Don Luis de Cunha to de Azevedo, 17 June (NS) 1738. 
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debates and votes. The bulk of the business of Parliament was far less dramatic, and 
involved private Bills, always by far the largest category of legislation, with local Bills the 
most time-consuming of them. 43 The one predictable point of confrontation was always 
the opening of the session and the speech from the throne, with the subsequent debates. 
Ministers were thus faced in January 1737 with a tactical difficulty at the least, if 
Parliament had to be prorogued because the King was not there to open the session. 
Opposition ranks would swell as even the most dilatory country gentlemen left their 
hunting. A ready-made grievance, linked to the hated word `Hanover', would put spirit 
into their motions. As the new year opened, this embarrassment was reported by the 
acting ambassador in the United Provinces, Robert Trevor, to the ambassador in Madrid, 
Benjamin Keene. He also passed on news of another small straw in the wind, an issue that 
was soon to galvanize public opinion. The Dutch, he said, and particularly those of 
Amsterdam, were `just now greatly incensed against the Spaniards for the piratical 
depredations lately committed by their Guarde des Cosies (sic) in the American Seas 
upon the Vessels of the Republick'. 44 
It was such unpredictable events as these which shaped the political confrontations from 
day to day, in Parliament and elsewhere. Faced with rapid change, the people involved in 
making policy could make a great difference to the outcome. Ministers had to read the 
signs aright, and respond both to rapidly changing events and to very varied audiences; 
the partisan political nation, foreign courts and their envoys at St. James's; the King and 
Queen; and a majority of Members of Parliament. Since personalities could be crucial to 
the course of policy, it is important to understand how far the various ministers had their 
own foibles, interests and rivalries. A great Victorian historian offered a useful caution to 
those who study the makers of policy: 
People assume that when men are concerned in high affairs, their motives 
must lie deep and their designs reach far. Few who have ever been close to 
public business, its hurries, chances, obscurities, egotisms, will fall in with any 
such belie f. `s 
43 S. Lambert, Bills and Acts. Legislative Procedure in Eighteenth Century England 
(1971), chaps. 4-8; P. D. G. Thomas, The House of Commons in the Eighteenth Century 
(1971), chap. 3. 
14 BL Add Ms 32794, f. 8, Trevor to Keene, 17 January (NS) 1737. 
45 J. Morley, Walpole (1899), p. 30. 
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This scepticism is salutary when one considers that so much of government policy in this 
period was made, not by the whole formal cabinet, but in practice by an inner circle of a 
handful of influential men. This inner cabinet group formed the key judgements on policy 
and political tactics. 
It is tempting to adopt a whiggish view that the gradual emergence of the Cabinet was 
one of the most significant constitutional developments of the eighteenth century, and that 
therefore Walpole's cultivation of a small inner cabinet was a kind of aberration. 6 It is at 
least equally likely, though, that by making the inner cabinet a concerted and effective 
group, Walpole gave it an influence over the King which a larger and inevitably more 
divided body might not have gained. Walpole's distrust of gifted colleagues, and his 
preference for a stable group of lesser talents, have been seen as weaknesses, but they did 
at least provide continuity in the development of cabinet procedures, and a settled cast of 
characters. The nature of cabinet government in the eighteenth century has yet to be fully 
explored, a neglect partly due to a paucity of surviving manuscript sources. 47 It would not 
be easy in any case to reconstruct the way in which policy was formed, since business was 
so often conducted in an informal and personal way. A good deal of business was done 
face-to-face, sometimes expressly in order to avoid using letters which could be 
intercepted, or could later be compromising. Scattered references do survive, though, in 
letters or memoirs, to show some of the ways in which the inner circle met and did 
business. Meetings at the house of Sir Robert Walpole were equivalent to an executive 
meeting of the Cabinet. What Newcastle called `... our little Cabinet at Sr. Robert's' met 
as often as nightly during the weeks after war broke out. 48 A very small group of ministers 
46 See just such a summary in G. Holmes & D. Szechi, The Age of Oligarchy. Pre- 
industrial Britain 1722-1783 (1993), p. 81. 
47 A stimulating pioneering article, though based too exclusively on the State Papers 
Domestic, is R. R. Sedgwick, `The Inner Cabinet from 1739 to 1741', English Historical 
Review, XXXIV, July 1919,290-302. Even the best recent treatments of Walpole's 
political techniques mention the cabinet only glancingly; Cruickshanks, `The Political 
Management of Sir Robert Walpole'; Black, Robert Walpole and the Nature of Politics. 
49 BL Add Ms 35406, f. 221, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 9 August (OS) 1740. A typical 
meeting of the inner circle, to discuss the relations between Spain and the South Sea 
Company, was minuted on 16 October (OS) 1738; BL Add Ms 33032, f. 216. Present 
were: Sir Robert Walpole, Mr. Walpole, the Lord Chancellor, the Duke of Newcastle, 
Lord Harrington and the Duke of Grafton.. 
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were invited - in the case of important people, pressed - to attend. Sir Robert wanted, 
even in wartime, to keep the number small. 49 A typical meeting, to discuss the vital 
convention agreement with Spain, brought together Lord Hardwicke, Sir Robert Walpole, 
Horace Walpole, the Duke of Grafton, the Duke of Newcastle and Lord Harrington. " 
The different contributions and the interactions of this relatively small group give us the 
best insight available into the nature of cabinet government under Walpole. 
The nature of the problem, at least, is clear. In theory, and to a great extent in practice, 
there was no collective cabinet responsibility at this period. The system was one of 
ministerial responsibility, with each minister answering personally to the King, and no one 
individual or department of State predominant. This meant jealousy and vigilance among 
the ministers, as Horace Walpole commented in 1735: 
I am afraid, if, besides giving a relation of my own Ministry, I should presume 
to tell my Sentiments, and doe it in extenso either to ye king or ye Queen; I 
may be thought, as I was last year sometimes, to dictate too much, or to 
encroach upon ye department of one or another of ye Secretary of States; if I 
send them to Sr. Robt. after having perused them, and finding that they are 
not relished by ye proper minister because not sent to him, his multiplicity of 
business makes him forgett them; if I send them to Hannover in a private 
letter, and that is known in England, then I am mistaken, I shall see at last, 
&ca. 5' 
These defensive comments show the importance of the closet and the court in the 
competitive thinking of the governmental inner circle. Access to the monarch was 
important in politics as a source of the psychological satisfactions necessary to politicians. 
While public popularity was desirable to ministers, it was in practice far more commonly 
enjoyed, at least in its most visible forms, by opponents such as Pitt or opposition heroes 
such as Admiral Vernon. Royal approval in the closet, however, could be equally potent, 
and cetainly more immediately rewarding. When Walpole offended his royal master in 
1740 by opposing his trip to Hanover, he had to redeem himself with a letter far more 
flowery than his usual terse style. Even allowing for the conventions to be observed when 
writing to a king, the letter reveals much about the working relationship involved: 
49 BL Add Ms 28132, f. 179, Norris Journal, 29 April (OS) 1740. 
S0 BL Add Ms 33032, f. 216, minutes, Sir Robert Walpole's, 16 October (OS) 1738. 
51 BL Add Ms 32788, f. 343, H. Walpole to Newcastle, 26 August (NS) 1735. 
52 
yr. countenance & goodness has been my only support in uncommon 
difficulties & under that protection I have been able to despise & defye all 
opposition, but ye power of serving with Successe depends solely upon ye 
proportion of creditt & confidence you are pleased to give, When that is 
withdrawn or diminished, I shall become an useless & unprofitable servant. 52 
A conviction that one's policy was correct, plus the approval of the king, could give 
politicians considerable resistance to public opinion. George II, in turn, was accustomed 
to rely on just two or three ministers to do his business. As he said of Newcastle, Pelham 
and Hardwicke in 1750, `they are the only ministers; the others are for show'. 53 The 
essence of the inner cabinet system, and the impetus to keep the working group small 
despite the pressures of ambition and vanity which worked to enlarge it, may well have 
come from the monarch as much as from Walpole. A different king, less fixed in his 
habits, more mercurial in his temperament and favours, might well have had a larger and 
more divided cabinet. 
It is unfortunate for historians that George II left few written records, for it is plain that 
he was active in decision making. He was often pivotal in the decisions and manoeuvrings 
of his most influential ministers. The broad patterns of their thinking can often be seen in 
the surviving papers, but the finer tactics and decision-making can usually only be inferred 
from events and from occasional comments by contemporaries. It does seem clear 
however that whenever the inner cabinet met, they were rehearsing and improvising in the 
absence of a key player. When their ideas were presented to the king, they might be 
overturned at once, especially in the spheres of foreign policy and the army. 54 At the least, 
ministers had to be prepared for long discourses on military policy, as Newcastle 
discovered, though he conceded that they were `in the Main very reasonable ones'. " As 
52 BL Add Ms 35335, f. 26, Walpole to King, 26 May (OS) 1740. 
53 R. Sedgwick (ed) The House of Commons 1715-1754 (1970), Vol II, p. 331. 
5' J. B. Owen, `George II Reconsidered', in Statesmen, Scholars and Merchants (1973), eds. 
A. Whiteman, J. S. Bromley & P. G. M. Dickson. For an example of the king's thoughts on 
a delicate area of policy, the Russo-Turkish war, see SP 43/19, f 97-102, Walpole to 
Sir Everard Fawkener, 26 August (OS) 1736,. 
55 BL Add Ms 35406, f. 136, Newcastle to Hardwicke, undated, c. 6 August (OS) 1739. 
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the commander-in-chief of the army, George's personal control over the use of his 
regiments was often crucial. 56 
As soon as war was decided upon, George wanted to raise new regiments at once, 
contrary to the decisions made in the inner cabinet. Newcastle encountered this resolve on 
a Friday evening, when Walpole was already at Chelsea for the weekend: `I could not 
debate it at Cards, but acquainted Sr Robert wth. it, who sett every Thing right on 
Monday'. " On the Tuesday morning, though, Harrington renewed in the closet the 
pleasing idea of royal control. Newcastle tried to counter this by presenting the views of 
the whole cabinet, but: 
H. My. argued quite on the other side of ye Question, chiefly insisting in a 
strong Manner, yt the raising of ye Troops should arise originally from ye 
Crown, wch I did admit, but that it should be done in a regular Way, by 
speech from ye Throne, & Estimate. This did not convince, &I by no Means 
made My Court. s8 
This episode epitomises many of the tensions and interactions of the inner circle. Sir 
Robert duly persuaded the King once more to wait for the sitting of Parliament before 
acting. Newcastle was alarmed by Harrington's interference, and sure that Walpole's 
personal views were similar to the King's. In this instance, however, he deferred to Lord 
Hardwicke: 
I verily believe Sr Robert's Consideration for your Opinion, has been the 
great, if not the only inducement to Him to sett this right, for upon both 
Points, His own Opinion is certainly rather on ye other side of the Question. 
But My Dear Lord, How is Business to go on? If one who scarce ever speaks 
His opinion in Council, and never says One Word in parliament, is to overturn 
56 E. g. BL Add Ms 28132, f. 171, Norris journal, 30 April (OS) 1740; BL Add Ms 35407, 
f. 17, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 1 May (OS) 1741,. See A. J. Guy, Oeconomy and 
Discipline. Officership and administration in the British army 1714-63 (1985), chapter 
2; J. A. Houlding, Fit for Service: the Training of the British Army 1715-1795 (1980); J. 
Hayes, `The Royal House of Hanover and the British Army 1714-760', Bulletin of the 
John Rylands Library, 40,1957-8, pp. 328-57; idem, `The Purchase of Colonelcies in the 
Army, 1714-63', Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 39,1961, pp. 3- 
10. 
S' BL Add Ms 35406, f. 153, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 28 September (OS) 1739. 
SS Ibid.. The factious adviser's name has been erased, but ultra-violet light reveals it to be 
Harrington. 
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the opinion of ye Lords [of council], which Lords are afterwards to support 
His Measures in parliament, contrary to their own Advice given formally in 
Cabinet Council to the King. These whisperers will destroy Every Thing. You 
see I write in great freedom, & begg you would burn my Letter. 39 
Even at less critical times, it was difficult to govern the King in army matters, and 
certainly hard to obtain the places and promotions to which Walpole's army of applicants 
felt they were entitled. 60 Sir Robert told Lord Hervey the answer which the King gave 
him on such occasions: `I will order my army as I think fit; for your scoundrels of the 
House of Commons you may do as you please; you know I never interfere, nor pretend to 
know anything of them, but this province I will keep to myself . 
61 The King's Commission 
was not simply a legal fiction, and George II signed military commissions personally, even 
when in Hanover. 62 When Walpole tried to influence appointments, he was told firmly not 
to meddle, as Horace reported: 
He frequently mentions these promotions to my brother who when he lets fall 
a word or two in favour of some officer, is told (that is between you and me) 
that he does not understand any thing of military matters, and by this means 
he has often the ill will of disappointments, which were not in his power to 
prevent... Sir Robert has very little to do in the military promotions; he 
recommends friends and relations of members of Parliament to be ensigns and 
comets, but his Majesty himself keeps an exact account of all the officers; 
knows their characters, and their long services, and generally nominates, at 
his own time the Colonels to vacant regiments. 63 
This taking of his own time made it easy for opponents to criticise the management of the 
army. Though they were loudly against the standing army, they could seize on any bad 
treatment of it. In April 1737 the Craftsman was ironic about the eight current vacancies 
by death among the Colonels; `The Savings thereby, it's not doubted, are frequently 
59 Ibid., f. 154. 
60 J. B. Owen, `George II Reconsidered', in Statesmen, Scholars and Merchants (1973), eds. 
A. Whiteman, J. S. Bromley & P. G. M. Dickson, pp. 120-21. Some examples, from May 
1738, of the constant pressure for places can be found in CUL Ch (H) Corresp 2767, 
2773,2775. 
61 Hervey, Memoirs, III, p. 772. 
62 PRO SP 43/19, f. 54, H. Walpole to Newcastle, 16 September (NS) 1736. 
63 BL Add Ms 9176, if. 32,34, H. Walpole to Trevor, 22 February (OS) 1740. 
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applied to the Relief of the Widows and Orphans of General Officers'. " When the posts 
were filled, the charge of meanness was changed to the more usual one of tyranny: 
We were in Hopes from these Posts being kept so long vacant, that though it 
is not thought proper to reduce whole Regiments at once, the Army would be 
suffer'd to reduce itself by Death; but We are now deprived of that agreeable 
Prospect, and must wait with Patience the appointed Time. 65 
A further shift of sentiment came soon afterwards, in a pitiful harangue delivered the week 
after one issue of the paper had been suppressed. Now the officers of the standing army 
were innocent victims of Walpole's resentment: 
Let their Services have been of never so long Duration, or meritorious, one 
disobliging Word or Action towards the Minister forfeits all, and They may 
be turn'd adrift to starve, or live in Obscurity, worn out with Age, Infirmities, 
Wounds and Fatigues, in Defence of their Country. " 
On the issue of the army, the minister's opponents could hardly lose, while Walpole 
himself lamented that he could never win. 
In anything that concerned the interests of Hanover, and more generally of Northern 
Europe, George II was hard to control. He persisted in sharing his time between his 
British and German dominions, too, even at the most inappropriate times. In the summer 
of 1740, the nation was at war with Spain, and the populace sensitive to any hint of 
favours to Hanover. (The Duke of Newcastle had to `launder' arms purchases from 
Hanover, making them appear to be from the stock of a Hamburg merchant. )67 
Nonetheless, the King insisted on leaving for his beloved Hanover. The news came as a 
surprise to ministers. Norris was at a cabinet meeting, seated next to Wager, when; `Sr. 
Charles writ upon a bitt of paper and gave me that the King went abroad: I writ under it 
God forbid and gave it to him: and this is the first notis I had any ways of its. 68 The 
Jacobites too were astonished at his leaving the way clear for them, and exulted that 
64 Craftsman 16 April (OS) 1737. 
65 Craftsman, 25 June (NS) 1737. 
66 Craftsman, 9 July (OS) 1737. 
67 BL Add Ms 32693, f. 432, Newcastle to Harrington, June 1740. 
68 BL Add Ms 28132, f. 181, Norris journal, 30 April (OS) 1740. 
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William of Orange had enjoyed nothing so hopeful in 1688.69 Walpole was made ill by his 
efforts to counter the inclinations of his royal master. Horace Walpole wrote; `My brother 
has been so fatigued with business and chagrin on account of the Journey, and by having 
received several shocks and reproofs in opposing it, that he has been a good deal out of 
order... '. 70 In 1741 also, George insisted on spending months in Hanover, and was so 
impatient to be off that he visited none of the troops or fleets. It was an additional 
handicap in the elections of that year . 
71 Not surprisingly, one of the prepared declarations 
of the Pretender urged Britons to `consider the advantages of having a King without 
foreign dominions'. 72 In 1741 George II concluded a neutrality for Hanover, while he was 
away in the Electorate, and without consulting the ministers at home, even though this 
action broke through his treaty obligations. 73 The popular disgust was striking, and led to 
Jacobite talk even of a civil war or revolution. 74 Newcastle, shocked and undermined by 
this turn of events, gave a vivid summary of the problems which ministers faced: 
I think the king's unjustifiable partiality for Hanover, to which he makes all 
other views and considerations subservient, has manifested itself so much, in 
the conduct of this summer, that no man can continue in the active part of the 
administration, with honour and satisfaction to himself, for he must either 
own he was a cipher, which, perhaps, I think is in a great measure the case of 
every minister, without exception, that was in England, or he must be thought 
to have advised and concurred in measures which, in my opinion, are both 
dishonourable and fatal to the interests of all Europe, and consequently to 
those of this country in particular. " 
Similarly in political and diplomatic matters, especially where any dynastic or family 
matter was involved, the King was a force to be reckoned with, and a complicating factor 
69 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 222/94, Sempill to James, 16 May (NS) 1740. 
70 BL Add Ms 9176, f. 42, H. Walpole to Trevor, 13 May (OS) 1740. 
71 BL Add Ms 9200, f. 74, Journal of Rev. Henry Etough. 
n Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 224/19, Memorandum, 21 June (NS) 1740. 
73 Harrington's first news of it opened `a very melancholy scene', and set the inner circle in 
motion; BL Add Ms 35406, if. 219-20, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 27 July (OS) 1740; BL 
Add Ms 33007, ff. 252-3, Harrrington, drafts of despatches, 19 August (OS) 1741; 
74 CUL Ch (H) Corresp/3107, unsigned letter to Baron de Harlang, 24 November (OS) 
1741. 
75 W. Coxe, Memoirs of the Administration of the Right Honourable Henry Pelham (2 
Vols, 1829), I, pp. 21-2. 
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in ministerial calculations. Often the convention that ministers spoke for the king may 
have been a working fiction, but at times the letters of the Secretary of State show equally 
clearly that he is relaying the personal views of the king. A good example is George II on 
the sensitive issue of the Russo-Turkish war, and another is his summary in December 
1737 of Fleury's initiative, proposing an Anglo-French treaty to settle good relations. (In 
both cases, he gave sound advice on playing the situation along). 76 Ministers had even less 
control when business fell within the scope of the royal prerogative, as did the 
management of such royal affairs as the allowance of the Prince of Wales, or his request 
to be given the distinction of being chief mourner at the Queen's funeral. When the King 
decided that Princess Emily was to occupy that place, the letter refusing the Prince's 
formal request to have that dignity was a highly sensitive issue. No one or two ministers 
dared to disoblige the next sovereign on such a point. The form of the written answer 
could only be authorised by the full cabinet council, and was considered by no fewer than 
eleven lords of the Cabinet. " Disputes in the royal household might change the whole 
pattern of high politics, but ministers had little influence on such family affairs. Horace 
Walpole even went so far in the Commons as to say that, in such matters, the House did 
not have the right to make any Address, for such papers or information, as the King might 
refuse. 78 This tenderness for the royal prerogative did not come from an unqualified 
admiration for the person of George II. Horace spoke out emphatically to his brother on 
the dangers of ministerial responsibility in serving a king who controlled foreign policy 
himself, and always with an eye on Hanover: 
I will tell you in confidence; little, low, partial, electoral notions are able to 
stop or confound the best conducted project for the publick... In the mean 
time nobody has credit or courage enough to speak plainly upon these heads 
in their respective departments; and if you venture to doe it sometimes, 'tis in 
76 PRO SP 43/19, if. 97-102, H. Walpole to Sir Everard Fawkener, 26 August (OS) 1736; 
BL Add Ms 32796, if. 324-5, Newcastle to Waldegrave, 30 December (OS) 1737. 
77 BL Add Ms 35586, if. 47-8, Hardwicke note of 9 December (OS) 1737. Only Lord 
Harrington was missing. 
78 S. Lambert (ed), The House of Commons Sessional Papers of the Eighteenth Century 
Vol 1, Introduction and List 1715-1760 (1975), p. 69. 
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a cursory manner. You receive a short answer; domestick affairs employ your 
time and your thoughts; and the foreign mischief continues. 79 
Sir Robert Walpole, as these comments show, occupied a special place in this system of 
overlapping duties but was never quite the `prime minister' which his enemies accused 
him of being. He did his best to coordinate the policy of the administration. That does not 
mean, however, that he saw his goal as one of collective responsibility or the working of a 
Cabinet in the modern sense. He harmonised the views of colleagues, and promoted his 
own policies, whenever he could, which was by no means always. Hill's recent biography 
of Walpole asserts that he was `not much trammelled' by the cabinet and that the inner 
cabinet had `only a semblance of real power'. 80 This seems however to misunderstand the 
orchestration of voices involved and the simple impossibility of Walpole's always being on 
hand to counter the influence of his colleagues in the closet. There was certainly 
competition to be among those in the effective cabinet, and ministers who did not form 
part of the inner circle felt excluded. Norris, Admiral of the Fleet and Vice Admiral of 
England, was sworn into the cabinet council in September 1739, and could have expected 
in wartime to be invited to almost all inner cabinet discussions. His diary shows that he 
was constantly anxious about the way in which the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir 
Charles Wager, was consulted before him. 81 Hill's view of a powerless cabinet, though, 
would doubtless have been shared at the time. Certainly contemporaries in opposition 
had no doubts that Walpole dominated his political subordinates. George Bubb Dodington 
recorded indignantly in his diary: 
On Sunday the 20th. [February 1737], about twelve gentlemen met at Sir 
Robert Walpole's, to be informed (as the custom is of all those meetings) of 
what is resolved upon; instead of being consulted (as the custom ought to be) 
upon what should be resolved on. 82 
79 W. Coxe, Memoirs of the Life and Administration of Sir Robert Walpole, Earl of 
Orford, Vol 3 (London, 1798), pp. 535-537, citing H. Walpole to Sir R. Walpole, I 
September (NS) 1739. 
80 B. W. Hill, Sir Robert Walpole. 'Sole and Prime Minister' (1989), p. 219. 
81 BL Add Ms 28132, f 107,179-80,183,188-89, Norris Journal, 22 December (OS) 
1739,29 April (OS) 1740,2 & 12 May (OS) 1740. 
82 Wyndham, Diary of Dodington, p. 322. 
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He was right that the larger Cabinet Council was so informed: but it was the small inner 
circle of three or four ministers, and not just Walpole, who made the decisions. If one 
were to judge by the picture given in Opposition newspapers, pamphlets and ballads, the 
Ministry would indeed seem to be solely dominated by one man, the arch corruptionist 
`Bob of Lynn'. This `Imperious, All-Grasping, Power-Engrossing Minister' was the 
English Colossus who bestrode all ordinary politicians, and was compared with Caesar, 
with Piers Gaveston, or with Jonathan Wild the master criminal. 83 A favourite comparison 
was with Cardinal Wolsey, the overmighty minister of Henry VIII who, like Walpole, had 
a taste for luxury and for building great houses, but whose career at least offered the 
comforting message that the mighty do eventually fall. 34 One of the most regularly 
recurring complaints against Walpole was the charge that he corruptly advanced his 
relations, and so it is not surprising that published criticisms often join his name with that 
of his brother Horatio. Horace was a tempting target, not least because, thanks to his 
brother, he enjoyed the profits of a secondary office as cofferer of the household. The 
presses delighted in showing the two Walpoles as the prime movers of the government, 
the nepotistic duumviri: 
O ROBIN! 0 HORACE! ye Brethren so wise! 
Who Matters of State so well handle" 
One successful opposition production of 1740 envisaged Walpole's defence against all 
charges: 
In my dear Country's Service now grown gray, 
Spotless I've walked before you to this Day, 
My Thoughts laid out, my precious Time all spent 
In the hard Slavery of Government; 
My BROTHER too the fruitless Bondage shares, 
83 BL Add Ms 31,149, if. 411-12, Quotation from draft heads of dissent to the quashing of a 
motion by the Duke of Marlborough that army officers should be removed only by court- 
martial, 13 February (OS) 1733,. 
84 An excellent collection of such depictions, which shows the frequent comparisons with 
Wolsey and the theme of corruption, is P. Langford, Walpole and the Robinocracy 
(1986). An instance of the standard repertoire is the popular Opposition pamphlet by the 
Rev. James Miller, Are these Things So? The previous Question from an Englishman in 
his Grotto to a Great Man at Court (1740); see, e. g. p. 11. It ran into six editions in 
1740, and set off a small pamphlet war. 
85 Quotation in An Historical Ballad, humbly inscrib'd to the Duumviri (London, n. d. 
c. 1730); see also The Negotiators: Or, Don Diego brought to Reason (London, 1738). 
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And all your Peace is owing to his Cares; 
Girding his Loins he Travels far and near, 
And brings home some rare Treaty ev'ry Year. 86 
From his exile in France Lord Bolingbroke saw this dual rule as the culmination of a series 
of stratagems which had made their power unshakeable. He wondered ironically at the 
`long catalogue of ... providences, 
by which the supream Being has conducted Robin & 
Horace Walpole into absolute power, & maintained them in it'. 87 
However accurate these hostile pictures may have been as a summary of Walpole's 
personal ascendancy over his colleagues, they do not give a full view of the process of 
cabinet discussion. Nor does the rival view of Horace Walpole, that policies were `not the 
Measures of a single Minister, but the joint Counsels of almost all the great Persons who 
surround the Throne, and are chief in Dignity and Office about the King'. 88 The truth lies 
somewhere between the two. In practice ministers and courtiers always presented varied 
views to the King. To counter this, Walpole's main resources were his access to George 
II, the trust built up over the years, and his own firm grasp of political and diplomatic 
realities. He advanced his arguments, though, mainly on the basis of summaries of 
diplomatic papers given to him by others, and on his private correspondence with his 
brother Horace, with Waldegrave, Keene and others. Vaucher, in a perceptive critique of 
Walpole's working methods, commented; `il n'aimait point ä gaspiller son temps dans le 
detail quotidien des affaires courantes'. 89 Regardless of his temperament, Walpole in any 
case lacked one major qualification for an involvement in all this daily detail. He did not 
even speak French, which was the language of diplomatic correspondence and of the 
envoys accredited to every court. The extent of his achievement despite this handicap was 
well summarised by Thomas Wyndham at the point when Walpole seemed about to fall. 
He was: 
an Extraordinary Man, who by the force of his own Genius made himself the 
first Minister in a Court, whose Language he could not speak, when his Rivals 
86 [Rev. J. Miller], Are These Things So?, 1740, p. 8. 
87 Bolingbroke to the Earl of Marchmont, 8 August (NS) 1740, BL Add Ms 37994, f. 5. 
88 [H. Walpole], The Grand QUESTION, Whether War, or no War, with SPAIN, 
Impartially Consider 'd: In DEFENCE of the present Measures against those that 
delight in War, 1739, p. 25. 
89 P. Vaucher, Robert Walpole et la Politique de Fleury 1731-1742 (1924), p. v. 
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were many & able, & the Intrigues of Favourites & women conspired to 
prejudice the Spirit of his Master. 90 
Walpole was not alone in his linguistic shortcomings. Even career diplomats did not 
always have a command of the main European languages, and it is a remarkable tribute to 
British insularity that, in a country ruled by a North German dynasty, so few politicians 
troubled to make their court by learning German. Carteret was the main exception to this 
rule of neglect. Despite the importance of Spanish diplomacy in these years, the Secretary 
of State in charge of the Southern Department, Newcastle, did not understand that 
language. 91 The bulk of all foreign material was translated by clerks into either French or 
English, and in any case only trade and consular documents, and intercepted 
ambassadorial letters, generally came into the office in Spanish. The time spent waiting 
for the translated version, though, was not the only nuisance. The translations themselves 
were not always good, according to St. Gil, who worried that at the British court the 
Spanish tongue `is used to be either adulterated or misunderstood'. 92 By not 
understanding the language, the Duke may well have been less aware of some of the 
nuances of Spanish thinking, and less understanding of their pride and punctilio. 
At least, however, Newcastle was fluent in the normal language of diplomacy, French, 
which Walpole was not. It is worth pausing over the rather curious fact that this great 
statesman did not understand the usual language of the very Court in which he was so 
successful, and the one which his master habitually spoke on public occasions. In an 
influential article in 1968 Gibbs rebutted the contention of Plumb that Walpole, like all 
George I's ministers, spoke French. 93 Gibbs sought to demonstrate, using rather indirect 
proofs, that Walpole could at most only read French, at least in the early part of the reign 
of George I. The direct testimony of a man such as Wyndham, who knew him personally, 
must have weight in confirming that Walpole never acquired a knowledge of that 
90 Walpole (Wolterton) Mss, Letters and Papers of Sir Robert Walpole (unfoliated), T. 
Wyndham to Earl of Radnor, copied in W. Harry, `a disinterested parish priest' of 
Llandaff, to the Earl of Orford, 21 October (OS) 1744. 
91 PRO SP 94/134 (unfoliated), Newcastle to Keene & Castres, 20 March (OS) 1739. 
92 PRO SP 94/206, f. 169, St. Gil to Geraldino, 17 June (NS) 1738. 
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language. Further proof can be found in a diplomatic episode involving the senior French 
official and long-serving British spy Francois Bussy, `101'. In February 1737 Bussy was 
to be sent to Britain as a `man of confidence' as an interim measure until the arrival of the 
new French ambassador de Cambis. Though every stage of 101's spying career was 
recorded in Newcastle's office, this was unknown to Bussy himself, as Waldegrave with 
some embarrassment confessed: 
When first our private Correspondence was begun, I was forced to give him 
the strongest Assurances that Nobody, besides Myself here, and Sr Robert 
Walpole, in England, knew any thing of the Matter; He insists still, upon its 
being kept in the same Chanel. He knows a little English; and has so good a 
Knack at Languages, that he will soon be able to talk with Sir Robert. '4 
If Walpole could not converse even in broken French with an important spy from the 
court of his leading European rival then we may conclude that he could not speak, and 
probably could not read, that language at all. This was not a crippling handicap, as 
Walpole's strength in foreign policy lay in his command of the wider view. Black has 
shown that, while Walpole may have lacked a detailed knowledge of foreign countries, he 
did have a firm grasp of some foreign policy essentials. He detected the essential patterns 
in the manoeuvrings of foreign diplomats, and he gauged the balance between foreign and 
domestic policy considerations. His judgement and political shrewdness, applied to an 
overview of foreign affairs, were an important part of the network of informal relations 
which led to decision-making. 95 
One can only speculate how much evidence of these personal interactions, and of cabinet 
divisions, disappeared when the great majority of the papers of Walpole were burnt on his 
fall from power. Walpole had, as a young politician in 1711, been menaced with 
impeachment and imprisoned in the Tower by the victorious Tory ministry. In 1742 he 
was finally toppled from office and faced with the prospect of another impeachment. He 
immediately burned large quantities of papers, and urged his friends and brother to do the 
same. ' Walpole's letters to his protege Benjamin Keene had already been burned, on the 
94 BL Add Ms 32794, if. 110-11, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 7 February (OS) 1737. 
95 J. M. Black, `An "Ignoramus" in European Affairs? ', British Journal for Eighteenth 
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minister's orders, before Keene gave up his post in Madrid and left Spain in 1739. Still 
others, no doubt relating to his most secret activities, were kept in a black box which 
never left Walpole's side, day or night, yet was found empty on his death. 97 Since 
Walpole, like George II, made his judgements on the basis of papers drawn up by others, 
and did most business by word of mouth, his manuscripts even had they survived might 
not have thrown a great deal of light on how the process of management worked. One 
insider summarised the documentary problem after Walpole's death: 
He was utterly averse to all voluntary Trouble & Business; what was 
necessary he dispatched with great Care & Vigour... His Memory was great 
& amazing; a few short hints were sufficient to supply [him] with Notice of all 
past Transactions. These I believe were ye whole [of] his own MS & 
therefore had they been preserved would have been insignificant. The Papers 
he had from others were of such a Nature, as made them ye proper Subjects 
of Destruction. Both he & his Brother during ye Ferment & Enquiry were too 
comprehensive in what they devoted to ye Flames. 98 
Prominent among Walpole's trusted correspondents, and a key member of the inner 
cabinet, was Lord Hardwicke, who was both valued by Walpole and indispensable to 
Newcastle. The Duke wrote in 1736 to his old friend the Lord Chancellor; `Dear 
Hardwicke, without you we are nothing'. ' At a critical point of the negotiations with 
Spain, the same note was struck: 
I have agreed to meet you tomorrow at Petersham at Ld. Harrington's. Sr. 
Robert & all of us begg you would not fail to be there, for Tomorrow's 
Meeting will determine ye fate of this great Affair. Pray, My Dear Lord, don't 
fail to come, Horace beggs you would be there by twelve o'clock. 100 
On the rare occasions when cabinet decisions were taken in Hardwicke's absence, it was a 
cause for apology. "' There is abundant evidence of the vital role played by the Lord 
Chancellor in healing the rifts within the inner circle, and moving the discussion 
9' BL Add Ms 4306, f. 75, Rev. Henry Etough to Rev. Thomas Birch, 6 August (OS) 1746. 
98 BL Add Ms 4306, f. 74, Rev Henry Etough to Rev Thomas Birch, 16 July (OS) 1746. 
99 BL Add Ms 35406, f. 19, Newcastle to Hardwicke, nd c. October 1736,. 
10° BL Add Ms 35406, if. 39-40, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 25 August (OS) 1738. 
101 BL Add Ms 35406, f. 152, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 28 September (OS) 1739. 
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forward. 102 Hardwicke of course had a significant workload in his capacity as Lord 
Chancellor, yet was also obliged to support Newcastle, in particular, with constant advice 
and reassurance on a wide range of government and diplomatic papers. 103 Newcastle was 
telling him only the simple truth when he wrote; `I can very truly say, I am never easy in 
my publick Capacity without your advice, & assistance'. 104 This could lead 
contemporaries to assume that Newcastle was `obsequious to this absolute authority', just 
as it was sometimes believed that Andrew Stone was the power behind the throne. '°5 
Neither was true, but certainly Hardwicke was a genuine friend to Newcastle. He was 
perhaps one of the few men of great judgement who could have gone on for years 
subordinating his own opinions to those of the duke. The lack of organised diplomatic 
archives put the onus of comment and knowledge on a few informed insiders such as 
Hardwicke. 106 In the absence of a permanent civil service, always on hand to provide 
background and analysis, ministers such as the indefatigable Hardwicke earned their 
places. He was consulted in person as much as on paper. He frequently met Walpole, 
sometimes alone, a fact which fuelled the suspicions of Newcastle, who was always liable 
to feel neglected or conspired against. More often he gathered with the other core 
members of the cabinet, to offer his advice on all current political issues. "" He refused 
one dinner invitation with the remark; `I know barely eating & drinking together is not the 
102 For example, BL Add Ms 35406, if. 39-40, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 25 August (OS) 
1738; BL Add Ms 35586, f. 129, Harrington to Hardwicke, 25 October (OS) 1738; BL 
Add Ms 35406, if. 219-20, Newcastle to Hardwicke 27 (July OS) 1740. 
103- BL Add Ms 32796, if. 319-20,324-5, Hardwicke to Newcastle, 28 December (OS) 1737; 
Newcastle to Waldegrave, 30 December (OS) 1737. A sample of his contribution could be 
gained by e. g. Hardwicke's extensive comments on treaty papers put forward by Horace 
Walpole, January 1738; BL Add Ms 9131, if. 199-271: on an earlier paper by Walpole, 
BL Add Ms 32692, f. 300: and his comments on a memorial by the Spanish Secretary of 
State, la Quadra; BL Add Ms 35884, if. 1-14. A few examples of his range can be seen in 
BL Add Ms 35875 passim, and his methodical approach to an extensive workload can be 
found in BL Add Ms 36051 and 36052. 
104 BL Add Ms 35406, f. 231, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 28 August (OS) 1740. 
105 BL Add Ms 4306, f. 179, Quotation H. Walpole to H. Etough, 1 September (OS) 1756. 
106 He was used as a treaty and legal dictionary on occasions; BL Add Ms 35406, if. 49-5 1, 
Newcastle to Hardwicke, 25 September (OS) 1738. 
107 CUL Ch (H) Corresp 2674, Hardwicke to Walpole, 17 March (OS) 1737,: BL Add Ms 
32693, if. 28-9, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 9 January (OS) 1740. 
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thing, unless we can have some time for political chat after dinner. 10' When discussions 
were in stalemate or ideas were at a premium, Hardwicke was particularly called upon. 
Newcastle wrote to him in typical vein: 
I this morning mett the Admirals att Sr. R. Walpole's. We had a great deal of 
Discourse, without coming to any Resolution but to dine att Chelsea with Sr 
R. W. on Monday next, where I must begg you would not fail to meet us. 109 
Even Hardwicke found the pressure of this constant attendance too much. In April 1740, 
having a very bad cold and being busy, he declined to attend some of the consultations of 
the inner circle, and defended himself with some asperity; `I firmly believe I have come to 
more nightly meetings than any man in the busy laborious Station, in which I am plac'd 
without any Assistance, ever did. ' ° From July 1740, the Lord Chancellor had the benefit 
of a country seat at which he could escape from some, at least of the pressures of his 
cabinet colleagues. He bought Wimpole Hall, the former house of Lord Oxford, in 
Cambridgeshire, and spent there most of the happiest hours of his life. ", It is noticeable 
from then on that he used every plea of health, or attendance on local political interest, to 
escape being called back to town from his rare, and short, holidays. 112 Much of 
Hardwicke's need for release came from the fact that he was regarded as an all-rounder, 
consulted not only on legal or related matters but on every aspect of policy, diplomacy 
and electioneering. 
Others played more specialised roles. The most notable instance perhaps was the leading 
minister's brother, Horace Walpole. His chief experience was in the sphere of diplomacy, 
and the making of treaties. Even his critics acknowledged Horace Walpole's expertise, 
though not without some degree of irony. Leading opposition politician William Pulteney 
wrote in 1731 to Francis Colman, the resident in Florence, to congratulate him on framing 
108 BL Add Ms 32692, f. 117, Hardwicke to Newcastle, 8 July (OS) 1739. 
109 BL Add Ms 35406, f. 137, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 6 August (OS) 1739. 
10 BL Add Ms 32693, f. 194, Hardwicke to Newcastle, 3 April (OS) 1740. 
"I BL Add Ms 35586, f. 270, Oxford to Hardwicke, 30 July (OS) 1740. 
112 During the Hanoverian neutrality crisis in the following year a positive volley of pleas and 
commands were needed to abridge his stay at Wimpole. One could instance, among many 
others, BL Add Ms 35407, if. 67-8,72-3,74-7, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 13 & 19 (two 
letters) August (OS) 1740. 
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a treaty; `The Great Horace himself I dare say could not have done better'. 113 A 
Craftsman leading letter in 1737 was a mock panegyric of Horace, and proposed to have 
his home, `the old treaty-house at Uxbridge' rebuilt and presented to him as Blenheim had 
been to Marlborough. 114 In a scurrilous rhymed pamphlet of 1740, he was still the brother 
`who Treaties makes so well'. ' 13 Mockery was the order of the day whenever Horace was 
mentioned, as he frequently was, in opposition writings. One satire addressed to the 
Prince of Wales promised not to sing Sir Robert's praises for money: 
First bid me swear, He's sound who has the plague, 
Or Horace rivals Stanhope at the Hague'16 
The embattled diplomat had merits, though, which his enemies overlooked. His surviving 
papers show the later Lord Walpole to have been an indefatigable drafter of projects, 
memorials and memoranda. " ' His particular ability lay in his marshalling of a clear 
chronological sequence of events, and his painstaking outlining of drafts of possible 
treaties. Hervey, with a characteristic combination of shrewdness and malice, dismissed 
him as `a very good treaty dictionary, to which his brother often referred', apart from 
which role `he was absolutely useless to his brother in every capacity'. ' $ By presenting a 
genuine strength as ridiculous, Hervey was able to dismiss the contribution of a man who 
was clearly a significant member of the ministerial team. Those who could command such 
skills were in demand. Even when abroad, Horace Walpole laid before the inner circle his 
drafts and proposals, and was kept constantly supplied with copies of all the 
correspondence in and out of the Secretary of State's office, which is no doubt why the 
bulk of his surviving papers bear such a resemblance to the Newcastle Papers and the 
State Papers Foreign. 19 When in England, Horace was treated as one of the small group 
involved in shaping the details of diplomacy. A letter from Newcastle in the spring of 
113 BL Add Ms 18915, f. 8, Pulteney to Colman, 25 August (NS) 1731. 
114 Craftsman, 28 May (OS) 1737. 
113 [R. Morris], Yes, They are..., 1740, p. 6. 
116 `Mr. Whitehead', Manners: a Satire (1739), p. 15. 
117 See for instance Wolterton (Walpole) Mss: Political Tracts (2 volumes); Original Drafts, 
1736-7; Projects, Letters &c.. 
118 Hervey, Memoirs, Vol 1, p. 285. 
119 BL Add Ms 15946, if. 34-5, Newcastle to Walpole, 11 September (OS) 1739. 
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1738, for instance, sent `dear Horace' various papers to be laid before Cabinet, including 
instructions to Lord Waldegrave, the British ambassador in Paris, which had been 
amended by Horace himself. He was to read them, present them to his brother, and 
arrange the time of meeting. In the meantime, Newcastle asked for assistance over the 
vexed issue of Oglethorpe's settlement in Georgia, disputed by Spain and likely to lead to 
conflict; `I should be Obliged to you, if you would sketch out something for Oglethorpe; I 
will be trying something myself. 120 
It was an established practice to circulate documents and drafts among the inner circle of 
ministers and advisers, and one who like Horace Walpole had a special expertise and was 
invited to draw up or amend such drafts was undoubtedly influential in forming ideas on 
policy. Horace's personality, like Newcastle's, could make him difficult to work with. He 
was prone to fancy his advice ignored and, though not slow to criticise others, was 
sensitive to slights. 12' Despite this, Horace was an important contributor to the ministerial 
effort, especially in the pamphlet war which raged between 1738 and 1740. He was an 
assiduous scribbler in the cause of government, marshalling arguments and facts 
indefatigably. 122 He had a didactic desire to place before his readers the full sequence of 
events, so that prejudice and vague assertion would be confounded: 
Tho there is no Country in the World in which matters relating to ye people in 
general are transacted in so publick a manner as they are in ours, yet there is 
hardly any place in which the Truth of publick Transactions is so little 
. 
known 
Sir Robert Walpole ordered the distribution, between 17 February and 16 March (OS) 
1739 of two magisterial pamphlets by his brother, The Convention Vindicated.. and The 
124 Grand Question... One opposition pamphleteer bemoaned this use of the government's 
120 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 219, Newcastle to H. Walpole, 3 April (OS) 1738. 
121 E. g. BL Add Ms 32788, f. 383, Newcastle to H. Walpole, 22 August (OS) 1738. 
122 See e. g. Wolterton (Walpole) Mss, Political Tracts. 
17' Wolterton (Walpole) Mss, Political Tracts, 'Note of Facts Relating to ye Expeditions for 
America', n. d., c. 1741, p. 1. 
124 [Horace Walpole], The Convention Vindicated from the Misrepresentations of the 
Enemies of our Peace (London, 1739); The Grand QUESTION, Whether War, or No 
War, with Spain... (London, 1739). Detailed circulation lists survive in CUL Ch (H) Mss 
P75/12-13. 
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resources, and belittled the ministerial writers: `their Fustian... is scattered and distributed 
gratis throughout the Land to vitiate and corrupt the lower Class of our People. 125 This 
was certainly no fair summary of these two particular performances by Horace Walpole, 
which are forcefully argued and closely reasoned. In The Grand Question, he presciently 
said that a war with Spain would not be a matter of seizing galleons groaning with 
treasure, but that it would be a privateering war. Since Britain had many rich trading ships 
upon the seas, and Spain few, it was not difficult to see where the balance of advantage 
would lie. The point was howled down by the opposition, but proved all too true a 
description of the war when it came. 126 The Grand Question won considerable praise as a 
performance. One friend of the government, the Rev. Henry Stough, was so impressed by 
`this excellent performance' that when he came to take notes on it in his private journal, 
he was insensibly led into transcribing the greater part of it. Looking back, he used the 
pamphlet as a litmus test of the influence of reason in politics: `This very instructive and 
prophetic pamphlet, as it had no influence on a mad and vain nation, is a memorable proof 
of the tenacious force of nonsense'. 127 
While he was by no means the power behind the throne which the graphic satirists and 
opposition writers of his day may have believed, then, Horace Walpole was a significant 
contributor to the thinking of the inner circle of ministers. In 1737 he was at the height of 
his powers. In the previous year he had turned down the chance to become Secretary of 
State for the Northern Department, though he was supported for the post by Queen 
Caroline as well as Sir Robert. Horace declined the promotion rather than have two 
brothers in two such great offices, but he relished the honour of the proposal. The 
incumbent Northern Secretary, Lord Harrington, was then too far out of favour to 
accompany the king to Hanover, where Horace duly went in his stead for seven months. 
'u Seventeen Hundred Forty-Two. Being a Review of the Conduct of the New Ministry the 
last Year (London, 1743), p. 10. 
126 The early development of this argument can be traced in BL Add Ms 9131, if. 236-7,244, 
H. Walpole, `Points, to be Consider'd, with Regard to the Depredations of Spain', 
January 1738. The opposition view of what the navy could do is discussed in P. L. 
Woodfine, `Ideas of naval power and the conflict with Spain, 1737-1742', in The British 
Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century (1988), eds. J. M. Black & 
P. L. Woodfine. 
127 BL Add Ms 9200, f. 67, Henry Rough's Journal. 
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He later recalled the elevated feelings with which he must have begun the year of 1737, 
since in Hanover; 
he has had the good fortune to conduct himself so as to meet with his Maty's 
approbation without the least frown or reproof during the whole time of his 
Ministry there. 12' 
Only after the death of Queen Caroline in November 1737 did he begin to lose the favour 
of the King, and to move slowly to the margins of the inner circle, as he lamented in a 
later autobiographical memoir. '" His written contributions continued, and were 
important, but he could no longer supplement these with the personal favour of the king. 
Another inner cabinet member, Lord Harrington, Secretary of State for the North, 
suffered from a loss of royal favour, when Queen Caroline put George II against him for 
being too close to Lord Chesterfield. Though he took care after that to devote himself 
only to the king, and indeed flattered the King's Hanoverian and army prejudices, 
Harrington found it hard to be trusted. 13° He gained most ground, and became a danger to 
his colleagues, after 1740 when ministerial divisions allowed him to gain greater influence 
with the King. As Hardwicke commented after one incident in which Harrington had 
advised George against cabinet policy; `That way of making Court in the Closet may now 
and then do little private Service to particulars, but must be a great Embarrassment to the 
Public Service'. "' Harrington eventually cast off the Walpoles through whom he had 
risen to office. Though he had used his influence to secure Harrington his employments, 
and twice managed to keep him in post when he was threatened with dismissal, Horace 
Walpole saw, with some bitterness, in 1740 that Harrington meant to break with him 
completely, and treat him badly. 132 Phlegmatic and undistinguished, Harrington was 
otherwise a minor figure in the ministry. Hervey dismissed him sharply; `he was absolutely 
nothing, nobody's friend, nobody's foe, of use to nobody and of prejudice to nobody... He 
128 BL Add Ms 9132, f. 96, 'Mr. Walpole's Apology'. 
129 BL Add Ms 9132, Coxe Papers Vol LV, `Mr. Walpole's Apology'. 
10 See above, p. 54. 
131 BL Add Ms 32692, f. 349, Hardwicke to Newcastle, 29 September (OS) 1739. 
132 HMC, Fourteenth Report, Trevor Mss, p. 79, H. Walpole to Trevor, 6 October (OS) 
1741. 
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was forgotten in his eminence, seen every day, and never mentioned'. 133 Horace Walpole 
junior was kinder. Lord Harrington, he said: 
understood both foreign affairs and the court; little of the constitution... He 
was very ambitious, civil, ceremonious, and a lover of pleasure. Never 
offended any party... was well with most. 134 
The Duke of Grafton, also a regular attender at the inner cabinet, worked hard to gain 
influence at court. His diplomacy was such that he rarely gave an intelligible answer for 
fear of offending. George II once told him `that his Grace was always balancing whether 
he should speak truth or flatter those whom truth would disoblige'. 135 Hervey may have 
been correct in his summary, based on long personal knowledge, of a man `who always 
blundered nor ever knew what he was about, and had lived in a Court all his life without 
knowing even the common forms of it'. 136 Yet, as Lord Chamberlain for almost the whole 
of George II's reign, Grafton was one of those courtiers who become necessary by habit 
and familiarity. It is not a bad thing to have second-rate talents in such positions. Only on 
the rare occasions when he tried his hand at intrigue was Grafton an obstacle to the work 
of the ministry. As the censor of theatrical productions from June 1737 he was 
undoubtedly of use. A good-looking man, he, like the Duke of Newcastle, made great 
court to the Princess Amelia. The younger Horace Walpole indeed hints that he succeeded 
in gaining her favours. When Queen Caroline died, Grafton and Newcastle had an 
incautious dispute, in front of Sir Robert Walpole, over which of them would now have 
the chief power. 137 The fact that Walpole's son later recorded this anecdote is good 
evidence that it made an impression on the leading minister at the time, and it may even 
mark the beginning of the split between Newcastle and Walpole. 
The policy contribution of Newcastle remains to be discussed, and will emerge more 
clearly in later chapters. Even his critics conceded that he was an extremely busy minister. 
His workload, and his consultation with others, were both extensive, as he chidingly told 
133 Hervey, Memoirs, Vol 1, p. 174. 
134 H. Walpole, Memoirs, p. 151. 
135 Hervey, Memoirs, Vol 1, p. 266. 
'36 Ibid., p. 28 1. 
137 Walpole, Memoirs, p. 152. 
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Horace Walpole; `You think here I have nothing to do. See what I write, & Consider, that 
that is the Result of the Qu., Sr. R. and often the Lords, and then think, what Time I 
have from Monday to Friday. ' 138 His working week was as long as that of anyone in the 
ministry: it was usual for ministers to go into the country on Friday evening, returning 
only on Monday. Newcastle was generally in the office before noon on Mondays, 
considered to be an assiduous approach. 139 Newcastle of course, as the principal Secretary 
of State, was involved at the highest level in all major political decisions, and was second 
only to Walpole in the ministry. The rift between the two men began early; according to 
Hervey, at the end of 1736.14° A comparatively rare surviving letter from Newcastle to 
Walpole in July 1737 is still affectionate and easy, but over the next two years relations 
deteriorated greatly. 141 The divergence between them came to the point of active rivalry 
when Walpole's position began to look weak, and the election year of 1741 saw division 
and discord in the cabinet. Even as early as 1737 however there was a crucial difference 
of view between the two about the policy to be pursued towards Spain. 142 Newcastle was 
veering towards the idea of punishing Spanish depredations, and was led into taking a 
legalistic and, as it turned out, mistaken view of the treaty position between the two 
nations. Walpole on the other hand was insistent on doing anything to avoid an open 
rupture between the two powers. By early 1739 there was no doubt of the conflict 
between them. Newcastle was bidding for independence, even supremacy, and jealously 
watched for dissent or challenge. Every hint of lukewarm support became disloyalty. 
His habitual insecurity was aggravated by the shocking rise in his personal debts. 143 In 
these years he was going through a major financial crisis and time of stress. Henry 
Pelham, called upon in January 1737 for yet another pledge of security for his brother's 
138 BL Add Ms 32788, f. 386, Newcastle to H. Walpole, 22 August (OS) 1735. 
139 PRO SP 107/21 (unfoliated), Cambis to Amelot, 10 February (NS) 1738; PRO SP 
107/24 (unfoliated), Hop to VanderHeim, 3 February (NS) 1739; BL Add Ms 40287, f. 1, 
Wager to Vernon, 8 July (OS) 1739. 
140 Hervey, Memoirs, Vol 3, pp. 829-31. 
141 BL Add Ms 32795, f. 156, Newcastle to Walpole, 8 July (OS). 
142 A summary of the duke at this point of his career, deeply considered and beautifully 
written, is R. Browning, The Duke of Newcastle (1975), pp. 80-88. 
143 R. A. Kelch, Newcastle. A Duke without Money: Thomas Pelham Holles, 1693-1768 
(1974), chap 3 gives an exhaustive account. 
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debts, was driven to write an unusually frank letter of admonition. It contained a warning 
of loss of office which must often have sounded in Newcastle's imagination in the 
following years: `if by any accident, there should be removals att Court, think, Dear 
Brother, what a condition you would be in'. 144 In June 1738 Newcastle's estate was 
placed in trust, a piece of major financial surgery to rescue the duke from his own 
improvidence. Debts continued to mount until the temporary relief of the Pelham Family 
Settlement, signed on 17 November (OS) 1741. This was a complex deal involving buying 
out the interest of Lord Vane in the Newcastle estate. 145 Even this was to be only a 
palliative, but it put an end to the most acute time of financial hardship. Newcastle 
claimed to be more distressed about his plight than his fecklessness led people to believe: 
`I feel more, than my best friends know or believe, & what is the worst of all, no 
Misfortunes are so great, as those that one brings upon oneself'. 146 This financial anxiety 
added to his reliance on his tolerant brother Henry Pelham and on Hardwicke, who was 
invaluable both as a lawyer and as a sincere friend. 147 It must also have added to 
Newcastle's insecurities, and his concern whenever others seemed to be forming alliances 
from which he was excluded. He complained to Hardwicke after one cabinet meeting: 
I must own I was extreemly hurt, to find myself so universally blamed the 
other Night by all my best Friends, and as I knew I intended nothing more, 
but as Chavigny says, de constater nos principes. The Opposition I mett with 
from a certain Quarter, I thought no good Omen for our future 
Proceedings. 149 
In November of that year Newcastle received some frank advice from Walpole's old 
tutor, Francis Hare, Bishop of Chichester. Hare had been talking with Walpole about the 
recent clash between him and Newcastle over the appointment of Lord Hervey to be Lord 
Privy Seal. Chichester warned Newcastle to be reconciled with Walpole, and to be wary 
of the blandishments of his friends among the Patriot opposition: 
144 Pelham to Newcastle, 14 January (OS) 1737, cited in Kelch, Newcastle, p. 86. 
143 Ibid., pp. 96-8. 
146 BL Add Ms 35407, f. 16, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 25 March (OS) 1741. 
147 BL Add Ms 35407, f. 65, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 8 August (OS) 1741. 
148 BL Add Ms 35406, f. 126, Newcastle to Hardwicke March 1739. 
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Sr R. said a great deal of matters between you & him for 3 years past, and 
how hard it was for him to live with you... But as these misunderstandings, as 
far as I can judge, seem all to have arisen from yr Grace's uneasiness, that he 
should have the lead... [Chichester advises, one: ] that while Sr R. is in the 
King's Service you can be but second: the other, that whenever his death or 
any other Incident shall make it be thought necessary to take in any of the 
Patriots, they will never suffer you to be the first. 149 
The main reason that Walpole had grounds for complaint was that from 1737 onwards the 
pattern of politics was shaped by diplomacy, in which Newcastle had some considerable 
advantages over his superior and rival. Though Walpole was little interested in the 
minutiae of diplomatic correspondence, these were the central concern of the Secretary of 
State. Newcastle was thoroughly conversant with the affairs not only of his own 
department but the northern as well, and by 1737 was a diplomat of long experience. He 
had set in place over a number of years a meticulously thorough office routine, aided by 
Under Secretaries of great abilities in Andrew Stone and John Couraud. lso At any given 
time, Newcastle had the fullest diplomatic information, though not necessarily the clearest 
overview of its significance. Like all ministers, he benefited from the system of 
departmental accountability, answering directly to the king, and having within the scope 
of his office considerable independence. The Duke certainly felt himself licensed to vary 
the policy advice being sent to envoys abroad. In June 1738 Hardwicke sent to Newcastle 
a note marked `Fail not to burn this letter', in which he revealingly urged the Duke now to 
give Keene in Madrid instructions fully in line with the views of Cabinet. " Newcastle 
hoarded all his correspondence, even the most indiscreet, so this small sign of tensions 
within the inner circle survives. 
The interactions of these individual ministers, their shifting perceptions of issues and their 
different roles and contributions, are essential to an understanding of politics and of 
149 BL Add Ms 32692, f. 450, Chichester to Newcastle 8 November (OS) 1739. On Hare, a 
useful recent article is A. Pettit, `The Francis Hare controversy of 1732', British Journal 
for Eighteenth-Century Studies, 17,1,1994, pp. 41-54. Pettit, `A Various Opposition: 
History and Rhetoric in the War on Walpole', unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Washington, 
1991, pp. 161-77. 
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cabinet government in these years. To these we must add the external play of forces 
acting upon them and their friends and enemies, forces which included the interests of 
foreign powers, the actions of indisciplined guardacostas and Spanish colonial governors, 
the self-interested pressures of the South Sea Company and the orchestrated howls of 
public opinion. These forces were fully unleashed in the autumn of 1737, the restraints 
torn off by a protest from the leading London merchants. 
75 
Chapter 3 Depredations and their Context 
The merchant protest against Spanish aggressions took the form of a cleverly written 
petition to the King, presented on 6 October (OS) 1737.1 The vehemence of feeling over 
depredations found the government surprised and divided. Though Newcastle took alarm 
early, not all ministers could at the outset believe that a narrowly-based merchant 
complaint would swell to a national protest. The issue of British trade in the West Indies 
was a vexed one. On the one hand were the depredations of the Spanish guards costas, a 
motley force of heavily armed patrol ships, set up by Patirno in 1722. To set in the balance 
against those was the admitted (and extensive) illicit trade of the British merchants and 
their colonial counterparts. Keene commented; `all allow that the American Seas were 
never more filled with illicite Traders of all Nations than they are at present'. 2 This trade 
was all the more resented because the fateful trading concessions made in the Treaty of 
Utrecht (1713) still rankled with the Spanish court. The Utrecht negotiations had involved 
Britain abandoning support for the pretender to the Spanish crown, Charles of Austria, 
who had been willing to offer Britain extensive legal trading rights without using the 
device of the asiento de negros, the right (but also the duty) to furnish slaves to the 
Spanish overseas possessions. Philip, to secure his crown, conceded to Bolingbroke (the 
later scourge of ministerial weakness towards Spain) an asiento of thirty years rather than 
the customary ten. 
As Bolingbroke frankly boasted, the asiento concession was mainly a cover for entry into 
the lucrative Spanish trade. 3 Philip also, in the Asiento Treaty's Article 42, gave the 
company the extraordinary privilege of the Annual Ship. 4 This official company ship, of 
500 tons, had the right to trade at the time of the great annual trade fairs in central 
America. Very soon, this privilege was opened to abuse. By a convention of 1716 the 
official ship was allowed to be of 1,000 tons, and its cargo was allowed to be sold without 
waiting for the arrival of the Spanish galleons. The ship became a floating warehouse, 
Printed as Appendix 2. 
2 BL Add Ms 32796, f. 244, Keene to Newcastle, 13 December (NS) 1737. 
3 7.0. McLachlan, Trade and Peace with Old Spain 1667-1750 (1940), p. 61. 
'` Ibid, pp. 71-74; R. Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739-1763 (1936; repr 
1963), pp. 10-12. 
repeatedly refilled from those which sailed along with it. 5 Even before the worst effects of 
this `smugglers' charter' had become apparent, the pure principles of monopoly had been 
infringed. In Philip's desperate need to secure his dynasty he had made concessions at 
Utrecht which were, in Walker's summary, the only example of a `foreign power's 
effective yet legitimate penetration into the very heart of the Spanish trading system'. 6 
Under the influence of the bustling Patifto, Spain attempted to limit the damage caused by 
these concessions and insist on its own understanding of legal trading and fair sailing. 
Successive ministers attempted to carry through the rebuilding of the Spanish economy 
which Patino had begun. 7 The favoured way to achieve this was through inflexible 
Spanish-centred policies. High and increasing taxes were to be levied on trade, especially 
that in silver and gold. Above all, the doctrine of colonial monopoly was to be upheld in 
full rigour. The principal idea was to exclude all foreigners from the trade to Spain's 
overseas empire, in theory Spain's exclusive possession ever since the 1494 Treaty of 
Tordesillas. The first decree prohibiting foreign trading came in 1501, and by the decree 
of Carlos V in 1538 the doctrine of exclusive Spanish trading was in full force! This old 
theory of an entirely Spanish-dominated American empire was revivified after the Spanish 
Succession War. At first sight this might seem to be contradicted by the commercial 
provisions of the 1713 treaties. As Walker remarks; `British merchants, after the Peace of 
Utrecht, found themselves in a stronger position than they had ever been in before to 
penetrate the forbidden market of the Spanish Indies'. 9 This apparent exception, and the 
constant irritations that arose from it, merely increased the determination of the Spanish 
court to restore the purity of the old ideal. It was for this reason that it was risky in the 
late 1730s to press for changes in the rules of Caribbean trade. If the existing situation 
was disturbed, British commerce stood to lose, since any redefinition would have to take 
account of the entrenched Spanish position on colonial monopoly. If the Spanish 
s C. Nettels, `England and the Spanish-American Trade, 1680-1715', Journal of Modern 
History, 3,1, March 1931, p. 31. See G. H. Nelson, `Contraband Trade under the Asiento, 
1730-1739', American Historical Review, 51,1945-6, pp. 55-67. 
6 G. J. Walker, Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade] 700-1789, p. 74. 
7 A. Castillo, `Coyuntura y crecimiento de la economia Espaßola el el siglo XVIII', 
Hispania, 117,1,1971, pp. 31-54. 
8 G. -B. Gonzalez, Cadiz y el Atlantico, pp. 95-7. 
9 Walker, Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade, p. 71. 
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authorities were compelled to look closely into any of the existing commercial or 
diplomatic relationships, in fact, the result was likely to be a stricter regime for the future. 
In Old Spain too, Keene complained that `the consequence of this Court's making 
inspection into any sort of Disputes of this nature, generally ends in some Infringement 
more or less material of our ancient Usages and Privileges'. 10 One such incident, 
construed as a small but irritating slight to King George, was that in which Consul Parker 
in Coruna was compelled to take down the King's arms from his gate, and hang them only 
within, out of public sight. " 
The doctrine of monopoly had repercussions even within Spain. In order to make it 
possible to police the payment of royal imposts, all trade was to go through specific ports. 
In 1717 Cadiz was established as the monopoly port for all trade to and from America. In 
theory, this would make it impossible for there to be any evasion of royal duties, though 
ships might always have to call in at other ports through stress of weather, enemy attack 
or other excuse. In practice, Cadiz managed to preserve a level of 85 percent of all trade. 
Even so, the incentive to evade the sometimes swingeing royal dues is clear: roughly 88 
percent of outward sailings went from Cadiz, but only 82 percent of returning vessels 
came into that port with its army of royal tax inspectors: the lucrative cargoes of gold and 
silver provided greater incentives to avoid scrutiny. 12 The essential weakness of the 
Spanish policy was that it relied on tight restrictions and high taxation, rather than on 
providing incentives to colonial expansion. Indeed a great concern of successive 
administrations was to prevent the settlement of the Indies by non-Iberians. 
Such a Castille-centred, apparently exploitative, policy was likely to create resentment not 
only among the American colonists of other powers but also among Spain's own colonial 
subjects. The profits of trade were meant to go uniquely to Spanish subjects, even to the 
exclusion of colonial-born sons of Spanish traders and planters. For these reasons, 
colonists and traders were almost driven to avoid royal controls. Given the distances 
involved and the poor condition of the Spanish navy, these restrictions could not in any 
10 BL Add Ms 32796 f. 312; PRO SP 94/130 (unfoliated), Keene to Newcastle, 6 January 
(NS) 1738. 
BL Add Ms 32796, f. 12, Newcastle to Keene, 7 January (OS) 1738; BL Add Ms 32797, 
ff. 86-7, Keene to Newcastle, February 23 (NS) 1738. 
12 Gonzalez, Cadiz y el Atlantico, table of shipping movements 1717-1765, p. 111. 
78 
case be upheld in the form demanded by the inflexible theories of Spanish policy makers. 
Throughout the eighteenth century the rigid fiscal regime was uniformly pronounced by 
commentators to be the central problem of empire, but it remained intact and its levies 
regularly increased. The ancient doctrine of monopoly remained the foundation of Spanish 
mercantilist policy. 13 Of course, the monopoly was dented by extensive illegal trading. 
And it was altogether broken by the unique legal rights given to a British trading company 
to share in, and in practice to undermine, the general prosperity of Spanish colonial trade. 
As these rights had been expressly granted for a limited term of years, only a generation in 
the course of long centuries of trade, Spanish officials seem always to have regarded the 
South Sea Company's intrusions as a temporary irritant. This was an enduring Bourbon 
doctrine of monopoly, breached for a time by fateful and long-resented commercial 
engagements with Britain at Utrecht. This outlook helps to explain why the depredations 
of overseas Spanish vessels on British shipping were not simply negotiable, and were not 
merely incidental excesses which could be easily squashed from Madrid. 
A problem which was clear at every stage was the difficulty of bringing cases such as this 
to a resolution. British accounts of the atrocities committed, and the pure intentions of the 
traders concerned, were not the same as legal proofs. Nor were legal proofs necessarily 
easy to provide in the cumbersome and often corrupt system of Spanish colonial justice. 
Under the Asiento treaty, the interests of the Company were supposedly protected by the 
hire of Spanish officials to judge all cases involving disputes between the Company and 
Spanish subjects. The juez conservador, or judge conservator, was in theory a safeguard 
to prevent the Company being overreached in an alien system of law. In practice, they 
were usually very severe upon the Asientists in any disputes. 14 A further aggravation of 
the problems caused by this clumsy system was the ruling of the Viceroy of Mexico in 
1727, that the South Sea Company's Judge Conservator should only have passive 
jurisdiction, that is, where the Company was a defendant. Since, as a large-scale creditor, 
the Company was almost always a plaintiff in its actions, this was to deny it redress. 15 
13 Ibid pp. 119-139,194-207. 
14 A. S. Alton, `The Asiento Treaty as Reflected in the Papers of Lord Shelburne', Hispanic 
American Historical Review, 8,1928, pp. 170-1. 
'S BL Add Ms 33032, f. 41, `Heads of Sundry Matters Necessary to the Establishment of 
the Assiento Trade... '. 
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Frictions between the South Sea Company and the Spanish crown were a constant of the 
years 1713 to 1739.16 When merchants sued for compensation in old Spain, they were 
invariably told to produce documentary proof of their loss, which could be provided only 
by notaries on the spot where the seizure and sale took place. As the local Spanish 
governors sometimes intimidated notaries into refusing to draw up the necessary autos 
(proceedings), the legalism of the Spanish tribunals could be seen as special pleading, if 
not a violation of natural justice. " To some extent the delays of Spanish law were 
inevitable and proper. The courts would not decide on property rights or compensation 
without hearing both parties in the case, and even Spanish shipowners suffered from this 
procedural delay. As one sufferer commented; `Demands, when once the opportunity is 
slip't, and that they are grown old, are long a recovering in America, & commonly lost. s1$ 
To some extent, too, the system was distorted by corruption and obstruction overseas. 
Guarda costa captains had strong reasons to be uncooperative and colonial governors and 
judges often acted in a partial manner. Captured ships would have been sold along with all 
their contents long before an enquiry into their seizure could be successfully concluded. 
These local and essentially small-scale transgressions however were not the stuff of which 
eighteenth century wars were usually made. Nonetheless, the disputes over the 
depredations issue and over the boundaries of Georgia and Florida were fundamental to 
relations between the two powers. Conflict in America had actually been more likely 
under the influence of Patino, but the issue was still capable of generating mistrust and 
anxiety both in America and in Europe. The long-standing dispute was about whether 
James Oglethorpe's colony of Georgia, begun in 1732, was within the bounds of British 
territory, formerly the Carolinas, or encroached upon the boundaries of Spanish Florida. 
The boundaries, at least the westward frontiers, claimed by all the North American 
colonies were only sketchily laid out at this time. Georgia had been successfully 
established within the shadowy southern limits of the undoubtedly legal colony of the 
Carolinas, and Oglethorpe at least could see no shred of a legal claim to it which Spain 
might make. 19 No British ministers seem to have contemplated giving up a colony named 
16 L. E. M. Batchelor, `The South Sea Company and the Assiento', thesis abstract, Bulletin of 
the Institute of Historical Research, 3,1925-6, pp. 128-30. 
17 BL Stowe Ms 256, if. 86-8, Newcastle to Keene, 5 June (OS) 1732. 
is PRO SP 107/29 (unfoliated), de Mugaguren to de la Quintana, 15 July (NS) 1739. 
19 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 52, Oglethorpe to Newcastle, 8 February (OS) 1738. 
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after their King. George had firmly made it clear that the colony would . always 
be under 
his sovereignty and protection. 20 The treaty position might be rather dubious, but, as 
Newcastle said; `I fancy however the Right may be, it will now be pretty difficult to give 
up Georgia'. 2' But there was still room to negotiate over its precise limits. In America, 
after many skirmishes and mutual accusations, Oglethorpe and the Spanish Governor of 
St. Augustine had drawn up an agreement on 11 October (OS) 1736 to live amicably 
together and abide by boundary decisions to be made by their respective courts. ' This did 
not prevent rumours of a supposed Spanish expedition against Georgia, a belief in which 
persisted during 1736 and 1737. Such an expedition does seem to have been seriously 
planned by Patino. ' 
One part of his design - it could hardly have been a central one - was placed in the hands 
of a London-born French adventurer posing as an Irishman. The supposed Irishman 
`Miguel Wall', real name John Savy, was one of those adventurers who throve on 
international disputes, and who repeatedly surface in the papers of the diplomats and 
ministers, offering military intelligence, weapons inventions or surefire ways to take 
colonial possessions. Savy was a rogue, who fled his debts by going to Carolina where he 
committed a murder and so decamped to Dieppe (in August 1735), and from there to 
Paris. Being destitute he there offered an account of the colony of Georgia to the Spanish 
envoy, and was paid by Patino to tell his story in Madrid. 24 He entered the Spanish service 
under his alias of Wall as a guarda costa captain. According to his own account he was 
charged by Patino himself to take all British traders, whether legal or not, and captured 
several British merchant ships. Shortly before Christmas 1736 Wall turned up in Port 
Royal, Jamaica, where a South Sea Company factor, Leonard Cocke, plied him with drink 
and discovered his plans. These consisted of little more than issuing a proclamation in 
20 BL Add Ms 32795, f. 24, Newcastle to Keene, 5 May (NS) 1737. 
21 BL Add Ms 35406, f. 50, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 25 September (OS) 1738. 
22 `... quedaran en una profond Paz, amorosa y amigable Correspondencia, y no se 
molestar5n los unos a los otros en ningun Modo ni Maniere, hasta que las dos respectivas 
Cortes determinen sobra esta Materia. ' BL Add Ms 32794, f 253-9, Mr. Martyn, 
secretary to Georgia Trustees, to Newcastle, 9 February (OS) 1737. 
23 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 88, Keene to Newcastle, 23 February (NS) 1738. 
24 BL Add Ms 32796, if. 46-7, Copy of Mr. John Savy to the Honble. the Trustees for 
establishing the Colony of Georgia, 22 October (NS) 1737. PRO SP 94/206, f 19-20, 
Geraldino to Torrenueva, London 12 December (NS) 1737. 
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Georgia to give freedom and a reward to all slaves who would join a rebellion. Still, the 
possibility that Spain might mount an expedition could not be ignored, and all concerned 
were duly put on the alert . 
2' Too much on the alert, in fact, for the Company's factors. 
They were angry at the spreading of news which would make it more difficult, and far 
more expensive, for them to hire shipping. 26 
By the early summer Keene was confident that there was nothing in all this talk, accepting 
the assurance of la Quadra that it was merely the legacy of one of Patino's erratic 
projects. Philip V disclaimed all knowledge of Wall, assuring Keene that no orders had 
been given for any attack. Keene remarked; `I do not perceive that there is half that 
prejudice and violence in their Counsels and Proceedings, which reigned but too visibly in 
them for several years last past'. 27 Pacific counsels continued broadly to prevail, though 
Spanish ministers, under the spell of the doctrine of exclusive possession, were still keen 
to protect their interests and robustly to assert their rights in North America. Unease was 
registered in Madrid when in June 1737 Oglethorpe, then in England, was named 
Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in South Carolina. 28 In August a `very 
extraordinary Memorial' was presented to Newcastle by Don Thomas Geraldino, making 
stout claims on South Carolina and Georgia, and threatening hostilities in case of a 
refusal. 29 The Secretary of State's reply was to make a firm but moderate representation 
in Madrid, and to send a naval detachment to South Carolina, with a battalion from the 
Gibraltar garrison. Newcastle was quite clear, though, that this was merely a precaution, 
and trusted in the pacific intentions of his opposite number la Quadra. 30 Even the more 
active Spanish minister Torrenueva, blamed by Newcastle for the meddling policy in 
25 BL Add Ms 32794, if. 248-9, Commodore Digby Dent to Newcastle, 8 January (NS) 
1737, enclosing a letter from Cocke, 3 November (NS) 1736. 
26 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 273, Unnamed correspondent in Kingston, Jamaica, to Walter 
Jenkins of Bristol, 20 February (OS) 1737. 
27 BL Add Ms 32795, if. 90-1, Keene to Newcastle, 10 June (NS) 1737. 
28 BL Add Ms 32795, if. 132-3, Newcastle to Keene, 23 June (OS) 1737. 
29 Wolterton (Walpole) Mss, Papers of Lord Harrington 1737-9 (unfoliated), Harrington to 
H. Walpole, 30 August (OS) 1737. 
30 BL Add Ms 32795, if. 303-8, Newcastle to Keene, 12 September (OS) 1737. 
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Georgia, disavowed the rumours of an invasion, and believed them to have been begun by 
Oglethorpe himself, to secure reinforcement from home. 31 
This did not, however, prevent Patino's mischief reaching beyond the grave. Later that 
year, his agent `Wall' was cashiered from the Spanish service for striking an officer. He 
returned to England, surrendering himself to the British vessel Grampus, and tried to 
secure for himself some friends. His first hope was to win favour with the Georgia 
trustees by revealing the supposed Spanish plot against the colony in which he said he had 
been involved. 32 His second was to `doe his Country service' by helping Pulteney, Perry 
and the London merchants. 33 Newcastle had this self-styled patriot arrested in early 
December 1737, and Walpole was told Savy's chequered history by Geraldino on 17 
December (NS). Soon after his release, Wall printed in the Craftsman an emotive letter, 34 
part of a campaign to suggest that there was on foot a Spanish expedition against the 
English settlement in Georgia. 35 The letter purported to be an account of depredations 
and invasion threats sent home from the Caribbean by an honest and patriotic trader: `I 
can't tell how things may be at Home, whether Peace or War, but I am sure 'tis open War 
here on their Parts'. The printing of the letter throws light on the methods of the 
opposition press and their City allies, since the original document must have been known 
to be a fabrication. 
The idea of `open War' was used by the opponents to press for decisive action from the 
ministry in November 1737, and the sense of crisis and disorder was heightened by every 
means that lay to hand. Newcastle warned Geraldino bluntly that the vocal parliamentary 
opposition would prevent any concession over Georgia. 36 The business of the opposition 
was to discredit Walpole and secure his fall by using the pressure of public opinion. The 
31 CUL Ch (H) Corresp 2697, Intercepted letter, Geraldino to Torrenueva, 13 June (NS) 
1737. 
32 BL Add Ms 32796, f. 47, Savy to the Georgia Trustees, 22 October (NS) 1737. 
33 CUL Ch (H) Corresp 2725, Information of John Cooper, Townshend packet boat, to 
Walpole, 24 December (OS) 1737,. 
34 PRO SP 94/206, f. 29, Geraldino to Torrenueva, 19 December (NS) 1737. 
;s Printed as Appendix 3. 
36 Simancas, Estado, Legajo 6902 (unfoliated), Geraldino to la Quadra, 2 January (OS) 
1738. 
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business of the City merchants was to gain a complete freedom for their trade, licit and 
illicit, in the Caribbean. In their well-publicised representations to the Cabinet and 
Parliament in October and November 1737 the main point which they stressed was the 
freedom of navigation. 37 This was a point of principle, and one with considerable 
resonance given Britain's naval history and national pride. The self-image of the British 
nation in the 1730s can be seen in the numerous graphic prints in which they are defined 
as beer-drinking, meat-eating and independent as opposed to the slavish subjects of 
catholic despots (especially of course the French) who wore clogs, were dominated by 
priests and ate frogs and soupe mafgre. 
A specific and powerful aspect of this self-image was based upon the defeat of the 
Spanish Armada and the buccaneering exploits of Raleigh, Hawkins and Drake. For one 
great Victorian historian, writing perhaps the most widely read history book of his day, 
the conflict with Spain in the 1730s was an aggresive protestant imperialism, a policy 
continuous with that of Elizabeth and Cromwell. 38 In reality, the conditions were very 
different, as Kenneth Andrews has shown. 39 The power relationships involved were rarely 
considered in this rhetoric of naval conquest. One pamphleteer, after three years of war, 
tardily took note of them. He commented that in the days of Cromwell the French had 
been our allies, yet even so the Spanish had taken over 300 of our merchant ships in each 
year of war. 40 In a world of more highly organised navies and far more strongly fortified 
colonial towns, the haphazard buccaneering of men such as Hawkins was no longer 
possible. What the shrill public voice ignored, too, was the fact that those glorious days, 
as Horace Walpole pointed out, had had their share of failures. 41 Despite the more 
37 The petition, presented in form on 11 October (OS) 1737, was enclosed along with 
numerous supporting papers in BL Add Ms 32796, ff. 77-94, Newcastle to Keene, 4 
November (OS) 1737, and is reproduced as Appendix 1. See also PRO SP 98/129 
(unfoliated), `A Short State of the Several Seizures and Violences complained of by the 
Merchants of London trading to the British Plantations in America & which were laid 
before the Lords of the Councill in support of their Petition.... 
38 J. R. Seeley, The Expansion of England (1883), p. 93. 
39 K. R. Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering. English Privateering during the Spanish War 
1585-1603 (1964), pp. 171-5. 
40 `Philalethes', The Profit and Loss of Great-Britain and Spain, from the Commencement 
of the Present War, to this Time, impartially stated (1742), pp. 49-50. 
41 Wolterton (Walpole) Mss, H. Walpole, `Note of facts relating to ye Expeditions for 
America', p. 49. 
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complex reality, however, the idea of a naval war which would finance itself by the 
seizure of booty persisted through the seventeenth century. 42 Indeed the images of Drake 
and Elizabeth were still being pressed into service when war was called for against Spain 
in 1790.43 The appeal of the Elizabethan period was its simple and belligerent view of 
Britain's power: 
Britannia's Figure once could Passion move, 
And Princes either fear'd or sought her Love. 
When fam'd Eliza gave one single Nod, 
The Spaniard bow'd, nay cring'd and fear'd her Rod. ` 
It was axiomatic, for those who indulged in these simple visions, that Britain's `formidable 
flag' which had done these deeds should still rule the waves. `3 As Common Sense averred, 
`we are able to blow any that shall insult us out of the Sea'. 46 
Any claim by Spain to the Americas, based on medieval papal authority, was of course 
indignantly rejected. Furthermore there was a well developed belief in the cowardice and 
inferiority of the Spaniards, and the lucrative spoils to be had by seizing their treasure. 
Ten years earlier, Britons had been told: 
The Learned in Politicks have an ancient Way of Talking (as old as Queen 
Elizabeth) about England's making War, which (with a little Amendment) 
reads thus: ENGLAND may gain by a War with France, but never Loses by 
a war with SPAIN. 47 
Spain could not be allowed to challenge British, ships in the American seas unless the 
government was prepared to admit that modern Britons had degenerated from their brave 
42 D. Davies, `The Birth of the Imperial Navy? Aspects of English Naval Strategy c. 1650- 
90', in Parameters of British Naval Power 1650-1850, ed. M. Duffy (1992), p. 21. 
43 J. M. Black, `Naval Power, Strategy and Foreign Policy 1775-1791', in Parameters of 
British Naval Power, p. 112. 
44 London Evening Post, 17 April (OS) 1739. 
45 [A. Boyer], Political State of Great Britain XLII, November 1731, p. 548. 
46 Common Sense, 18 February (OS) 1738. This mentality is discussed in P. L. Woodfine, 
`Ideas of naval power and the conflict with Spain, 1737-1742', in The British Navy and 
the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century, (1988), eds. J. M. Black & P. L. 
Woodfine. 
47 [Anon], The Evident Advantages to Great Britain and its Allies from the Approaching 
War: Especially in Matters of Trade (1727), p. 15. 
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ancestors. " The Spaniards were always bullies when they felt that they. could get away 
with it, but; `no sooner did our brave English Sailors shew their Faces, and the British 
flag been display'd on their Coasts, than they have as readily drawn in their Horns, and 
shewn themselves the most abject, humble, suppliant people living. " Given this emotive 
view of the Spaniards and of the mighty British navy, an appeal to the freedom of the seas 
was likely to cause the most embarrassment to the government and have the widest 
national support. 
The best prospect of long-term harmony consisted in a full renegotiation of territorial and 
commercial issues, a fact recognised by George II and his ministers. What they may have 
appreciated less clearly was the fact that colonial disturbances were not accidental but 
rather were central to the Spanish conception of their imperial role. Spanish responses to 
events were shaped by a long-held belief in their monopoly rights and also by a tender 
respect for the pride and power of the ruling house. Keene saw and feared the 
intractability of Philip and Elizabeth on these points, which could so easily overthrow any 
pragmatic considerations, but he tended to ascribe it to the strange personalities involved: 
These People are certainly not content with what passes in America, neither 
are they in a condition to support an expensive Engagement; but 
considerations of this sort do not always hinder them from precipitating 
themselves into it; and notions of Injustices done them will make stronger 
impressions upon minds like these than the bad state of their Finances. " 
Even as Keene wrote in October of the tranquillity of Madrid, letters were on the way to 
him from Newcastle which would trigger just such notions of injustices, and were to set 
the tone for the next two years of diplomatic endeavour. The President of the Council of 
Jamaica, closely linked to the City of London merchants, and not an official to be 
neglected, had written to the Secretary of State enclosing detailed complaints against the 
Governor of Porto Rico. Newcastle forwarded the papers to Keene, with orders to send 
48 [Anon], The British Sailor's Discovery, or, the Spanish Pretensions Confuted (1739), p. 
2; see Common Sense, or The English Man's Journal, 22 July (OS) 1738. 
49 Capt. Jinkins, Spanish Insolence Corrected by English Bravery. Being an Historical 
Account of the many Signal Naval Achievements Obtained by the English over the 
Spaniards from the Year 1350 to the present Time... (1739), pp. 2-3. 
50 BL Add Ms 32794, f. 341, Keene to Newcastle, 22 April (NS) 1737. 
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the strongest memorial on this individual case (of Captain Curtis of the St. James, taken 
on 12 May near Porto Rico). He was also to send; 
a short abstract of all the complaints of this nature, that have been made by 
you for these last two years, of the Answers that have been returned to them, 
and of the redress and satisfaction that His Majesty's Subjects have received 
thereupon. " 
Keene did urge the case in very strong terms, though his letters survive in the archives of 
the Spanish Secretary of State without the comment or replies that would have been 
common in the corresponding English office papers. La Quadra was a cautious bureaucrat 
who offered little initiative. With the King's mental indisposition growing, their Catholic 
Majesties were transacting little business. 52 What was done was done slowly, said Keene: 
`Your Grace will hardly believe that by the present form of Government, Matters of this 
nature must be sent four times to Madrid and back again before I can have an Answer in 
form'. s3 
Keene was not surprised that Newcastle should not be able to understand the present 
administration in Spain: `We who are eyewitnesses can hardly comprehend it'. 34 Even his 
long years in Madrid had not accustomed Keene to `la lenteur Espagnole'. 55 To help 
unravel the mystery, he sent home by messenger a long summary of the Spanish court. 
Part of the problem was the collegial decision-making of a system which inhibited action 
or the taking of responsibility. Patino had destroyed his health in struggling against this 
tradition, whereas la Quadra was its natural product. The character of la Quadra was 
spelled out anew by Keene; `he is ... more a Clerk of State than a Minister, and his own 
indolence and diffidence of himself will always keep him so, and that by his own choice'. "' 
and his love of the bureaucratic routines and shared responsibilities of the Spanish 
s' BL Add Ms 32796, f. 1, Newcastle to Keene, 3 October (OS) 1737 [in post only on 2 
November]. 
52 Simancas, Estado, Legajo 6900 (unfoliated), Keene to la Quadra, 30 October (NS) 1737; 
BL Add Ms 32796, if. 36-7, Keene to Newcastle, 28 October (NS) 1737. 
53 BL Add Ms 32796, f. 31, Keene to Newcastle, 24 October (NS) 1737. 
5' BL Add Ms 32796, f. 297, Keene to Newcastle, 30 December (NS) 1737. 
ss W. Coxe, Memoirs of the Kings of Spain of the House of Bourbon (1815), Vol III, p. 
291. 
56 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 241, Keene to Newcastle, 13 December (NS) 1737. 
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system,: `he is never more easy nor happy, than when He can say, that he has put my 
offices in their Course and Channel'. 57 La Quadra was still active enough where protocol 
was concerned. In December 1737 he pressed Geraldino to stir the British ministry into 
sending an ambassador to present compliments to Elizabeth's son Don Carlos on his 
acquisition of the title of King of the Two Sicilies. s$ Here was just the kind of limited 
issue of protocol which he relished, with a clear correct course of action if he wished to 
gain royal approval. 
At this point a number of issues of a more dangerous kind came together with damaging 
effects. To support the principle of freedom of the seas, a potent weapon lay to hand in 
the recent escalation of Spanish violence against British shipping. The depredations, 
apparently sanctioned by Spanish colonial governors, contributed to a crisis which by the 
autumn of 1737 could not be ignored. Having laboured through the summer with little to 
excite their readers other than repeated onslaughts on placemen and on the recent stage 
licensing laws, the opposition press now had an issue which might again reach the heights 
of the great campaign against the Excise in 1733. Depredations were the form in which 
renewed Spanish imperial controls impinged upon British traders and the public 
consciousness. The range and timing of these depredations upon British shipping needs 
therefore to be briefly outlined. When the depredations issue forced itself upon the notice 
of the British crown in 1737, two kinds of offence were in question. Some older instances 
dated back around ten years. The 1727 seizure of the Anne galley, master Samuel 
Bonham, was the subject of a shilling pamphlet in 1738 and the 1727 case of the Betty 
galley, master Richard Copithorne, was raised by the Craftsman in February 173939 In 
contrast were the newest and most pressing cases, of which news was filtering in (and 
being magnified by the Opposition press) even as the debate over policy was being 
conducted. 
Two particular episodes of depredations can be discerned, from 1726 to 1731 and from 
1736 to 1738. Both were linked to the Spanish policy of vigorous enforcement of its 
imperial trading monopoly. A burst of activity against interlopers began with the tenure of 
57 Ibid.. 
58 PRO SP 94/206, f. 13, La Quadra to Geraldino, 2 December (NS) 1737. 
59 The case of Samuel Bonham and the other Owners of the Anne Galley (1737); 
Craftsman, February 24 (OS) 1739. 
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Patino as Secretary of the Office of the Indies in 1726. This was the point also at which 
the guarda costa force, created by Patiflo in 1722 and first operating in 1725, began to 
have an effect on illegal traders. 60 These were fast-sailing, heavily armed and manned 
vessels, whose mode of operation was to outsail the laden merchantmen, board them and 
put aboard a prize crew. The degree to which Spanish colonial justice was weighted 
against foreign shipping was made evident in the case of the Swan sloop, master James 
Wimble, in June 1728. The Swan was boarded by a typical guarda costa vessel, carrying 
16 guns and 200 men. Wimble and his men were soon released, but on 10 June (OS) the 
Swan was taken by a Spanish sloop of 10 guns and 50 men, and carried into Cuba. When 
the Spanish captors reached Santiago; `the Spanish Governour came & condemn'd 
Sixteen Sail of English Ships & vessels over a Glass of Wine without Examining what 
there was on Board, or where they was taken & without any manner of Court of 
Admiralty or the like'. 61 American armateurs felt licensed to attack British shipping 
particularly after the outbreak of conflict between Britain and Spain in February 1727, 
when England and France opposed the attempts of Philip V's son Don Carlos to take over 
the Italian duchies of Tuscany, Parma and Piacenza. These Italian ambitions were dear to 
the heart of Queen Elizabeth, born in Parma and intensely ambitious for both her sons. 
Though the hostilities in the Mediterranean were soon over, this news was slow to reach 
the Indies, which may account for the spate of seizures which went on into 1728. At 
lesser levels, seizures went on until 1731, no doubt for the same reason that profitable 
privateering activity was slow to end after every war. 
Several cases of the late 1720s were accompanied with brutality by the Spanish colonial 
forces, and were given only tardy consideration by the Spanish crown. One such was the 
seizure by guarda costas of the Bristol galley, the Robert, of which Story King was 
master, in 1728. King was tortured for three days with thumbscrews, and lighted matches 
in his nails, but seems only to have brought a formal complaint and deposition in May 
1731.62 This delay may well have been caused by the dubious legality of his trade. It was 
notorious that many of the captures were of ships which had been breaking through the 
60 Pares, War and Trade, pp. 22-3; Walker, Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade, pp. 1S0, 
154,188. 
61 BL Add Ms 32797, f 279-80, Testimony of William Grayhams; sworn statement. 
62 PRO SP 98/129, (unfoliated), Deposition 15 May (OS) 1731; full deposition and petition 
of August 1731 in BL Add Ms 32774, ff. 118-20,122. 
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Spanish monopoly. James Wimble's Swan, condemned over a glass of wine, does seem 
genuinely to have been carrying only the produce of North Carolina and to have been 
innocent of illicit trade. It is probably significant, though, that Wimble claimed to have had 
sloops taken by the Spaniards in 1719,1720,1727 and 1728 yet only in the autumn of 
1737, encouraged by the City campaign for redress, did he come forward to complain to 
the Secretary of State. 63 Lawbreakers were in a poor position to agitate for their rights, 
and their protests were always likely to compromise and embarrass the efforts made by 
British diplomats. Ministers, fully aware of the often dubious nature of the trade involved, 
did not always place a high value on these complaints. The plaintiffs in the Anne galley 
case were told briskly by the, Duke of Newcastle that; `it was a matter of State, and 
Merchants had no Business to meddle therewith, those Things being out of their 
Province'. 64 Meddle they did, however, and on 4 March (OS) 1731 the petitions of the 
Bristol and Liverpool merchants against depredations led to an enquiry by a Committee of 
the whole House. 65 
The enquiry was inconclusive, though, and the affair aroused none of the national interest 
of the later London petitions. Part of the reason lay in the very different response of the 
press, who in 1731 were far more concerned to vilify Walpole by accusing him of 
corruption. Pulteney believed that the current low standard of the press arose from the 
government's having no good arguments at its disposal, and resorting to name-calling: 
Such usage has made it necessary to return the same polite language, and 
there has been more Billingsgate stuff utter'd from the Press within these two 
months than ever was known before 
The personal attacks on leading ministers seem to have blinded opposition journalists to 
the value of other ammunition. That provided by depredations was little used, as if the 
issue had somehow not come into focus as a question of government responsibility. The 
case most famous to posterity, that pf Jenkins, was treated by the press in a very low key 
in 1731. The picturesque detail of Captain Robert Jenkins losing his ear was not the cause 
63 BL Add Ms 32796, f. 82, Keene to Newcastle, 4 November (OS) 1737. 
6' The Case of Samuel Bonham and the other Owners of the 4nne Galle ... (1737), p. I. 
63 [A. Boyer], The Political State of Great Britain, Vol XLII, November 1731, pp. 466-7. 
66 BL Add Ms 4806, if. 16-17, Pulteney to Swift, 9 January (OS) 1731. 
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of the subsequent war, nor was it even the most important case of Spanish violence. 67 The 
conventional timescale offered for the causes of the war - Jenkins losing his ear in 1731, 
appearing at the bar of the House of Commons in March 1738, and an indignant nation 
forcing a war in October 1739 - is self-evidently faulty. Still it continues to offer the 
writers of textbooks a convenient (and harmless) image with which to explain something 
about the role of public opinion in making war likely. 68 Jenkins's sufferings were certainly 
bandied about in 1738 and 1739 as a kind of shorthand for Spanish cruelty and disregard 
of law. Yet at the time of the incident in 1731 numerous papers failed to mention the case 
at all, and the Gentleman's Magazine in June gave Jenkins only brief coverage. The 
Craftsman in July led with a letter on the Jenkins episode, but was concerned mainly to 
reflect on the `odd medley of peace and war' in the Indies. 69 The fullest account, that of 
Abel Boyer in July, was still far from graphic, though it placed a stress on the insolence of 
the Spanish captors towards the British crown. 70 
The reason that this case was still remembered after seven years was not that the cruelty 
to Jenkins was unprecedented but rather that satisfaction for his losses was so slow in 
coming. At the end of September 1737, Newcastle was complaining of the dilatoriness of 
Spanish colonial justice, `... especially in Cases that cry aloud for Justice, such as that of 
Jenkins, master of the Ship Rebecca taken by a Spanish Garde de Cotes in the West 
Indies, and treated in so cruel and barbarous a manner'. 71 The case was memorable, of 
course, for the simple reason that the detail of the severed ear made it so. An ear sliced 
off was striking without being too gruesome - it was a legal punishment in current use in 
England, and drew crowds about the stocks to see it. n As a symbol of Spanish atrocities 
the ear was easily remembered, and frequently mentioned. Usually, there is a note of 
humour in the treatment of it, as in the newspaper poem published in the summer of 1739, 
after the Convention of the Pardo had broken down: 
67 Woodfine, `The Anglo-Spanish War of 1739', pp. 185,192-3,196-8. 
68 It would be invidious to pick out examples of unsatisfactory textbook summaries. Few, 
even of the best, can resist the story of the ears. 
69 Craftsman, 17 July (OS) 1731. 
70 [A. Boyer], The Political State of Great Britain, Vol XLI, July 1731, pp. 10-12; 
Gentleman's Magazine, Vol 1, June 1731, p. 265. 
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BRITAIN once more, herself appears, 
Therefore let Dons beware their Ears. 73 
In the following month, at Tottenham-Court Fair, a sideshow exhibited a Spaniard, an 
Englishman, and two `Jack Puddings' (sailors). After a long mock battle, one Jack 
Pudding `bid him take care of his Ears, and at last knock'd him down'. " In the various 
references to Jenkins' ear that one encounters, however, it is rare to find a note of any 
very specific concern about the actual Jenkins case. Indeed, the details seem to have been 
rather cloudy in the public mind. A fortnight after the signing of the Convention of the 
Pardo early in 1739, a masquerade was held in London featuring, among other `turns', a 
`Knight of the Ear' with `Jenkins' on his sash. Incongruously, he was acting the 
aggressor, rummaging and whipping several seamen, some with an ear hanging down. The 
slogans included `Ear for Ear' but also `No Search or no Trade' and other current 
political catchwords. " The celebrated ear was a colourful slogan, but not the one most 
frequently used, and not the most emotive. 
In the year of 1731 itself, the barbarity of such treatment was kept firmly in the context of 
the gains to be made in the whole trade. Boyer followed his account of the Jenkins 
episode with some sober reflections on the profitable trade to the Indies; he argued that 
any war with Spain would be irrational. In June of that year some Jamaica merchants 
made representations against Admiral Stewart's orders to cruize against legitimate 
Spanish commerce. The merchants were quite clear that reprisals and confiscations would 
bring all trade to an end while war went on, a lesson not remembered seven years later in 
the fury of enthusiasm for war. 76 In the early 1730s, it was still possible openly to avow 
the extent and the profitability of illicit trade, `the South Sea trade being one of the most 
profitable and convenient Trades we at present enjoy'. 
" Indeed, without the contraband 
trade with Spanish possessions, it would have been hard for the English colonies in 
78 America to prosper at all, as contemporaries recognised. Illicit trade was positively 
73 London Evening Post, 3 July (OS) 1739 
74 Craftsman, 25 August (OS) 1739. 
75 London Evening Post, 10 February (OS) 1737. 
76 [A. Boyer], The Political State of Great Britain, Vol XLI, June 1731, pp. 553-7. 
77 Ibid., July 1731, p. 98. 
78 BL Add Ms 19036, if. 7-10, `The Force of Spain'. The point is developed by Pares, War 
and Trade, pp. 78-83. 
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encouraged, and an explicit link was seen between the financial exactions of the Spanish 
crown and the willingness of its colonists to connive in British trading: 
It is to be hoped that our People of Jamaica will take hold of this 
Opportunity to renew their smuggling Trade with the Spanish West Indies, 
for they will certainly meet with Encouragement from the Inhabitants, of 
purpose that they may thereby have an Opportunity of sending their Money 
by way of Jamaica to England, from whence they may easily send it to their 
Correspondents in Old Spain, without any danger of such arbitrary 
Detensions as they meet with from their own Court. 79 
This pragmatic outlook allowed those involved to look upon the losses by Spanish guarda 
costas as a kind of tax on an immensely profitable smuggling trade. 80 The same point was 
made by an anonymous pro-ministerial pamphlet of 1739, which pointed out that the 
losses by depredations had never amounted to more than two and a half percent of the 
entire value of the West Indian trade. 81 It was of course a resented tax. The South Sea 
company complained bitterly of their treatment, and of the workings of Spanish colonial 
justice, in an attempt to gain new safeguards in the Treaty of Seville (November 1729), 
but without success. 82 Spanish traders themselves also found the depredations costly. The 
higher levels of Spanish zeal were sustained by the imposition of a new guarda costa tax 
in 1732, whereby a levy of 4 percent was made on vessels bringing from America gold, 
silver or cochineal. 83 This was intended to contribute to the costs of the navy and licensed 
armateurs in patrolling the American coasts. After Patilio's death there was a quieter 
interlude, though without any changes in the thinking or the forms of administration in the 
Spanish overseas domain. The use of armed trading patrols was not, as some 
contemporaries imagined, piracy, or at best a semi-official activity. La Quadra confirmed 
that these agents were in the royal pay: 
79 [A. Boyer], The Political State öf Great Britain, Vol XLI, September 1731, p. 289. 
80 Horace Walpole, both then and later, took the same view: BL Add Ms 9132, f. 99, 
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c'est un Erreur que de penser que les Gardecotes de 1'Amerique n'ayent 
aucune Paye du Roy, qu'au contraire leurs Officiers et les Equipages sont 
soudoyes chacun selon leur Etat, et non seulement eux, mais aussi les autres 
Navires dont on se seit dans ces Mers. 84 
Certainly there was no marked eagerness to settle the British grievances or decide on 
compensation. Some financial grievances went back to the hostilities between Britain and 
Spain which broke out in 1718. Admiral Byng, despite the formal peace between the two 
powers, savaged the Spanish fleet off Cape Passaro, Sicily, in August 1718. In retaliation 
the Spanish crown seized British merchant shipping by way of reprisals (represalias). 
Much the same pattern was repeated in 1727 when Britain and Spain were briefly in 
conflict. The financial settlement being sought in the late 1730s included these mixed 
demands for compensation, partly private and partly national, stemming from earlier 
periods of conflict. Some of these claims had been met and others had not, and it was 
difficult in any case to decide on levels of compensation in terms of a balance between 
destroyed warships and captured merchantmen. For all these reasons, the detailed 
accountancy of the grievances was never likely to result in one genuine and agreed figure. 
There were lingering attempts nonetheless to produce such a figure. 
In 1732 the Spanish and British courts had commissaries dealing with the compensation 
issue which was the most conspicuous piece of unfinished business left by the Treaty of 
Seville. The British representatives were experts on the spot, Benjamin Keene, Arthur 
Stert and John Goddard. Fourteen cases of seized ships were then in dispute. One of 
them, the Anne, Joseph Spackman, was not even discussed by the Spanish commissioners, 
as His Catholic Majesty had ordered restitution of the ship in the Indies. Despite the long 
delays which could be expected, it was not diplomatically possible to challenge the 
statement that justice would be done according to royal decree. Two cases were rejected 
outright, three were allowed to bring further proofs, and for eight of the fourteen cases 
being considered the Spanish response was a formula: `The Spanish Commissaries will 
send for the Autos from the West Indies'. 8S In August a fresh turn was given by the 
Spanish negotiators to the question of satisfaction. The brief war between the two 
countries was deemed by the Spanish court to have ceased on 2 July (NS) 1727, and as 
94 BL Add Ms 32796, f. 291, De la Quadra to St. Gil, 25 November (NS) 1737. 
85 PRO SP 94/114 (unfoliated), Keene to Harrington, 9,18 July, 19 September (NS) 1732. 
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there was no need to make restitution for ships taken in time of open war, the Spanish 
commissaries refused to consider at all the cases of the Lusitania, the Loyal galley, the 
Betty and the Mary, all taken in mid-June 1727.86 
One of the wartime captures, a brigantine owned by a Scot named Bournes and seized in 
May 1727, figured also in the next period of conflict. It was the centre of an odd episode 
when, currently trading as the Sta. Teresa and owned by a merchant in Bilbao, the vessel 
was repossessed in Dublin on 29 August (NS) 1735. Bournes had taken out an order of 
Chancery, granted by the Dublin court on his own testimony alone, and was subsequently 
allowed to sail with his ship before a Spanish appeal could be heard. Three times over the 
next eighteen months Geraldino appealed for justice, and by January 1737 the Spanish 
court was pressing Keene to obtain justice and punishment of the Dublin court. All such 
disputes, it was claimed, should be regulated under the Treaty of Seville and were matters 
between the two crowns, and not to be decided by local judicial action. By contrast, the 
British ministers argued that the King could not act outside the law by taking the case out 
of the Irish Chancery court and handing it over to be settled by commissaries. The case 
was still the subject of dispute, and causing misunderstandings, as the Convention of the 
Pardo was being finalised. 87 The Spanish ministers had a taste in this case of the delay and 
the insecurity felt by British claimants. They rested their demands for speedy satisfaction 
on the need to preserve the security of the Spanish flag and harmony and good relations 
between the two powers: the very grounds on which British ministers demanded prompt 
and effective Spanish control over their colonial courts and governors. 88 
Keene did not fail to point out to the Spanish ministers that such arguments worked both 
ways. He was able to score a point in this way a year later, when news arrived in Madrid 
of a Dutch 60-gun vessel off Curacao capturing Spanish vessels and throwing the crews 
86 Ibid., Keene to Harrington, 19 August (NS) 1732. 
$7 Simancas, Estado, Legajo 6907 (unfoliated), Keene to la Quadra, 9 January (NS) 1739. 
See the second annexed article to the Convention, Appendix 4. 
88 `Y verificandose de todo la culpa en los Ministros de aquel Tribunal, espera S. M. que el 
caitigo quere diesse alos que huviessen concurrido al atentado, que ha recordado, sirba de 
exemplar para en adelante, quedando por este medio restablecida la entera seguridad del 
sagrado de su Bandera, y la buena armonia y correspondencia que deica se continue entre 
ambas Coronas sin la menor bulneracion. ' PRO SP 94/127 (unfoliated), Protest of 5 
January (NS) 1737, in Keene to Newcastle, 14 January (NS) 1737. 
95 
overboard. Keene harangued the Marquis de Torrenueva on how he would feel and act if 
the Spanish envoy in the United Provinces, St. Gil, got the kind of answers which Keene 
was so regularly given: 
I askt him, how it would be relished in Spain, when in answer to the instances 
Mr. St. Gil might be ordered to make on this Subject, he should be told, that 
the States-General could [not] determine without hearing both Parties, That 
the Governor of Curacao has not as yet sent the Autos, That he should be 
wrote to give an Account of these proceedings; and if unfortunately that 
Governor should be interested with the Captors, (as I was afraid happened 
but too often, with the Spanish Governors) and consequently should order his 
Escrivanos and Notaries to cook up a Proces in such terms as he thought fit 
to intimidate them into, would the Catholick King, and such zealous Ministers 
of His, as he, the Marquis, be satisfyed with such Replyes? And this not only 
in one or two Cases, which might accidentally have fallen out, but in the 
course of several years spent in demanding Justice in vain? The same Cases 
might likewise happen with the Governors of His Majesty's Possessions, and 
then the Spanish Commerce would feel, what it was to have let the Guarda 
Costas have triumphed so long in their iniquities. 89 
The frustration of Keene's tone, and the implied threat of general reprisals, can be 
explained by the seeming impossibility of making the Spanish administration act with any 
urgency, however long the delay or however manifest the crimes committed on British 
ships. By the time of his harangue, several of the cases of the late 1720s had still not been 
resolved, and the City merchants and the British administration were pressing for action 
over some new and particularly horrid cases, involving the new and incendiary slogan of 
Britons being held as slaves. Keene was being urged, as a result of the City merchants' 
petition, to get action particularly on the most notorious cases, listed by Newcastle as 
those of the Anne galley (whose owners he had previously told not to meddle in affairs of 
state), the Woolball and the salt ships. 90 These last ships (the brigantines Two Sisters, 
Hopewell and four others), were part of the salt fleet when they were taken in March 
1733 off Tortuga, and carried into Carthagena. 91 
Given the cumbersome processes of Spanish justice, it was necessary to produce evidence 
of very considerable delays indeed before Spanish diplomats could accept that justice was 
89 BL Add Ms 32797, if. 26-7, Keene to Newcastle, 27 January (NS) 1738. 
90 BL Add Ms 32796, f. 79, Newcastle to Keene, 4 November (OS) 1737. 
91 Details given in BL Add Ms 32796, f 89-94 
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not being - somehow, and very slowly - done. There was clearly a pressing need for a 
thorough and explicit renegotiation of the existing commercial treaties with Spain if these 
causes of offence were to be avoided. In September 1736, though he was then in 
Hanover, George 11 was preoccupied with the issue of improving the treaties with Spain, 
perhaps not least because the minister accompanying him was Horace Walpole, who was 
himself very enthusiastic for new and fully explicit treaties. 9' Despite the malpractice of 
Spanish officials overseas, and the `tricking and chicaning temper of Patiflo', the Spanish 
need for British recognition of Don Carlos did give the King some hope of a satisfactory 
settlement. 93 
The British public was to prove uninterested in the finer points of treaty relations, 
however, but was bound to be affected by the cruelties of a fresh wave of depredations 
between 1736 and 1738. This undoubtedly owed something to the laxity of royal control 
of colonial governors, but was also linked to new attempts to invigorate ancient 
monopoly rights. A royal cedula of 25 April (NS) 1736 reemphasised the governors' duty 
to expel all non-Spanish immigrants, and was reaffirmed, when relations with Britain had 
broken down, by a fresh cedula of 20 September (NS) 1739.94 The older depredations 
cases could be represented as examples of justice delayed and denied, and so were 
important. Horace Walpole advised his cabinet colleagues that they `may be such an 
Unreasonable delay of Justice as to fall under the Rules of Reprisals, tho' if granted..., 
may be the cause of such a Retalliation on the side of Spain, as to occasion Hostilities in 
the W. Indies, equal to War'. 93 In every respect, though, the cases which preoccupied 
both Ministry and Opposition were those which were unfolding at the time, some of them 
being presented by the captains concerned in a highly polemical and partisan way. Some 
of these instances deserved to be more notorious, however, than seems, judging by the 
press, to have been the case. Perhaps the public were really quite accustomed to the 
tortures and barbarity of the Caribbean. British privateers in those seas, and most notably 
the colonial crews out of New York, were notorious for their brutality, despite the code 
92 PRO SP 43/19, H. Walpole to Keene, 31 August (NS) 1736. 
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of instructions of 1666 which forbade the maiming or cold-blooded murder of the crews 
of captured prizes. 6 
In May 1736 an English sloop commanded by Captain Weir, bedridden and `maim'd of 
both arms' was robbed and plundered with the apparent connivance of the Deputy 
Governor of Santa Marta and the royal officers there. Weir and most of his crew were 
murdered. 97 Another Caribbean trader had an equally grisly story to tell, and one which 
caught the imagination of the City and of ministers. William Fisher was an unlucky 
passenger in early September 1736 aboard the sloop Fanny of Antigua, bound for St. 
Vincent to buy corn, and taken by a guarda costa, a sloop of 18 guns and around 70 men. 
Though the Spanish captain, Antonio, claimed to have a commission, he never produced 
it, and gave different accounts of his home port. This was a common complication, 
making it impossible to distinguish confidently between an excess of colonial zeal and 
actual piracy. Far away in Madrid, Keene and la Quadra were to reduce the problem to a 
simple basis: if depredations were committed by authorised Spanish agents then the King 
of Spain should provide compensation, whereas in the case of piracy the King of England 
could take the necessary steps to chastise the offenders. 98 
In the hostile waters of the Caribbean, matters did not look so simple to the shocked and 
confused victims. The Fanny's six white crew were stripped, whipped and put ashore on a 
desert island, the Grand Rocas, where after five days they were joined by another English 
sloop whose crew were treated in the same way. For nine days altogether Fisher and his 
companions lived on raw whelks and lobsters, before they were picked up by a Dutch 
sloop bound for Salt Island. Two days after this rescue, the same guarda costa seized the 
Dutch crew also and subjected them to the same treatment, with the additional sadistic 
flourish that they `... cut off the Dutch Captain's Right hand, & in the sight of this 
Deponent Broil'd it, and made the Dutch Captain eat it. '99 The cruelties recounted by 
96 R. Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, 1739-1763 (1938), pp. 53-5. 
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Fisher were striking enough, but more important was the fact that this was a case in 
which the British and Spanish ideas of fair sailing came into conflict. The Fanny was 
driven by calms and contrary winds to the southward of Martinique, and after three days 
of losing way the master, Thomas Nanton, chose to stand further to the south until they 
could fetch their port. Effectively, they were making a very long tack out to sea. In 
Spanish eyes, they had deviated from a proper course and approached too near to Spanish 
coasts. Given the problems of wind and current in the Caribbean, this doctrine was one 
which, if seriously applied, would make it all but impossible for foreigners to trade in 
those seas. 1°° Equally, the doctrine arose in circumstances of persistent and deliberate 
evasion. Dutch sea captains could justify being off Ste. Domingue by pretending to be 
bound for the Dutch colony of Curacao, and to have been carried past it by the strong 
currents, or to have missed it in the night. Pares found that; `In many instances the Dutch 
captains actually went through the ritual of missing Curacao'. '°' 
Another similar case was raised by the President of the Council of Jamaica in July 1737, 
the St. James, master John Curtis, which was seized without having traded anywhere in 
the Spanish possessions, or even going within 15 leagues of the Spanish coasts. This was 
a Bristol ship bound for Jamaica and captured 20 leagues south of Porto Rico. The 
governor of Porto Rico ignored all their protests and superintended the plundering and 
sale of the cargo of provisions, much of it bought by a Spanish man of war bound for 
Vera Cruz. Thanks to strong pressure from Keene, the officials of Porto Rico were 
reprimanded and ordered to make restitution, which was, as he said, `a step farther than 
ever this Court yet took towards discouraging and chastising the fomentors and authors 
of such unjust and cruel practices'. 102 Torrenueva seems to have been really willing to 
stop future problems: but this would require good faith on both sides. 103 The Jamaica 
interest believed that all the virtue lay on their side, and all the vice on the Spanish. In 
reporting the St. James case, the President summarised their view of the conflicts: 
100 Pares, War and Trade, pp. 23-4, is the deftest summary of this problem. 
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I shall not pretend to make any other Remarks on this Treatment, than that 
we lay under great Disadvantages in these Parts. We act with Honour & 
Lenity towards them; They like Villains, & are but too well supported in their 
Robberys. 104 
To accept this picture one would have to ignore the extensive illicit trade in which the 
Jamaica merchants were prominent. As a description only of the legal processes, though, 
there was some truth in it, as was demonstrated in the following year. A Spanish register 
ship suspected of depredations was taken into Jamaica but released by the Governor, in 
the absence of positive proof. This episode, taken up forcefully by the Craftsman, did 
seem what Newcastle termed it, `strong Proof of the Moderation of His Majesty's 
Governors, and Officers'. While the Craftsman thought the release was the result of 
craven ministerial policy, Newcastle seems actually to have been rather disappointed with 
the Jamaicans' decision, but willing to make the best possible use of it. To Keene he 
remarked: `How far they acted prudently in so doing is a Question; But however it ought 
to be an Argument with the Spaniards to do the like on their Part'. '°5 
As 1737 drew to a close there was little prospect of the Spaniards restraining their 
overseas officials. Another vessel named Hopewell, a schooner captained by John Harris, 
was seized by a privateer out of Porto Rico and Harris and his crew treated in a now 
familiar way. They were put ashore with only raw shellfish to sustain them, and in the 
course of their maltreatment by a second Spanish ship which found the abandoned crew, 
Harris's son was shot in the back and seriously wounded. 106 The number of such cases 
and their increasingly violent character swelled the chorus of outrage at what Horace 
Walpole called `this crying, & insupportable Mischief. The King's prompt orders to 
Keene to secure redress for the recent cases picked out that of the Hopewell, `attended 
with the most cruel and aggravating Circumstances imaginable'. '07 Keene himself was 
disposed to see these attacks as negotiable, and many of his letters show a preoccupation, 
natural enough in the court where he was, with the minutiae of noble and royal 
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behaviour. 108 Horace Walpole, closer to the mood of London, displayed a much stronger 
political instinct. In November he wrote to Keene in terms as urgent as those of the 
Opposition: 
You will by this time have heard how great the Cry of the Merchants in 
England is on account of the violent Depredations that have been, & continue 
to be daily committed by the Spaniards upon our Commerce. Must we always 
be employed in negociating Redress, & never receive any? The Nation will 
not bear this long. '09 
The list of complaints to the Spanish court which Newcastle had asked Keene to draw up 
was a necessary precaution, for the City merchants were soon to present a long list of 
their own, in support of their October petition. They had held daily meetings at the Ship 
Inn to collect information for a petition on all ships plundered since 1729.110 The petition 
was to be addressed to the King, and the evidence they sought pointedly covered almost 
the whole of his reign. The tactic hit home, and was resented by the ministry, as can be 
seen by the indignant rejection of it in a ministerial pamphlet of 1739.111 A printed version 
of their list, updated to December 1737, shows the potency of selectively using 
depredations as a weapon. The list gives 52 merchant ships taken or plundered by the 
Spaniards and claims that many others besides could be given, but that their full 
particulars are not known. This is odd, considering the vagueness of many of the cases 
which were included, eight of the ships not even being named. Four of the listed ships 
actually escaped capture, including one, the Caesar, which later appeared on the 
Captain's own deposition to have been engaged in smuggling cocoa. 112 What the list did 
clearly show was the great predominance of abuses committed by Spanish vessels 
operating out of Havana and Porto Rico. Keene believed that the problem lay in the self- 
interest of the governors there rather than in deliberate central policy. 113 These cases 
108 BL Add Ms 32795, if. 2282-29 1, Affidavit of 11 July (OS) 1737 enclosed in Newcastle to 
Keene, 12 September (OS) 1737. 
109 BL Add Ms 32796, if. 73-4, H. Walpole to Keene, 14 November (NS) 1737. 
110 London Evening Post, 11 March (OS) 1738. 
"' The Original Series of Wisdom and Policy... (1739), p. 49. 
112 PRO SP 94/128, (unfoliated), List of British Merchant Ships, Taken or Plundered by the 
Spaniards. BL Add Ms 32796, f. 221, Keene to Newcastle, 13 December (NS) 1737. 
113 BL Add Ms 32796, ff. 243-4, Keene to Newcastle, 13 December (NS) 1737. 
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however certainly made it difficult for the two countries to adjust their differences, 
especially given the cumbersome nature of colonial justice and the timidity of the leading 
Spanish ministers. However factious and contrived this tactic of the merchants may 
appear in hindsight, there is no doubting its power at the time. 
The London Evening Post reported that when the House was given the list of 52 captures, 
some Members were close to tears. The atmosphere was obviously a heightened one, and 
the public gallery was full of women, who in this crisis seem to have come forward as 
strongly as they had during the Sacheverell affair of nearly twenty years before., 14 
Perhaps, like the `Church in danger' cry of the early century, this was a point at which the 
views of the masses and of the wealthy minority of women could coincide. In general, one 
would expect their outlook to be very different. If there was emerging at this time a 
cloudy sense of popular nationalism, there was still a marked divergence between ordinary 
people and the elite. This was a world in which people of any birth, breeding or education 
looked and sounded different to the masses. They held themselves differently. They were 
taught to comport themselves socially, to dance, perhaps to fence. The very way in which 
men or women of rank stood distinguished them at once. 
The same was true in the sphere of the mind. Where the masses were fired by xenophobia 
and caricatures, with heroic stories drawn from schoolbook history, the elite were 
classicists. All their voluminous surviving correspondence shows the same tendency to 
lapse into Latin quotation or example in order to locate an idea or an emotion, or to give 
a metaphor for some current event. For one observer, the Patriot opposition indulged in a 
dangerous license for want of understanding the lessons of the downfall of the Roman 
Republic. Middleton's long-awaited life of Cicero was a timely publication, which might 
teach them the need for virtue and order. Tully, he hoped, would `become known & 
Familiar even to the Goths and Vandals in Westminster Hall'. "5 Even Walpole, with a 
carefully cultivated image as a bluff Norfolk squire, had this indelible stamp of Eton upon 
him. He quipped and thought in Latin tags as readily as anyone in politics. He had a 
famous wager in the House with Pulteney over his accuracy in quoting from Horace. 1" 
114 London Evening Post, 25 March (OS) 1738. 
"s BL Add Ms 35605, if. 8-9, Thomas Clarke to Philip Yorke, 17 February (OS) 1739. 
116 Summarised and set in context by P. D. G. Thomas, The House of Commons in the 
Eighteenth Century (1971), p. 131. 
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This experience marked off the elite from the mass of their countrymen, and must have 
increased their sense of detachment and the value which they placed upon irony. They saw 
and judged by different standards. The latinity of their outlook is a vital aspect of the 
making of their mental world. "' But this way of seeing the world was to a great extent 
confined to men. 
Women, even women of rank, were usually denied this common grounding in the classics, 
which may partly explain their different approach to politics. They were also conditioned 
by the idea of a separate, private sphere as being their proper world, and by notions of 
what was and was not appropriate for women to discuss, and hold views on. "8 One of the 
disappointments of reading correspondence by and to women at this period is the thin 
quality of much of the comment upon political matters. "9 Views on dress, scandal and 
personalities dominate most letters. One can only speculate on the reasons why women 
should be so prominent in the public agitation over depredations. Unlike religion and food 
or other home-related issues, this was not typical of the aspects of politics which women 
seem to have been expected to make their own. 120 Perhaps on this issue their perceptions 
117 This is not a congenial thought today, when classical learning is confined to very few, 
even among those who consider themselves educated. Some good work exists, though, to 
alert the non-latinist (like myself) to this vital context: e. g. R. Browning, Political and 
Constitutional Ideas of the Court Whigs (1982), and C. Kidd `The Ideological 
Significance of Scottish Jacobite Latinity', in Culture, Politics and Society in Britain 
1660-1800 (1991), eds. J. M. Black & J. Gregory. 
118 I know of no good recent study of the education of women in this period. An interesting 
and wide-ranging sketch of the subject is M. Sonnet, `A Daughter to Educate', in A 
History of Women in the West, III, Renaissance and Enlightenment Paradoxes (1993), 
eds. N. Z. Davis & A. Farge, pp. 101-31. There are some useful textual extracts, though 
mainly drawn from the 1790s, in V. Jones (ed), Women in the Eighteenth Century. 
Constructions of Femininity (1990). For a contemporary (male) exploration of the proper 
limits of a wife's behaviour in marriage, and of female intelligence and literacy, one could 
do worse than the voluminous works of Samuel Richardson; e. g. on the former, Pamela (4 
Vols. 1740-1), I, Everyman ed., pp. 330-6,401-9; on the latter, The History of Sir 
Charles Grandison (7 Vols. 1753), I, Letters IX - XIII. 
119 E. g. Lady Anson (BL Add Ms 35387), Lady Suffolk (BL Add Ms 22626 &22628), 
Charlotte Digby (BL Add Mss 51340 & 51422). 
120 Margaret Hunt has offered valuable evidence on women, lower down the social scale, who 
were involved in opposition, radical and pornographic publication: `Hawkers, Bawlers and 
Mercuries: Women and the London Press in the Early Enlightenment', in Women and the 
Enlightenment (1984), eds. M. Hunt, M. Jacob, P. Mack & R. Perry, pp. 41-68. Compare 
G. Sheridan, `Women in the booktrade in eighteenth-century France', British Journal for 
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of patriotism were less shaped by ideas of republican and imperial Rome, and were nearer 
to the simpler assertiveness of the uneducated masses. Certainly there is evidence of 
xenophobia among the ladies of London society. The Prince of Wales, no doubt 
influenced by his active wife Augusta, led a campaign in late 1738 to involve upper-class 
women in the anti-government agitation. He urged society ladies to lead a boycott of all 
French wines and Italian songs, which were being patronised by the aristocracy, to the 
detriment of British talent and British purses. The fashion for foreign fabrics came in for 
the same treatment. The Prince and Princess, just before the King's birthday, ordered all 
the gentlemen and ladies of their court to wear only English manufacture. The London 
Evening-Post puffed the tactic: 
If such Resolutions as these prevail, we may hope to find, that OPERAS, 
CLARET and CAMBRICKS, will become as distasteful to the Polite, as 
PENSIONS, EXCISES and STANDING ARMIES are to the honest Part of 
the BRITISH NATION. 12' 
The campaign seems briefly to have captured the mood of society ladies, and there was a 
short-lived but determined campaign to introduce the wearing of muslin, and to receive no 
visits from gentlemen who drank French wines or patronised the Italian opera. It was 
clearly tied to Frederick's designs to promote the cause of opposition, and to foment the 
current troubles with Spain. On the day on which the wearing of muslin was to come into 
force, the Prince and Princess of Wales were enthusiastically greeted on a visit to Bristol 
in which much stress was laid on the Prince's respect for trade. 122 
Among those ships whose fate aroused so much indignation among London's female elite 
were two whose cases ushered in the next phase of public reaction, the Loyal Charles and 
the Despatch, taken in August 1737 near the Havana. Their capture when, as they 
claimed, they had only two pieces of logwood aboard to justify it, was offence enough. 
Eighteenth-Century Studies, 15,1,1992, pp. 51-70. Reflections on the problem of 
recovering the history of women at this time can be found in A. J. Vickery, `The neglected 
century: writing the history of eighteenth century women', Gender and History, III, 1991, 
pp. 211-19. An outstanding historiographical survey is A. J. Vickery, `Golden Age to 
Separate Spheres? A Review of the Categories and Chronology of English Women's 
History', Historical Journal, 36,2,1993, pp. 383-414. 
12' London Evening-Post, 14 November (OS) 1738. 
122 London Evening Post, 18 and 23 November (OS) 1738. 
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But it was the circumstances of their imprisonment which launched the preoccupation in 
the London press with British seamen being kept as slaves. Slavery, and British seamen 
eating bug-ridden Spanish prison food, were images far more potent, in picture and 
ballad, than Jenkin's ear. 123 The very first letter from the captain of the Loyal Charles, 
Benjamin Wray, presented the events in a polemical way, reminiscent of the opposition 
newspapers of the day, which shows that he was aware of the political and popular 
dimension. He wrote to his owners a description of his being brought into Havana with 
colours at half mast and the Union downwards, with thousands jeering them ashore: 
which I dare say will be thought very shocking to your selves & all true 
Englishmen in times of the most profound Peace, & having not the least 
Appearance of carrying on any Contraband Trade. 124 
Insults to the flag were particularly sensitive issues, as they affected the honour of the 
monarch who had a duty which could not be set aside to maintain `the Privileges and 
Protection of His Flag'. 'u In this charged political atmosphere, and with a formal and 
much-publicised petition presented by the merchants of the City of London, the divided 
Walpole ministry had to decide how best to calm the storm. The diverse views of the 
inner cabinet prevented a firm and concerted response. Newcastle plunged in to give a 
forceful reaction, and Walpole hung back and belittled the scale of public concern. Key 
advisers such as Horace Walpole and Lord Hardwicke gave their different understandings 
of the overall diplomatic picture. Their royal master, at this point, favoured action and 
feared losing face by delay, a stance which may have been decisive. 126 
123 See e. g. the frontispiece to [Anon] The Voice of Liberty: or, A British Philippic (1738), 
reprinted in Walpole and the Robinocracy (1986), ed. P. Langford, p. 149; see below, 
chap 5. 
124 PRO SP 94/132 (unfoliated), Wray to Messrs. Drake, Pennant & Long, 25 August (NS) 
1737. 
'u BL Add Ms 32796, f. 286, Newcastle to Keene, 19 December (OS) 1737. 
126 Ibid., ff. 284-5. 
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Chapter 4 Diplomatic Protest and Political Constraints 
George II wanted a rapid response to the complaints of the City merchants. Their petition 
was brought to him personally, at Hampton Court, by sixteen merchants and it touched 
him on a sensitive spot. ' The protection of the trade of his subjects was one of his prime 
duties, yet his reign had opened with Spanish depredations and for ten years was plagued 
with them. 2 A confidential paper circulating among members of the cabinet was emphatic 
that the merchant outcry `highly reflects Upon the Honour and Dignity of the Crown, in 
not being able to protect her Subjects'. 3 Black has commented on the value as an extra- 
parliamentary tactic of having the cry of the people reach the monarch. 4 This was a 
particularly effective ploy where the opponents were constantly attempting to distinguish 
between the monarch and his corrupt and overbearing servants. The Prince of Wales did 
not fail to fish in these troubled waters, aligning himself with the welfare of London trade 
and urging the City to `strengthen the Ties between the King & his People', pointedly 
omitting any comment on the King's ministers. 
5 
At one level, though, this reflected the reality of diplomacy. The formalities of royal 
intercourse and royal prestige were more than merely the form in which diplomacy was 
expressed. The privileged position and strong self-will of monarchs put pressures upon, 
and set limits to, the negotiations of their servants. Their involvement in business could 
make an important difference. George, even much later in his reign, had what Pares called 
6 `an insatiable appetite for business'. Philip was far less active. Former Spanish kings had 
On 13 October (OS) 1737; Hervey, Memoirs, Vol 3, p. 853. For the unmistakeable 
impatience of the King, see Simancas, Estado, Legajo 6900 (unfoliated), Newcastle to 
Keene, 7 January (OS) 1738. 
2 W. Laird Clowes, The Royal Navy. A History, from the Earliest Times to the Present 
(1898), Vol III, p. 48. 
3 BL Add Ms 9131, f. 268, H. Walpole, `Considerations relating to the Navigation, and 
Commerce of Great Britain in America... '. 
4 J. M. Black, The English Press in the Eighteenth Century (1987), p. 129. 
Windsor RA Bootle Mss, RA 54042, Answer of the Prince of Wales to the Address of the 
City of London 1737. 
6 R. Pares, `George III and the Politicians', in The Historian's Business. And Other Essays 
(1961), ed. R. A. & E. Humphreys, p. 108. 
signed all the orders and despatches from their offices, but Philip V had always had his 
Secretaries sign them. 7 This inaction, as it arose from scruples about his legitimacy, and 
from his weak mental health, was a real danger to the course of business. Philip was an 
extreme instance of the personal influence of the crown on diplomacy. This was one 
reason why British commentators were hostile to Spain. Abel Boyer commented 
scathingly on the reluctance of the Spanish ruling caste to allow any court to declare him 
mad. They feared that the judiciary might in this way acquire the right to adjudge that the 
King was acting outside the law, `and therefore these Despisers of the People chuse rather 
to submit in Theory to the arbitrary Commands of a downright Madman, than to place 
any legal Authority, or Supremacy in the People'! Even at that period, though, probably 
the worst point of his deranged behaviour, Philip was capable of intervals of lucidity and 
energy in pursuing favourite projects. He was generally credited with pushing through the 
successful Oran expedition in 1732.9 Keene commented on the constant danger of his 
arousing himself to action, when he would become extremely stubborn: `on some times 
and occasions He awakens, as it were, at a dispatch'. 10 His morbid Religiosity and 
obsessive sex drives gave the means of managing him, but the task was never easy or 
predictable. 
Because management was needed in the case of both Philip and George, the contrasting 
influences of Queen Caroline and Queen Elizabeth are a significant part of the politics of 
these years. Caroline was an important figure in the daily interactions of court life, and 
devoted many hours each day to swaying the thinking and the temper of her husband. The 
Prince of Wales later commented; `No one could manage him but the Queen, and she with 
Tears and Fits'. 11 King George himself, not prone to be sensitive or generous to the merits 
of those about him, lamented her loss, in the first days of his widowerhood. He paid 
tribute to: 
the great releife, & assistance_ which he found from her calm, & masterly 
disposition & opinion, in his governing such an humoursome and inconsistent 
7 BL Add Ms 32795, f. 45, Keene to Newcastle, 22 May (NS) 1737. 
The Political State of Great-Britain, Vol XLI, January-June 1731, p. 284. 
PRO SP 94/114 (unfoliated), Keene to Harrington, 9 July (NS) 1732. 
10 BL Add Ms 32796, f. 237, Keene to Newcastle, 13 December (NS) 1737. 
11 BL Add Ms 51437, f. 14, Dr. Ayscough's political journal, 3 May (OS) 1742. 
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people, that her presence of mind often supported him in trying times and her 
sweetness of temper would check & assuage his own hastiness & 
Resentment, that incidents of State of a rough difficult &a disagreeable 
nature would, by her previous conferences and consort with that able Minister 
Sir R. Walpole, be made smooth, easy, and palatable to him... 12 
Caroline was indeed an invaluable intermediary between Walpole and the King. 13 Her fatal 
illness brought immediate speculation that Walpole would suffer by the change, though in 
fact she recommended Sir Robert so earnestly on her death bed that George II relied on 
his minister more completely than ever. 14 Queen Caroline deputised for her absent 
husband, too, presiding over the Regency council in 1736-7 and taking a close interest in 
Spanish affairs. '5 The memoirs of Lord Hervey, the man closest to the Queen, show a 
sharp change in her temper and approach from February 1737, a change possibly 
associated with the illness which killed her in November of that year. 16 She seems to have 
aggravated the clashes with the Prince of Wales which were such a feature of the last 
months of her life. 
The influence of Elizabeth was far greater. Where Caroline devoted to her husband 
monotonous hours in each day, it is safe to say that there were very few minutes in the 
day when Elizabeth risked being separated from her mentally unstable, melancholic 
husband. The fear that he would give way to his religious scruples and abdicate, as he had 
already done in 1724, never left her. '7 One could apply to the whole of Philip's later life 
12 Wolterton (Walpole) Mss (unfoliated), `Sketch of Mr. Walpole's conduct from ye 
accession of this family'. This appears to be the first draft, and a rather freer one as 
regards the royal character, of BL Add Ms 9132, if. 96-8, `Mr. Walpole's Apology'. 
13 Among numerous examples given by Hervey, one could cite Memoirs Vol 2, pp. 458,560, 
597-608. 
14 CUL Ch(H) Corresp 2716, Duke of Chandos to Walpole, 12 November (OS) 1737; BL 
Add Ms 9132, f. 96, `Mr. Walpole's Apology'. 
IS SP 94/129, unfoliated, Newcastle to Keene, 13 January (OS) 1737. 
16 Hervey, Memoirs Vol 3, pp. 670-702 illustrates this change, and describes the Prince of 
Wales' affair. 
" The best short treatment of the King is J. Lynch, Bourbon Spain 1700-1808 (1989), chap 
3 `The Government of Philip V'; the abdication episode is discussed there pp. 8 1-9, and in 
D. C. Seco Serrano (ed), Marques de San Philip, Comentarios de la guerra de Espafa e 
historia de su rey Philip V, el animoso (1957), pp. 351-363. Fuller studies still worth 
reading are W. Coxe, The Bourbon Kings of Spain (1813) and, in more opinionated story- 
telling mode, E. Armstrong, Elisabeth Farnese (1892). 
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the description given in the early 1720s by the Duc de Saint-Simon of the `endless 
togetherness' contrived by the Queen's vigilance: 
Regarding state affairs, nothing could be hidden from her, for the king 
worked only in her presence; and was present at all private audiences; thus 
there was little she did not know... As a final touch, their Catholic Majesties 
shared a privy in all their residences, with their chaises percees placed side by 
side... Thus their lives were a continual tete ä tete. 's 
In August 1737 Keene commented; `The King is more in the Queen's power than ever; 
and I dare say she has no mind to abdicate'. 19 The more Elizabeth grew fat and suffered 
from bad legs, the more important it was to confine the King and keep him by her side. 2° 
If they could not hunt together, they must both enjoy entertainment indoors; `as they 
grow tired of Field diversions, something was absolutely necessary to amuse him at home, 
to keep his mind as much in motion as his natural melancholy will allow it to be'. 21 The 
way was prepared by the early summer of 1737. Keene reported: 
The least air imaginable keeps their Catholick Majesties from stirring out of 
their Appartements: Little or no business is done, and, what I never imagined 
I should see, the King hears Musick with patience. 22 
Elizabeth distracted and controlled the king with plays and operas performed by the royal 
children and through the music of the celebrated castrato, Farinelli. This protege of the 
Prince of Wales, and darling of the Opposition opera, was all but kidnapped and 
imprisoned in the Escurial in the summer of 1737, remaining in his gilded cage for nearly 
twenty years to sing the same songs nightly for the delight of the King, his fellow 
inmate. 23 The mastermind of this dual captivity, Elizabeth, had ambitions for her sons in 
18 L. Norton (ed), Historical Memoirs of the Duc de Saint-Simon, Vol III (1972), pp. 359, 
356. - 
19 BL Add Ms 32795, f. 223, Keene to H. Walpole, 19 August (NS) 1737. 
20 BL Add Ms 32795, f. 128, Keene to Newcastle, 1 July (NS) 1737; BL Add Ms 32797, f. 
30, same to same, 27 January (NS) 1738. 
21 BL Add Ms 32795, f. 247, Keene to Newcastle, 2 September (NS) 1737. 
22 BL Add Ms 32795, f. 61, Keene to Newcastle, 27 May (NS) 1737. 
23 See e. g. BL Add Ms 32794 if. 137,148, Keene to Newcastle, 18 & 25 February (NS) 
1737; , BL Add Ms 32795, if. 61,223,235-6, same to same, 27 May, 12,19 & 26 
August (NS) 1737. The story is summarised in Armstrong, Elizabeth Farnese, p. 339. 
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Italy which made her a constant threat to the stability of European diplomacy. 24 Part of 
the British Opposition's hostility towards Spain came from the aversion to a queen `who 
puts in Practice every Stratagem to accomplish her ambitious Designs'. 25 
The impact of the respective queens on the political situation can be seen in the midst of 
the discussion of the November memorial. Queen Elizabeth already arranged daily royal 
audiences for her favourite, Marquess Anibal Scotti, `a Man of as bad morals as Parts, of 
neither common Sense nor common honesty'. Scotti, like Elizabeth herself, was a 
Parmesan (and had been Parma's ambassador to Paris in 1719). He and her physician, 
Cervi, were increasingly to be her preferred channels of information. ' Preoccupied by 
arranging a marriage for her eldest son, Elizabeth contrived in November to levy a heavy 
indulto on the value of the flota, homeward bound for Cadiz, to pay for it. Patino had 
doubled the former level, to 9 percent, but Elizabeth now secured a swingeing levy of 20 
percent. 27 Philip could be persuaded into this measure only by the ruling of a specially 
convened junta of clergymen, and the Queen was elated by her success. 28 
Caroline, in less obvious control of her spouse, was still a major influence, and almost 
always a constructive and moderating one. Lord Tyrconnel gave a glowing summary of 
Caroline: `With Grandeur Amiable, with Power Affable, from whose Presence none ever 
went unpleas'd or unoblig'd away'. Some allowance no doubt has to be made for the 
fact that Tyrconnel was a diplomat with his court to make. The most intimate picture 
which we have of the Queen comes from Hervey, who as a particular favourite of hers 
had also his own bias. Even so, Caroline was clearly a woman of intelligence and ability 
who used her gifts and sacrificed her hours to make the monarchy more successful. Her 
value became obvious in the sudden crisis of her illness and death. The Queen's death 
dislocated the political world in a number of ways, and not only because it removed an 
24 Lynch, Bourbon Spain, pp. 75-6; J. M. Black, The Rise of the European Powers 1679- 
1793 (1990), pp. 85-7,154-5. 
u Craftsman 11 June (OS) 1737. 
26 BL Add Ms 32796, f. 238, Keene to Newcastle, 13 December (NS); BL Add Ms 32799, 
f. 34, same to same, 29 August (NS) 1738. 
27 BL Add Ms 32796, f. 67, Keene to Newcastle, 11 November (NS) 1737. 
28 BL Add Ms 32796, if. 53-4, Keene to H. Walpole, 4 November (NS) 1737. 
29 CUL Ch (H) Corresp 2724, Tyrconnel to Walpole, 24 December (OS) 1737. 
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important channel by which Sir Robert Walpole was accustomed to influence the King. 
Such a sudden change in key relationships can change perspectives and bring into being 
new combinations. The Queen was taken ill suddenly on November 9, a day on which an 
unsuspecting Sir Robert sent an attentive letter from Houghton regretting that he had no 
truffles to send to her. So quickly did the danger grow that three days later a relay of 
horses was ordered along his route to speed him from Norfolk to town. 30 The Queen died 
after an illness of twelve days on the twentieth of the same month. 31 Even as Horace 
Walpole was penning to Keene his views on the Spanish affair and the treaties between 
the two countries, news reached The Hague of the danger to the Queen. 32 Horace's shock 
was evident in the sudden breaking off of the letter; `Having wrote what goes before, I 
was suddenly surprised and struck on a heap with the most melancholly news of Her 
Majesty's desparate (sic) Condition' 33 His dismay and grief were believable, and stemmed 
from his own belief that he had been particularly favoured by Queen Caroline. 
Retrospectively he said of their relations: 
the late Queen was pleased to honor him with more frequent conferences 
upon business of State, with a greater confidence and in a more gracious 
manner than, except to Sir R. Walpole, she showed to any other of the 
Ministers; would indulge him & require him to speak with freedom his 
sentiments on matters of the highest concern & moment which when they 
were not agreeable to her own she always pardoned, and often, upon 
reflection would approve & follow. 3a 
30 BL Add Ms 12099, f. 8, Sir R. Walpole to the Queen, 9 November (OS) 1737; Wolterton 
(Walpole) Mss, Letters to Sir Robert Walpole, f 30-31, Andrew Stone to H. Walpole, 11 
November (OS) 1737. 
31 The news was conveyed officially to Spain in two letters of George II of 1 December (OS) 
1737, one in Latin to King Philip and one in French to `Madame ma Soeur la Reine 
d'Espagne', BL Add Ms 32796, if. 203-7; Simancas, Estado, Legajo 6900 (unfoliated). 
32 Harrington had sent him the first official news of the Queen's illness on the same day on 
which news reached the Hague with the English mails of I1November; Wolterton 
(Walpole) Mss, Lord Harrington 1737-9 (unfoliated), Harrington to H. Walpole, 15 
November (OS) 1737; PRO SP 84/369, f. 10, H. Walpole to Harrington, 15 November 
(OS) 1737. 
33 PRO SP 84/369, f. 6, H. Walpole to Keene, 15 November (OS) 1737. 
34 BL Add Ms 9132, f. 97, `Mr. Walpole's Apology. ' Memoir of his own life from 1715 to 
1739. 
111 
To lose such an influential friend at the centre of power made it vital to be upon the scene 
and share in the mourning and the inevitable manoeuvring. Lord Hervey, ever an acute 
observer of littleness of behaviour, commented tartly on the pains taken by Newcastle and 
Princess Emily to keep Sir Robert Walpole away from the palace during the illness so that 
the King and Queen might feel neglected. 33 When Princess Emily was named as the chief 
mourner, rather than the Queen's hated first-born son, it gave grave offence to the 
reversionary interest 36 At such times it was vital to be on the spot and able to influence 
events. From the first breaking of the news Horace Walpole's correspondence became 
one agitated endeavour to get permission to return to England, which he soon did, 
returning to The Hague only in the Spring of 1739. This alteration meant that for the 
crucial period ahead Walpole was on hand to give his advice in person, while Robert 
Trevor acted as envoy at The Hague. 37 Despite his genuine grief and his hasty return to 
the scene of action, Caroline's death brought a loss of influence with the King of which 
Horace Walpole himself was acutely aware, but the reason for which can only be guessed 
at. 39 
The Queen's death also highlighted at a critical point of negotiations the nature of 
personal relations between sovereigns, always important to the working of foreign policy 
at a period when the fiction of a European family of monarchs was still important. Affront 
would be caused by any coolness in the `family' spirit, and Keene was instructed to look 
closely at the mourning observed in the Spanish court `and every other Circumstance that 
relates to it'. 39 Though the Spanish court passed this test of ceremonial correctness, it was 
far less clear that it had the same concern for the substantive issues in dispute. Even at the 
height of this royal tragedy, the overriding impression given by the British court and 
ministry in these months is one of preoccupation with the Spanish disputes and the public 
35 Hervey, Memoirs Vol 3, p. 882. 
36 See p. 59 above. 
37 Wolterton (Walpole) Mss, Lord Harrington 1737-9 (unfoliated), Harrington to H. 
Walpole, 22 November (OS) 1737. 
38 BL Add Ms 9132, if. 96-8, `Mr. Walpole's Apology'. If Hervey can be believed, and 
George II was really provoked to laughter by seeing `poor Horace Walpole' and his 
clumsy way of crying, then perhaps the estrangement of the King had already happened; 
Hervey, Memoirs Vol 3, p. 917. 
39 BL Add Ms 32796, f. 203, Newcastle to Keene, 1 December (OS) 1737; Ibid if. 306-7, 
Keene to Newcastle, 6 January (NS) 1738. 
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reaction to them. In Madrid, by contrast, the court seems to have given much less 
attention to these events. Court and ceremonial affairs were always likely to predominate 
over international negotiations. Commenting in January 1739 on la Quadra's delay in 
replying to a memorial, Keene blamed `the diversions of the Court, or any other light 
occasions ... which 
I must beg leave to acquaint you, are sufficient to postpone much 
more important affairs'. 40 In March 1739, at a critical juncture and with war ever more 
likely, Geraldino sent his minister a full account of all the developments in London over 
the Convention of the Pardo. La Quadra did not trouble to read the British mail on its 
arrival, and only did so at all on Keene's direct urging. Meanwhile the latest letters from 
Paris about the impending royal wedding were `greedily read as soon as received'. 41 What 
was important to la Quadra was what lay closest to the hearts of their Catholic Majesties. 
Similarly in January and February 1738, faced with the crucial British Memorial, the 
Court did very little. Delays were caused which looked from Britain like deliberate 
provocation but were really due to the indolence, preoccupation and at times illness of the 
Bourbon King. A royal wedding was also in hand, an event far more engrossing to the 
Spanish court than the muffled cries of London merchants. Don Carlos, King of the Two 
Sicilies, was to marry Princess Mary Emily of Saxony, a surprise betrothal which put King 
Philip in raptures with his skill and secrecy. La Quadra was created a Marquis, and Scotti 
exulted to Keene; `the world will now see that we know how to steer our Bark without 
Patiflo'. Costly celebrations went on for days in Madrid and Naples, though they had to 
be paid for by the extraordinary and heavy indulto on the Cadiz trade, and though the 
officers of the army had been unpaid for eighteen months-and the King's Household for 
five years. 42 For some weeks the King was also subject to fits of his mental illness, and 
required all the comfort that could be brought to him by Farinelli and by Elizabeth's 
planning of an opera at the Retiro to amuse him during Easter. 43 By May, while the world 
watched to see if the two powers would go to war, the Spanish King was so deranged 
that he would lie mute on the floor for two days together, and at other times attack his 
40 BL Add Ms 32800, f. 3, Keene to Newcastle, 13 January (NS) 1739. 
41 PRO SP 94/133 (unfoliated), Keene to Newcastle, 30 March (NS) 1739. 
42 BL Add Ms 32797, if. 5-7, Keene to Newcastle, 13 January (NS) 1738. 
43 BL Add Ms 32797, if. 94-5, Keene to Newcastle, 24 February (NS) 1738. 
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ministers. The Queen was so dropsical that she had to be lifted into her chair by four 
attendants. Both were expected to die, and business slowed almost to a halt. 
44 
The personal lives and troubles of both British and Spanish monarchs had their influence, 
then, on the course of events. George II at least recovered quickly from the upheaval in 
his domestic life, and certainly did not cease to involve himself in diplomatic business. 
Even in his distress, he wanted to see a remedy for the merchants' grievances. Quickly - 
perhaps too quickly - Newcastle responded to the petition of the City merchants by 
preparing a stiff Memorial to be presented by Keene in Madrid. In a private letter to 
Keene accompanying the Memorial, Newcastle urged that the king had a serious wish to 
promote good relations with Spain, and believed that only the problems in the West Indies 
stood in their way. The letter displays Newcastle's firm grasp of the position and the 
outlook of the Spanish ministers, and his summary is worth quoting at some length: 
The present Situation of the Court of Spain with other Powers, the cool Foot 
they are upon with France, and the secret Enmity that they have towards the 
Court of Vienna, which discovers itself upon all Occasions, makes it 
improbable, that they should have any Designs at present to quarrel with us; 
But the Notions and Schemes of Mor. Patino, to retrieve what he called the 
Spanish Trade in the West Indies, and, under pretence of hindering 
Contraband Trade, to endeavour to exclude other Nations, and particularly 
the English, from carrying on any there, may have so filled their Heads, that 
they may have resolved in that View, to continue these Practices, and may 
hope, by giving amusing Answers, and, now and then, forbearing, for some 
few months, to go on with them, that no great Inconvenience will arise to 
them from it. `s 
This was a combination of ideas typical of Newcastle: an appreciation of the diplomatic 
realities and of the meaning of patterns of behaviour, allied to a determination to produce 
a solution, in this case by a wholesale restructuring of commercial relations between the 
two powers. This meant amending or at least applying the existing treaties, though; 
principally the 1667 treaty which was designed to create peace in the Mediterranean and 
control such matters as the shipment of arms, and the 1670 treaty, which applied 
specifically to the Americas. In his haste to secure prompt action from Spain, Newcastle 
failed sufficiently to reflect on the treaty grievances which the merchants had elaborated in 
44 PRO SP 78/218, f 99-100, Intelligence in Waldegrave to Newcastle, 26 May (NS) 1738. 
45 BL Add Ms 32796, f. 111, Newcastle to Keene, private letter, 4 November (OS) 1737. 
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discussions with the Lords of the Council. They had made great play with the safeguards 
of the Anglo-Spanish Treaty of 1667, not least because by that treaty brazaletto and 
logwood were specifically excluded from the list of goods which were to be regarded as 
contraband if carried on board English ships. This exemption, and the observation of the 
rules of visiting and search laid down in the treaty, seem to have been regarded by the 
merchants in their evidence to the cabinet as strong points of any future strategy for 
secure Caribbean trade. 46 
Newcastle echoed their judgement in the Memorial to be presented to the court in 
Madrid, stressing that the 14'h article of the 1667 Treaty should be the rule of searching, 
and quoting it verbatim in Latin to demonstrate the point. " Newcastle's freedom of action 
in his own office, and Walpole's restricted interventions in the details of diplomacy, meant 
that, though there was consultation, it was more perfunctory than was usual for such an 
important policy paper. Hardwicke approved the draft, with comments which show that 
he was mainly concerned with the issue of legal proofs to accompany the complaints of 
depredations. 48 The ministry's treaty expert, Horace Walpole, then still at The Hague, 
does not seem to have seen a draft of the memorial until it had been sent, and was in two 
minds about it. On the one hand, he clearly wanted the ministry to take a stronger line 
with Spain, and in that light approved `ye Strong, well reason'd and becoming Memorial'. 
He largely followed its wording in a stiff memorial which he himself sent to the States 
General. 49 On the other, he saw that it contained a dangerous mistake about the scope of 
the treaties concerned, and one which might give the Spanish ministers grounds for cavil. 
Horace took the liberty of suggesting `to you alone': 
I am apprehensive, that if the Spaniards have a Mind, instead of giving 
Satisfaction, to enter into a nice Discussion of your Memorial, They will 
observe perhaps, That the Treaty of 1667, and the Articles cited in it, have no 
46 BL Add Ms 32796, if. 100-106, Proofs and complaints accompanying Newcastle to 
Keene, 4 November (OS) 1737; PRO SP 94/129 (unfoliated), `A Short State of the 
Several Seizures & Violences complained of by the Merchants of London Trading to the 
British Plantations in America & which were laid before the Lords of the Councill in 
support of their Petition... '. 
47 PRO SP 98/129 (unfoliated), BL Add Ms 32796, if. 95-7. 
48 BL Add Ms 32796, f. 62, Hardwicke to Newcastle, 31 October (OS) 1737. 
49 Copy in Wolterton (Walpole) Mss, Lord Walpole's Original Draughts 1736-7 
(unfoliated). 
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manner of regard, to the Navigation, and Commerce to the American seas and 
ports. 5° 
Horace Walpole's idea was that the ministry should shift onto the ground of national 
rights; `by ye Right of Nations they can have no manner of Pretence, to Stop, or seize a 
Ship carrying British Colours, upon ye High Seas, unless they suspect those Colours to be 
fraudulently made use of by an Enemy'. " In the week in which Walpole wrote to convey 
these views, the London press was busy considering the same issues. Not only was this 
the week in which Wall's inflammatory letter about the supposed invasion plan for 
Georgia appeared in the London Evening Post, but the Crafstman led on the treaty issue. 
At first the emphasis on the treaties and on freedom from search was straightforward, but 
the following week, November 19 (OS), Newcastle's legal mistake had been picked out. 52 
The Opposition were not inclined to let the Ministry forget their error. Pulteney later 
commented; `it unfortunately happen'd, that Those, who ought to have defended our 
Rights, rather gave them up, from not understanding them'. 53 Over the next few months 
the issue of the treaties was to lead to much discussion among the ministers, their 
supporters and opponents, as well as in the wider diplomatic world. The reply to the 
memorial sent by the man charged with reinforcing it in Madrid must have dampened 
Newcastle's spirits. Keene inclined to believe that the merchants were wrong to cite 1667 
and to labour the point of rules of search, when the (American) 1670 treaty gave to the 
Spanish no such rights: 
I fear it will be found, first, That the said Treaty is not applicable to the 
present Case; and Secondly, That the interpretation the Merchants have put 
upon it, is giving authority to the Guarda Costas to do what no Treaty has 
yet given them authority to do, and what it is our business to prevent them 
from doing in America. 54 
50 PRO SP 84/369, f. 1, H. Walpole to Newcastle, 26 November (NS) 1737. The copy of 
this letter surviving in Keene's papers suggests that Walpole was by no means inclined to 
keep these reservations to himself; BL Add Ms 43422, if. 128-134. 
S' PRO SP 84/369, f. 5, H. Walpole to Newcastle, 26 November (NS) 1737. 
52 Craftsman, 12 & 19 November (OS) 1737. 
53 [W. Pulteney], A Review ofAll that hath pass 'd between the Courts of Great Britain and 
Spain, Relating to our Trade and Navigation..., London, 1739, p. 25. 
54 BL Add Ms 32796, f. 213, Keene to Newcastle, 13 December (NS) 1737. 
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The 1667 treaty had given wide powers of search because of the war then going on 
against the Barbary pirates, and the need to stop war supplies from being shipped by 
British vessels to the enemies of Spain. To extend to the Caribbean such wartime rights of 
stopping and searching would be fatal, he argued, because there would always be found 
on board enough illicit cargo to justify seizure. Newcastle, however, always touchy and 
inclined to suspect a conspiracy to place him in the wrong, would not retreat from his first 
decision. He countered Pulteney's printed Questions by compiling a long paper, laid 
before the Commons, to justify his citing of the 1667 treaty. 55 One supporter of 
Newcastle's, at least, Henry Stough, remained convinced by this insistence on the 1667 
provisions, but most observers were not. 56 Horace Walpole blamed this confusion for the 
subsequent delay in replying to Spain: 
the Council is divided with respect to the sense of the treaty of 1667 as to the 
West Indies, and his Grace must support what he has wrote, and Lord 
Chan[cello]r, between you and me, must support his friend. 57 
The view from The Hague was particularly clear. The Spanish minister there, St. Gil, was 
scathing on the corner into which the Secretary of State had painted himself. He had just 
read both the 1667 and 1670 treaties in the printed collection: 
a book which I bought lately, and without which Ministers are liable to 
mistakes, like that in the present case, of which the English court being 
sensible, has, with reason, refused to impart the Answer to the bellowing 
people. " 
La Quadra, too, had read his treaties. On the specific instructions, as he said, of King 
Philip, he pointed out that the 8th. Article of the 1667 Treaty contains a specific exception 
ss BL Add Ms 33007, f. 122, Paper of Reasons to show that the Treaty of 1667 extends to 
America; given in full, Wolterton (Walpole) Mss, Political Tracts, (unfoliated), `Reasons 
to shew that the General Regulations laid down in the Treaty of 1667 ... may extend to the West Indies, as well as to any part of Europe: And that it is for the Benefit of His 
Majesty's subjects, that they should do so'. 
56 BL Add Ms 9200, f. 62, Journal of Rev. Henry Stough, 1738. 
s' HMC, Fourteenth Report, Trevor Mss, p. 13, H. Walpole to Trevor, 28 February (OS) 
1738. 
58 PRO SP 94/206, f. 112, St. Gil to Geraldino, 25 March (NS) 1738. The collection was 
probably that of Jean Dumont, Corps Universe! Diplomatique du Drolt des Gens, 
Amsterdam, 8 volumes, 1726-31. 
117 
which relates to the Indies. This made it clear that the rest of the treaty did not apply 
there. So did Article 23, referring to the Admiralty, a tribunal which had no existence in 
the Indies. 39 Horace Walpole himself certainly did not mark his disagreement with 
Newcastle only by his first, relatively tactful letter. This may have been a difficult period 
in his career, for he seemed to be experiencing some stress at this time. He left The Hague 
without any of the usual ceremony of leave-taking of fellow ambassadors, and was 
known, on his arrival in London, to be at odds with the other ministers. 60 The reason may 
well have been the mounting debate over the question of treaties with Spain, in which at 
this time Horace Walpole was certainly involved. Before the third week in January he had 
written for his cabinet colleagues and for the King two long and important papers on the 
depredations issue (and, like St. Gil and unlike Newcastle, he used collections of treaties 
to pin down the detail of the problem). 6' He saw that the nub of the issue was the right of 
free navigation on the high seas, and that the chances of maintaining peaceful trade 
depended on the state of friendship between the Bourbon powers. When Spain no longer 
needed to fear France, that country would no longer need to court England or to fear 
disobliging British traders. 62 Since Horace saw the wider diplomatic question as crucial, 
he believed that the way forward was to renegotiate the treaties between the two powers. 
Nothing less than a wholesale new understanding, based on unambiguous treaty 
agreements, would preserve the peace. In the mean time, he advised reluctantly that it did 
appear that the ministry could and should license the issuing to British merchants of letters 
of reprisal against Spanish shipping. Though jaundiced as to the probable success of the 
measure, and believing that it would be likely to lead to war with both France and Spain, 
he nonetheless saw it as unavoidable: 
But yet if the Merchants will accept Letters of Reprisal, They cannot be 
refused them; the Cases of doing oneself Justice are so flagrant, & have 
59 Article 23 `habla de Almirantazgo que es tribunal que no ay en Indias'. PRO SP 94/130 
(unfoliated), la Quadra to Keene, 26 May (NS) 1738. 
60 PRO SP 94/206, f. 25, St. Gil to Geraldino, 17 December (NS) 1737,; Ibid, f. 27, 
Geraldino to St. Gil, same date. 
61 P. L. Woodfine, `Horace Walpole and British Relations with Spain, 1738, Camden 
Miscellany, Vol XXXII, (1994), pp. 277-311. 
62 Ibid., pp. 299,307-8; BL Add Ms 32795, f 361-2, H. Walpole to Keene, September 26 
(NS) 1737. 
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subsisted so long, that such a refusal would make us appear a most 
Contemptible Nation with all our Maritime Power. 63 
This internal debate about Newcastle's memorial, though, did not affect the public 
diplomatic position, in which Spanish diplomats had to respond to what was in effect an 
ultimatum. The way in which the Spanish ministry received the Memorial was affected 
both by their own outlook on imperial trade and by their understanding of the motives of 
the English ministers. Keene assured Newcastle that la Quadra had considerable goodwill 
and desire for a settlement: 
Not but that He with the rest of the Ministers have their heads filled with the 
prejudices of the illicit Commerce, which, they say, is daily carrying on in the 
Indies by His Majesty's subjects, as well as those of other Powers, to the 
great Detriment of His Catholick Majesty, and in violation of the most solemn 
Treaties. " 
This insistence on traditional monopoly rights and (perfectly correct) belief in extensive 
illicit trading did not of course preclude a desire to reach an agreement with Britain. 
Indeed, just before the receipt of the Memorial, the response of the Spanish court had 
been very accommodating. Following Keene's early November representations, Geraldino 
was instructed to assure the British court that His Catholic Majesty would - after a strict 
and minute enquiry - restore captured effects or pay compensation, and also prevent 
future disorders. 65 Keene was pluming himself on his success in getting speedy action on 
the case of the St. James, including a mulct upon the Governor of Porto Rico. M The 
Memorial, however, stiffened the Spanish attitude, not least because Spanish ministers 
believed that much of the motivation of their British counterparts was tactical. Their 
actions were seen as an attempt to placate the opposition and to attract favourable 
63 Ibid., p. 309. 
64 PRO SP 94/128 (unfoliated), Keene to Newcastle, 13 December (NS) 1737. 
65 PRO SP 94/206, f. 11, Torrenueva to Geraldino, 2 December (NS) 1737. 
66 BL Add Ms 32796, f. 268, Keene to Newcastle, 23 December (NS) 1737; the orders are 
confirmed in PRO SP 94/206, f. 37, Torrenueva to Geraldino, 27 December (NS) 1737. 
The full surviving text makes it clear that this was a serious effort to control the guarda 
costa and the governors: `[el Rey] se expedieren las ordenes correspondientes, y otras al 
Govr. de Puerto Rico, y de la Havana, que tratan del Modo quo han de obrar, y contenerse 
nuestros Armadores, para atasar las violencias que se refieren y ponderan', PRO SP 
107/21 (unfoliated), same to same, same date. 
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publicity. "" It was difficult for them to appreciate the constraints of politics in countries 
like Britain or the United Provinces. 
Trevor put the issue starkly when he commented on a later proposal in the Dutch 
Republic to embargo trade to the Spanish West Indies. Though several political leaders 
would favour it, he said, it would be `too unpopular and dangerous in a Trading that is to 
say pilfering Nation, and where the Populace is a real Sovereign'. 69 Crises involving 
popular clamour gave the ministry less leeway than usual, as the smaller fry of politics 
knew. One independent but loyal Whig member, having his interest menaced by a protege 
of Admiral Wager's, was chided by a local ally for not pressing his case while the ministry 
was under attack; `now those fears are over they will Act with their usual Insolence' 69 
For ministers in Spain, that kind of insolence was perhaps more common. Public opinion 
did make itself felt, and made it difficult for the King's advisers to countenance any 
diminution in national honour. Purely merchant or regional pressures, however, were 
different. The Spanish ministers, like the French, could expect to silence their own 
merchants at will. 70 The Spanish administration was more than usually unrepresentative of 
the nation which it served. Between 1726 and 1746, some 76 percent of officials in the 
office of the Secretary of State came from the Basque region, a preponderance which was 
known to run through the whole Spanish administration. Recruitment to administrative 
office was largely a closed circle of family and regional patronage. 71 In such a service it 
was not surprising that ministers had little sympathy with the grievances of interest 
67 PRO SP 94/206, f. 4, Torrenueva to Geraldino, 28 November (NS) 1737. 
68 BL Add Ms 32800, f. 137, Trevor to Keene, 26 February (NS) 1739. 
69 BL Add Ms 31142, f. 212, Mr. Lord to Squire William Conolly, 27 April (OS) 1738. 
Conolly was MP for Aldeburgh on the Tory interest of Lord Strafford, whose daughter he 
had married, but was a genuinely independent (and wealthy) Whig; Sedgwick, House of 
Commons Vol 1, p. 571. The protege was George Purvis, Conolly's fellow Member for 
Aldeburgh; Ibid. Vol 2, p. 377. 
70 E. g. the new fora ordered by Philip in 1731; the merchants protested against having to 
provide cargoes for the next fleet before they had received their profits from the last, but 
their protests were ignored and they had no redress. [A. Boyer], Political State of Great 
Britain, XLI, January-June 1731. 
71 `Esta solidaridad familiar y regional demuestra que en la epoca de Felipe V el 
reclutamiento se opera casi en circuito cerrado. ' D. Ozanam, `La Diplomacia de los 
Primeros Borbones (1714-1759)', Cuadernos de Investigaci6n Hist6rica, 6,1982, p. 
173. 
120 
groups. Torrenueva told Keene that `we ought not to take the noise and clamour of our 
Subjects for well founded complaints; a language I perceive he has learnt from Mr. del 
Montijo'. n 
There was in fact a source of information closer to home than the former ambassador in 
London. In April 1738 Keene reported to Newcastle what la Quadra had told him of how 
`Geraldino has represented our Motions in England, as the effects of the Malice of those 
who oppose the Administration, joyned by what that Minister calls the Prince's party'. ' 
The Duke wrote to Keene expressly to contradict, in energetic terms, this view of the 
case: 
You may be assured , that there are no Grounds for that Suggestion; And that 
the present Dissatisfaction upon the repeated Injuries & Provocations from 
the Spaniards in America, is Universal & National; And that Nothing, but a 
full Satisfaction for what is past, and Security from the like Abuses for the 
future, can put an End to the general Uneasiness, & Resentment... 74 
Newcastle must, though, have known from letters intercepted the previous December, 
that this allegedly groundless suggestion had been deliberately conveyed to Geraldino by 
the Walpoles. Already in November, Geraldino had told Torrenueva that the Ministry 
needed a clarification of the treaty position regarding Georgia, `and this before the next 
session of Parliament, in order to avoid the dispute which the opposite Party might raise 
about this affair'. 75 On 18 December 1737, Geraldino had a long conversation with 
Horace, on the day after his return from The Hague, in which the Spanish envoy was 
confirmed in his belief that Horace's main preoccupation was to safeguard the ministry 
from criticism in the next sessions of Parliament. Two days later he had a prolonged 
briefing from Sir Robert, to much the same effect. Both were urging Geraldino to secure 
some face-saving action from Spain in order to guard against political criticism. 
Newcastle was careful not to express this view in the formal office correspondence, 
always liable to be laid before Parliament in case of a crisis. In private comments, though, 
he did not disdain to have his secretary convey just such an idea to Keene . In August 
72 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 27, Keene to Newcastle, 27 January (NS) 1738. 
73 PRO SP 94/130 (unfoliated), Keene to Newcastle, 7 April (NS) 1738. 
74 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 303, Newcastle to Keene, 13 April (OS) 1738. 
75 PRO SP 94/206, f. 4, Torrenueva to Geraldino, 28 November (NS) 1737. 
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1738 Stone wrote, on the Duke's instructions, to urge Keene to secure the recall of some 
of the offending Spanish governors, a mark of resentment which would `look well, and 
have a good Effect at Home'. 76 The crucial distinction was that, whereas Newcastle 
insisted on the idea of public opinion as reflecting the sense of the nation, the Walpoles 
saw it as a creation of the interested partisans of Opposition. Sir Robert was explicit that 
the problem was: 
the dissention between this Monarch and the Prince of Wales, and what the 
partisans of the latter were scheming in order to perplex Affairs as well 
foreign as domestick: & that these circumstances did oblige the Ministry to 
proceed with particular circumspection in order to destroy the impressions 
which the wickedness of their Adversaries was labouring to give to the 
Publick. n 
Even in this first major confrontation with Spain, there were divisions within the ministry, 
both over the form of the memorial and over the nature of the domestic political 
challenge, which affected the course of diplomacy. Partly the problem was that, like his 
predecessor Montijo, Geraldino found the Walpoles more congenial and more 
approachable than Newcastle. Sir Robert especially, `in whom I always experienced more 
clearness than in the other Ministers', was the first person to be approached for 
information. 79 It was certainly the vision of a ministry bound by the pressures of public 
clamour which Geraldino continued to give to his court, and to fellow diplomats: 
In good truth I cannot help praising the wisdom with which the Ministry 
conduct themselves; but the freedom of the Nation in their way of talk, and 
the infinite number of printed publick Papers which make an impression upon 
the Commonalty, produce such effects, that the Government cannot help 
following the Current. 79 
He believed what Walpole told him, that ministers struggled to steer in a current 
channeled, at least in part, by the opposition; `they are forced to quiet and give some 
satisfaction to the great outcries & noise of the people, Traders, & contrary party'. 8° 
76 PRO SP 94/132 (unfoliated), Stone to Keene, 21 August (OS) 1738. 
7' PRO SP 94/206, f. 43, Geraldino to la Mina, 23 December (NS) 1737; Ibid, if. 47-8, 
Geraldino to Torrenueva, 26 December (NS) 1737. 
79 PRO SP 94/206, f. 29, Geraldino to Torrenueva, 19 December (NS) 1737. 
79 PRO SP 94/206, f. 119, Geraldino to St. Gil, 11 April (NS) 1738. 
E0 PRO SP 94/206, f. 128, Geraldino to St. Gil, 18 April (NS) 1738. 
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Prominent among the traders were the governors of the South Sea Company, the 
privileged monopoly which was at the heart of the dispute between Britain and Spain. 
Negotiations were already delicate and complex. The South Sea Company made matters 
far worse, partly because it was a constant irritant to the Spanish court, reminding them of 
their surrendered rights, and of the extensive illicit trade for which the Asiento trade was a 
cover. Partly also this was because of the Company's intransigence in insisting on a 
settlement of grievances on its own terms. The sheer bulk of the South Sea papers 
presented to Newcastle in May 1737 made him realise that the disputes with the Spanish 
court were `not in any great likelyhood to be soon concluded'. 81 Six weeks later the 
Governors of the Company told Newcastle that they had in fact reached a provisional 
agreement with Geraldino for settling grievances, but this was just another illusion of the 
false calm of that summer. 82 The Asiento company undoubtedly had grievances to 
complain of. One was that some of their trusted agents overseas had been persuaded, as 
they alleged, to convert to Catholicism, thus gaining full protection for any embezzlement 
committed against their employers. Another was the basic problem of the clumsy and 
partial motions of the Spanish administration. Wilful misunderstandings by Spanish 
officials repeatedly obliged the Company to seek from the Spanish King cedulas 
(warrants) explaining the original orders. Delay and loss were inevitable irritants in such a 
scheme of things. 83 
The Company was not easy to discipline, since its London contacts and active political 
involvement made it a dangerous adversary. Affronts to the Asientists had a habit of 
finding their way quickly into the London press. The details of the Company's 
negotiations were made familiar to a public who would ordinarily have had little idea of 
commercial practice and high finance. Complex disputes involved claim and counterclaim 
going back to the unresolved commission at Seville in 1732. The Company refused to pay 
the whole of the `negro duties', the tax on the slave trade due to the Spanish crown, 
which amounted to thirty-three and one third pesos per negro, for an annual quota of 
4,000 slaves. They based their refusal on the fact that the supposedly annual flows (and 
81 BL Add Ms 32795, f. 24, Newcastle to Keene, 5 May (OS) 1737. 
82 Ibid, f. 134, Newcastle to Keene, 23 June (OS) 1737. 
83 BL Add Ms 33032, if. 43-49, `Heads of Sundry Matters Necessary to the Establishment 
of the Assiento Trade'. 
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therefore the annual South Sea ship) did not always take place. Only seven annual ships 
actually ever sailed, partly because Philip was reluctant to grant a cedula for a new flota 
while the Company withheld payment. The main cause, though, was a lack of demand in 
the Indies, as the American markets were flooded by illicit trade, in which the Company 
had a not negligible share. " This tension was aggravated by a dispute, begun in 1733, 
about the rate of exchange at'which payments for the slave duties should be made. The 
silver real coin had been demonetised, in Old Spain, in 1725, though in the Indies it 
continued to circulate as the main medium of payment. In 1726 a new, debased, silver 
real coin was issued at the devalued rate of exchange of ten, not the old eight, to the 
dollar. The Company received much of its cash in the heavier old silver reales, but wished 
to pay the Spanish Court in the new debased coins, yet at the old rate of eight to the 
dollar. Asiento payments were made, according to treaty, in `pieces of eight' (pesos, or 
dollars), and the Spanish administration demanded that these should be `hard' pieces of 
eight, or pesos gordos, worth ten of the new reales. Each dollar would therefore be worth 
four shillings and fourpence (52 pence), whereas by the Company's fraudulent reckoning 
the dollar was worth only three shillings and fourpence (40 pence). 85 The value of this 
piece of effrontery was considerable. The exact figures alleged did vary, and not all of the 
Company's transactions benefitted from this disputed exchange rate of the real, but 
assuming an average difference for each trading year of twelve pence between the two 
rates, the Asientists would gain one pound thirteen shillings and fourpence per slave, or a 
potential £6,600 per year. The company naturally had an interest in prolonging the 
dispute, and in retaining the duties due to Spanish crown. In an unusually neutral 
comment, the London Evening Post reported: 
Fresh Matter of Discontent every Day arises between the English and the 
Spaniards, the former frequently taking Spanish Ships in the American Sea, 
and the Court of Madrid stedfastly refusing to grant the Assiento Schedule to 
the South-Sea Company, upon Pretence that this Corporation scruples taking 
their Pieces of Eight at more than forty-one Pence each, whereas they are 
current in the Indies at fifty. 96 
84 L. Batchelor, `The South Sea Company and the Assiento', Bulletin of the Institute of 
Historical Research, 3,1926, pp. 128-30; E. Donnan, `The Early Days of the South Sea 
Company, 1711-1718', Journal of Economic and Business History, 2,1930, pp. 444-7. 
35 E. G. Hildner, The Role of the South Sea Company in the Diplomacy leading to the War 
of Jenkins' Ear, 1729-1739', Hispanic American Historical Review, 18,1938, pp. 328-9. 
86 London Evening Post, 30 Dec (OS) 1737 to 1 Jan (OS) 1738. 
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The case of the Company was taken up by the politically aware people of London, far 
beyond the confines of the coteries who shared in its wealth and knew its back ways into 
parliament. This was certainly not public opinion in the national and spontaneous sense 
defined by Newcastle, but rather in that of Walpole, the pressure created by skilled 
practitioners who knew how to use their leverage. Royal issues were also involved, not 
least because George II was the nominal head of the Company, enjoyed its dividends and 
gave it his protection. The impact of the Company on Spanish royal pride was also 
significant. The South Sea Governors behaved like a second British government, an 
overlap of functions increased by the fact that the Company's agent in Madrid was none 
other than Benjamin Keene. In some respects, indeed, the South Sea Company did behave 
like a kind of English consulate abroad. The Company's factories were often the only 
source of advice, help or money available to British mariners in distress. Two South Sea 
factors in Carthagena, for example, were burdened with a stranded schooner in the 
summer of 1736. They lodged and fed the crew for over two months while the Governor 
there demanded more for repairs than the vessel was worth. When the crew finally left, 
the factors had to pay an array of duties and legal fees on their behalf. 87 This role, and the 
special access which the company enjoyed to British ministers, perhaps explains the high- 
handedness of their approach. Certainly the Governors' peremptory dealings with Pati11o 
were a considerable irritant to the Spanish court, and the formality of their despatches 
both then and later makes them difficult to distinguish from the diplomatic papers of the 
day. 88 
The Asiento company wanted to pin down the Spanish monarch in such matters as the 
precise duration of the Asiento. The thirty years of the slave contract granted at Utrecht 
were to run out in 1744, but the Company wanted to reinterpret the agreement as being 
for thirty uninterrupted years of trading (excluding years of hostilities). Successive Courts 
of Directors had still never settled a figure either for the cost of the represalias; the 
seizures made in the Americas under a cedula of October 1722, and still not resolved 
despite the work of the commissaries in 1732-3. Keene summarized the problem 
retrospectively; `it looks as if Every Direction had been willing to shift off the blow from 
87 PRO SP 94/129 (unfoliated), Extract from a letter by Crowe & Ord, 23 July (NS) 1736, 
88 See e. g. BL Add Ms 33032, if. 185-192, `The Royal Assiento Company's Reply to the 
Answer given by His Catholick Majesty's late Minister M. Patino to their Complaints of 
Grievances', 24 February (OS) 1737. 
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its own shoulders to saddle Those of their Succesors & this is what has brought Matters 
to Extremities'. 89 The company wanted full satisfaction for all its old claims for the 
represalias and, as a secure last resort for payment, wanted to be sure of having on its 
hands money due to the Spanish crown as negro duties. 90 Yet they calmly proposed that 
their own accounts should be accepted on a summary valuation, avoiding the tedious 
scrutiny of the full records. 9' Just as important in the bargaining process was their sharp 
practice over the rate of exchange of the dollar. Their position was that they were due to 
pay their accounts in Madrid, at the current, variable, exchange rate prevailing. Payment 
in the `hard' dollars of the Indies was not in question, and not sanctioned by the treaties. 92 
Of course, the treaty-makers could have had no foreknowledge of a devaluation twelve 
years later. La Quadra was right to complain of the accountancy practices of the 
Company and of their medley of dubious complaints and claims. 93 The Spanish crown, in 
turn, had grievances, which dated from the early 1730s, against the South Sea Company. 
There were duties on the slave trade which remained unpaid by the Asientists, and there 
was the issue of the Company's ships carrying goods from America on behalf of Spanish 
subjects, avoiding Spanish duties. There were also the numerous frauds of both the annual 
ships and slave ships, which carried saleable clothing and provisions far in excess of the 
quantities laid down in the Asiento treaty. 94 
The South Sea Court of Directors drew up a plan in June 1737, approved by George II at 
the end of July, which was designed to end these disputes. His Catholic Majesty should 
settle the account of the represaliated goods (seized in the conflict of 1727), and give 
orders for payment within a time satisfactory to the Company. Reasonable as the 
compromise must have seemed to ministers, that time was left dependent on the goodwill 
of the Company. Once (and if) they were satisfied, the Company would settle their 
89 PRO SP 94/133, Keene to Couraud, January 1739. 
90 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 56, Paper by W. Smith, by order of the Directors of the South Sea 
Company, 9 February (OS) 1738. 
91 Ibid., if. 56-7,67-8, Reports and paper. 
92 Ibid., if. 73-7, South Sea Company's Observations on the Answer given by the Marquis 
de Torrenueva to the Proposal of Mr. Keene. 
93 PRO SP 94/130 (unfoliated), La Quadra to Keene, 26 May (NS) 1738. 
94 PRO SP 94/131 (unfoliated), `The pretensions of his Catholick Majesty', 1732, given to 
the Secretary's office by Stert, 23 September (OS) 1738. 
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outstanding debts in the negro trade at the full 52 pence per dollar, as claimed by Spain 
after the revaluation of that coin. 9S This plan was being pressed upon the British ministry 
by a more insistent message in December. An important proposal by Peter Burrell in 
February 1738 brought together the voluminous and legalistic paperwork of the 
Company's grievances, incorporated the June and December statements and finally 
quantified their demands. They computed the unpaid bill of represalias as being 
1,521,394 dollars. Against this, they owed His Catholic Majesty for the negro duties on 
the Asiento trade between May 1722 and April 1727, some 666,666 dollars. 6 Even this 
was qualified, as they had been able to send only five and not ten annual ships in the 
period concerned; one of 500 tons and four of 650 tons, making in all 3,100 tons rather 
than 5,000. Such quibbles, which took no account of any extra profit from the voyages, 
may be regarded as purely bargaining positions, yet they could seem very definite 
concessions, even injustices, in the polemical press. 
By this time the Company was firmly making conditions with which Philip V must 
comply. The Company insisted that he declare that the Asiento was not simply given for 
thirty calendar years, but for thirty trading years. The asientists were insisting, in other 
words, on the right to send a full thirty `annual ships', and to ignore those years in which 
Philip had not authorised a sailing. But to prolong indefinitely the hated concessions of 
Utrecht was impossible for Philip. 97 The South Sea Company put its claims in a way to 
which the proud government of Spain could not submit. Even when a financial settlement 
seemed to be concluded in the autumn of 1738, the South Sea Directors saw fit to insist 
on securities for payment as if they were dealing with a foreign merchant of unknown 
credit. Such stipulations, Keene was told by an alarmed Spanish minister, `were indecent 
and injurious to the honour of the Spanish Crown'. 98 One offensive aspect of the 
Company's case was taken up vigorously by Newcastle, no doubt sensing a way to make 
progress. The Company argued that, where a cedula to America did not produce payment 
93 BL Add Ms 32795, f 335-9, Humble address of the Court of Directors of the South Sea 
Company to the King's most Excellent Majesty, 30 June (OS) 1737. 
96 Ibid., ff. 67-72, Report of a Special Committee Containing ä State of the Accots. of the 
Reprisalias, 9 February (OS) 1738. 
97 BL Add Ms 32797, if. 64-5, P. Burrell & J. Bristow, Governor & Deputy Governor of the 
South Sea Company, explanatory address to the King, 21 December (OS) 1737. 
BL Add Ms 32799, f. 81, Keene to Newcastle, 8 September (NS) 1738. 
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within three months from the viceroy or governor concerned, Philip himself should pay in 
Europe. Newcastle insisted in his November 1737 memorial that this was in fact Philip's 
duty under the final settlement of the Treaty of Seville signed in February 1732. Keene 
was ordered strongly to insist on this duty, which was as much as to accuse Philip of 
lacking royal authority over his governors, and then to make him their purse-bearer. " The 
pride of even a normal Spanish ruler might have been expected to rebel at this treatment. 
In the case of a king so irrational and so eccentric as Philip, the consequences were bound 
to be harmful. 
In the British case, the eccentricities of monarchy were less marked, and the dangers of 
relying on a hereditary system of government less apparent. The danger and the 
eccentricity were still there, however. There was one important way in which the family 
peculiarities of the House of Hanover affected politics adversely. This was the harm 
wrought by the tragi-comic conflicts of the king and queen with their son Frederick, 
Prince of Wales. The first signs of political trouble came with the prince's marriage in 
April 1736, exploited by Frederick to embarrass his father over the issue of his allowance. 
The Prince of Wales began to press his claim for an enlarged allowance of 1100,000 from 
the Civil List. He made the demand into a test of loyalty among the coterie of Tories and 
opposition Whigs who surrounded him, and did his best to make his father George II 
seem mean and unreasonable. Frederick began to press his supporters to vote for the 
increase in early February 1737, Sir George Bubb Dodington first broaching the Prince's 
wants in a private conversation with Sir Robert Walpole. 100 The Lord Chancellor headed a 
deputation sent to the Prince to carry his father's message of disapproval, but despite the 
care which ministers had taken to soften the King's expressions as much as possible, 
Frederick simply declared that the matter was now out of his hands (implying that it was 
in those of the Opposition). 101 Walpole took the contest between father and son seriously, 
and when the motion for a settlement on the Prince came on, he resorted to unusual 
persuasions. He promised Watkin Williams Wynn, the leading Jacobite Tory, that if he or 
William Shippen would bring the Tories to vote against it, the ministry would provide 
99 BL Add Ms 32796, f. 79, Newcastle to Keene, 4 November (OS) 1737. 
100 H. P. Wyndham (ed), The Diary of the Late George Bubb Dodington (1784), p. 320. 
101 Hervey, Memoirs Vol 3, pp. 672-80. BL Add Ms 35870, f. 31, record of the Prince's 
verbal answer, 21 February (OS) 1737. 
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£20,000 for the widow of the executed Jacobite the third Earl of Derwentwater, whose 
estates had been confiscated and sold. Williams Wynn refused to help her `in so mean a 
manner' according to Edward Harley. In the debate itself, Walpole struck the pathetic 
note in his fears of a breach between father and son: `He pretended almost to shed tears 
tho' as soon as he had carried his Question & the whole was over He turned the Affair 
into ridicule'. 102 
By the end of the month the immediate crisis was believed to be over, and the rumour was 
that the Prince was falling under the influence and using the purse of Aislabie, the ruined 
Chancellor of the Exchequer who had retired in disgrace after the South Sea Bubble. 103 
The young cornet of horse, William Pitt, was dismissed from his place for his speeches on 
this occasion, and he and Lyttelton soon led an able and discomfiting group of Opposition 
critics. 104 They were encouraged by their patron Lord Cobham, who had been driven out 
by the ministry over the Excise Crisis of 1733 and who was so imbued with the `Patriot' 
rhetoric of opposition that he built a `Temple of British Worthies' to reflect it in his 
magnificent landscape garden at Stowe, the wonder of the age. 105 Among the busts placed 
in this garden feature were those of the heroes of the opposition press, Drake and Queen 
Elizabeth who had put the Spaniards in their place, Hampden who, a hundred years 
earlier, had resisted Ship Money (as Cobham had opposed Excise), and even a bust of the 
current London champion of the anti-Spanish cause, Sir John Barnard. '" Prince Frederick 
began to gather around him at his Leicester House residence an opposition court, 
102 CUL Add. 6851, quotations if. 72 & 77, Edward Harley, 3rd. Earl of Orford, 
Parliamentary Journal, 1728-1751. 
103 CUL Ch (H) Corresp. 2667, Bishop of Chichester to Walpole, 28 February (OS) 1737; 
K. Darwen, `John Aislabie (1670-1742): A Study in Augustan Politics and Hanoverian 
Finance', Yorkshire Archaeological Journal, XXXVII, 147,1950, pp. 262-324. 
104 BL Add Ms 22626, f. 118, Pitt to Hon. George Berkeley, 7 June (OS) 1736. 
105 P. Langford, The Excise Crisis: Society and Politics in the Age of Walpole (1975), p. 
100; J. M. Price, `The Excise Affair Revisited. The Administrative and Colonial 
Dimensions of a Parliamentary Crisis', in England's Rise to Greatness, 1660-1763 
(1983), ed. S. B. Baxter. 
106 For the role of the grouping gathered around Lord Cobham, see L. M. Wiggin, The 
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frequented by those who had given up hope of employment under George II and who 
therefore bowed to the `reversionary interest'. 
The breach was completed by the scandals surrounding the birth of the Prince's daughter. 
When he took away the Princess, actually in labour, from Hampton Court on 31 July (OS) 
1737, he insulted the crown and risked endangering the succession. The break was final, 
and bad relations were aggravated by disputes over the royal christening. The whole 
episode was so vital to the political elite that Hervey devoted to it the greater part of his 
memoirs of 1737.107 The admixture of royal and popular politics in the whole of this 
episode is very instructive. Queen Caroline, at the height of her agitation over the Prince's 
behaviour, was `really ashamed for the figure one makes in foreign Courts, when such a 
story is told of the affronts one receives in one's own family'. 108 At the same time, she 
accepted Walpole's advice to visit the child and do all possible honours to it, seeing that 
this would win the publicity battle at home: 
though one does not care a farthing for them, the giving oneself all this 
trouble is une bonne grimace pour la publique; and the more impertinences 
they do, and the more civilities we show, the more we shall be thought in the 
right, and they in the wrong, when we bring it to an open quarrel. 109 
The King's final message to his undutiful son was delivered, with much trepidation, by the 
Dukes of Grafton and Richmond and the Earl of Pembroke on 10 September (OS) 1737, 
and specifically debarred the Prince from St. James's until he ceased to foment divisions 
by cultivating Opposition. ' o An official order went out that all those who paid their court 
to the Prince and Princess of Wales would not be admitted into the King's presence. "' 
This ban made the Opposition officially into a rival court, and one which politicians could 
frequent without automatically being anti-Hanoverian. The astute and the ambitious at 
once rallied to Leicester House, and John Perceval, Viscount Egmont, even quickly 
107 On the royal birth alone, Hervey, Memoirs, Vol 3, pp. 756-824; see the exchanges of 
letters between the Prince and his parents in August 1737, Windsor RA Bootle Mss, 
54035-41, and in BL Add Ms 32795, if. 352-7. 
108 Hervey, Memoirs Vol 3, p. 766. 
109 Ibid., p. 767. 
110 Windsor RA Bootle Mss, 5043-4. 
III BL Add Ms 35870, f. 36, Notice of 12 September (OS) 1737. 
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offered to give the Prince his own, adjacent, house to go with it. 112 This breach remained 
officially open until the reconciliation with Frederick which was forced upon the King 
after Walpole's fall. Privately, George continued to hate and mistrust all the Prince's 
followers. Even a long-time critic of the court such as Sandys found that simply to be 
attacked by Pitt was enough for the King, who told him; `Since they piss upon you, I will 
stand by you'. 13 George determined in 1737 never to employ those who had made their 
court at Leicester House, a resolve which limited his freedom of action and bound him all 
the more firmly to Walpole. "4 
There was a great contrast in the openness of monarchy to public opinion in the two 
countries. At the head of an administration heavily weighted towards Italians and 
Basques, and himself a Frenchman, King Philip had always been despised by the mass of 
his adopted people. The ordinary people, early in the war with Britain, were violently 
against the French, `whom they look upon as the Supporters and Abettors of the present 
Tyranny'. '" As Philip's reign progressed he became increasingly isolated from these 
discontented subjects, seeing no-one without the Queen, and enmeshed in a court system 
which prevented almost all Spaniards from having the kind of direct access to the crown 
which had existed up to 1727.16 In Britain by contrast, foreign envoys could be surprised 
by the freedom with which the king could be approached; `the great liberty with which 
things are spoke and written in the very presence of the Sovereign. 117 One great stimulus 
to this liberty was the influence of George II's Hanoverian connections on the minds of 
the `Multitude'. By early 1737 George II had spent more than half a year in Hanover, 
never a circumstance likely to endear him to the British, and perhaps especially the 
London, public. He was rumoured moreover to be detained there not by affairs of state, 
112 BL Add Ms 47012 A, if. 1-4, Perceval to Col. Schutz, 13 September (OS) 1737. 
113 BL Add Ms 51437, f. 25, Ayscough's political journal, 3 December (OS) 1742. 
14 J. B. Owen, `George II Reconsidered', in Statesmen, Scholars and Merchants, ed A. 
Whiteman, J. S. Bromley & P. G. M. Dickson (1973), pp. 126-7; shrewd comment on the 
tactical effects is found in H. P. Wyndham (ed), The Diary of the late George Bubb 
Dodington (1784), p. 305. 
its PRO SP 78/224, f. 74, Waldegrave to Newcastle, quoting the French consul at Cadiz, 28 
September (NS) 1740. 
116 PRO SP 78/227A, if. 191-2, Information of the younger Sicilian abbe, Caracciolo, in 
Thompson to Newcastle, 16 May (NS) 1742. 
117 PRO SP 94/206, f. 45, St. Gil to Geraldino, 26 December (NS) 1737. 
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but by the charms of his newest mistress, Mme Walmoden. This was the King's most 
obvious infatuation, and caused even Queen Caroline herself unusual anxiety. "" The mob 
allowed themselves great freedoms in denouncing their monarch's private pleasures. In 
December 1736 there took place an incident described with some amusement by Pulteney 
to swift: 
One Mrs. Mopp, a famous she Bone-setter and mountebank, coming to Town 
in a coach with six horses on the Kentish Road, was met by a Rabble of 
People, who seeing her very oddly and tawdrily dress'd, took her for a 
Foreigner, and concluded she must be a certain great Person's Mistress. Upon 
this they followed the Coach, bawling out, No Hannover Whore, no 
Hannover Whore. The Lady within the Coach was much offended, let down 
the Glass, and screamed louder than any of them, she was no Hannover 
Whore, she was an English one, upon which they all cry'd out, God bless 
your Ladyship, quitted the pursuit, and wished her a good Journey. 11 ' 
The mob did not always mistake their target. When Mme Walmoden, to the open joy of 
George II, was installed in England, a crowd insulted her coach also, with cries of 
`Hanover whore'. 120 Towards Christmas 1736 George II reluctantly decided to return to 
England, but the royal flotilla was caught in a severe storm and had to put back into the 
port of Helvoetsluys, where the King was detained for some weeks by westerly gales. 
Opposition newspaper The London Evening-Post commented drily: `The Expence of 
Horses, Coaches &c waiting at Harwich, and on the Kentish Roads, for His Majesty's 
I 
Return from Holland, is computed at above 1251. per Diem'. 121 
Freedom of speech about the sovereign was not confined to the press or to those in high 
office. The anti-Hanoverian sentiments of the public could be expressed in an indirect but 
unmistakeable manner. When the Prince of Orange was in London in 1734 on his 
marriage to the Princess Royal, the enthusiasm of the play-going audiences was highly 
selective. The Prince of Wales, who fancied himself the people's darling, was met with 
polite clapping, while `the moment the Prince of Orange appeared, the whole house rung 
its Hervey, Memoirs, Vol 2, pp. 630-4. 
119 BL Add Ms 4806, f. 178, Pulteney to Swift, 2 Dec (OS) 1736. 
120 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 207/133, Thomas Carte to Daniel O'Brien, 3 July (OS) 1738. 
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with peals of shouts and huzzahs'. It was not only inside the opera that the crowds paid 
these attentions. The King himself began to be: 
very uneasy at distinctions of this kind that were paid him, and could not 
contentedly see, every opera-night from his own window, the coach of the 
Prince of Orange surrounded by crowds and ushered out of Court with 
incessant hallooing, whilst his own chair followed the moment after through 
empty and silent streets. 122 
Liberty could become license, and more direct insults might be offered to the crown, as 
was gleefully retailed by one young peer at Westminster School: 
The last time the King was at Ranelaigh Gardens he had this joke cut upon 
him, viz., two young fellows were walking by the King, one said to the other, 
`where shall we sup? ' T'other made answer, `At the King's Arms. ' `Oh', says 
t'other, `that's too full' (for the Countess of Yarmouth was with him). `At the 
King's Head, then. ' `Oh, no, ' says he, `that's very empty. ' On which the King 
made out of the Gardens directly, as well as the young fellows, and they say it 
caused a great disturbance. 123 
Though an unusual incident, this familiarity was only one aspect of the politicisation of 
public places in London, most evident in the rival Vauxhall Gardens. Visitors were 
presented with political allegories which favoured the outlook and supporters of the 
Prince of Wales. One motif added in the early 1740s was a series of large marine paintings 
by Peter Monamy. Patrons in the supper boxes could refresh their eyes with two of the 
rare examples of the Spanish war bringing glory to the British navy. One (of course) was 
the taking of Porto Bello by Admiral Vernon, and the other was the 1742 episode in 
which Capt. Tucker of the Fowey took a Spanish Register ship, the St. Joseph. 124 The 
King, especially when popular opinion in the capital boiled over into protests, was not 
insulated from these scenes. The court went every week to masquerades, opera, comedies 
122 Both quotations Hervey, Memoirs, Vol 1, p. 282. 
123 Historical Manuscripts Commission 78, III, Report on the Mss of Reginald Rawdon 
Hastings, p. 37, Francis, Lord Hastings, to Selina, Countess of Huntingdon, 24 July (OS) 
1742. 
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and concerts, and George was never missing. 123 Since the King went so regularly into the 
places of entertainment in London, and mingled so freely with his subjects, he could 
hardly fail to be aware of the mood and prejudices of the vociferous London public. 
'u PRO SP 107/25 (unfoliated), Andrie to King Frederick William I, 13 March (OS) 1739. 
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Chapter 5 Bug Food and British Beef 
The clamour which reached the ears of George II was a chorus about Britons kept in 
Spanish slavery and fed on `bug food'. The first mention of the problem came almost 
casually, in a letter from the Consul at Cadiz informing Keene that eleven sailors had been 
brought from America and imprisoned there, but that all but one had been released at 
Consul Cayley's instance. ' For some time this episode was all but overlooked. In late 
February Sir Robert Walpole rebuked Geraldino over thirty-one English sailors, taken in 
Havana, brought to Spain in the Fuerte man of war, and now imprisoned in the Carraca in 
Cadiz alongside criminals condemned to labour. 2 What Walpole's political antennae had 
detected was to prove the beginning of a chorus of protest which would dominate the 
newspaper press and figure in ballads and cartoons for the next eighteen months. Britons, 
the cry began, were imprisoned by the ancient and cowardly enemy, and treated as slaves 
while the government tamely talked and offered commercial concessions. On March 7 
(NS) a ship arrived in London bringing letters from several sailors: `This news... has 
greatly augmented the Clamour of the Merchants, who have resolved to lay it, with the 
rest of their Complaints, before the Parliament on the 12th. Inst. '3 
This was enough to stimulate Newcastle to action, sending on to Keene extracts from the 
letters and demanding the instant release of the sailors. Newcastle's urgency came from 
the `Accounts here of the greatest Cruelties and Barbarities having been exercised against 
these poor people'. 4 These cruelties were in fact rather vague, and later proved to be 
poorly founded. They were enough, though, to generate an image of hapless slaves 
languishing in unsavoury foreign gaols. The captain of the Loyal Charles, Benjamin Wray, 
pushed along the concern about ill-treatment, in a long letter aimed at City sentiment; `the 
Loyal Charles and the Dispatch is two as noted Ships among the Merchants as any out of 
London'. ' An unnamed writer of one of the crew's letters commented on their conditions 
PRO SP 94/130, (unfoliated), Keene to Newcastle, 6 January (NS) 1738. 
z PRO SP 94/206, f. 99, Geraldino to La Mina, 10 March (NS) 1738. 
3 Ibid.. 
BL Add Ms 32797, f. 143, Newcastle to Keene, 2 March (OS) 1738. 
5 Ibid. f. 148, enclosed letter of Benjamin Wray, 1 February (OS) 1738. 
in terms which seem to have been the origin of the charge of slavery; `we are close 
confined, and work as the Slaves do, and We have very little victuals'. 6 It was not 
surprising that a low foreign diet would figure prominently in any such complaint. Eating 
beef and plum pudding, and drinking beer, was what defined the Englishman against not 
just the Spanish and French, but even their partner in the Union, the starveling oatmeal- 
eating Sawney the Scot. There was no one unpalatable foreign food with which the 
Spanish were conventionally associated. The usual caricature of the Spaniard (always 
depicted as a man) had more to do rather with his pride, shown by foppish, old-fashioned 
dress. It seems to have been taken for granted, though, that Spanish food was inferior, 
and an indicator of the difference between a free society and one tyrannised over by both 
Church and King. 7 This image of the well-fed Briton, though at this time it was regularly 
celebrated in renditions of Fielding's popular song, The Roast Beef of Old England, can 
never have been a very exact representation of the state of the common people. 8 
Ironically, it was even less true of those who, as a result of this agitation, were sent on the 
campaign to the West Indies. The diet of the forces in the Caribbean was at least as bad as 
that in the Spanish prisons. One officer wrote home to complain that; `our meet is salt as 
brine, our bread as it lays on the table swarms with Maggots, & the water here fluxes us 
all'. 9 Those who served in the expedition, unlike the news-reading public at home, quickly 
discovered how common `bug food' was outside these islands. 
The men concerned in the charge of slavery were the crews of the Loyal Charles and 
Dispatch. These vessels were returning from Jamaica loaded chiefly with sugar and rum 
when they were taken on August 5 1737 by a Spanish ship of twenty-four guns and 350 
6 Ibid. f. 146, enclosed copy of anonymous letter of 22 January (NS) 1738. 
7 M. Duffy (ed), The Englishman and the Foreigner (1986), pp. 23-5,134-7. The 
frontispiece to the 1738 poem, The Voice of Liberty in ibid. p. 135 uses as part of its 
caption the phrase `the vanquished sons of Spain' to highlight the indignity of their attacks 
on Britons. The same words are used in `Britannicus' [Mark Akenside], A British 
Philippic (1738), p. 7, as part of a routine Patriot onslaught on a ministry which has 
broken faith with the glorious past of Cavendish, Raleigh and Blake (p. 10). 
= Originally written for his Don Quixote in England, and enlarged and set to a new tune by 
Richard Leveridge in 1735. Theatre audiences sang it in the same way as modern football 
crowds chant their own repertoire; M. C. Battestin, with R. Battestin, Henry Fielding. A 
L fe (1989), p. 114. 
9 BL Add Ms 34207, f. 11, Captain William Burrard to brother Harry, 26 April (OS) 1741. 
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men, and a sloop of ten guns and 100 men. They were imprisoned in Havana, and fed for 
three months on `Turked Beef and magotty Bread', then sent to Cadiz where the food 
was horse beans and salt fish. The lodgings and company were equally disappointing: 
we are put in Gaol every night among all manner of Villains, such as Thieves, 
Murderers, Turks, Fellows that has committed all manner of Villainy, where 
the Vermin is ready to eat us up, & in the Morning We are turn'd out with an 
Iron about our legs among the rest of the Slaves to wrought, & is told like 
Sheep out of a Pen. '° 
Another crew member wrote home to his wife about the `Beans full of Vermin' and the 
bad conditions; a prison one hundred and thirty foot long and about thirty foot broad 
contained some 300 prisoners, with irons and chains. " In London, not having yet caught 
up with the latest developments, the Craftsman reported a petition about the ship seizures 
from the Jamaica merchants concerned. Both it and the London Evening Post printed the 
petition of the imprisoned sailors. 12 The Craftsman launched a violent editorial `letter' on 
the meagre and ragged captives in the Havana: 
Are our brave English Mariners to be thus abused, who have committed no 
Crime, and whom the Spaniards durst not look in the face upon equal Terms, 
were their Hands unty'd? Have those poor fellows forfeited their Liberty, 
because They happened to belong to a Ship, that had 8 or 10 tons of 
Logwood, or a few bags of Cocoa on Board, which perhaps were ship'd on 
Freight, and produced at Jamaica? 13 
More cynical readers might have questioned the force of that `perhaps'. The London 
press was open to deliberate manipulation where the grievances against Spain were 
concerned. At the beginning of January the French ambassador in London was surprised 
to see in the Daily Advertiser a circumstantial account, apparently endorsed by himself, of 
the seizure of a French merchantman by the Spaniards. The man behind this piece of 
provocation was Oglethorpe, prominent among those who were trying to foment feeling 
against Spain. He had obtained a copy of the French captain's declaration, added to the 
10 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 148, letter of Benjamin Wray, 1 February (OS) 1738, in Newcastle 
to Keene, 2 March (OS) 1738; an earlier letter by Wray was copied to Keene in ibid. f. 
43, Newcastle to Keene 2 February (OS) 1738. 
It ibid. f. 150, anonymous letter of, 6 February (OS) 1738. 
12 Craftsman, 11 February (OS) 1738; London Evening-Post, 9 February (OS) 1738. 
13 Craftsman, 11 February (OS) 1738. 
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picture some darker shades of his own, and had it printed. "' Any new matter which might 
force the issue against Spain was acceptable to the press. News of the prisoners in the 
Carraca therefore came as an unexpected windfall. It heightened the disgust already felt at 
Spain's tardy answer to the British memorial. '5 
Slavery was an ideal emotive topic with which to raise the still cool political temperature. 
All observers agreed, early in the session, that it would prove an easy one. As the Earl of 
Egmont saw it; `there will be few or no struggles this session, wch. will be up as soon as 
possible'. 16 In mid-February, Horace Walpole was sanguine about the current Commons 
session; `Our business in Parliament goes on so fast and glib that we go to dinner every 
day at 3 o'clock, and indeed I foresee nothing at present that should prevent our rising by 
the end of April'. " Even at the end of that month, Geraldino believed that `The Session 
goes on at present as happily as the Government could wish'. 
'8 The skilful serial printing 
of letters from the British `slaves', though, was generating a momentum which such 
political insiders had not at first appreciated. By late February it was obvious that 
ministers could not ignore harangues about innocent captives `us'd like Slaves, and 
worked very hard, for a wretched Sustenance of Stock-Fish, rotten Beans, &c. '. 
19 Two 
weeks after his optimistic account of the business of the House, Horace Walpole was 
ruefully driven to comment that; 
some letters from Cadiz of the cruel treatment of the English that have been 
taken by using them like slaves have given leisure and occasion to set ill 
humours afloat, and the merchants have resolved to petition, and lay their 
14 Cambis commented; `Je m'aperceu sur le champ de la malignit6 de rette Insertion qui tend 
a fomenter les plaintes des Anglois contre les Espagnols, et a faire croire au public qu'ils 
ne nous menagent pas plus que Eux... Il est bon d'observer que M. Oglethorpe est i la tete 
de Ceux qui crient contre les Espagnols, auxquels il a cependt. donne mille sujets de 
Plaintes... '. PRO SP 107/21(unfoliated), Cambis to Amelot, 6 January (NS) 1738. 
is PRO SP 94/206, f. 101, Geraldino to St. Gil, 11 March (NS) 1738. 
16 BL Add Ms 49689, f. 13, Egmont to Wm. Taylor, 11 February (OS) 1738. 
" HMC, Fourteenth Report (Trevor Mss), p. 12, H. Walpole to Trevor, 14 February (OS) 
1738. 
i8 PRO SP 94/206, f. 97, Geraldino to St. Gil, 4 March (NS) 1738. 
19 London Evening-Post, February 25 (OS) 1738. 
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case before the Parliament in very strong terms, so that we shall certainly 
have some flame on that subject. 2° 
The powerful West India merchants spread the flame very vigorously. They held a large 
meeting which deputed Alderman Perry to present their petition to the Commons, forcing 
a call of the House and a full discussion a week later. 21 In that debate Pulteney made 
effective use of naval history in his scornful comments on the prospect of the 
guardacostas blockading the Thames. 22 The merchants' petition cleverly linked the 
protection of the Crown to the issue of sailing a proper course, and the freedom of the 
seas. They argued that in effect the Spaniards were `claiming and exercising the Sole 
Sovereignty of those Seas' as well as committing acts of cruelty. So early was the link 
made between Britannia's ruling of the waves, and the claim that Britons never will be 
slaves: 
the Spaniards have paid so little regard to his Majesty's most gracious 
endeavours that they have continued their depredations almost ever since the 
Treaty of Seville and most particularly last year have carryed them to a 
greater height than ever they having arbitrarily seized severall Ships with their 
effects belonging to His Majesty's Subjects on the high Seas in the destined 
course of their Voyages to and from the British Colonys amounting to a very 
considerable value and the Captains or Masters of some of the said Ships 
were according to our last Advices and are (as we believe) at this time 
confined by the Spaniards in the West Indies and the Crews are now in 
Slavery in Old Spain where they are most inhumanly treated? 
The issue was sensitive enough for Keene to be rebuked several times for his laxity in 
handling the affair. 24 The London Magazine printed Keene's letter on the `slaves'. 23 It was 
good for the ministry that opponents did not have the power to print his private views on 
20 HMC, Fourteenth Report (Trevor Mss), p. 13, H. Walpole to Trevor, 28 February (OS) 
1738. 
21 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 154, Newcastle to Keene, 3 March (OS) 1738; London Evening- 
Post, 4 March (OS) 1738; Journal of the House of Commons, 23, pp. 53-5. 
22 Debate of 3 March (OS) 1738, W. Cobbett, Parliamentary History, X (1812), p. 647. 
23 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 162; Journal of the House of Commons, 23, pp. 53-4, `The Petition 
of diverse Merchants Planters and others Trading to and interested in the British 
Plantations in America on behalf of themselves and many others'. 
24 E. g. BL Add Ms 51388, fl 58-9, Newcastle to Keene, 17 March (OS) 1738; BL Add Ms 
32797, f. 283, same to same, 12 April (OS) 1738. 
25 London Magazine, April 1738, p. 202. 
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this clamour. He confided to Robert Trevor what it would have been dangerous to admit 
in London: 
I never dare venture to speak my sentiments upon Depredations: Though to a 
friend like you, I may lay it down for a maxime, that there is great difference 
between Grounds for Complaints, and Proofs upon which a Dispute is to be 
justly and finally determined and Satisfaction granted. Had I had as many of 
the latter sort as I have of the former, I should venture to assure you, you 
should never have heard such clamour in England from Mr. Drake and his 
abettors. 26 
Geraldino was ordered by his court to present a very similar view: `it will be found 
perhaps that the Parties themselves have abandoned their Claims from a Consciousness of 
their having but little right on their side'. 27 
Diplomacy had its own rhythms and demands. La Quadra had finally replied in February 
to Newcastle's memorial of late November 1737. In March, Newcastle had to send a 
further memorial, glossing as best he could the confusion over the treaties of 1667 and 
1670, and explaining Britain's position in decided terms designed to bring on a resolution 
in one way or another. As well as strong protests against the colonial procedures, the 
letter made the issue one of freedom of navigation. Against the advice of Hardwicke, it' 
was put in terms similar to those urged by the merchants. Newcastle stressed that this was 
a question of direct conflict between the pretensions of the two monarchs. It could almost 
be supposed that the Spanish crown was claiming sole sovereignty of the American seas: 
`Mais une pareille Domination ou Souverainete, est ce que les Rois, Predecesseurs du 
Roy mon Maitre, n'ont jamais connu, et ce que Sa Majeste n'admettra jamais'. 28 
A vital point on which Spanish ministers insisted was that the claims of the merchants 
were affairs inter parios and that in equity the Council of the Indies had to hear the case 
26 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 132, Keene to Trevor, 3 March (NS) 1738. 
27 Enclosed in PRO SP 94/130 (unfoliated), Keene to Newcastle, 15 April (NS) 1738. `L'on 
ne pourra non plus faire paroitre, que le Conseil des Indes... ait refuse d'administrer 
Justice aux Sujets de V. M. qui se sont presentes pour y suivre leurs Appellations, puisque 
Gelles qui n'auront point ete determinees ou qui auront ete differees, c'aura ete 
vraisemblablement a cause que les Parties les auront abandonnes, se reposant peut etre 
peu sur leur Justice. '; BL Add Ms 32797, if. 347-8, Geraldino's memorial, 20 April (OS) 
1738. 
28 Ibid., f. 194; BL Add Ms 32797, f. 172, Hardwicke to Newcastle, 9 March (OS) 1738 
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of both sides and not just the appellant-29 Newcastle's reply, in words which directly 
echoed Horace Walpole's January cabinet memoir, was that justice could not be expected 
in the Indies where `la meme partie est en meme tems Plaintiff et Defendant'. 30 Montijo 
was indignant about the British insistence on speedy justice, which implied a prior 
acceptance that British claims were justified. Waiting for the autos, he said, was the only 
way and any other course was `imposing Laws upon Spain'. 31 Nonetheless, the Spanish 
administration was conscious of the dangers involved in having only vaguely defined rules 
of capture and proof. The Fiscal of the Council of the Indies submitted a report, which 
Keene, thanks to his friends, saw before Montijo himself. Stimulated by the cases of the 
Loyal Charles and others, and by recent confidential orders sent to him to place the most 
favourable interpretation possible upon disputed cases, the Fiscal asked Philip V for clear 
published guidelines on procedure, fair sailing and so on; `since without some such 
regulation, matters will remain in perpetual confusion, and there can otherwise be no 
other foundation for condemning a Prize, than mere probabilities'. 32 
Montijo's emphatic argument to Keene was that the best hope of a good understanding 
lay in leaving the authority for such matters with the Council of the Indies. Patifo was 
once again made to bear the posthumous blame. He had usurped the authority of the 
Council, and so encouraged the insolence of the colonial Governors. Now a better order 
was being restored. 33 Fearing the clamour and misrepresentation in England, Montijo was 
emphatic. He was also realistic about the consequences for Spain: 
if you, says he, have a mind to regulate our Disputes in the Indies, you can 
never wish for better Intentions and Dispositions than ours now are; and if 
you have a mind to take advantage from our bad Situation and fall out with 
us, you can never look out for a better opportunity: In the first Case, You 
shall have all that can be asked or granted in reason and justice: But if you 
will not distinguish your Cases, but equally demand the Restitution of what 
belongs to the Guilty, as well as what belongs to the Innocent, it will be 
imposing so hard a law upon us, That a Nation, like ours, which has its 
29 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 129, Keene to Newcastle, 3 March (NS) 1738. 
30 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 183, Projet d'une Lettre de Mor. Keene i Mor. de la Quadra, 17 
March (OS) 1738. 
31 PRO SP 94/130 (unfoliated), Keene to Newcastle, 12 April (NS) 1738. 
32 Ibid.. 
33 BL Add Ms 32797, f 334-5, Keene to Newcastle, 7 May (NS) 1738. 
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honour at heart, will not, nor can not suffer it; and sooner than to submit to 
such Conditions, we will sell the Plate and Vessels from our Altars to put Us 
in a Situation to resist you. 34 
Waldegrave's French informant in Madrid confirmed that there was indeed a great 
willingness to give redress for real grievances, but that the ministry would not submit 
tamely to unjust demands. 35 And the demands were largely seen as being unjust. The 
evidence of Benjamin Wray himself, whose case was at the centre of the agitation over 
slavery, was contradictory and evasive. La Quadra expressed himself surprised that it 
could be believed by `un ministerio tan especulatino, experto, y circunspecto como el de 
essa Corte'. 36 On the Spanish side there were grievances just as jarring. When Keene 
spoke of compensation denied to shipowners in the form of cedulas which had not been 
complied with, la Quadra could retort that those given cedulas had acted in bad faith. The 
notorious 1732 case of the Woolball was a particular irritant. Even before restitution 
could have been made, and while a legal appeal was still lodged with the Council of the 
Indies, the British navy had retaliated by taking a Spanish register ship in the Bay of 
Campeche. 37 When the owners were granted a cedula, they loaded a ship, under Royal 
Navy protection, with a valuable cargo and went from one Spanish colonial port to 
another, under pretence of delivering the cedula, but really disposing of their goods. 38 La 
Quadra angrily denounced this episode to Keene. The particular object of his wrath, 
though, was the South Sea Company: `nothing', he said, `has been able to contain the 
Directors within the limits of their contract'. Their annual ship, the Royal Caroline, on its 
last voyage, abused its privileged position by bringing home over $600,000 on the 
account of private persons. 39 Scepticism as to British claims was strengthened by the 
fundamental belief that only Spanish traders had any rights in the Indies other than those 
limited privileges which were specifically granted. 40 Such legal doubts and patriotic 
34 Ibid., f. 337. 
35 Ibid., f. 360, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 10 May (NS) 1738. 
36 PRO SP 94/130 (unfoliated), La Quadra to Geraldino, 23 May (NS) 1738. 
31 PRO SP 94/114, (unfoliated), Keene to Harrington, 19 September (NS) 1732. 
38 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 325, Keene to Newcastle, 7 May (NS) 1738; see Pares, War and 
Trade, pp. 26 & 35. 
39 PRO SP 94/130, (unfoliated), la Quadra to Keene, 26 May (NS) 1738. 
4° Ibid.: `bajo las Leges fondamentales de Espafia, sin dar entrada en ellas a las Naciones 
extranjeras'. 
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feelings among the ministers in Spain, though, were more than matched by the high 
resentment of their opponents in England. 
From such frayed and intractable materials the ministry had to plait the tangled strands of 
diplomacy, and to determine whether it was to be peace or war. In January 1738 
Newcastle took a strong line, making demands on the Spanish and depending heavily on 
the compliance of Montijo. He and the king wanted the seized British ships releasing at 
once: 
His Majesty did indeed expect, and does still, That those Ships, which have 
been lately taken, should be immediately released; And not go the roundabout 
way, which has hitherto been so ineffectually practised. "' 
But it was simply impossible for the Spanish administrative system to work with that 
speed. And in any case he overestimated the influence of Montijo. Newcastle wanted the 
commissions of the guardacostas revoked, and the colonial officials responsible to be 
speedily punished: 
His Majesty observes in one of your Letters, that Mr. Montijo told you that if 
our Complaints were founded, he should be glad to make some signal 
example of the severest chastisements and it is to be hoped that he will be as 
good as his word. 42 
Important private assurances were forthcoming, but a change in the handling of individual 
cases would take a long time to be apparent to the British public, and it is hard to see how 
Newcastle could expect a radical change in the whole procedures of colonial law. 43 The 
king waited `with great Impatience' for a reply to the Memorial, the key to the diplomatic 
problem. 4' When the Spanish reply did come, belatedly, on February 21 (NS), it brought a 
fresh round of problems. " The governors and royal officers were to be gingered up, and 
sent full details of the various cases complained of. However, la Quadra was unequivocal 
41 BL Add Ms 32796, f. 284, Newcastle to Keene, 19 December (OS) 1737, in post January 
19 (OS) 1738. 
42 Ibid., f. 287. 
43 BL Add Ms 32797, ff. 225-8, Keene to Newcastle, 15 April (NS) 1738, Keene to Stone, 
same date. 
44 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 10, Newcastle to Keene, 7 January (OS) 1738. 
as La Quadra's reply to Keene is given in PRO SP 94/130 (unfoliated) and BL Add Ms 
51388, if. 48-56. 
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in dismissing the relevance of the 1667 Treaty, which had nothing . to 
do with the 
commerce of the Indies `since all Nations are excluded from trading and navigating to any 
Port in His Majesty's Dominions in America'. 46 In a sweeping rebuttal of the English 
doctrine of freedom of the seas, la Quadra insisted that the British commerce had rights of 
navigation only while sailing a due course to their own colonies, `and their Ships liable to 
a Seizure and confiscation, if it be proved that they have altered their Route, without 
necessity, in order to draw near to the Spanish Coasts'. " The letter closed by affirming 
that his Catholic Majesty would defend his subjects if they were threatened in any way by 
Britain. King George's response was an immediate rejection of the idea that British 
shipping could in any way be confined to certain shipping lanes only. Spain continued to 
insist that ships could be stopped and searched if they were found in a `suspicious 
latitude'. 
This issue was discussed repeatedly in the letters of the following months. In the confines 
of St. Stephen's Chapel, or the chamber of the Lords, lined with tapestries of Britain's 
naval greatness, the absolute freedom of the seas was not to be questioned. For Spanish 
ministers the position was more complex, and they were in no mood to give up rights 
which had been, as they thought, accepted in the past. La Quadra made his case by 
pointing out that the term was used in a royal cedula of December 1732 which was not at 
that time contested. The Woolball was restored to Britain mainly on the grounds that it 
was not taken in a suspicious latitude, so `la referida expresion de rumbo suspechoso' was 
one which the British had not challenged when they had the opportunity. `' However, with 
the merchants already fanning the flames of discontent, and the reading public afire with 
notions of Britain's universal dominance of the oceans, it was politically quite impossible 
to accept that large areas of the seas were effectively closed to British shipping, unless 
they allowed rights of search. 
The demand for specific action could no longer be resisted. Reprisals must be granted at 
last. Newcastle wrote to tell the beleaguered Keene that the king had offered to the 
46 PRO SP 94/130 (unfoliated), La Quadra to Keene, 21 February (NS) 1738. 
47 Ibid.. 
48 PRO SP 94/130 (unfoliated), Keene to Newcastle, 28 May (NS) 1738; PRO SP 94/130 
(unfoliated), extract of Report by Fiscal of the Council of the Indies, in Keene to 
Newcastle, 15 April (NS) 1738. 
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injured merchants Letters of Reprisal, `which is what His Majesty thinks he could not 
justly any longer delay'. 49 No small part of the pressure came from the press, rather than 
the merchants who had first started the idea. S° It was a device unlikely to bring much 
profit to the merchants themselves, and demanded a risky initial investment in arming and 
manning a suitable vessel. As late as July 1739 the merchants were refusing to spend in 
this way for fear of a patched-up peace which would waste their money. It was deemed 
especially newsworthy when eventually one custom-built privateer was launched. 5' If any 
merchants did choose to make this investment, however, it might be the beginning of 
war. 52 The prospect of reprisals was seen by Spanish diplomats in just the same way as it 
struck Horace Walpole when he earlier advised on the issue. It was a move which would 
take relations out of the hands of the diplomatic class, and put the issue of war or peace 
to the hazard of arbitrary and chance actions by aggrieved individuals. The leading figures 
in the Spanish administration all believed, in any case, that reprisals would not be legal 
because the necessary time had not elapsed without justice being done to the original 
complainants. S3 But for this untimely warmth, hinted Montijo, much might be done. There 
were faults on both sides, he told Keene, and `our Contrabandists ought to be punisht, 
and some of their Governors hanged'. 54 Reprisals certainly made a rupture more likely, 
and brought nearer the prospect of war with both France and Spain, as Walpole had 
argued they would. 55 
He would have been confirmed in his view could he have seen the glee which the news 
brought to the camp of the Pretender. James III described the move as `un grand 
acheminement ä une rupture'. 
56 Edgar, his secretary in Rome, saw the letters of marque as 
49 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 142, Newcastle to Keene, 2 March (OS) 1738. 
50 Common Sense, 18 February (OS) 1738. 
s' Craftsman, 21 July (OS) 1739, London Evening-Post, 24 & 31 July (OS) 1739. 
52 Wolterton (Walpole) Mss, Papers of Lord Waldegrave 1738-9 (unfoliated), J. Burnaby to 
Trevor, March 7 (NS) 1738. 
53 PRO SP 94/206, f. 113, St. Gil to Geraldino, 1 April (NS) 1738; PRO SP 94/130 
(unfoliated), BL Add Ms 32797, f. 217, Keene to Newcastle, 12 April (NS) 1738; Ibid., 
la Quadra to Geraldino, May 1738. 
54 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 218, Keene to Newcastle, 12 April (NS) 1738. 
ss P. L. Wine, `Horace Walpole and British Relations with Spain, 1738', in Royal 
Historical Society, Camden Miscellany, XXXII, pp. 279-81,303. 
56 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 206/33, James to Daniel O'Brien, 15 April (NS) 1738. 
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`the next thing to a declared War, and may very probably produce one'. 57 British 
diplomats abroad were dismayed to receive the gist of la Quadra's reply and news of 
reprisals at the same time. SB Certainly the news struck Geraldino in London very forcibly, 
and there is no doubt of its impact on his masters in Madrid. He did his best to persuade 
his court not to make too much of it, but lamented the timing of this decision, just when 
an accommodation might have been likely. 59 Keene prided himself, at such a difficult time, 
that he had `made no sort of Concessions, nor given any advantages that could be retorted 
upon me'. 60 This applied to the vexed issue of Georgia as well as to the complaints of 
commerce. Britain and Spain alike had an interest in an accommodation in America, not 
least because both wished to thwart the ambitions there of other powers, including 
Russia. 61 La Mina, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, found Fleury unsympathetic to the 
more warlike ideas which he put forward on his own initiative. 
62 The Spanish ministry 
privately conceded the point forcibly made by Horace Walpole, that nothing in the 
Treaties of 1667 or 1670 related to the limits of Georgia. 63 
Commissaries were appointed in March to settle the boundaries of Georgia and Florida. 
(Keene first knew that he was one when la Quadra told him). Torrenueva insisted upon 
the demolition of those forts, in the region claimed by Spain, which had been recently built 
by Oglethorpe in an obvious attempt to preempt the findings of any commission. 
Geraldino had carried out his instructions to have commissaries appointed, but had 
suppressed the request for demolition, which would have prevented any progress. 64 Such 
delicate negotiations were easily upset. Keene nonetheless remained optimistic that a 
rupture would be avoided, despite reprisals. He confided, in unbuttoned remarks to 
s' Ibid., 206/39, Edgar to George Kelly 17 April (NS) 1738. 
58 Wolterton (Walpole) Mss, Papers of Lord Waldegrave 1738-9 (unfoliated), J. Burnaby to 
Trevor, 7 March (NS) 1738. 
59 PRO SP 94/206, f. 107, Geraldino to St. Gil, 18 March (NS) 1738. 
60 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 224, Keene to Newcastle, 15 April (NS) 1738. 
61 BL Add Ms 32795, f 326-7, Newcastle to Keene, 12 September (OS) 1737. 
62 PRO SP 28/218, if. 25-6, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 17 May (NS) 1738. 
63 BL Add Ms 32795, f. 250, H. Walpole to Keene, 3 September (NS) 1738; PRO SP 
94/130, (unfoliated), la Quadra to Geraldino, 28 November (NS) 1737 (sent 23 December 
(NS) 1737). 
64 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 167, Keene to Newcastle, 17 March (NS) 1738. 
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Andrew Stone; `It is pretty plain They would not fall out with Us at present, 
notwithstanding their late blusterings about Georgia. 3.65 Spain had no obvious allies other 
than the Queen's son, the King of Naples, which was Keene's chief diplomatic reason for 
thinking that bold action was not likely. Keene obtained the best intelligence he could 
about Spanish military preparations, and though early warnings were being sent off to the 
Caribbean he found no other significant preparations, and thought there was little to fear 
from the Spanish fleet. 66 His other source of comfort came from private assurances from 
Montijo that His Catholic Majesty was sure that the British grievances would be amicably 
settled, if only they had patience. Further, `He could safely assure me, that no such 
proceedings would be suffered for the future'. 67 
The British public mood, though, at least as it was assiduously presented in print, was too 
violent to be so easily satisfied. The nation, cried the press, was being humiliated and its 
sailors enslaved by the cowardly and treacherous Spaniards. It was enough to prompt a 
major editorial change in a leading opposition newspaper. The London Evening-Post 
adopted for the first time in April 1738 the established Craftsman format of a leader in the 
form of an indignant front page letter. Significantly, this `letter' was on the subject of 
British slavery: 
When we look back to the GLORIOUS DAYS of Queen Anne, and see both 
France and Spain stretching out their Hands and supplicating her Mercy, what 
humble Thoughts ought we not to have of the Vicissitude of human Affairs, 
at seeing the Subjects of Great Britain now chain 'd down as slaves in the 
Dungeons of Spain? 
P. S. When the 71 ENGLISH SLAVES return home, I hope they will bring 
some of their FETTERS and BUG-FOOD along with them; and also let us 
know, if they can, how many Englishmen more are still left SLAVES in Spain 
68 and America. 
Sure enough, a week later, the returned sailors - thirty-one and not seventy-one in number 
- appeared at the Royal Exchange with their bags of beans, part-eaten by bugs. 69 The 
65 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 227, Keene to Stone, 1S April (NS) 1738. 
66 BL Add Ms 32798, ff. 44-50, Keene to Newcastle, 26 May (NS) 1738. 
67 BL Add Ms 32797, if. 225-6, Keene to Stone, 15 April (NS) 1738. 
68 London Evening Post 1 April (OS) 1738. 
69 Ibid., 8 April (OS) 1738. 
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depositions of the various crew members were sworn before Sir John Barnard, the Lord 
Mayor. 7° Shortly afterwards they were given £200 from the King's bounty, and a further 
£80 raised by the City merchants. 71 The sufferings of the prisoners seemed to Torrenueva 
to be exaggerated, as they received one silver real (nearly six pence) a day for 
subsistence, the same rate given to a private soldier in the British anmy. n They ate the 
standard prison (and indeed Spanish army) diet, and the one who was made to wear a leg 
iron did so because he had tried to escape. 
The Commons' hearing of the merchants' petition was held at an extremely excitable 
time. The fullest House of Commons for many years, 468 Members, gathered for the 
debate. ' The Opposition concentrated their attack on a resolution that searching British 
ships on the open seas was contrary to treaty, a resolution defeated by 256 votes to 209. 
However Pulteney skilfully posed a series of questions covering the whole ground of 
complaints collected by the merchants, as well as the treaty questions. The Committee of 
the House set up to appraise them was emphatic in its conclusions: 
The British Ships have been unlawfully seized on the open Seas, plundered, 
and confiscated, The Sailors robbed, inhumanly tortured, imprisoned, & made 
Slaves to the grievous loss of the Merchants, the Obstruction of the 
Commerce, and the Dishonour of the Nation. 74 
The impact of this debate may be gauged by the change in the London Evening Post. Not 
only did the paper from then on adopt the front-page format of the Craftsman. It also 
became more explicitly political and anti-ministerial, supplanting its rival in the range and 
force of its attacks. It was the issue of slavery, and the theatre of violent Commons 
debate, which seem to have galvanised the Evening Post. 
The impetus of protest did not fade away in Parliament, either. The Lords, on 17April 
(OS) called to have laid before them copies of Newcastle's draft memorial of 4 November 
70 BL Add Ms 32797, if. 295-7, Depositions sworn 10 April (OS) 1738. 
71 Ibid., 20 & 29 April (OS) 1738. 
BL Add Ms 32797, f. 202, Keene to Newcastle, 31 March (NS) 1738; PRO WO 24/197 
(unfoliated), `Establishment of the Forces... '. 
73 London Evening Post, 30 March (OS) 1738, Craftsman, 1 April (OS) 1738. The petition 
is given in BL Add Ms 32797, if. 256-8. 
74 BL Add Ms 35875, if. 374-5, `Mr. P----'s questions'. 
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(OS) 1737, together with any other possible memorials or letters of that period, and la 
Quadra's reply of 10 February (OS) 1738, with Newcastle's reply to that in turn on 17 
March (OS). 75 The volume of material, and the refusal of both Houses to accept papers in 
French without their translation, meant a virtual prison sentence for the personnel of the 
Secretary of State's office. Couraud complained; `I have scarce stir'd from my 
Confinement at the Office since the Parliament first met this Year'. 76 Not only was this 
enquiry in effect a public review of the whole course of recent diplomacy with Spain. The 
Lords also made it an excuse to air the question of slavery once more, calling before them 
Captains Wray, Delamotte and Kinslaugh to testify about their capture near Havana. " 
Newcastle was still paying the price for his error over the treaties. He produced a paper, 
given to the Commons, attempting to show how the 1667 treaty really applied to the 
West Indies. 78 It did not convince either House. In the Lords, Carteret brought in the 
same resolution about freedom from search on the high seas which had been voted down 
in the Commons. If a Jacobite observer is to be believed, he enjoyed a complete triumph: 
Ld. Carteret explained the Articles of those Treaties in so clear and 
satisfactory a manner to the House, & shewed so plainly the mistakes made 
by our Ministers with regard to the true meaning thereof in their letters on the 
subject, that it was not possible to make any reply to him. There was a perfect 
silence in the House after this speech for a quarter of an hour, whilst the 
Lords in the Ministry conferred together & with Sr RW who said there was 
nothing to be done in the case, but to give up the question & let Carteret's 
amendment pass. 79 
In a full House, led by the Prince of Wales, their Lordships went into committee and then 
produced a proposal designed to put pressure on the ministry. A committee of named 
peers was set up to prepare (in the Prince's own house) an Address to the crown and 
75 Journals of the House of Lords, XXV, p. 216; request granted 19 April (OS); ibid., p. 
220; full list of papers given 25 April (OS) , ibid., pp. 226-8. 
76 BL Add Ms 32798, f. 105, Couraud to Keene, 29 May (OS) 1738. 
77 Journals of the House of Lords, XXV, p. 228. 
78 Wolterton (Walpole) Mss, Political Tracts, (unfoliated); R. Chandler, The History & 
Proceedings of the House of Commons from the Restoration to the Present Time (1743), 
X, p. 160, `Reasons to show that the General Regulations laid down in the Treaty of 
1667, between England and Spain, with regard to the Navigation, may extend to the West 
Indies... '. 
79 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 206/106, Carte to O'Brien, 4 May (OS) 1738. 
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report back to the House. Among them were Newcastle and Hervey, as well as Carteret 
and Chesterfield. The main point of the Address was the concluding promise to support 
the King, if diplomacy failed, `in all such Measures as shall become necessary, for the 
Support of Your Majesty's Honour, the Preservation of our Navigation and Commerce, 
and the common Good of these Kingdoms'. 8° Newcastle may have been willing to see 
such brisk resolutions as a way of stiffening his negotiating position. Certainly soon after 
he sent a copy of them to Keene, saying; `you will make use of This, to shew the Sense of 
every Part of the Legislature on this great and important Question'. 81 The culmination of 
this wave of parliamentary indignation was votes by the Commons to allow the ministry to 
raise an extra 10,000 sailors, and to provide the sum of £500,000 to pay for them. 82 
Despite these debates, the evidence of the `persons, produced by the Merchants', the skill 
with which the Opposition seized their chance to occupy the popular and high ground, 
and the pressure for war implicit in the unprecedented vote of supply, the ministry decided 
on a final attempt to avert extremes. Keene was told that `the King has determined to 
make one further and final attempt' to avoid a rupture. 83 Keene was instructed to press 
home particularly a conviction that George II was really keen to avoid a conflict, and to 
stress the king's belief that Philip also wanted to avoid war. This belief was not entirely 
justified, however. The clamour in Britain made Elizabeth stubborn. News filtered 
through to Waldegrave, by way of `101', that the Queen relied on Jacobitism to 
embarrass the British if they did push matters to extremes. She was unconcerned about 
the present troubles with Britain, `and says, that, if we force her to a War, She can raise 
such troubles in England, as will make us sick of it'. 84 With Elizabeth in such a mind, 
friendly approaches alone from the Hanoverian and protestant king were by no means 
likely to win her over. Nor were these overtures unmixed. At the same time as royal 
kinship and prestige was pressed hard into service to prevent a diplomatic breakdown, the 
British ambassador was made to insist on the principle of freedom of the seas: 
E0 BL Add Ms 35875, if. 377-80; Journals of the House of Lords, XXV, p. 238. 
61 BL Add Ms 32798, f. 9, Newcastle to Keene, 8 May (OS) 1738. 
82 Journals of the House of Commons, XXIII, pp. 138 & 141. 
$; BL Add Ms 32797; quotations if. 246 & 247, Newcastle to Keene, 12 April (OS) 1738. 
84 BL Add Ms 32798, f. 6, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 16 May (NS) 1738. 
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no British ship should be stop'd, search'd, detain'd, seized or confiscated, 
that is not actually sailing and trafficking in the Ports and Havens, which have 
Fortifications, Castles, Magazines, or Warehouses, or in other places 
possessed by the King of Spain. 85 
This principle, representing a fundamental divide between the policies of the two 
countries, might alone have been enough to bring war. Nonetheless, Newcastle's proposal 
at this stage, for a convention to remedy grievances, began a new phase of negotiations 
with at least the hope of compromise. 86 The same letter in which the convention was 
proposed contained full plans for a large-scale armament, with ten thousand seamen to be 
raised and a squadron sent into the Mediterranean. Though on the brink of hostilities, 
Newcastle was also insisting that la Quadra be reassured that all these preparations were 
purely defensive. At the same time he threw out optimistic long-term thoughts about a 
complete commercial renegotiation, and arrangements for keeping good relations in 
Europe. Horace Walpole's proposals for a thorough overhaul of the treaty position, as 
well as Newcastle's indecisive and miscellaneous approach, can be seen in all this. 87 
Shifting his ground to the Treaty of 1670, and insisting on freedom of navigation 
everywhere but in the actual overseas ports of Spain, Newcastle mixed overtures of a 
general settlement with assertive demands of restitution for past offences. As a final 
thought he enclosed the sworn deposition of Benjamin Wray of the Loyal Charles, with 
its contentious charges of trickery by which his ship was sold at one third of its value, 
after he was made to sign papers in Spanish, a language which he did not understand. 88 
Newcastle's correspondence was far from welcome to Spanish ministers. St. Gil in Paris 
found the instances which Keene was required to forward in Madrid, provoking; `the 
explanations and expressions in it are not over and above decent'. 89 If Keene is to be 
believed, he read out this letter to la Quadra `in a tone that did not diminish any of its 
Spirit'. '* St. Gil argued, a little unreasonably, that the British ministers ought to have 
considered the inexperience of their-Spanish counterparts in their posts, which they held 
85 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 251, Newcastle to Keene, 12 April (OS) 1738. 
86 Ibid.. 
87 Ibid., if. 250-2. 
88 PRO SP 94/132 (unfoliated), Newcastle to Keene and enclosures, 15 April (OS) 1738. 
89 PRO SP 94/206, f. 127, St. Gil to Geraldino, 18 April (NS) 1738. 
90 PRO SP 94/130 (unfoliated), Keene to Newcastle, 7 May (NS) 1738. 
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merely temporarily, awaiting the appointment of a more experienced and able minister to 
combine the offices of Indies and the Marine. In any case, they should not be so hasty to 
condemn the Spanish parties in the Caribbean, `for God did not condemn the Devil in the 
terrestrial Paradise without hearing his Defence' 91 The cases of unjust seizure, though, 
were not really the nub of the problem. When Keene spiritedly read out his letter of 
complaint to la Quadra, the Spanish minister had nothing to say until the passage which 
demanded that orders go out to the colonial governors not to stop and search shipping. At 
this point he abruptly broke in: 
Then, says he, the King must leave open the Indies to all Interlopers, if 
foreign Ships may be skimming our Coasts as they think fitting: Is it possible 
for His Majesty to line them with Troops for so many leagues together, as 
may be necessary to prevent Strangers from landing and trading with the 
Inhabitants? 92 
Despite this concern, the Spanish view of the way ahead was at this point fundamentally 
the same as that of the British ministry. Keene reported: 
I find they are absolutely of His Majesty's opinion, (though without knowing 
it, at least from me) That some Convention, some fixed and established 
Regulations, should be agreed upon, whereby our Trading Vessels may be 
sure of following their honest designs without the least hinderance or 
interruption, and the Guarda Costas know their precise Duty, without 
neglecting their Coasts, or doing Us any Injury. 93 
The source of this idea may have been Horace Walpole, as St. Gil had been told by him in 
late March that this was `the most useful and important' issue-94 
One Spanish envoy who shared the British outlook was Geraldino. He committed himself 
very early to the prospect of a settlement. Despite the Pretender's belief that the Irishman 
was well inclined to the Jacobite cause, (he ordered approaches to be made to Fitzgerald), 
the Spanish envoy does appear to have been genuinely seeking a settlement. 95 He was 
noted in French diplomatic circles for his love of England, so that even on the brink of 
91 PRO SP 94/206, f. 139, St. Gil to Geraldino, 29 April (NS) 1738. 
92 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 322, Keene to Newcastle, 7 May (NS) 1738. 
93 Ibid., f. 327. 
94 PRO SP 94/206, f. 111, St. Gil to Geraldino, 25 March (NS) 1738. 
95 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 207/43, James to Col. Cecil, 28 May (NS) 1738. 
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war it was believed that he would be able to hold back his court. 96 British ministers do 
seem to have trusted Geraldino, and confided in him with unusual freedom. Keene had to 
complain that his task was made harder when Geraldino was shown, and of course 
forwarded to Madrid, copies of the material which Keene was to present, and the words 
he must use. " Geraldino told Stert in June that he had authority to accept these figures, 
and made the same offer to Sir Robert. 98 He soon after admitted that he had no direct 
authority to do so, but felt sure that his Court would approve. An Irishman, friendly to 
England and under the influence of direct discussions with Walpole, was behaving in a 
way far removed from the punctilious caution of the Madrid court, and this was bound to 
lead to trouble. All this came at a time when the views of the Walpoles were leading 
Geraldino to assure his court that the clamour in London came only from a claque led by 
the parliamentary Opposition. The ministers, he said, were quite aware of the points to be 
made in behalf of Spain, but `cannot convince the vulgar'. There was certainly truth in 
the latter comment. Waldegrave spent three months in England for his health, from early 
February, and gave Keene a first-hand account: 
people are very warm in England, I was a witness to it, and I can tell you in 
confidence that it was as much as the King's servants could do to keep the 
generality within the bounds now prescribed to you. 1°° 
The Pretender's agent in Paris, George Robinson, reported in very similar terms; `the 
greatest part of our merchants and allmost all our Sea faring people are exasperated to the 
highest degree, every where & openly threatening revenge'. '01 La Quadra had not the 
same interest as the Jacobites in exaggerating popular protest, and was more cynical. He 
favoured a clear regulation in the Indies for the future so that all concerned would know 
the legal bounds of their position. In this way, `to make use of his own Phrase, our people 
in Coffee houses shall know whether their Ships shall be lyable to be taken, or not'. 102 The 
96 BL Add Ms 32801, f. 304, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 2 November (NS) 1739. 
97 BL Add Ms 32796, f. 227, Keene to Newcastle, 13 December (NS) 1737. 
PRO SP 94/131 (unfoliated), Stert to H. Walpole, 5 June (OS) 1738. 
99 PRO SP 94/206, f. 143, Geraldino to St. Gil, 29 April (NS) 1738. 
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101 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 206/58, Robinson to James, 21 April (NS) 1738. 
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signals being sent out from England were very confused, and amply justified Newcastle's 
characteristic mood, compounded of anxiety and optimism. 
There seems in this tense atmosphere to have been a kind of tacit encouragement to 
English sailors to assert themselves against the Spanish. Merchant sailors in Spanish ports 
had long been harrassed by the Guards of the Tobacco Rent, who sometimes seized even 
the personal tobacco of the sailors under cover of looking for smuggled goods. In May 
1738 a group of English sailors caused a serious affray, beating up the tobacco Guard in 
Malaga. When they were arrested, the British consul, who had himself been involved, 
abusively demanded their release, sword in hand. Despite these loutish provocations, King 
Philip agreed to let the sailors go. 103 A similar clemency was extended the following 
month to sailors released on Consul Cayley's request, despite, as Keene admitted in 
cipher, being `taken on board a Dutch ship, employed, by their own Confession, in a 
clandestine Trade'. '°4 There seemed good reason for Cardinal Fleury's amusement and 
calm certainty that both sides were really wishing to avoid war. He told Waldegrave; `I do 
not believe you will go to War; for you have neither of you a mind to it, and would be 
equally glad to bring yourselves off with honour'. 105 La Mina was encouraging the 
Jacobites in Paris with long-term hopes, but even he warned them that hostilities were not 
likely as yet. 106 La Quadra too was giving his private opinion that there would be no 
warßo7 
The reality of Spanish moderation and a mutual desire for compromise was not enough. It 
could not compete with the appeal of the image of brave Britons languishing in foreign 
gaols and, even worse, eating foreign food. This was just the issue which was likely to fan 
the flames of extravagant claims of British naval dominance over the seas of the world. 
One of the opportunist publications of 1738 was a pamphlet containing an English 
translation of Milton's Latin work of 1655, A Manifesto of the Lord Protector.... This 
reminder of a more vigorous and successful era, when England had won Jamaica, was 
103 PRO SP 94/130 (unfoliated), la Quadra to Keene, 24 May (NS) 1738. 
104 PRO SP 94/131 (unfoliated), Keene to Newcastle, 9 June (NS) 1738. 
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joined to a poem from the commencement of the reign of George II. James Thomson's 
poem Britannia, originally written in 1727, made up most of the pamphlet. In it, Thomson 
gave ringing expression to notions of national destiny and power: 
And is a Briton seiz'd! and seiz'd beneath 
The slumbring terrors of a British Fleet? 
Then ardent rise! Oh great in vengeance rise; 
O'erturn the proud, teach rapine to restore: 
And as you ride sublimely round the world, 
Make every vessel stoop, make every state 
At once their welfare and their duty know. 
This is your glory; this your wisdom; this 
The native power for which you were design'd 
By fate, when fate designed the firmest state, 
That e'er was seated on the subject sea. 'os 
The echoes of the famous speech which Shakespeare gave to John of Gaunt are no 
accident. The Patriot poets of this era were developing a rich imagery, rooted in 
Elizabethan verse traditions. 109 The bellicose set of mind of the London public in early 
1738 was clearly highly infectious. When the young Tory Samuel Johnson came down to 
the capital to make his way in the world, he fell at once under its spell. His first great 
poem, London, was a close adaptation of Juvenal, and therefore a high-genre way of 
demonstrating his skills. It was also, in the themes which it contained, a kind of 
compendium of the Opposition way of viewing the nation's ills. Published on 12May 
(OS), just after the great Parliamentary debates on depredations, it linked the corruption 
of the ministry and the debauching of the national character to, on the one hand, upper 
class vices such as masquerades and the Italian opera, and on the other hand to the 
cowardly truckling to Spain. "o The lure of Britannia's great Elizabethan glories drew in 
even Johnson: 
In pleasing Dreams the blissful Age renew, 
los A Manifesto of the Lord Protector... Wherein is shewn the Reasonableness of the Cause 
of this Republic against the Depredations of the Spaniards... To which is added 
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And call Britannia's Glories back to view; 
Behold her Cross triumphant on the Main, 
The Guard of Commerce, and the Dread of Spain, 
Ere Masquerades debauch'd, Excise oppress'd, 
Or English honour grew a standing Jest. ' 11 
The infection of patriotism was catching for more than merely authors. Sailors were 
flocking to volunteer for the fleet in May and June. At Spithead alone, nine large ships lay 
fully manned and ready for sea, a rare luxury for naval commanders. Couraud 
commented; `I never knew the Sailors enter so fast. 112 Even those on the profitable East 
India run, normally very resistant to pressing, volunteered in the hope of some action 
against the Spaniards. 11' That this was quite uncharacteristic can be seen in the enormous 
difficulties faced by the fleet once war was actually imminent. Vernon complained in July 
1739 of being sent `a pack of the wretchedest Vermin that ever were sent to vindicate the 
Honour of the Nation... more likely to infect ships than to do good'. 114 Even when the 
war began, the navy could be manned only by a vigorous resort to pressing, and during 
most of 1740 the Impress Service was discussed by the ministry as a matter of urgency. 115 
The hatred of the Spaniards strong enough to cause this massive volunteering was 
increased by anti-catholicism and vice versa. The mid-1730s saw a brief but nationwide 
anti-popery scare. 116 This was partly caused by the narrow avoidance of war with Spain in 
1735, caused by British support for Portugal. As the French had done so well in the War 
of Polish Succession, and a Bourbon-supported Jacobite invasion seemed possible, it is 
not surprising that Britons felt vulnerable, and saw the Franco-Spanish threat in religious 
terms. Black has shown how, due to these anxieties, `the press spent the summer of 1736 
III London, 11.25-30. 
112 BL Add Ms 32798, f. 25, Couraud to Keene, 17 May (OS) 1738. 
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discussing the need for a Protestant League'. 117 Thomson's bellicose ideas, then, rode the 
current of the times, and found their most famous expression in Rule Britannia in the first 
year of the war. Britannia was proudly assured: 
All thine shall be the subject main, 
And every shore it circles thine. 
And of course, she was exhorted: 
Rule, Britannia, Britannia rule the waves: 
Britons never will be slaves. 
Thomas Arne's masque, A fred, in which the song first appeared, was performed at a 
garden party given at Cliveden by the Prince of Wales on 1 August (OS) 1740.118 The 
music could scarcely have been heard in a more breathtakingly English scene, looking out 
from the terrace over the formal gardens to the sweep of the Thames below. It must have 
been an ideal setting for the expression of ideas deeply rooted, not just in the recent 
sufferings of sailors in Cadiz, but in the way in which Englishmen defined their special 
glory, their diet and way of life. It is an interesting comment on the mixed nature of this 
dawning patriotism that the man who did so much to foment it spent the Easter of 1738, 
at the height of the agitation over British slavery, in clownish amusements: 
when P. F. about Easter spent a fortnight at Cliffden, he spent all his time in 
hunting a duck with an owl tied on his back, & baiting cats in the river, they 
being either put into a large bowl, or on a plank with a slit in which the cats 
tail was fixed; or else at nine pins, having made an alley for the diversion of 
himself & the Country fellows: such are his ways of making himself popular 
among them. 119 
This affords a glimpse of the cruel side of popular culture, in which the torture of animals 
figured prominently, and against which Hogarth campaigned so vigorously. The prince 
was shrewd enough to flatter the mob in its habits and prejudices, and ministers also could 
not afford to oppose them. The political nation was far from docile, at least in the capital. 
The London pressure groups, and the London press, who were to be so important over 
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of Religious History, 12,1983, p. 378. 
118 A. Scott (ed), Musica Britannica. A National Collection of Music, XLVII, Alfred. 
Thomas Augustine Arne (1981), pp. xv - xxiv, 143-9. I am grateful to my Music 
colleague, Dr. Graham Cummings, for this reference. 
119 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 206/106, Carte to O'Brien, 4 May (OS) 1738. 
157 
the next few years, were certainly highly visible to ministers and their supporters as they 
went about their daily business at Westminster. 120 London offered particular opportunities 
to those who could profit from discord and unrest. It was the setting for the most 
turbulent scenes of vice and criminality, in what contemporaries took to be a rising crisis 
of public disorder. Pressure for harsher use of the `bloody code' came not least from 
London: `Nothing can put a Stop to the great Number of Robbers, but the Gallows'. 121 In 
a large city without police, mob action was regularly resorted to, where the views of the 
masses differed from those of their rulers. It was not surprising that establishment 
commentators wrote with massive condescension of the uneducated and violent mob. 122 
Even the political writers who depended on popular support shared this viewpoint. A 
leading Opposition newspaper commented ironically on one riotous gallows rescue at 
Tyburn. The mob prevented the corpses from being handed over to the anatomizing 
surgeons; `these ordinary Wretches having a terrible Opinion of being Otamiz'd'. ' 
Disorder could be used to frustrate government decrees, most obviously in the open 
flouting of the Gin Acts and the mobs who resisted the impressment of young men into 
the navy. 124 Informers under the 1736 Gin Act gained half of the ten pound fine levied on 
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unlicensed gin sellers, but beatings by the mob made it a precarious gain. ' The Bow 
Street magistrate Colonel de Veil had to read the Riot Act and call out a guard of soldiers 
to protect two informers and bring them to court. The mob threatened to pull down the 
Justice's house, and the one informant who fell into their hands was `almost ready to 
expire, being terribly beat, cut and bruis'd, and all over Mire, that it was impossible to 
guess he was a Man but by his walking, he being (as it seem'd) one entire Lump of 
Dirt '. 126 Though the various societies for the reformation of manners were moribund by 
the late 1730s, this was not because the evils of prostitution, theft and gin-addiction were 
removed. Rather, the public reaction against informants removed the chief weapon of the 
reformers. 127 This turbulent city was the stage on which the mob, led by the `Cits', played 
out their violent politics. Since London was the residence of all Members for several 
months each year, and of ministers and courtiers for far longer, this stamp of public 
opinion was bound to be pressed with disproportionate force upon the minds of 
politicians. 
Perhaps, in a larger sense, this public opinion was `real', and not merely the product of a 
specific London setting and agitation. Despite the deeply flawed character of Prince 
Frederick, and the short-sighted partisanship of the Patriots, the jingoistic song which he 
sponsored has survived. Its chorus, at least, is recognised and sung everywhere in Britain 
even today. Linda Colley has explored the growth of a `radical patriotism', based on 
chauvinism, imperialism and a demonstrative protestantism, and deployed for the 
purposes of protest and criticism of government. 
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'u E. g. the case of the three informers beaten half-dead and unable to find refuge anywhere 
but the lock-up; Crafstman 11 February (OS) 1737; P. Clark, `The "Mother Gin" 
controversy in the early eighteenth century', Royal Historical Society Transactions, 5 ser, 
31,1981. 
126 London Evening Post, 17-19 November (OS) 1737. 
127 T. C. Curtis & W. A. Speck, `The Societies for the Reformation of Manners: a case study 
in the theory and practice of moral reform', Literature and History 3,1976; R. B. 
Shoemaker, `Reforming the City: the Reformation of Manners Campaign in London, 
1690-1738', in Stilling the Grumbling Hive. The Response to Social and Economic 
Problems in England, 1689-1750, (1992), eds. L. Davison, T. Hitchcock, T. Keirn & 
R. B. Shoemaker. 
128 L. Colley, `Radical patriotism in eighteenth century England', in Patriotism: the making 
and unmaking of British national identity, 3 Vols. (1989), ed. R. Samuel, Vol. 1, pp. 
169-87; Colley, Britons. Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (1992), pp. 371-2; Colley, 
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of xenophobia and national assertion of these years. Though based upon misinformation 
and interested actions, and worked upon by both Opposition leaders and the press, the 
national feeling which existed cannot simply be discounted. '29 Narrow self-interest, 
sensationalism and ignorance may have played a part, but so they do in the politics of 
every modern state, yet the views of the wider public are taken seriously. 130 In Black's 
words: "`Negative" drives, arising from hostility and fear, play a major role in many 
movements, ideologies and tendencies, and that was certainly true of British public culture 
in this period, more specifically of the patriotism of that age'. 131 That patriotism was also 
reinforced by a very widely spread idealisation of an earlier Tudor order. This was a 
potent body of myths in an age when the working poor still looked to statutes that were 
predominantly Tudor for the protection of their jobs, property, food prices and right to 
poor relief. 132 It could well be that in the agitation over `slavery' one is seeing the 
emergence of attitudes rooted in beliefs about national history, and which form a genuine, 
though crude and divisive, national consciousness. 133 
`Britishness and Otherness: an Argument', Journal of British Studies, 31,1992, pp. 316- 
26. 
'29 Generalisation on this subject is difficult, and full allowance needs to be made for specific 
local interests and concerns. Nicholas Rogers has shown, for example, that in Bristol, with 
its interest in the Atlantic trade, the late 1730s saw a growth of Country opposition which 
drew on the weavers, manufacturers and a swing of `middling opinion'. In Norwich, on 
the other hand, the Tory interest failed to extend its base of support. Rogers, 'Popular 
Jacobitism in Provincial Context', in The Jacobite Challenge (1988), eds. E. 
Cruickshanks & J. M. Black, pp. 132-6. The lives of many must have been centred far 
more on locality, harvests, health and death. E. g. Arthur Jessop, a West Riding 
apothecary, recorded in his diary almost no comment on the nation and its politics; C. E. 
Whiting (ed), Two Yorkshire Diaries, Yorkshire Archaeological Society, Records Series, 
CXVII (1952), pp. 29-30,48,61. 
130 A combative refutation of those who dismiss pro-imperial attitudes among the masses is 
K. Wilson, `Empire of Virtue. The imperial project and Hanoverian culture c. 1720- 
1785', in An Imperial State at War. Britain from 1689 to 1815 (1994), ed. L. Stone, pp. 
128-64. 
131 J. M. Black, British Foreign Policy in an Age of Revolutions 1783-1793 (1994), p. 507. 
132 For an instance of the power of appealing to Tudor protections, in the dawn of the factory 
age, see the mass of evidence from West Riding clothiers in Report from the Select 
Committee on the Woollen Manufacture of England, 4 July (OS) 1806. 
133 A. D. Pettit, 'A Various Opposition', examines the mythopoeic literary representation 
which runs throughout what he rightly calls `a motley aggregate' of high and low writings. 
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Public opinion alone, though, could not wreck this kind of diplomacy. What was more 
likely to sabotage these involved negotiations was their dual nature. Both the British 
government and the South Sea Company were to be satisfied, and both alike, in their 
different ways, managed to grate upon the sensibilities of the Spanish administration. By 
late April 1738 Keene had received his full instructions and claims from the Company 
which he represented, but had to write for clarification of his diplomatic orders, since 
there was an obvious clash of interest between the nation and the traders. 134 The details of 
the accountancy in any case bore no relation to the probable cost to the nation of a war. 
Waldegrave admitted as much freely to Cardinal Fleury; `but I observed that vindicating 
the Honour of a Nation, and the obtaining of Justice tho for trifles were always looked 
upon as sufficient Cause of War'. 135 If war was to be avoided, there would have to be 
some new impetus to negotiation, and it would need to be supported by both ministers 
and Company agents. That impetus came with the plan put forward by two of the 
commissaries appointed under the Treaty of Seville, Arthur Stert and Geraldino, in what 
was at first described as a `private transaction', but seems to have originated with Sir 
Robert Walpole. 136The long and testy reply of la Quadra to Newcastle's latest memorial 
brought out a last initiative perhaps born of desperation. The beginnings were not 
auspicious. As well as the difficult state of relations with Spain, Walpole had deep 
personal concerns. His beloved mistress Molly Skerrett had enjoyed only three months as 
Lady Walpole before her untimely death plunged Sir Robert into a `deplorable and 
comfortless condition. 137 Rumour at once suggested that he would be shaken from office, 
a premature speculation but one which showed how deeply affected Walpole was known 
to be by his loss. 138 Both the optimism of March, when he was newly married, and the 
inactivity of June, when he was freshly bereaved, can be traced to Walpole's private life. 
'34 BL Add Ms 32797, f 244-5, Keene to Newcastle, 21 April (NS) 1738. 
135 PRO SP 78/218, f. 163, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 11 June (NS) 1738. 
136 Quotation PRO SP 94/32 (unfoliated), Newcastle to Keene, 21 June (OS) 1738. Stert's 
deliberations are referred to in the Secretary of State's office as `the New Plan'; BL Add 
Ms 33007, f. 124, List. The best summary of the origins of the Stert plan, using Spanish 
sources to which I have not had access, is J. O. McLachlan, Trade and Peace with Old 
Spain, pp. 110-13. 
137 H. Walpole to Trevor, HMC, Fourteenth Report, Trevor Mss, p. 17. 
138 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 207/68, T. Carte to D. O'Brien, 8 June (OS) 1738. 
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Stert gave an account to Horace Walpole of his first tentatives to Geraldino. He had 
floated the idea that perhaps the Company could be paid in Madrid, and His Catholic 
Majesty could take on himself the trouble and delay of obtaining the money in the Indies. 
La Quadra had been in favour of it, though deterred by Keene's presenting the plan only 
verbally and by the apparent British determination to have immediate payment at source. 
As soon as he got this relatively emollient answer from Madrid, Geraldino entered eagerly 
into the discussions. He wanted, through Stert, to deal personally with Walpole. Stert first 
approached to Admiral Wager, a Walpole supporter within the divided ministry. Wager 
told Sir Robert that Geraldino `does not care to shew his letter [from la Quadra] to the 
Duke of Newcastle', despite the fact that Newcastle was the Secretary of State with 
direct responsibility for Spain. 139 Geraldino went to Sir Robert, at the height of his wife's 
last illness. From there he went, much chastened, back to Stert: 
he called upon me and told me what had passed, and that it was the most 
disagreeable Visit he ever paid him, whether it was occasioned by the dislike 
Sr. Robert had to the Reply from Spain, or whether it proceeded from the 
Concern he was under for the Indisposition of his Lady, or from both, he 
could not tell. 140 
Walpole was to continue ill and in low spirits until the autumn, though he gave the Stert 
plan as much support as he could. "' At least the plan was now officially adopted by the 
cabinet, though Newcastle was a reluctant supporter of it. Hardwicke wrote to urge the 
Duke to promote it, reminding him that; `It is not now a Nostrum of Mr. Stert's'. '42 
Walpole's bereavement may have made him more careless than usual about offending 
Newcastle, or preserving the appearance of cabinet unity. Geraldino reported the meeting 
at which Walpole offered to make the new plan official, and send it in writing to la 
Quadra. Newcastle, present at the meeting, `said that no answer would be given definitely 
till His Britannic Majesty's opinion was known, Sir Robert replied that he already knew 
his master's views, which answer seemd to surprise the Duke not a little'. 143 To have 
139 BL Add Ms 19030, f. 369, Wager to Walpole, 3 June (OS) 1738. Steg carried the letter 
in person. 
140 PRO SP 94/131(unfoliated), Stert to H. Walpole, 5 June (OS) 1738. 
141 Ibid., pp. 22-3. 
142 BL Add Ms 32690, f. 300, Hardwicke to Newcastle, 16 June (OS) 1738. 
143 McLachlan, Trade and Peace, p. 113, citing Simancas, Estado, Legajo 7622, Geraldino 
to la Quadra, 3 July (NS) 1738. 
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Walpole and the King pushing forward a negotiation in Newcastle's own field of 
responsibility, and the Duke not even aware of developments, was a serious breach in 
ministerial relations. 
This unharmonious period was the one in which the crucial decision for war or peace had 
to be made. Horace Walpole appears genuinely to have balanced between the two; 
`apparent popularity, dignity, and glory present themselves at first sight on one side; but 
does not cruel disappointments, destruction and disgrace threaten ... the conclusion of 
such glorious resolutions[? ]'. 
144 The decision was all the more fraught with danger 
because of the upsurge of national feeling and the demonstrative mood of the country. 
The Craftsman happily commented on the gap between `the Popularity of the Kingdom' 
and that of `the ruling Powers, for the Time being'. It pointed to the riots in Edinburgh, 
the West Country, the Northern coalfield and, in London, theatre riots in Drury Lane and 
gin riots everywhere as evidence of robust national disaffection. The mob might be wrong 
to act as it did, but their riots showed that the nation was restless on many counts; `above 
all, the Spanish Depredations; about which the People have so chafed Themselves, that 
They have hardly Patience to wait till our vigilant and wise Ministers have made Proper 
s 143 Remonstrances. 
144 HMC, Fourteenth Report, Trevor Mss, p. 18, H. Walpole to Trevor, 13 June (OS) 1738. 
145 Craftsman, 17 June (OS) 1738. 
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Chapter 6 Back from the Brink 
The vigilance and wisdom of the ministers did not lead them to send `proper 
remonstrances' from the gundecks of the fleet. Instead they decided to pursue this final 
expedient towards an accommodation. George II appointed a group, consisting of 
Hardwicke, Harrington, Walpole, Wager and Newcastle, to push forward the Stert plan. ' 
Only twelve days after his wife's death Walpole had a private meeting with Stert and 
Geraldino. 2 The main outcome of it was agreement to a proposal made by Geraldino, that 
if a plan was produced agreeable to His Catholic Majesty, plenipotentiaries should 
immediately be appointed to settle, at Madrid, all the differences between the two 
countries. 3 The task then was first of all to produce an acceptable plan of financial 
settlement. Stert at first calculated the claims of the British merchants at £343,277, 
though he gave his opinion that the true figure could not be more than £200,000. Spain's 
total demands came to '£180,000, though £142,000 of this was for Spanish men of war 
taken by Byng in 1718, and the commissaries put the true value of this compensation as 
around £40-50,000. (£60,000 was eventually included under this head. ) Stert at first 
suggested a compromise of taking £120,000 off each figure, leaving the Spanish claim at 
only £60,000. ° These figures of course could not be precise. They amounted to 
suggestions for reasonable compromise; figures at which both parties could settle without 
feeling too aggrieved. As such they passed around the inner circle of ministers, along with 
drafts of the instructions to be sent to Keene. 5 
Reasonable compromise was difficult to achieve however, given the mutual 
misunderstanding of the two courts, remote from each other in time and outlook. It would 
inevitably be difficult to conclude such agreements at a distance, with infrequent and slow 
communications, and swayed by the very different ethos and preoccupations of the two 
courts. In June and July, for instance, the daily gossip of London court circles centred on 
I BL Add Ms 32798, if. 165-9, Newcastle to Keene, 21 June (OS) 1738. 
2 BL Add Ms 32798, f. 186, meeting of 16 June (OS) 1738. 
PRO SP 94/132 (unfoliated), paper H. 
° PRO SP 94/131 (unfoliated), `Offers from Spain'. 
BL Add Ms 32798, if. 152,156-7, Hardwicke to Newcastle, 19 June (OS) 1738; 
Newcastle to Walpole, 19 June (OS) 1738. 
yet another cause of friction between George II and the Prince of Wales. The birth of a 
male heir, the future George III, was a predictable source of tension within the 
Hanoverian dynasty. At once, the Craftsman engaged in pointed comment on the 
blessings to be expected (implicitly, in contrast to the reigning monarch) from his being 
bred up to rest in the affections of his people. 6 There was a specific problem, too. The 
infant George had been baptised privately as an emergency measure, when his life was 
thought to be in danger. ' George II resented this action having been taken without 
reference to him and refused to name godparents or sanction any arrangements for this 
important ceremonial! Trivial as these family tensions might be, they occupied a good 
deal of the time and the talk of ministers. The concerns of the Spanish court were 
different. At the point of active discussion of the Stert-Geraldino plan, Keene observed a 
new and more hawkish mood in Spain. 9 It might be due to encouragement from France, 
he thought, but could not proceed from any new resources found in Spain, for they had 
none. 10 Fleury's health became more than usually important when France's peaceful policy 
was in doubt, and there was a minor scare soon afterwards when the Cardinal, who had 
eaten well, fainted in a hot and crowded church. " Observers continued to link the 
Bourbon powers. When Fleury's health recovered in March, it had been assumed that he 
would bring Elizabeth to her senses. 12 The real case, though, seemed to be that the 
Spanish ministers had finally taken their stand on the question of national pride. 
The stiffness of the Spanish position was evident in a new doctrine enunciated by their 
ministry, and which the British press later found difficult to understand: the idea of a rule 
of proportion. It was a matter of national honour, not of logic. It was bad enough that in 
all the early stages of the British complaints, the justice and good intentions of his 
Catholic Majesty had been called into question. 13 Now fresh humiliations were offered as 
6 Craftsman, 8 July (OS) 1738. 
BL Add Ms 32798, f. 89, Couraud to Keene, 25 March (OS) 1738. 
a PRO SP 107/22 (unfoliated), Cambis to Fenelon, 1 July (NS) 1738. 
9 BL Add Ms 32798, f. 55, Keene to Newcastle, 29 May (NS) 1738. 
10 BL Add Ms 32798, f. 204, Keene to Newcastle, 7 July (NS) 1738. 
11 BL Add Ms 32798, f. 226, Waldegrave to Keene, 28 July (NS) 1738. 
12 PRO SP 78/217, f. 113, Burnaby to Couraud, 19 March (NS) 1738. 
13 'No comprehende su Majd. como puedan abultarse tan siniestramte. estas ilaciones, que 
passan a poner en duda la rectissima intencion con que hä distribuido, y distribuye 
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financial terms were being dictated. If Britain's claims and those of Spain were to be 
abated, said the Spanish ministers, the cuts must be' in direct proportion to one another, 
rather than two-thirds off the Spanish claim and only one-third off that of Britain. This 
was understandable from the point of view of ministers being presented with a whole 
agreed and detailed set of accounts, which they had to present to the King as a fait 
accompli. La Quadra's first response was that `there was a sort of Precision, which would 
not be agreeable to a Prince of his Master's Temper, who could not well brook with 
having a certain Project chalked out to him, to which no variation was to be made'. 14 
They did not object to the amounts, said Keene, though la Quadra threw out sarcasms on 
the British `giving yourselves the trouble to make our Account for us'. 13 But they were 
adamant on the principle of equal treatment. La Quadra, only newly raised to his dignity 
of Counsellor of State, and a man of common birth, had little room for manoeuvre amidst 
the prejudices of the Spanish court and nobility. Keene emphasised the significance of this 
aspect of the negotiations: 
They think and insist in the strongest terms, that their honour is engaged not 
to admit of any other rule of Abatement than that of a common one between 
both Nations. No arguments I have been able to use have had force enough to 
get this Notion out of their Heads. This they say is only an equal and just 
Composition, and as I have hinted before, they look upon their Honour now 
to be so much engaged, that they will run all hazards rather than admit of any 
other Method than that proposed. 16 
La Quadra, after accepting some judicious amendments of detail by Keene, put forward 
two plans for securing due proportion, of which the one with the higher final figure owed 
to Britain was accepted. '7 If the British merchants' £343,000 was to be abated only by 
£143,000, then Spain's claimed £180,000 should be abated by £75,128, a reduction of 
approximately forty two percent in each case. This meant that Britain was due £200,000 
siempre su justicia. '; PRO SP 94/130 (unfoliated), la Quadra to Keene, 26 May (NS) 
1738, giving Philip's comments on Keene's letters of 28 February, 1 March, 7 April &5 
May (NS) 1738. 
14 PRO SP 94/131(unfoliated), Keene to Newcastle, 19 July (NS) 1738. 
is BL Add Ms 32798, f. 249, Keene to Newcastle, 2 August (NS) 1738. 
16 PRO SP 94/131 (unfoliated); BL Add Ms 32798, if. 224-5, Keene to Newcastle, 28 July 
(NS) 1738. 
17 BL Add Ms 32799, f. 36, Newcastle to Keene, 21 August (OS) 1738. 
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and Spain was owed £104,872. That last figure was assigned over to the Crown of Great 
Britain, leaving the remainder to pay in money: £95,128.18 This was accepted by the 
cabinet as equitable and unanswerable, if one really wanted peace. 1 ' Such was the loose 
arithmetic of the famous £95,000, which was formally agreed as the balance owed to 
Britain at a meeting at Lord Harrington's in early August, between Walpole, Newcastle, 
Harrington and Geraldino 2° Ministers in Spain had little control of the details of the deal, 
and complained that the calculations had all been made at a distance, and some Spanish 
21 claims omitted. 
The precise figure of course was always open to grievance on both sides, and gave a 
convenient handle to the British Opposition. The London Evening Post later dwelt at 
length on this issue, and wondered if Spain wanted compensation for its Armada while 
they were about it. 22 Pulteney made withering comments on the false logic by which the 
claims of merchants were offset by a compensation of £60,000 for something quite 
distinct, the exploit of destroying the Spanish fleet twenty years earlier. The resulting total 
to be paid by Spain was an easy target for him, too. Taking away the £68,000 which the 
South Sea Company was to pay on behalf of Philip V, he derided the `remaining £27,000, 
a prodigious Sum, ... to 
be paid by Spain'. ' Pulteney called on public opinion to judge 
what was done on their behalf: `All, that the People without Doors can wish, or desire is, 
that if there is any Thing doubtful in those superior Acts of State, They might be better 
inform'd, especially where their Interest is so manifestly concern'd'. 24 This supposed 
interest may not have been so manifest to more detached observers, but it sounded well. 
is PRO SP 94/131 (unfoliated), `Offer from Spain'. 
19 BL Add Ms 32799, f. 45, Enclosure in Newcastle to Keene, 21 August (NS) 1738. 
20 BL Add Ms 32799, f. 48, Minute of a meeting at Lord Harrington's, 9 August (OS) 1738; 
PRO SP 94/132 (unfoliated), Newcastle to Keene, 21 August (OS) 1738. 
21 PRO SP 94/131 (unfoliated); Spanish document enclosed in Keene's `Plan de Dn. Arturo 
Stert, Londres Abril de 1738': `... pues passa par los Calculos, ö, presupuestos que so han 
echo sin conocimiento suio en Inglaterra; en que no deja de reconoces se algun agravio 
aria la Espafia, y quo se omiten algunas pretensions quo tenia que alegar'. 
22 London Evening-Post, 27 February (OS) 1739. 
2' [W. Pulteney], A Review ofAll that hath pass 'd between the Courts of Great Britain and 
Spain, Relating to Our Trade and Navigation... (1739), p. 31. 
24 Ibid., p. 30. 
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When ultimately even the £27,000 was not paid by Philip, there was much scathing 
comment on the ministry's fatal generosity towards Spain. 
The ministers indeed were negotiating all these details under sustained pressure of press 
comment and expectation. Small informal meetings could escape the notice of the press, 
but there was no concealing the cabinet meeting of the day preceding the final decision. 
This gathering of great office-holders was taken to be the important conference, which 
would decide between war and peace. It was commented on in all the leading Opposition 
journals, which had been careful to keep the whole progress of talks and letters before the 
eyes of their readers. 23 The London Evening-Post reprinted from the Utrecht Gazette a 
full page letter purporting to be the ministry's reply to la Quadra's last letter to Keene. 
`We cannot say that this Extract is genuine; if it be, we hope our Ministers will soon give 
Don Diego a still more British Answer from the Muzzles of our Guns and the Mouths of 
our Cannons. 926 The ballad-mongers were promoting the same views. One popular ballad 
of 1738 depicted Sir Robert and Horace Walpole negotiating with Geraldino, the `Irish 
Don Diego'. Don Diego keeps them waiting in a cold antechamber while he shits (a 
satisfying reversal of the usual role played by such great men), then scorns to compromise 
and demands huge payments in order not to attack British shipping. The frontispiece to 
this ballad was the original of a print later elaborated and sold separately as Slavery. It 
showed (in the ballad version) three glum British sailors in the shafts of a two-wheeled 
cart, while a curly-moustachio'd Spaniard wields a whip and Walpole holds back the 
British lion. 27 Such images of indignity no doubt did much to create a fierce mood among 
the London populace. Among the London merchants, though, Horace Walpole saw a 
different attitude; `a good many of those who were so clamorous for justice and honour, 
25 E. g. London Evening-Post, June 13 & 15, August 10 (OS) 1738, Craftsman, August 12 
(OS) 1738. 
26 London Evening Post, 10 August (OS) 1738. 
27 The Negotiators. Or, Don Diego brought to Reason. An excellent New Ballad. Tune of, 
Packington's Pound (1738). Slavery uses the same foreground scene, though with four 
men pulling a plough, and places Jenkins and his ear in the middle distance, with a 
Spanish ship firing on a British merchantman in the centre background; reproduced in M. 
Duffy (ed), The Englishman and the Foreigner (1986), pp. 136-7, and also (slightly 
misdescribed) in P. Langford (ed), Walpole and the Robinocracy (1986), pp. 150-1. 
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beginning to reflect upon the consequences of a rupture on account of trade, &c, grow 
uneasy at the apprehension of it'. 28 
This unease was increased by the growing likelihood that Britain would be alone in 
demanding justice from Spain. Until the summer of 1738 it could perhaps be said that 
three powers were at odds with Spain over trade in the Caribbean; Britain, the United 
Provinces and France. It was increasingly evident, though, that Britain alone would persist 
in its grievances. Keene lamented that `the Dutch will abandon Us in this Conflict, and get 
private advantages by our fighting for a Cause in common to both Nations'. 29 This view, 
echoed in numerous published caricatures over the next few years, was a resigned 
comment on the defection of a traditional but never warmly trusted ally. The Dutch, like 
the British, suffered depredations at the hands of Spain, but despite some strong early 
protests they took the pragmatic view that they would lose more than they gained by 
proceeding to arms. 
30 The States General made stiff representations to la Quadra about 
specific cases . 
31 They were very slow to enforce them with any vigour. Keene was 
robustly critical of their inaction: 
It was pity, and I speak it as a good Hollander, That when we began to make 
Preparations, They did not order their Admiralties to careen but a couple of 
Frigats; it would have done Us both Service, and Them honour, by enlivening 
a little their reputation in this Country, which, between Us, ... 
has been low 
nay dead for many years. 32 
Admiring the justice of Keene's reading of the Dutch mind, Trevor pointed out the little 
chance there was of stronger action: `The losses they reclaim are not very considerable, 
28 HMC, Fourteenth Report, Trevor Mss, pp. 20-1, H. Walpole to Trevor, 1 August (OS) 
1738. 
29 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 227, Keene to Stone, 15 April (NS) 1738. An incisive appraisal of 
the Dutch position is H. L. A. Dunthorne, `The Alliance of the Maritime Powers, 1721- 
1740', unpublished Ph. D. thesis, London, 1978, pp. 110-16. 
30 BL Add Ms 32794, f. 8, Trevor to Keene, 17 January (NS) 1737; ibid., f. 133, same to 
same, 14 February (NS) 1737; ibid., f. 143, same to same, 21 February (NS) 1737. 
31 BL Add Ms 32795, if. 363-6, Extrait du Registre des Resolutions de L[eurs] H[autes] 
P[uissances] les Seigns. Etats Generaux des Provinces Unies des Pals Bas, 23 September 
(NS) 1737; BL Add Ms 32796, f 259-62, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 18 December (NS) 
1737; BL Add Ms 33007, if. 116-20, Remonstrance of States General to la Quadra, 18 
February (NS) 1738. 
32 BL Add Ms 32798, f. 83, Keene to Trevor, 2 June (NS) 1738. 
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neither have they the best opinion of their plaintiffs' causes. Besides they have begun to 
turn the tables upon the Spaniards, by tacit and unavowed Reprisals'. 33 These included 
sending out two warships to protect Dutch commerce, and fitting out three privateering 
vessels in Curacao, which soon captured and killed one famous guards costa captain, 
Brassovant 34 Trevor believed that their tactics were too half-hearted; `the Dutch must 
begin to robb more cautiously or more irresistibly than They do at present'. 35 But whether 
or not it was perfectly carried out, this was a very natural method of dealing with the 
problem. So much so, in fact, that the Dutch found it difficult to believe, Trevor thought, 
in England's determination to do otherwise. `And as they look upon the present clamour 
in England only to be a feu de paille, they are in no hast to burn their fingers in it. i36 In 
August Keene was able to remark to Trevor, `We have now gotten a little life into your 
Matadores; but how late and aukwardly does it come! 37 Even this sign of life, however, 
was to fizzle out in a memorial . 
39 It was obvious to seasoned diplomatic observers, 
though, that this would not last, and that the Dutch, like the French, would make the 
greatest gains by staying out of war and profiting from the carrying trade. 39 
Dutch neutrality was not a certainty or a matter of course, especially as the Dutch 
ambassador in Madrid, Van der Meer, was meddlesome and created misunderstandings. 40 
Indeed, Philip V personally in 1740 vetoed a proposed joint Franco-Spanish Jacobite 
adventure, fearing that it could bring in the Dutch. 41 But neutrality was always the most 
likely outcome. The Dutch were buoyed up not only by the prospect of a lucrative neutral 
33 Ibid., f. 147, Trevor to Keene, 26 June (NS) 1738. 
3' BL Add Ms 32794, f. 351, Trevor to Keene, 25 April (NS) 1738; BL Add Ms 32795, f. 
286, General Matthew to Board of Trade, 14 June (OS) 1737. 
35 BL Add Ms 32799, f. 215, Trevor to Keene, 20 November (NS) 1738. 
36 Ibid., f. 148. 
37 BL Add Ms 32799, f. 11, Keene to Trevor, 18 August (NS) 1738. 
33 BL Add Ms 32799, f. 288, Harrington to Keene, 23 November (OS) 1738; ibid., if. 290- 
314, memorial; ibid., if. 325-6, Keene to Newcastle, 15 December (NS) 1738. 
39 PRO SP 107/22 (unfoliated), D'Acunha to Azevedo, 22 August (NS) 1738. 
40 St. Gil in The Hague complained that; `no llega äqui correo de Espana en que no venga 
alguna considerable novedad fomentada de dicho Vander Meer'. PRO SP 107/22 
(unfoliated), St. Gil to Geraldino, 4 November (NS) 1738. 
41 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 228/175, Sempill to James III, commenting on a letter in Philip's 
own hand, 28 November (NS) 1740. 
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trade in case of an Anglo-Spanish war, but by the logic of commercial profit in the 
Caribbean. The Spanish ministers themselves complained that they were the losers in the 
balance of depredations, due to the seizures made by Dutch privateers out of Curacao. 42 
Trevor found a general nonchalance about the prospect of either war or peace in the 
United Provinces, since on the one hand Dutch traders did not greatly fear molestation by 
Spain, and on the other the present position was profitable enough to make it worthwhile 
to put up with occasional seizures. The merchants, he said, `make their party good with 
the Guarde-Cotes, and in spite of now and then a mischance, find their account largely 
upon the Ballance' 43 The Dutch public and merchants were easily calmed, despite some 
horrid examples of atrocities in the Caribbean. " Despite ideas of an old alliance of 
northern protestant powers, and sympathies going back to 1688 and beyond, Britain was 
effectively alone in the process of negotiation with Spain. The only obvious alternative 
was an active alliance with Prussia, which would involve making concessions (at the 
expense of Hanover) over Jülich and Berg. Horace Walpole was an active proponent of 
this strategy, which however came to nothing. 45 
A further complication, which might cause British merchants to be even more cautious, 
but was certain to chafe the patriotic populace, was the role of France. The best guess of 
those in the know was that the solidarity of the two Bourbon powers would lead Fleury to 
support Spain in case of a conflict, even though he greatly disliked the Queen of Spain. ' 
When Newcastle sent a stiff memorandum to Spain, following the Parliamentary debates 
of the late spring, a copy was shown by Waldegrave to Fleury. He not only approved the 
message on diplomatic grounds, but `he was pleased at the Mortification this Letter 
42 BL Add Ms 32799, f 5-6, Keene to Newcastle, 18 August (NS) 1738. 
43 BL Add Ms 32800, f. 246, Trevor to Keene, 9 April (NS) 1739. 
It will be remembered that it was a Dutch captain who, in November 1736, was made to 
eat his own hand; PRO SP 98/129 (unfoliated), information of William Fisher, in 
Newcastle to Keene, 24 March (OS) 1737. See above, p. 99. 
as He laid out his arguments in discussion papers when Frederick William's death became 
imminent; `Project of a Grand Alliance founded upon a good Understanding between His 
Majty & the King of Prussia, Oct 5 1740'; `Some thoughts on the Utility of an Alliance 
with Prussia occasion'd by the approaching Death of that King, 1740'; both in Wolterton 
(Walpole) Mss. 
46 PRO SP 78/218, f. 265, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 2 July (NS) 1738. 
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would be to the Queen of Spain, and to the Pride of the Spanish Nation'. 47 Yet France 
and Spain, linked by the Bourbon Family Compact, had much in common. The trade of 
Spain alone was a valuable consideration, since most of its commerce was in other hands. 
France and Britain had each around ten consuls in Spain, while Spain had, even in 1750, 
only ten consuls anywhere, and several of those were recent appointments. 49 Spanish 
treasure was shipped in French bottoms, and France enjoyed an extensive market for its 
exports in Spain, so that for this reason alone war with Spain was likely to lead to conflict 
with France. 49 To set against that, relations between France and Spain were generally 
cool, partly because of the high indulto levied in November 1737 on the French ships 
trading to the Spanish colonies. SO Part of the coolness came from a typically slight but 
significiant diplomatic incident. Louis XV had been told of the intended marriage of Don 
Carlos, but asked to remain silent on it. Meanwhile, the Spanish and Neapolitan 
ambassadors whispered the whole affair abroad, giving the appearance that France, the 
senior Bourbon partner, had not been consulted. Fleury was furious at this, since it 
unsettled his king, and the episode probably marked the height of his disillusionment with 
Spain. 5' The Queen of Spain returned all of Fleury's dislike with interest, and was 
handicapped by dealing with him through an ambassador, La Mina, whose relations with 
the Cardinal were at their worst in the summer of 1738.52 Waldegrave was told that 
Fleury `looks upon him [La Mina] as a Brouillon sent hither to perplex their Domestick 
Affairs'. 33 Bussy (101) was told by Fleury himself in May 1738 that France was `as ill as 
47 The Cardinal's judgement was; `Vous vous conduisez bien sagement, la lettre est forte, 
mais vous ne pouvier la faire autrement'. PRO SP 78/217, f. 243, Waldegrave to 
Newcastle, 2 May (NS) 1738. 
48 D. Ozanam, `La Diplomacia de los Primeros Borbones (1714-1759), Cuadernos de 
Investigaci6n Hist6rica, 6,1982, p. 188 
49 BL Add Ms 32798, f. 49, Cayley to Keene, 13 May (NS) 1738; BL Add Ms 9131, f. 271, 
H. Walpole, `Considerations relating to the Navigation, and Commerce of Great Britain in 
America... '. 
50 BL Add Ms 32796, f. 9, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 14 October (NS) 1737; BL Add Ms 
32796, f. 237, Keene to Newcastle, 13 December (NS) 1737. This grievance was lessened 
by an explanatory cedula early in 1738; ibid., f. 300, same to same, 30 December (NS) 
1737. 
s' PRO SP 78/217, if. 1-3, Fleury's private conversation, reported in Waldegrave to 
Newcastle, 11 January (NS) 1738. 
52 PRO SP 78/217, f. 225, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 1 May (NS) 1738. 
33 BL Add Ms 32798, if. 101-2, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 6 June (NS) 1738. 
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possible with Spain'. 54 The leading Jacobite agent in Paris commented dolefully on `cette 
malheureuse meffiance qu'ils ont les uns des autres'. ss By contrast, there were numerous 
indications that the French minister wished to be well with Britain. 56 Relations were 
soured from February to at least May by a minor but irritating issue. A Bill was 
introduced in the Dublin Parliament which increased the penalties for those who lured 
away Irishmen to serve abroad as soldiers. This was particularly damaging to France 
because of her Irish Regiments, and the French ambassador tried hard to persuade the 
British ministry to obstruct the passage of the proposal. " The confessional barrier 
between the two countries emerged clearly over this issue also: Fleury alleged that the Bill 
was a device to allow the Irish protestants to seize the estates of the catholics. 58 
But there was common ground as well, in the commercial grievances of both powers 
against Spain. Hardwicke approved the advice of Horace Walpole that Waldegrave 
should concentrate on this issue in his talks with French ministers. 3 ' Keene was proved 
correct, however, in his more sceptical assessment: 
The truth is they have but few [ships] that go to their Plantations, and they are 
large, well armed, and not easily mastered by a Guarda Costa: & Besides as 
the French Ministry can stop the Cryes of the Merchants when they think 
fitting, they never fail to do so when they contradict any private view they 
may have to sooth this Court. 60 
At this stage of the dispute, though, Cardinal Fleury was toying with the idea of a French 
mediation between Britain and Spain. His main concern seems to have been to prevent the 
British navy scoring a decisive victory over Spain, and so altering the balance of perceived 
power in Europe. 61 The Sicilian abbes seem to have judged his approach rightly, telling 
Waldegrave that `in his Heart he is an enemy to the English, but will ever act in the 
5' BL Add Ms 32797, f. 360, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 10 May (NS) 1738. 
ss Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 208/43, O'Brien to James, 21 July (NS) 1738. 
.%E. g. PRO SP 78/217, if. 1-3, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 11 January (NS) 1738. 
s' PRO SP 107/21 (unfoliated), Cambis to Amelot, 10 February (NS) 1738; same to same, 
10 March (NS) 1738. 
58 PRO SP 78/217, f. 223, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 1 May (NS) 1738. 
59 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 204, Hardwicke to Newcastle, 22 March (OS) 1738. 
60 BL Add Ms 32796, f. 226, Keene to Newcastle, 13 December (NS) 1737. 
61 PRO SP 107/22 (unfoliated), Paretti to Fitzgerald, 20 May (NS) 1738. 
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patching way' 62 He was even willing to take a close interest in the proposal of a defensive 
alliance between Britain and France, a project which was in abeyance while he was ill in 
the Spring, but was still being actively discussed at the end of May, though Maurepas in 
the following month frankly told Waldegrave that there was no prospect at all of France 
signing such an agreement. 63 Fleury seems at this time to have entertained very decided 
ideas of the pivotal peacemaking role of France, ideas which grew later into a settled 
scheme of French mediation, even dictation to the parties. " While this was his favoured 
policy, he was not inclined to encourage the Jacobites. Waldegrave looked very closely 
into their movements, but cautiously believed assurances that `the Cardinal is Bans la 
bonne foy, When he disclaims meddling with the Pretender's Affairs'. 65 
An arrogant France giving the law to Europe was bad enough. An active alliance of 
France and Spain to help the Pretender had also to be feared. James himself was unusually 
optimistic: `We are certainly in a great Crisis... I am sure I shall endeavour to make the 
most of all that may fall out'. 
' As early as January 1738, Daniel O'Brien in Paris was 
authorised to negotiate with La Mina about the terms of a treaty which Spain would be 
offered in return for help in a successful invasion. O'Brien assured the Spanish 
ambassador that it would actually be in Britain's interests to give back Gibraltar, though 
there might need to be some equivalent given in exchange for returning Port Mahon. 67 
James was even more encouraging; 'Si la Cour d'Espagne contribue a cet evenement je ne 
prevois pas qu'il y auroit la moindre difficulte a la restitution de Portmahon & 
Gibraltar'. 68 Prominent Jacobites spent the summer hoping for an early Anglo-Spanish 
conflict, not doubting that French aid would then be forthcoming, to give them `a speedy 
62 PRO SP 78/218, f. 154, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 31 May (NS) 1738. 
63 BL Add Ms 32796, if. 275-6, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 20 December (NS) 1737; PRO 
SP 78/218, f. 118, same to same, 31 May (NS) 1738; ibid., f. 195, same to same, 15 June 
(NS) 1738. 
64 Ibid., f. 120, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 31 May (NS) 1738; BL Add Ms 33007, f. 193, 
same to same, 23 November (NS) 1739. 
65 BL Add Ms 32798, f. 70, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 31 May (NS) 1738; ibid., f. 72, 
Waldegrave to Stone, 31 May (NS) 1738. 
66 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 207/44, James to Hay, 28 May (NS) 1738. 
67 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 204/17, O'Brien to James, 13 January (NS) 1738. 
a Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 206/33, James to O'Brien, 15 April (NS) 1738. 
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and merry meeting'. 69 The Duke of Ormonde prompted James to take serious soundings 
among his supporters in Scotland and England as to the planning of an invasion aided by 
France and Spain, while he urged that some person `of consideration' in Holland should 
try to keep the Dutch neutral. 70 Reviews were undertaken of the failure of past invasion 
attempts, of the numbers and training of the British troops, and of possible strategies for 
defeating Britain in the Caribbean. " No doubt James was shrewd enough, and sufficiently 
seasoned by past disappointments, not to place too much trust in the assurances he 
received from some of his correspondents. It was easy to make court to the Pretender by 
claiming that even the `Hanoverians' were disaffected, and cowed only by the standing 
army. ' By the late summer, James placed little faith in the general and confused accounts 
he was receiving from his adherents in Britain, but he was much more confident of foreign 
support. '3 
Increasingly, Stuart hopes came to centre on Fleury's probable death, and the livelier and 
more warlike policies which would almost certainly follow. 74 In the French ministry, 
Amelot promised a favourable reception to any plans for joint action which might be 
proposed by Spain, though the Pretender had great reason to fear that support for him 
might be weakened by King Philip's `usual ails'. 
" The Stuart court lamented that without 
strong leadership from Philip, there was no single strong minister who might be `capable 
de quelque chose de Grand; au moins si Patigno etoit en vie j'en esperais d'avantage'. 76 
69 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 208/4, Edgar to Sir Charles Wogan, 12 July (NS) 1738. The 
whole summer's correspondence in that volume shows an optimism and activity which had 
been noticeably lacking in previous years. 
70 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 208/85, memorandum sent by Captain Hay to Rome, July 1738. - 
71 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 208/86 & 93, Col. Arthur Bret's memorial, brought by Lord 
Sempil, July 1738, Capt. William Hay to James, July 1738; ibid., 209/53, memoir by 
father Begon de St. Martin to Cardinal Acquaviva, 9 September (NS) 1738. 
n E. g. Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 206/80, Francis Bulkeley to James, 28 April (OS) 1738. 
73 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 208/149, James to Ormonde, 20 August (NS) 1738. 
74 E. g. Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 210/55,56 & 118, James to Hay and to Ormonde, 21 
October (NS) 1738, James to Ormonde, 3 November (NS) 1738. 
's Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 209/57 & 110, James to Ormonde, 10 September (NS) 1738, 
James to Owen O'Rourke, 26 September (NS) 1738. 
76 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 207/16, James Murray [Dunbar] to O'Brien, 21 May (NS) 
1738. 
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Despite the disappointing lack of enthusiasm for his cause in Madrid, though, James 
considered his hopes of foreign assistance to be good, and certainly better than his hopes 
of action from the Jacobites in England. James wrote to encourage the zeal of his leading 
supporters, and in a letter meant to be circulated among them he added in his own hand a 
note to urge them to promote the great design: 
Affairs are now come to that pass betwixt Spain & the English Government, 
that a rupture is lookd upon to be almost unavoidable, What is certain is that 
it may happen from one day to another, & Therefore it is of the greatest 
Consequence to my friends with you to take such measures out of hand, as 
may put you in a readiness to receive Foreign assistance, & enable you to give 
the Court of Spain such particular & satisfactory informations of the state of 
the Kingdom, as may encourage that Court to act for us. " 
The more apparent it became that Walpole had patched up an inglorious compromise with 
Spain, the more confident did the Pretender's advisers become that this was indeed going 
to be a crucial period of national disillusionment. 78 The Highland chiefs of Scotland, at 
least, were in good heart and hoping for a speedy invasion. "' Still, though, the signals 
from the English Jacobites were equivocal. They were clearly hoping for a political crisis, 
but were far from offering hope of direct action to overturn the existing system. James 
sadly concluded; `I am sorry to think that nothing less than the immediate hand of 
Providence can inspire a desirable courage & union into our friends on t'other side, but I 
fear I am not mistaken'. 8° 
Though the year ended in disillusionment and postponed hopes for the exiled Stuart court, 
there was a real possibility that the turn of British politics might signal a great change in 
their fortunes. Walpole's ministry was keenly aware of the revival of Jacobite hopes and 
plans, and of the danger of a Franco-Spanish invasion in the event of war. 81 Only a 
T' Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 209/6-7, James to Lord Orrery, William Shippen & Watkin 
Williams [Wynn], James to Col. Cecil, 28 August (NS) 1738. 
79 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 209/169 & 175, Edgar to George Kelly, 8 October (NS) 1738, 
James to O'Rourke, 10 October (NS) 1738. 
79 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 210/82, Young [Lord John Drummond] to James, 10 October 
(NS) 1738. 
80 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 210/178, James to Hay, 12 November (NS) 1738. 
s' E. g. CUL Ch (H) Corrcsp 2783-6, Governor Joseph Sabine to Newcastle, Gibraltar, 1& 
7 July (OS) 1738, Consul Parker to Wager, Corunna, 13 & 25 July (NS) 1738; BL Add 
176 
settlement, with or without the aid of French mediation, could be relied upon to avert the 
threat of an active alliance between France and Spain. It was little wonder that there 
should be divided counsels in the ministry. Walpole was anxious to secure a financial 
settlement which would seem fair to Spain, and give no cause for future grievances. 
Rumour was rife that his cabinet colleagues were greatly divided over his strong pacific 
inclinations. 82 Newcastle was more determined to put an end to all the causes of conflict, 
even at the cost of war. Parliament had, after all, provided the means of war, and the 
public was ready, even eager, to see them employed. Waldegrave explained to Keene the 
Duke's thinking: 
Our Ministry is under a violent Dilemma: If they take the King of Spain's 
word, and He keeps it, well and good; if He does not, they will be blamed and 
censured for not using the means put into the King's hands, for obtaining 
satisfaction. Surely there never was a greater ferment than the present in 
Europe. 83 
His letters, even at the height of preoccupation with the Stert-Geraldino plan, in August, 
never cease to stress the issue of the freedom of the seas, `the first, and principal 
Consideration'. 84 Newcastle ordered his secretary Andrew Stone to write privately to 
Keene, in a letter which even a Parliamentary enquiry could not demand to see, urging 
him to make this his first priority and to obtain, if he could, some signal punishment for 
the Spanish colonial governors. So long as Spanish ships visited British merchant vessels 
at sea, war would remain likely. 83 This was a reasonable position, and consonant with 
Horace Walpole's advice on the need for a complete renegotiation of the treaties between 
the two powers. Even when the convention was first signed, Horace urged; `That it will 
Ms 32798, f 95-100, letters of Sample and others in Waldegrave to Newcastle, 3&6 
June (NS) 1738. 
82 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 206/58, George Robinson to James, 21 April (NS) 1738. He 
cites the information both of Knight in London and an employee of Waldegrave's in Paris. 
83 BL Add Ms 32798, f. 130, Waldegrave to Keene, 17 June (NS) 1738. This fear is referred 
to in a most private letter, PRO SP 78/218, f. 164, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 11 June 
(NS) 1738. 
84 PRO SP 94/132 (unfoliated), Newcastle to Keene, 21 August (OS) 1738. 
85 PRO SP 94/132 (unfoliated), Stone to Keene, 21 August (OS) 1738. 
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be a very lame Friendship, and a plaistered Business if Spain will not absolutely stipulate a 
freedom of Navigation without Searching our ships in the American Seas'. " 
But Newcastle's concern also seems to have stemmed from more fundamental and 
persistent differences within the ministry. Bolingbroke in early February had contended 
that the split between Walpole and Newcastle was irreconcilable. He urged Wyndham to 
cultivate his links with Newcastle, and especially Hardwicke, to topple Walpole: `I love 
the chancellor much, and I should therefore be very sorry to see him become the crutch of 
a battered minister'. 87 Montijo saw the same breach in the ministry, telling Keene in 
August; `I see how affairs stand. We must not press too hard upon your administration; 
they are not all of the same sentiments'. 88 Waldegrave, Walpole's protege in Paris, wrote 
to Keene: 
This I know that the sober part of the Administration, Sr Robert Walpole is of 
the number, would do their best to avoid coming to a rupture: some 
foreseeing the dangerous consequences of it, whilst others, of a more military 
disposition, push the contrary way. 89 
Hardwicke was, inevitably, called in to examine the papers concerning the Stert 
negotiations, and to bridge the differences emerging within the inner circle. In mid-August 
1738 he approved the pragmatic compromise reached, despite the anomalous nature of 
various parts of the agreements. Most of his efforts, clouded by a bad cold, were devoted 
to persuading Newcastle not to stick at trifles and to approve the wording of Walpole's 
draft of a letter officially offering the proposal. Newcastle's own draft was not very 
dissimilar, he said, `and surely at this time it is not worth while to dispute about small 
matters'. 90 Three days later Hardwicke tried once more to press the Duke into preserving 
harmony: 
Think coolly & deliberately of the thing it self, its circumstances, & this 
critical juncture with regard to the King's affairs. As to any little appearance 
96 BL Add Ms 32799, f. 116, H. Walpole to Keene, 7 September (OS) 1738. 
97 Coxe, Memoirs of the Life and Administration of Sir Robert Walpole Earl of Orford (3 
Vols. 1798), III, p. 507, Bolingbroke to Sir William Wyndham, 3 February (NS) 1738. 
88 Ibid., p. 509, Keene to Walpole, August 1738. 
9 BL Add Ms 32798, f. 302, Waldegrave to Keene, 11 August (NS) 1738. 
90 BL Add Ms 32799, f. 19, Hardwicke to Newcastle, 15 August (OS) 1738. 
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of being out of humour, Your Grace knows better than I on how slight a 
matter such appearances sometimes turn. 91 
Hardwicke indeed seems to have succeeded in keeping together the jarring ministerial 
colleagues throughout the negotiation. In late August, Newcastle congratulated him that 
all would continue to go well `by a Continuance of your Advice on one Side 
[Newcastle's], & your powerful Interposition of ye other [Walpole's]'. 92 A crucial 
showdown was reached in the negotiations, over whether or not Geraldino would include 
in the negotiations a full reappraisal of the issue of free navigation and the treaties. Even 
Walpole took a stand with his colleagues on this point: 
Sr Robert wth all ye firmness imaginable, & we all told Him, there was an 
End of ye whole Affair, for Sr Robert & all of us told Him, without that, it 
was in vain for Him to expect we would or coud agree. He took time to 
consider, & is to give Mr. Walpole His answer tonight. Sir R is very positive, 
not to yeild, & sd. very rightly, yt if we did, all ye world would say, we had 
given up our Rights for 95'h, When we were in a Condition to force them to 
admitt them. 93 
Meanwhile the Spanish objection was not that Geraldino was demanding but that he had 
gone in so deep at all. At first they did not realise that their envoy was one of the initiators 
of the scheme, and Keene was careful not to tell them. ' Both la Quadra and Montijo, 
though, were angry with Geraldino for exceeding his powers and committing them to an 
arrangement which might well entangle and embarrass the crown. 95 The Spanish ministers 
were not satisfied with the payment by the South Sea Company of its debts, and did not 
choose to separate the two transactions. They insisted on associating the overdue negro 
duties with the £95,000 compensation payment. Since the Company had on its hands a 
great deal of money, £68,000, owing to the Spanish crown, it seemed reasonable to make 
the Asientists act as Spain's paymaster. Along with this rational scheme went a great deal 
of pent-up antagonism toward the Company. Keene observed to Newcastle; `It is not 
91 Ibid., f. 27, Hardwicke to Newcastle, 18 August (OS) 1738. 
92 BL Add Ms 35406, f. 39, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 25 August (OS) 1738. 
93 Ibid.. 
94 BL Add Ms 32798, f. 251, Keene to Newcastle, 2 August (NS) 1738. 
95 PRO SP 94/131 (unfoliated), Keene to Newcastle, 2 August (NS) 1738, and BL Add Ms 
32798, f. 258, private letter of same date. 
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easy for me to express to your Grace half the wrath They throw out against the said 
Company on this Occasion'. ' 
With a convention almost agreed, the Company did its best to earn these Spanish 
compliments. 97 The plan put forward by the Company on 30 June (OS) 1737 had not been 
ratified by the King of Spain, and that of 21 December (OS) 1737 was not even consented 
to by the Spanish ambassador, and yet it was the Company's last word. This humble 
address (and rarely can a document have been more misnamed) demanded `strong and 
effectual' cedulas to be immediately sent for payment to the Viceroys of Mexico and 
Peru. They were to furnish payment every six months in instalments, to pay off the whole 
compensation claimed within three years. On the non-payment of any instalment, the 
Spanish crown should pay in Europe within three months. On any failure by Philip to pay, 
the Company was to be entitled to hold back the sum from the negro duties. Further, in 
order to make that possible, his Catholic Majesty was to declare that the Asiento should 
continue for thirty full trading years, not counting any years in which the negro trade was 
obstructed. 98 The Company refused to act as Philip's paymaster until both their papers of 
demands had been agreed by the Spanish crown. Indeed, they accepted their part in a 
national negotiation only conditionally, coolly adding various provisos of their own about 
the manner of payment of compensation for the represalias by the Spanish crown. They 
agreed to pay the negro duties at 52d per dollar, but only when his Catholic Majesty had 
settled the represalias account to their satisfaction, and also given cedulas for the full 
thirty annual ships envisaged in the Utrecht treaty. 99 These arrogant demands amounted to 
dictation to the Spanish King, something which his ministers would hardly dare to 
tolerate, even if the king's mental health had been more robust. 
A great complication in this tricky stage of the negotiations was the state of Philip's mind. 
The army reforms of March 1738 had to be managed very tenderly so as to avoid 
disgusting the King with the business of carrying on government. He had to be persuaded 
96 PRO SP 94/131(unfoliated), Keene to Newcastle, 29 September (NS) 1738. 
97 'The South Sea Company formed the one stumbling block to an agreement'; E. G. Hildner, 
`The Role of the South Sea Company in the Diplomacy leading to the War of Jenkins' 
Ear, 1729-1739', Hispanic American Historical Review, 18,1938, p. 336. 
98 BL Add Ms 32799, f 56-8, humble address, 21 December (OS) 1737. 
99 BL Add Ms 32799, if. 50-3. Newcastle to Geraldino, 16 August (OS) 1738. 
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to make cuts and reforms without being informed clearly of such existing practices as 
paying for non-existent troops. Knowing about such corruption might `make Him fonder 
of leaving the Government than continue in it, even as easy as it is rendered to Him by the 
pains of Her Catholick Majesty'. '°° In May, Philip's mental disturbance was so violent 
that he was almost unapproachable, while Elizabeth was so dropsical that there were fears 
that she would choke. The ministers delayed their answers to England, and made them 
evasive and general, for fear of being found in the wrong if and when their master and 
mistress recovered and resumed control of negotiations. '°' In July and August Philip was 
able to discuss business in the mornings, but after that became more and more bizarre in 
his behaviour. He would howl frightfully, sometimes imitating Farinelli, who for the past 
twelve months had sung to him after dinner the same five Italian airs of his first ever 
performance at the Court. 102 Philip's instability, and the total seclusion of the court at this 
time, must have heightened the sense of unreality which diplomats saw in Elizabeth's 
policies. 
The royal wedding festivities for the King of Naples were draining the financial resources 
of the country, and the popularity of the Bourbons was at its nadir, yet Elizabeth talked 
and planned, as if the nation were ready for war. She seemed to believe in a plot by the 
British to favour the Empire and attack her in Italy. 103 Certainly she feared the use of a 
Royal Navy squadron to cut her off from Italy, and when she heard of George II's orders 
to fit out another twenty men of war she blurted out after mass; `On a envie de nous faire 
peur'. 104 Keene summarised her position at this point, immured with her mad consort, 
taking her facts from la Quadra and Montijo, but making her decisions with her Italian 
favourites, Scotti and Cervi'°5: 
It is in these Circumstances that the Queen of Spain exposes Herself and this 
Country to the consequences of a Rupture between the two Nations, which it 
100 BL Add Ms 32797, f. 127, Keene to Newcastle, 3 March (NS) 1738. 
101 PRO SP 78/218, if. 99-100, Intelligence from court ladies in Spain, in Waldegrave to 
Newcastle, 26 May (NS) 1738. 
102 BL Add Ms 32798, f. 259, Keene to Newcastle, 2 August (NS) 1738. 
103 PRO SP 94/131 (unfoliated), Keene to Newcastle, 1 September (NS) 1738. 
104 BL Add Ms 32798, f. 290, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 10 August (NS) 1738; PRO SP 
94/131 (unfoliated), Keene to Newcastle, 29 August (NS) 1738. 
105 BL Add Ms 32799, f. 34, Keene to Newcastle, 29 August (NS) 1738. 
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is probable she would not do, did she give Herself either more time to 
consider of them, or had other Heads to assist her... She must know the 
general disgust there is against their present proceedings, but this indeed does 
not give Her any great uneasiness, because She likewise knows, that the 
Nation is abject and low-spirited enough to suffer even more than they do. 
Her Finances she must be sensible are in an extreme disorder, and yet She 
must provide money to supply the enormous extravagances committing at 
Naples. 106 
However abject the nation seemed to Keene, the Spanish court was not immune from the 
pressure of public opinion, expressed in salons, circles and clubs, and also in clandestine 
periodicals and satires. Dissidence was rife, especially in such regions as Aragon and 
Catalonia, since the dynasty was still perceived there as an alien one. 107 Philip, as the uncle 
of Louis XV, was unpopular, though never as much so as Elizabeth, and both were 
subjected to especially intense criticism between 1737 and 1743. In 1738, satire focussed 
particularly on the acquisition of the kingdom of Naples for Prince Charles, and the 
burdens this would impose on Spain. The other topic was the majority of the Prince of 
Asturias (later Ferdinand VI). This was regarded by critics as the point at which Philip, 
according to an old promise, should abdicate in favour of a Spanish-born heir. 1°8 Fleury 
tried to head off an abdication, fearing that Ferdinand `may be too much a Spaniard and 
independent on the French'. 109 Ferdinand was fated to remain patiently in the wings while 
his stepbrothers, Elizabeth's children, were given kingdoms and prestigious appointments 
of State, yet remained alienated from the country which they helped to rule. The Infante 
Don Philip was bred up by his French attendants to despise Spanish ways: `Every thing 
must be French to please him: He does not even care to speak his own Language but 
when he is entirely forced to it'. 10 There were limits to how far such monarchical 
outsiders could safely go in flying in the face of their people. 
By late August the strain on the Spanish ministers was telling, especially as they felt 
themselves to be under pressure from the British naval threat, and obliged to remain firm 
106 PRO SP 94/131(unfoliated), Keene to Newcastle, 2 August (NS) 1738. 
107 T. Egido Lopez, Opinion Publica y Oposicion al Poder en la Espana del Siglo XVIII 
(1971), pp. 35-9,103. 
108 Ibid., pp. 79-80,118-9,175-9. 
109 PRO SP 78/219, f. 82, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 24 September (NS) 1738. 
110 BL Add Ms 32794, f. 190, Keene to Newcastle, 18 March (NS) 1737. 
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in their latest resolutions. Keene was constantly watched while in public, and his letters 
intercepted. " Soon afterwards several people in Madrid were imprisoned merely for 
spreading the rumour that the King intended to reabdicate his throne. 112 This was not an 
atmosphere in which ministers could easily make humiliating concessions. Geraldino had 
made just such a concession, fearing that the agreement would break down over the 
refusal of the Asientists to pay their share of the money until Philip had accepted the 
demands expressed in their June and December 1737 papers of grievances. He had taken 
it upon himself to say that His Catholic Majesty would still pay the £95,000, in cash in 
London, if the South Sea Company were obstructive. 113 Quite apart from the poor 
finances of Spain, this was objectionable on grounds of pride, since that court believed 
that it had an absolute right to the money to be paid on their behalf by the Company. 
Keene reported; `They have got it into their heads that such a step would have the air of 
buying a Peace with England'. 114 
One way for the Spanish ministers to show strength while still accepting this unauthorised 
settlement was to insert restrictions upon their cash payment. By September the Spanish 
ministers were floating the idea that if they had to pay in such circumstances they would 
punish the Company by cancelling the Asiento. "5 It was a move easy to understand from 
the viewpoint of Madrid. The King would be withdrawing a privilege from a defaulting 
company, in response to many slights and indignities. More experienced ministers, 
though, would have been unlikely to allow the notion to gain ground. The Asiento was 
not a royal privilege only, but was granted in a formal treaty between Spain and Britain. 
To revoke it unilaterally was a fateful step. Once the Court had begun to discuss this 
possibility, however, it was a measure too tempting to be taken from the grasp of Philip 
and Elizabeth. Both alike constrained by royal pride and public pressures, the Spanish 
ministers were not free to truckle to the Asientists, and the British ministers were not free 
to truckle to Spain. For some months, the British opposition papers had been trying to 
III BL Add Ms 32799, if. 29-34, Keene to Newcastle, August 29 (NS) 1738. 
112 Keene to Newcastle, September 8 (NS) 1738, PRO SP 94/131 (unfoliated). 
113 BL Add Ms 32799, f. 61, Geraldino to Newcastle, 17 August (OS) 1738; ibid. f. 37, 
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rouse a suitable level of resentment in their readers. The Craftsman in the spring 
bemoaned their apathy over depredations: `We are so much degenerated from our brave 
and virtuous Ancestors, that many Persons hear, and discourse of those infamous 
Practices with more Coolness and Indifference than of the Mail being plunder'd, or some 
other Robbery on the High-way. 116 This coolness was banished with the summer heat. 
Now every issue of the London press was full of pressure to settle the disputes with a 
dash, and preferably with a brisk (and of course successful) war. Naturally, the 
Elizabethan motif was constantly in use. "7 The Craftsman was typical in resenting the 
insults and cruelties of Spain, `the more sensibly felt, as they come from a People, whose 
Power we have always scorn'd and subdued, whenever brought to a Trial'. "g Caleb 
d'Anvers purported to believe: 
The Gentlemen in the Administration seem to be at last in Earnest; and no 
idle Rumours shall convince Me, as much a Malecontent as I am represented, 
that all this Bustle is to end in Preparations only, or a Spithead Expedition. lt9 
It was clear that, as Parliament had voted funds for arming the fleet, the government 
would face great discontent in the next parliamentary session if no blow had been struck 
against Spain. 120 If the ministry was to send the country's forces beyond Spithead, though, 
it would have to have a clear idea of the kind of war which it wanted to fight. The main 
options were obvious, and discussed in the Craftsman. '2' Seizures on the Spanish 
mainland were likely to be of no value, as even that newspaper admitted. To capture the 
flotas on the seas would be the next step (and Cromwell had never missed them). Thirdly, 
captures should be made in the Indies - of Havana, la Cruz and Panama, or at least of 
several lesser and lucrative places - which would be easy for a free government, offering 
liberation to the local peoples. 122 
116 Craftsman, 18 March (OS) 1738. 
117 E. g. Common Sense, 22 July, 5 August (OS) 1738. 
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For the past year, ministers had been giving thought to these possibilities too, but the 
decision was not an easy one to take. Montijo advised Philip that he should rather bow to 
Britain's demands than try to fight a short war, but that in a long war Spain would bring 
Britain to submit on terms favourable to Spain-'23 Bussy pointed out to Waldegrave that 
all the problems of coming to a workable understanding with Spain would still exist even 
after a long war. He correctly foresaw that only a decisive war would make any 
substantial change in their relationship: and since Spain lacked the naval power of Britain, 
and would take care not to come to fixed sea battles, there was no chance of a speedy and 
definite victory. 124 The same idea was prevalent in the Spanish ports, as Keene reported; 
`it is the opinion of every body here, that the Spanish Naval Forces will keep out of risk 
and danger as much as is possible'. 125 In the popular mind, the power of the British navy 
was beyond challenge. The Portuguese ambassador in Paris caught this idea shrewdly; `I 
have ever observed that the bulk of that Nation think, that by arming a huge Fleet, they 
have conquered the whole World'. 126 Yet the true position, as he observed, was more 
delicate, and the rhetoric of Britannia's rule of the waves was misplaced. 127 
The dilemma of British ministers was caught in some highly prescient comments by the 
older Sicilian abbe, Platania, shortly before his death in June 1738. Platania agreed with 
the common view that `the greatest Treasure of the Crown of England is the Credit of her 
Naval power'. But he argued that this credit meant the reputation of being able to do two 
things: to engage other navies, certainly, but also to be able so to annoy any enemy power 
that they must sue for peace. If England once lost more than it gained in a conflict with 
Spain, and was unable to force Spain to put an end to the war, this naval credit would be 
sunk: 
it would be the greatest evil that could befal England, in so much as the 
World would no longer entertain the high opinion it has hitherto had of her 
12' BL Add Ms 32798, if. 257-8, Keene to Newcastle, 2 August (NS) 1738. 
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Naval Forces, and that they alone were sufficient to make the other Powers 
hold England in the highest Respect... 
Therefore whoever means to make war with Spain ought first to have some 
good and solid Project for a great Operation with a reasonable probability for 
the safety of its Execution, and of Consequence enough, if it succeeds, to 
oblige Spain to sue for Peace, and to give more ample satisfaction than any 
she has offered in her Negotiations. 129 
The outcome of the war, though he did not live to see it, amply justified his prediction. " 
At this early stage the British ministers were making little progress in considering the 
specific form of a great project against Spain. An attack on the Spanish mainland, quite 
apart from the fact that it would bring France immediately into the war, was not 
practicable. Because of the severe problems of regional unrest in Castilian-Bourbon 
governed Spain, the Spanish land forces were numerous and well organised, though not 
well paid. They could rely, thanks to the planning of Patino, on strongly fortified towns 
and the largest proportion of mobile horse troops of any army in Europe. 130 There was no 
doubt about the shaky financial state of the nation's armed forces, and much of the naval 
bustle and preparation of 1737-8 was more designed for show than for use. 131 Yet there 
were also serious attempts being made in Spain to reform both the navy and merchant 
marine. In March 1737 a new post of High Admiral of Spain was created, and given to 
the Infante Don Philip, who, with enthusiastic support from his mother Queen Elizabeth, 
set about making changes. 132 The Admiralty, in existence from 1737 to 1748, and not 
again until 1807, had total authority over the fleet, its construction, navigation, materials 
and manning. 133 Though the spending increases and reforms in supply took time to show 
an effect, the changes in manning were immediate. Spanish sailors throughout the 
kingdom were now `matriculated', in a version of the French system of registration 
128 PRO SP 78/218, ff. 268-70, Intelligence report in Waldegrave to Newcastle, 2 July (NS) 
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whereby all seamen could be called up quickly for naval service. Sailors who were not 
matriculated in one of the three departments, Cadiz, Ferrol and Cartagena, could not 
serve on profitable passages to America, or in rented or private ships. 134 To make this 
system more useful, the High Admiral decreed that the matriculados should be alternately 
employed in ships of war and in merchant ships, with a record kept of their service. 135 AS 
yet there were only the beginnings of the great naval revival, which took off after 1748, 
but even the first improvements were significant. 136 Despite the financial problems of the 
country, it would be no simple matter to invade Spain, or even to harrass her ports, where 
defensive precautions were strongly under way. 137 
Horace Walpole had warned of the difficulties of a war with Spain in his two cabinet 
memoirs of January. Indeed, he predicted that it would be hard to bring such a war to a 
distinct end. The nature of the trade of the two countries suggested caution as to the kind 
of war which would result: 
Their Guarda Costas are difficult to be met with by our Men of War, & if 
taken, are not worth any Thing; And as to their Galeons, Flota, & Register 
Ships, They carry the Riches of other Nations; the Spaniards have but one 
tenth part in Them, And two thirds, or one half, at least, of all Those Rich 
Loadings belong to the French; And therefore the Consequences of 
proceeding to seize these valuable Ships, will be consider'd before too 
vigorous a Measure be pursued: - On the other side since the great 
perfection, & encrease of our Settlements, & intercourse of Trade between 
our Colonies with one another, & between Them, & Great Britain, Our 
Navigation, & Commerce in those Parts is so large & Extensive, that the 
Spaniards, in revenge for our taking one Guarda Costa from them, which 
may be worth nothing, will soon seize, or take a vast number of our own Rich 
Vessells, belonging to ye Merchants of London, Bristol & Liverpool, together 
with the Effects of the S. Sea Compa.; ... And if a Rupture should ensue, our 
Commerce would be exposed in all Parts, to Privateers of all Nations, 
carrying Spanish Colours. 138 
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A naval war was an emotive part of the `blue water' thinking which went back to the 
opposition to the costly continental campaigns of Marlborough. The Hanoverian ministry 
was thought to favour expensive wars in northern Europe, tying down resources in 
subsidies and creating a larger standing army at home. The way to success and freedom 
lay rather in naval conquests overseas. 139 The prospects for a successful war were not 
nearly so clear to those whose job it was to do the planning as they were to the talkers in 
coffee shops and the buyers of satiric prints. Popular ideas of the prospects of war were 
rooted in the notion of the impotence of Spain, and especially of the Spanish colonists. 
One of the British government's early intelligence assessments nicely summarised the 
optimistic view of colonial strength on both sides; `the Spaniards have no fforce in the 
West Indies, but what may be entirely destroyed the first year, by our Men of War, who 
need stay but one year there, and leave the Rest to our Plantations to do'. The plantations 
were to drive out the peninsular Spaniards at less expense than they had faced in 
providing ships for Queen Anne's wars, and `will be very well Satisfyed with what 
Plunder they get for their Labour'. 140 As well as the belief in lucrative plunder, two other 
ideas underlay this optimistic assessment. One was the notion that one galley manned 
`with such brave people as the Americans are' would beat five French or Spanish galleys, 
and the other was the belief that the colonial subjects of New Spain were ripe for an 
overthrow of their masters, and would heartily join the invaders. 
141 
The belief in treasure is central to understanding the appeal of a war against Spain in the 
popular mind. The distinguishing feature of the Spanish empire was its command of huge 
quantities of gold and especially silver, shipped regularly in bullion fleets to the Old 
World; some fifteen million pesos in 1737 alone. 142 Drake's raid on Nombre de Dios, and 
139 D. A. Baugh, `Great Britain's "Blue Water" Policy, 1689-1815', international History 
Review, 10, (1988), pp. 33-58. 
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his captures of the Cacafuego, the San Felipe and the Santa Anna were fabled examples 
of the seizure of this wealth. Few Britons in the 1730s doubted the ability of the Royal 
Navy to do perform similar feats. One scholar has recently claimed that an interest in 
treasure alone was dead after 1727, and that the war which began in 1739 was aimed at 
`permanency and real security' in the form of colonial captures. 143 This is a misleading 
formulation, as an interest in treasure remained pronounced well into the 1740s, and 
colonial captures were often valued for the treasure they would yield. There was good 
reason to remain excited about Spanish treasure in the late 1730s, even though the most 
productive years of the Indies were over. In October 1737 news reached Horace Walpole 
in The Hague of a newly-discovered silver mine in Mexico. '" Though Keene could find 
no good evidence of this, the rumour was enough to stimulate still further the interest in 
Spanish bullion. 145 
There were four possible types of treasure ships to capture. The galleons (galeones) were 
the ships of the fleet sent out in late summer to the great fairs at Cartagena and 
Portobello, trading centres of the Viceroyalty of Peru. The, flota was the similar fleet sent 
in the early summer to the Central American fair at Veracruz. They of course sailed only 
when markets were not saturated with illicit goods, and fairs were actually held. Both 
fleets joined up in Cuba in the early spring after their departure from Old Spain, and 
returned together laden with bullion and specie. In years when the great fleets did not sail, 
the azogues ships made the journey instead, carrying out mercury for silver smelting, and 
bringing back the royal bullion which had accumulated since the last sailing. The 
consolation prize for predatory sailors were the register ships (registros), licensed by 
Philip to trade for specific purposes, and usually carrying valuable luxury cargoes. The 
value of the treasure fleets was bound to stimulate cupidity: the thirteen fora and azogues 
ships of 1737 brought in, according to Keene, `between 14 and 15 millions in gold and 
silver, about 2 millions in Fruits; and about 4 millions of Piastres... 9.146 
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The first, and as it proved delusive, British plan in 1739 was to capture the two azogues, a 
lightning stroke which would at once both ruin Spanish finances and amply compensate 
Britain for all the costs of armament. It was George II who ordered the azogues to be 
seized, a decision made as soon as Walpole gave him the intelligence that the treasure 
ships were on their way back to Cädiz. 147 Admiral Haddock's orders to commit this 
aggression were sent out four months before war was declared, immediately upon the 
expiry of the time stipulated for Spain to pay its agreed compensation. 148 Admiral 
Vernon's orders, two months later, were amended to request him particularly to intercept 
the treasure coming from the Indies. 149 Talk of seizing some of the treasure fleets 
continued well into the war, with observers abroad and especially the Opposition at home 
convinced that Britain's navy had such command of the seas that no such fleet could 
escape them. Bussy in 1740 `talked mightily, that the King was le Dieu de la Mer, and 
would be Master of their Commerce, Treasure &c... '. 
'so Horace Walpole disparaged the 
idea of colonial gains such as this, but even those in the ministry could not absolutely 
discount the possibility of a lucky seizure. The Craftsman even after two years of war was 
insisting that the war with Spain could be made as profitable as the discovery of America 
by Columbus was to the Spaniards. '5' A year later, one pamphleteer still clung to the idea 
that the navy must inevitably capture a great part of the Spanish treasure. "' 
These heady ideas often went along with the very prevalent notion of the goodwill of 
Spain's colonial subjects towards Britain, and their dislike of their own masters. Shortly 
before the declaration of war, the inner cabinet listened to a proposal to seize the treasure 
ships at Manila, and subsequently to keep Manila by treating the natives well. 153 The 
Craftsman pinned its hopes on taking British liberties to American shores. "" The overseas 
subjects of Bourbon despots were thought to be ripe to enjoy the blessings of the happy 
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148 BL Add Ms 19030, if. 418-9, `Orders sent to Haddock..., Kensington, 6 June (OS) 1739. 
149 BL Add Ms 32692, f. 222, Newcastle to Vernon, 13 August (OS) 1739. 
ISO BL Add Ms 32693, f. 360, Newcastle to Harrington, June 1740. 
's' Craftsman, 22 August (OS) 1741. 
132 `Philalethes', The Profit and Loss of Great Britain and Spain... (1742), p. 62. 
153 BL Add Ms 28132, f. 56, Norris journal, 18 October (OS) 1739. 
154 Craftsman, 3 June (OS) 1738. 
190 
British establishment in Church and State. For these reasons, both Admiral Anson's fleet 
sent into the Pacific, and Cathcart's expedition to the Caribbean, carried printed 
manifestos which it was hoped would subvert the allegiance of the discontented subject 
peoples of the New World. 
155 One anonymous experienced seaman in central America 
believed that it would be easy to take Panama; `Millions of miserable People wou'd bless 
their Deliverers; their Hearts and their Mines wou'd be open to us'. 156 Admiral Vernon 
found, though, that the Spaniards there had seen the error of their ways since the menace 
of the Darien scheme, and managed to conciliate the natives. 
157 The native populations of 
Cuba and Hispaniola in particular were believed to `hate the Spaniards mortally'. '58 One 
army commissary on the West Indies expedition opined that the people there `love and 
esteem the English above any other Nation ... they 
have a great Opinion of our Integrity 
& honour & Regret our being Hereticks'. 159 This was not perhaps so slight an objection 
as such advocates believed. It was unlikely to escape the notice of subject colonial 
peoples that the English were of an alien religion and language, and that their slaveowning 
practices in the West Indies did not make them the best advocates of freedom and 
respectful treatment. An object lesson lay close at hand in Minorca, where the blessings of 
protestant rule were stubbornly resisted. The cabinet were well aware that if a Spanish 
army landed there, the local population would rise and join them. 
'6° The army officer 
charged with assessing the state of defence of Port Mahon in the early months of the war 
reported that the natives misguidedly detested the British: 
at present the Islanders from their Religion are so influenced by the Priests, 
that they are insensible of the Blessings They enjoy, and such is their Aversion 
to Hereticks, that They prefer Poverty and oppression, under a Roman 
Catholick Prince, to Riches and Freedom under a Protestant one; but 
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particularly on all Occasions of Differences, the Confessors are prompted to 
exert their Authority among those Bigots. 161 
Though the idea of a widespread uprising in the Americas continued to be popular among 
the West Indian planters, propounded for example by Governor Trelawney, it was never 
more than wishful thinking. 162 The Jacobites were no more, but certainly no less, realistic 
in their hopes of promoting a successful insurrection in Jamaica, using the Maroons of the 
interior, after which rebellion would sweep through all Britain's other possessions. "" 
Less comment is needed on the jingoistic notion of the strength of the British tar or 
soldier compared with the cowardice of the puny Spaniards. '" This was a staple of the 
press comments on the British seamen kept as prisoners in Cadiz: their plight was all the 
more unnatural because only their chains could make them inferior to their captors. 161 
They were `a People, whose Power we have always scorn'd and subdued, whenever 
brought to a Trial'. '66 The odds on British pluck were even stronger overseas: an 
eyewitness at Campeche claimed to `have seen one of our Seamen in a quarrell, make half 
a score of them fly'. 167 This prejudice was equally strong among both the masses and their 
betters. Horace Walpole the younger gleefully described a perfect example of it early in 
the war, when a rumour circulated in Naples that Admiral Vernon had captured 
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Portobello. The Prince di Santo Buono, chamberlain to King Charles and the son of a 
Spanish governor in the Indies, refused to believe the news. `Having seen Porto Bello 
himself, he pronounced it impregnable, if there were any men in it: Lord Deskfoord told 
him he did not know that, but there were five hundred Spaniards. i168 Their liberties, it was 
believed, gave Britons heroic valour, while `nothing but want of Thought can make these 
Slaves to arbitrary Power brave... ', 169 Such views explain the early confidence that it 
would be enough to have the `West Indies let loose on ye Spaniards'. 
170 
The beggarly state of the troops of Spain was also a matter of comment. Waldegrave 
reported, a year into the war; `By all accounts the Spanish Troops are in a miserable 
Condition, the Common Soldiers are naked, and the officers look like beggars and are not 
much better'. 171 The impression was confirmed by a band of twenty-nine prisoners 
brought ashore a year later. The Champion, in the person of Fielding's partner Ralph, 
commented; `They appear to be a pack of abandoned Wretches, ragged and dirty'. 
172 
Along with this disparagement went the notion that the defences of Spain in the Americas 
were weak and ill-manned. Oglethorpe was confident that he could take the Havana with 
only two batallions, with help from his Indians and from Vernon's fleet. The garrison was 
weak and made up of discontented and unpaid troops, and the town full of women, 
children and priests. 173 
Both ideas were flattering to British prowess, but unfounded. The state of military 
readiness in Central America was very different from what it had been in Elizabethan 
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172 The Champion, 23 July (OS) 1741. The best short summary of that newspaper's structure 
and outlook is M. C. & R. Battestin, Henry Fielding. A Life (1989), pp. 257-89. 
173 CUL Ch (H) Corresp 2942 & 2948, Oglethorpe to Walpole, 25 January &2 April (OS) 
1740. 
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times. 174 It was true that the Spanish preparations there lacked glamour, and were all 
geared towards defence, but the leading scholarly study of the subject concludes that this 
was a strength which ensured success against both invaders and internal rebels throughout 
the century. The defensive Spanish `army of settlement' (ejercito de dotacion) did its 
duty. 17' There had been a considerable effort of defence reorganisation during the reign of 
Philip V, and especially in Patino's time, involving the spending of large sums on 
fortifications, and laying down rules for the conduct of them. 176 Though this was well 
enough known, the significance of static fortifications, `the backbone of the defence', 
according to Richard Harding, was underestimated both then and by later historians. '77 
British observers tended to estimate the strength of the colonial defences by the numbers 
of troops sent out from Old Spain. 
More than four hundred soldiers were sent out to the Havana in July 1737 to reinforce its 
critical garrison. '7 The force assembled there was indeed so considerable that it at once 
gave rise to suspicions of a great expedition against Georgia. 179 Just as relevant to the 
state of the colonial defences was the level of sickness there, and in early 1738 there was 
raging in the West Indies `an epidemical distemper, little less than a plague', which killed 
many of the recently arrived European soldiers. 18° This did not, however, automatically 
mean that the garrisons were defenceless. Disease took a greater toll of non-acclimatised 
Europeans than of those brought up in those regions, whose resistance was far greater. 
14 K. R. Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering. English Privateering during the Spanish War 
1585-1603 (1964), pp. 171-5. 
175 `Tods su estructuaricön y su funcionamento va dirigido a conseguir la maxima eficacia en 
la defensa de las Indias contra todo peligro, tanto extern como intern... En definitiva, 
los establecimientos ingleses sobre el territorio americano fueran minimos, luego quiere 
decir esto que el sistema defensivo espafol funcionb, mejor o peor, pero el Ejercito de 
America cumplib su cometido. ' J. M. Fer ndez, Officiales y Soldados en el Ejercito de 
America (1983), p. 167. 
176 J. M. Fernandez, Officiales y Soldados, p. 51. 
The role of fortifications is scrupulously evaluated in Harding, Amphibious Warfare, pp. 
154-69. 
"g BL Add Ms 32795, if. 49-50, Keene to Newcastle, 1 July (NS) 1737. 
179 BL Add Ms 32797, f 273-5, anonymous letters of 10 & 20 February (OS) 1738, 
enclosed in Newcastle to Keene, 12 April (OS) 1738. 
180 BL Add Ms 32797, if. 35-6, Keene to Newcastle, 3 February (NS) 1738, BL Add Ms 
32798, f. 50, Cayley to Keene, 13 May (NS) 1738. 
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The colonists, too, were far more involved than formerly in the defence of their main 
towns, and Spanish documents show a continuous readiness among the governors and 
chiefs. 181 Though regular troops gave added strength, the colonial militia were themselves 
not a negligible force when defending suitably fortified places, and the creole sergeant 
class were the backbone of the more efficient modern garrisons. 192 This would always 
give the Spanish system of defence an important advantage against freshly arrived bodies 
of troops from the Old World. 183 The popular British vision of treasure-stores defended 
only by inferior and cowardly poltroons was destined to fade before the reality of 
hardened colonials defending their own property, and with tropical disease and climate to 
help them. '84 
181 Fernandez, Officiales y Soldados, pp. 173-4. 
182 Fernandez, Officiales y Soldados, pp. 31-2. 
183 The entire range of British difficulties in attacking Spanish commerce and possessions, 
including the effects of disease and the seasoned Spanish colonial militia, was incisively 
predicted by the remarkable Sicilian abbes; PRO SP 78/218, if. 148-54, paper enclosed in 
Waldegrave to Newcastle, 6 June (NS) 1738. 
194 D. Crewe, Yellow Jack and the Worm. British Naval Administration in the West Indies, 
1739-1748 (1993); R. Harding, Amphibious Warfare; J. R. McNeill, `The Ecological 
Basis of Warfare in the Caribbean, 1700-1804', in Adapting to Conditions. War and 
Society in the Eighteenth Century (1986), ed. M. Ultee. 
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Chapter 7 The Convention of the Pardo 
However bitter the later reality may have been, it was the alluring vision of war which 
animated the public in the summer of 1738, and which ministers had to contend against. 
Geraldino complained of the difficulty of negotiating `in a Country where reason and 
justice cannot prevail, unless accommodated to the opinion of the people'. ' Nonetheless, 
the negotiations were at first successful. Couriers arrived from Spain on 13 August (NS) 
1738, with the crucial reply to the proposals which Geraldino had shaped and approved. 
Horace Walpole summarised the ministry's early response to this Spanish answer; `it is 
not so satisfactory as was to be wished, but it is such as requires great consideration 
whether it deserves the hazarding the consequences of a war... '. 2 This was a critical 
point, at which ministers had to decide whether peace was worth obtaining at the price of 
concessions and political difficulty at home. Geraldino noted the highly unusual departure 
from cabinet routine occasioned by the despatches: 
As the Ministry here were already informed of them, they had called a 
Cabinet Council, which mett at noon & did not rise till after 5, tho' the 
regular practice of that Council is to make themselves acquainted with the 
Affairs at their first meeting, and to put off to another the voting upon them? 
Some of the vexed issues would have to be left to plenipotentiaries to settle later on, but 
within three more weeks the negotiations for a convention between the two countries 
were concluded. On 9 September (NS) 1738 Geraldino signed, on the authority of a 
special full power from his sovereign, a convention of preliminary articles for a full 
definitive treaty. On the British side, George II gave full powers to a working group of 
the Lord Chancellor, the two Secretaries of State, and Sir Robert Walpole. 4 Though 
considerable further negotiation of detail remained, agreements had been reached and 
signed which could lay out a path to peace, if both parties were determined to pursue it. 
In both Britain and Spain, though, that determination was flawed. The rumour in London 
PRO SP 94/206, f. 179, Geraldino to St. Gil, 1 July (NS) 1738. 
2 HMC, Fourteenth Report, Trevor Mss, p. 21, Horace Walpole to Trevor, 19 August (NS) 
1738. 
3 PRO SP 94/206, f. 199, Geraldino to St. Gil, 19 August (NS) 1738. 
4 PRO SP 94/206, f. 217, Geraldino to St. Gil, 12 September (NS) 1738. 
was that the ministers were divided about the wisdom of the convention, until Walpole 
took it on himself to see it through. 5 Geraldino at least was delighted at his part in 
averting a bloody war, after eight months of tedious diplomatic effort6 La Quadra on the 
other hand, far removed from the atmosphere of London, was very cool about the 
agreement signed on his behalf by his ambassador, and disposed to amend the details of 
payment as far as he could. 7 He told Keene, `That his Catholick Majesty was extremely 
surprised at receiving a Convention already signed and sealed, when He had no 
knowledge antecedent of such a Convention, nor had given his Minister the authority he 
had assumed to himself! This was a real feeling of the Spanish court, and not simply a 
negotiating stance. Spending money freely for intelligence, Keene was assured by his 
`friend' and all the other informants he could find that the Spanish ministry had now gone 
as far as they would in order to avoid war: 
They think they do not sacrifice a Little of their Pride in accepting, in the 
manner they have done, a Convention which they pretend does still contain 
many Expressions to their disadvantage, besides its having been signed 
without the least previous knowledge on this side, and by a Minister without 
sufficient authority. 9 
It was a time when delicate negotiations required the utmost goodwill and skill in those 
concerned, and it may have been unfortunate that both Keene and Walpole lacked their 
customary resilience. Keene was ill during most of October and November, and the 
volume of his letters and apparent business falls off noticeably. 10 No doubt his enthusiasm 
for his arduous labours was diminished when his requests to be promoted to the rank of 
Ambassador and Plenipotentiary were turned down. " Walpole's heart may not have been 
fully in his work, either, at this time. Ill and in low spirits throughout August and 
s Craftsman, 23 September (OS) 1738. 
6 Ibid., f. 223, Geraldino to St. Gil, 23 September (NS) 1738. 
7 PRO SP 94/131 (unfoliated), Keene to Newcastle, 29 September (NS) 1738. 
8 PRO SP 94/131 (unfoliated), Keene to Newcastle, 13 October (NS) 1738. 
Ibid., Keene to Newcastle, 13 October (NS) 1738. 
10 Ibid., passim. 
I Ibid., Keene to Newcastle, 13 October (NS) 1738. 
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September, he was reported to be recovered in mid-October. 12 The following month, 
though, Walpole reported to Hardwicke the death of Sir Charles Turner, `the oldest friend 
and acquaintance I had in the world'. 13 From this period onwards, Walpole seems to have 
followed a rhythm in which he would recover his old form, or produce some strong 
parliamentary performance, only to relapse into ill-health. '4 
The difference made by individuals in diplomacy is hard to document from the surviving, 
largely formal papers, but is likely to be significant. Less easy to assess is the impact of 
opinion outside the small circle of the court. It was clear that at a time when diplomatic 
compromise was within the grasp of the ministry, public opinion was more hostile than 
ever to the idea of even the smallest concession. The agreements reached in September 
were only a small distance away from a workable accord between the powers. Yet 
xenophobia in Britain was at its height, against not just Spain but also - even especially - 
France. This aversion was strongest among the lower orders: the wealthy (a much 
resented fact) went abroad, consumed French food and wines, and patronised French 
plays and Italian operas. It was not merely a visceral prejudice, however. Anti-French 
feeling was fuelled and justified by ideas of the contrast between British liberties and 
foreign popery and tyranny. Black has argued that; `Europe was a stage depicting what 
would happen to Britain were it to be misgoverned... '15 There was also a keen awareness 
of the threat from French trade. One subscription paper, which joined a newsheet to a part 
publication of the Old and New Testament, was roused to unusually explicit political 
comment by French commercial rivalry. After a report on restrictions imposed at 
Marseilles on British ships, the London and Country Journal denounced the French as the 
12 HMC, Fourteenth Report, Trevor Mss, pp. 20-23, sundry letters from H. Walpole; PRO 
SP 94/206, f. 233, Geraldino to St. Gil, 14 October (NS) 1738. 
13 BL Add Ms 35586, f. 137, Walpole to Hardwicke, 25 November (OS) 1738. 
14 He was prone to sudden fits, for which he was treated with `quinquina'; PRO SP 107/27 
(unfoliated), Ossorio to Marquis d'Ormea, 4 May (NS) 1739. The symptoms included 
shivering, sweating and vomiting, and from 1739 onwards they frequently recurred. See 
e. g. BL Add Ms 15946, f. 35, Newcastle to H. Walpole, 11 September (OS) 1739; PRO 
SP 107/32 (unfoliated), Sohlenthal to de Schulin, 25 September (NS) 1739. 
15 J. M. Black, `The Challenge to Autocracy: the British Press in the 1730s', Studi 
Settecenteschi, 3-4,1982-3, p. 111. He makes the case for a genuine fear of standing 
armies and an absolutist state. 
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real enemy; `Surely this will make us rub the Film off our Eyes, if anything can'. 16 The 
Evening-Post also saw the French as the root of the trouble. " So apparently did the 
London crowd. At the Haymarket theatre, a visiting French company found it impossible 
to present their entertainment. The barracking was begun early, and obstinately 
maintained: `the Cry on one Side the Galleries was, No Soupe Maigre, and the other Side 
answer'd in a different Tone, Beef and Pudding... '. The players struggled to be heard, 
and in desperation `to please the Audience, one of the Mademoiselles fairly shew'd her 
A but it being Foreign Goods gave no Content'. 18 Only a subsequent subscription 
among the nobility enabled the Gallic troupe to leave the country. 
This demonstrative popular hostility flared up just as the final stage of negotiations was 
reached. In mid-November the prospect of agreement seemed to have vanished. The 
Spanish ministry attached various explanations and conditions to the agreements reached 
in London, to the extent that George II could not accept their complex and strained 
ratifications. '9 On some points la Quadra was persuadable. He had softened his court's 
position over freedom of the seas, and Georgia for example. 20 On the question of the 
South Sea Company's demands, though, and in particular the Spanish determination to 
cancel the Asiento as a last resort, la Quadra was adamant. Philip was to ratify the 
convention not as it stood, but only insofar as it conformed to the explanations annexed 
by Spain, which were not to be altered. 21 The Spanish resolve to, in effect, annul a treaty, 
16 20 February (OS) 1739. 
17 London Evening-Post, 12 August (OS) 1738. 
i8 London Evening Post, 12 October (OS) 1738 
19 PRO SP 94/132 (unfoliated), Newcastle to Keene, 13 November (OS) 1738. 
20 BL Add Ms 32799, if. 144-53, Keene to Newcastle, 13 October (NS) 1738. 
21 Tor tanto en virtuo dela presente apruevo, y ratifico todo la comprehendido en la 
mencionada Convencion en lo que no se opone, ö, contraviene a la Explicacion aftadida 
alos Articulos 1° y 2°. Segun queda Expuesta, literalmente, y sin ampliacion alguna, y en 
cuyos Termins se han de entender observar y practicar los puntos concernientes a ella, y 
no como estän en la Convencion. ', PRO SP 94/132 (unfoliated), in Newcastle to Keene, 
13 November (OS) 1738. 
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caused a formal cabinet meeting to be held to decide upon the heads of the next letter to 
Keene 22 
The ministry needed to keep the South Sea business entirely distinct from the negotiations 
between the two crowns, no easy matter since both negotiations were so intertwined. 
Geraldino believed that the delays were entirely due to the private and impertinent 
demands of the South Sea Directors. When he protested to the ministry, he was told that 
the Company interested the public so much that its demands could not be disregarded. ' 
At one point in November, after Newcastle's hurried departure from an inner cabinet 
meeting, Walpole sent to know if they had agreed to send to Keene copies of various 
papers relating to the Asientists' claims on Spain. Newcastle in some alarm insisted that 
they must adhere strictly to the method proposed, to keep the affairs of the Company and 
those of the Government absolutely separate. 24 This was impossible to do, as was 
embarrassingly obvious when negotiations broke down, but the delicate balancing act had 
to be attempted. 
An internal balance had also to be preserved within the inner cabinet. Newcastle leaned 
heavily on his brother Pelham and on Lord Hardwicke, who in turn had to palliate every 
cause of offence, and reconcile and explain Newcastle constantly to Walpole, and vice 
versa. The advisers involved in framing letters for Spain, and Walpole's dislike of 
Newcastle's stiff and pugnacious drafts, are made clear in a letter from Pelham in mid- 
November: 
This morning we read over your dispatches together, and Sir Robert, I can 
assure you, not only in the conclusion, but as he went. along, approved of 
every paragraph in your letter. I did not tell him that I had your original 
22 BL Add Ms 32799, ff. 244-5. Present were the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Lord 
Chancellor, Lord President, Lord Privy Seal, Lord Steward, the Duke of Devonshire, Lord 
Pembroke, Lord Ilay, Lord Harrington, Sir Robert Walpole and the Duke of Newcastle. 
23 PRO SP 107/22 (unfoliated), Geraldino to St. Gil, 18 November 1738. His exact words 
were: `A lo que este Ministerio me respondio, declarando que por lo respectivo a los 
Negocios Publicos de cuye acomodamto. hacia side el objecto do la Convenzn. no se le 
Ofrecia reparo alguno, que pudiesse embarazar el Cauxe [sic] de las ratificaf: pero que 
la Comp' del Asiento interesaba tan considerablem`° al comun que no podia el Ministeno 
desatenderla'. 
24 BL Add Ms 32799, f. 211, Newcastle's draft comment, endorsed on Pelham to Newcastle, 
5 November (OS) 1738. 
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draught, nor did he insinuate that you had any assistance in forming it. I am 
glad you took Lord Chancellor's alterations; for though they don't make any 
great difference in the substance of what you wrote, yet it makes your orders 
introduced in a manner more agreeable to the present system, than your way 
of writing was; what I mean is, yours had more of what Sir Robert calls 
`invita Minerva'. 25 
An undated letter from the same period shows the nature of the struggles in the inner 
circle. Newcastle complained to Hardwicke about his apparent tendency to withdraw (not 
unreasonably, the Lord Chancellor might have felt) into the duties of his own office. It 
was a cry for help against `measures started in a hurry, often first in the closet, executed 
with precipitation'. Without the aid of both Pelham and Handwicke, he complained, he 
could not `resist by myself the torrent'. `My brother has all the prudence, knowledge, 
experience, and good intention, that I can wish or hope in a man, but it will, or may, be 
difficult for us alone to stem that which, with your weight, authority and character, would 
not be twice mentioned. '26 Such tensions were all the more unfortunate, given the extreme 
delicacy of the entire Convention discussions. Since negotiations began in earnest, the 
British and Spanish couriers had even been travelling together, so as to avoid any 
misunderstandings or frictions caused by letters arriving at different times. 
27 
While these careful steps were being taken to ease the two countries towards a genuine 
settlement, there came a new provocation certain to stimulate the prejudices of the public. 
A fresh case emerged of a Briton being held prisoner in Cadiz, an incident well timed to 
revive memories of the `slaves' of the previous year. Captain Jason Vaughan of the ship 
Sarah was detained in prison though his crew were quickly released, and no unusual or 
cruel treatment was reported. 
28 A Jacobite observer in Cadiz expected benefits from the 
timing of the sailors' return: `as in all probability they may arrive about the opening of the 
Parlement I am hopefull this will occasion new Clamours'. 29 This it speedily did, not least 
u W. Coxe, Memoirs of the Administration of the Right Honourable Henry Pelham (2 
Vols, 1829), I, pp. 11-12. 
26 All quotations from W. Coxe, Memoirs of the Administration of the Right Honourable 
Henry Pelham (2 Vols, 1829), I, p. 40, Newcastle to Hardwicke, nd. 
27 BL Add Ms 32799, if. 286-7, Waldegrave to Keene, 28 November (NS) 1738. 
28 BL Add Ms 32800, f. 45, Keene to Newcastle, 26 January (NS) 1739. 
29 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 211/161, Edward Marjoribanks to Edgar, 16 December (NS) 
1738. 
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because the Sarah was taken some fifty-five leagues out to sea. The Craftsman launched 
an editorial setting the stakes impossibly high in any treaty negotiations. `Caleb d'Anvers', 
from his own chambers, demanded that there must be no `SEARCH of our Ships at Sea, 
though but a Cable's Length from the French or Spanish Ports'. 3° Vaughan's seizure, 
though, was not an instance of depredations in the customary mould. Indeed the case was 
aggravated by the fact that the ship was taken by a Spanish warship, a snow on her way 
from Carthagena to Havana, and the British flag insulted. Spain's colonial forces, on a 
war footing, and awash with rumours that war had begun, seem to have jumped the gun. 
31 
Vaughan wrote to his owners from prison, in strongly political terms, urging that the 
government should use action, not memorials. 32 The letter was speedily reprinted in the 
press. 33 The London Evening Post in particular took up the incident as fiercely as those 
`slavery' cases which had brought it to the fore in the previous year. The Craftsman took 
a rather quieter approach. That paper had recently lowered the temperature of its readers 
by moving away from depredations and emphasising much more the question of 
commerce. It had devoted several weeks to the issue of how to increase the nation's 
trade, the chief conclusion being that it was absolutely impossible for there to be a 
genuine peace with our chief commercial rival, France. 34 Though this was suited to the 
prejudices of its readers, it was not such an immediately striking approach as that of its 
rival. The Craftsman was somewhat in decline at this time, though it continued to be the 
newspaper which foreign diplomats read and sent abroad, as representing the sense of the 
Opposition, if not the nation. 35 At home it was outdone by the London Evening-Post, 
which had been taken over by J. Meres in 1737 and soon transformed. 
30 Craftsman, 30 December (OS) 1738. On the uses of the eidolon Caleb d'Anvers, and its 
intended associations, see S. R. Varey, `The Craftsman 1726-1752. An Historical and 
Critical Account', unpublished Ph. D., Cambridge 1977, pp. 61-4. 
31 PRO SP 94/134 (unfoliated), Anthony Weiden to Court of Directors of South Sea 
Company, 6 August (OS) 1738. 
32 BL Add Ms 32800, f. 81, Vaughan to owners, 4 December (NS) 1738. 
33 London Evening-Post, 30 December (OS) 1738; [A. Boyer], The Political State of Great 
Britain, LVII, January 1739, pp. 29-3 1; Craftsman, 6 January (OS) 1739. 
34 Craftsman, 25 November to 16 December (OS) 1738. 
35 J. M. Black, The English Press in the Eighteenth Century (1987), pp. 227-8 
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Late in the summer of 1738, the London Evening Post was still in the shadow of the 
senior publication, approvingly quoting the Craftsman as the voice of the people. 36 
Thereafter it rapidly developed its own voice, cynical about the moneyed interest, shrewd 
on ministerial manipulation of the news, and stridently anti-French. 37 Meanwhile `Caleb 
d'Anvers' was feeling the pressure of competition, and reduced to complaining about the 
uneven effect of the stamp duty. This tax hurt law-abiding papers like his own, but was 
evaded by a dozen unstamped sheets circulating at a halfpenny or a farthing: why, he 
plaintively asked, was the government not punishing these bare-faced offenders? " G. A. 
Cranfield has argued that the Post was influential particularly in the country, as it gave 
more news than the Craftsman, which relied on a heavy diet of editorial opinion. Soon the 
London Evening-Post was drawn upon heavily by almost the entire country press, both 
for its news items and for its distinct Patriot politics. 39 Its more polemical style made it 
very effective in London, too. In 1740 it was seen by one agent of the Pretender as the 
leading voice of the `malecontents', and Meres was described as himself a professed 
Jacobite-40 
Faced with the varied press assault over Vaughan, ministers must have wished that they 
could share the nonchalance of Cardinal Fleury. Speaking frankly to Waldegrave, he said; 
`he had always let the People say what they would, but did what he pleased. That the 
King was a good deal in the same way, and did not mind what People thought'. 41 British 
political life was very different. Though Keene soon procured the release of Vaughan, and 
earned his gratitude with other favours, the wronged captain's return home was bound to 
cause a sensation, which would promote the cause of opposition. 42 In poignant contrast to 
the sufferings of British sailors, the well-manned navy lay idle. Admiral Balchen at 
Christmas went to Portsmouth to strike his flag. He had spent four months in Plymouth in 
36 London Evening-Post, 19 August (OS) 1738. 
37 London Evening-Post, 24 August, 9 September (OS) 1738. 
38 Craftsman, 2 December (OS) 1738. 
39 G. A. Cranfield, `The London Evening Post, 1727-1744: a Study in the Development of 
the Political Press', Historical Journal, VI, 1,1963, pp. 20-37. 
40 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 2227/186, Cockburn to Edgar, 27 October (OS) 1740. 
41 PRO SP 78/219, f. 224, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 8 December (NS) 1738. 
42 PRO SP 94/133 (unfoliated), Vaughan to Keene, 10 February (NS) 1739. 
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the same plight as the forlorn sailor in the current popular print, `The British Hercules'. 
Leaning disconsolately on an anchor within sight of the moored Spithead fleet, the sailor 
holds in his hand a paper bearing the words; `I wait for orders'. 43 One lady there 
expressed the, no doubt common, regret at having passed up the chance of easy conquests 
in the Caribbean; `Admiral Stuart I reckon is sorry that he should not have one Feast upon 
the Spaniards before the Peace was made'. 44 The Vaughan case, by contrast, drove home 
the realisation that any feasting that might be going on was at British expense. It 
unavoidably therefore became entwined in the national negotiations. In the same full 
cabinet meeting which advised the King to accede to the final form of the convention with 
Spain, the ministers discussed the application of the proprietors of the Sarah. 45 
Newcastle's letters to Keene capture the frustration of the ministry's position. On the one 
hand they wished to promote good relations even to the extent of an alliance, implicitly 
against France, which `might tend to the Preservation of the Balance of Power in Europe, 
and prevent any one from aggrandising itself in such a Manner, as to become formidable 
to the rest'. 4' At the same time they had to insist in peremptory fashion on Spain's putting 
a stop to all such depredations, and giving guarantees for the future. 47 The timing of the 
Vaughan case, stiffening British demands and highlighting the issue of freedom of the 
seas, made it much more important as a contributory cause of war than that of Jenkins's 
ear. It was obvious to ministers, in any case, that freedom from search was the crucial 
problem, and they had given a great deal of thought to ways in which to secure some 
acceptable rule of navigation. It lay within the province of Horace Walpole to advise how 
this could be incorporated into a future treaty, though of course Newcastle was bound to 
set out his own ideas. Hardwicke advised on these, but was anxious that Horace should 
not know it. He told the Duke in October 1738, when returning detailed draft comments: 
43 P. Langford (ed), Walpole and the Robinocracy (1986), pp. 160-1. 
44 BL Add Ms 22256, f. 44, Juliana Cleveland to Lady Anne Strafford, 29 December (OS) 
1739. 
as PRO SP 94/134 (unfoliated), cabinet meeting 22 January (OS) 1739. 
46 BL Add Ms 32800, f. 77, Newcastle to Keene, 26 January (OS) 1739. The ministry's 
views on France and the balance of power are discussed in J. M. Black, Natural and 
Necessary Enemies. Anglo-French Relations in the Eighteenth Century (1986), pp. 34-5. 
47 Ibid., ff. 72-4. 
204 
Mr. Walpole made me a Visit last night. I said not one Syllable of your 
Project, or of my having seen one Word of it, therefore I begg your Grance 
not to give any hint of my being at all privy to it. 48 
The final negotiation of the Convention signed at the Pardo on January 1739 was attended 
with confusion and delay entirely typical, of the preceding discussions. This critical 
convention could not command the entire attention of the Spanish court so long as there 
were religious festivals, family marriages or even ceremonial pleasures to absorb their 
Majesties' attention. Keene was fated to meet with `Birthdays and other Amusements, 
which have busied their Majesties at this Critical Juncture'. 49 The different sense of 
priorities at the two courts can be vividly seen at this time. George II, acutely aware of 
the voice of the London people and of the approach of a new session of Parliament, saw 
the convention with Spain as the chief business of his government. 50 Next only to that was 
his anxiety to prevent France from disturbing the balance in Europe during the Anglo- 
Spanish disputes. He was urging his ministers to see if `some stop cannot be put to the 
Torrent of their Success at present'. 31 Philip and Elizabeth had other preoccupations, 
constantly together as they were and secluded in their stately apartments at the Pardo, to 
which foreign ambassadors, and many Spanish courtiers, had to make a daily sixteen mile 
round journey. An exasperated Keene burst out in indignant comment: 
Can you well believe that such is the Infatuation here that more serious 
Moments have been spent in choosing Patterns for Lacing & embroidering the 
Uniforms they have given to all the officers of the Household, than in thinking 
of our Affairs? 52 
Another absorbing topic for the Spanish court - far more absorbing to la Quadra than his 
letters from Geraldino - was the negotiation of marriages which would tie France and 
Spain doubly together. 53 This was no less than the marriage of a Spanish princess to the 
48 BL Add Ms 32799, f. 172, Hardwicke to Newcastle, 9 October (OS) 1738. 
49 BL Add Ms 32800, f. 4, Keene to Newcastle, 13 January (NS) 1739. 
S0 BL Add Ms 32800, if. 76-7, Newcastle to Keene, 26 January (OS) 1739. 
s' BL Add Ms 32800, ff. 24-37, quotation f. 31, Newcastle to Waldegrave, 5 January (OS) 
1739. 
52 PRO SP 94/133 (unfoliated), Keene to Couraud, January 1739. 
53 See above, p. 114. 
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French Dauphin, and a French princess to the Infante Don Philip. 54 It was a sign of the 
rapprochement between the two powers, despite Fleury's continued dislike of Elizabeth; 
`the name of Bourbon makes him overlook all private grudges'. 55 Such a development 
was so important to Britain that Newcastle even authorised Waldegrave to pay Bussy the 
50,000 livres which he demanded for fuller information. 56 The payment must have seemed 
poor value when, three weeks later, Louis XV made a public announcement of the 
marriage (a single one only as yet), between his eldest daughter and the francophile Don 
Philips' Dynastic marriages such as this were part of the fabric of diplomacy. Along with 
this one went detailed negotiations for a most-favoured-nation treaty between France and 
Spain, well advanced by April, which would guarantee French support for the King of 
Naples. 58 
The one British issue which did constantly occupy the attention of the Spanish court was 
the tricking conduct of the South Sea Company, resentment of which runs through all the 
Spanish discussions. The Company had refused, even with an international agreement 
awaiting signature, to concede two points on which Spain insisted. One was to accept as 
legitimate the debt due to the illegal private profit made by the Royal Caroline in 1732. 
The other was to pay their debts at the rate of fifty-two pence sterling per dollar. 59 The 
invincible obstinacy of the Company's stand was highly offensive. 60 No sooner was the 
Convention signed than the Directors denied that they had agreed in the past that they 
actually owed £68,000 to the Spanish crown. Their case was that this sum was agreed 
only conditionally, on the basis that first Philip V should settle the account of the 
54 Intelligence of it was first given by the surviving Sicilian abbe, Caracciolo; PRO SP 
78/219, f. 284, Waldegrave to Newcatle, 24 December (NS) 1739. 
ss BL Add Ms 32800, f. 66, Waldegrave to Keene, 3 February (NS) 1739. 
56 BL Add Ms 32800, f 112-5, Newcastle to Waldegrave, 1 February (OS) 1739. 
S' PRO SP 78/220, f. 78, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 25 February (NS) 1739. 
58 BL Add Ms 32800, if. 262-8, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 20 April (NS) 1739. Horace 
Walpole had lively fears of the outcome; HMC Fourteenth Report, Trevor Mss, p. 28, H. 
Walpole to Trevor, 17 April (OS) 1739. 
59 Simancas, Estado, Legajo 6907 (unfoliated), la Quadra to Keene, 29 December (NS) 
1738. 
60 `... hace ver una obstinaciön invincible en la compailia ä no pagar lo que tan 
legitimamento debe', Ibid.. 
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represalias, and give to the Company satisfactory security for their reimbursement. 61 In 
trying to palliate this offence, Keene must have given still further umbrage. He reminded 
la Quadra that the Directors had a mandate from the General Meeting of the Company. 
They ran the risk of censure by that body if they settled the accounts before the court of 
Spain saw fit to answer the Company's queries. 62 
Keene urged la Quadra to sign the convention as soon as possible, and then appoint 
ministers to thrash out, with himself, the disputed balances. Though he promised that it 
would take not more than eight to ten days to put an end to this `affaire epineuse', the 
Spanish minister was not impressed. 63 To put the House of Bourbon to the question of a 
group of London merchants, and to represent their censure as more important to the 
Directors than that of the King of Spain, cannot have seemed appropriate to the minister 
who was one of Spain's most newly-made grandees. La Quadra replied curtly that the 
Company were in breach of the Asiento agreement, by not paying. The proposal to 
suspend it (in itself a concession, since the original London document spoke of cancelling 
it) was merely a response to the Asientists' breach of faith. " This view of the question 
was simply not negotiable, and Keene's defence of the notorious conduct of the Company 
was unlikely to change la Quadra's mind. 65 
Indeed, Keene, in his dual capacity as ambassador and South Sea Company 
representative, was virtually accused of bad faith. La Quadra protested that nothing less 
61 CUL Ch (H) Corresp 2833, Burrell & Bristow to Geraldino, 25 January (OS) 1739. 
62 `... ce sont les Directeurs qui ont ete charges de la Negotiation au nom & de la part de la 
Compagnie, laquelle ayant dans une Assemblee generale, donne plein pouvoir A Ses 
Directeurs desterminer ses Differends avec la Cour d'Espagne sous telles & telles 
Conditions, ces Messieurs n'ont pü, sans se departir de leurs Instructions, & s'exposer au 
ressentiment d'une Assemblee generale, s'engager au payement des 68 mille livres 
sterling, dans le terns que la Cour d'Espagne avoit juge A propos dc ne point s'expliquer 
sur plusieurs Articles que la Compagnie regarde comme de la derniere Importance. ' 
Simancas, Estado, Legajo 6907 (unfoliated), Keene to la Quadra, 30 December (NS) 
1738. 
63 Ibid.. 
64 `Para convencimiento de [eso], bastara ei expresar ä V. S. que ä la Suspension del Asiento, 
que estrafia por nueva amenaza, he dado la Compania anteriormente sobrado motivo con 
la falta de complimiento en sus mas sustanciales Capitulos. ' Simancas, Estado, Legajo 
6907 (unfoliated), la Quadra to Keene, 1 January (NS) 1739. 
65 PRO SP 94/133 (unfoliated), Keene to la Quadra, 2 January (NS) 1739. 
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than their full demands would ever satisfy the Company, and that the powers given Keene 
by London as a plenipotentiary seemed only to allow him to accept any fresh advantages, 
but not to agree to just proposals. 66 Writing privately to Walpole, Keene was himself 
quite frank about the errors of the Company: 
Every set of Directors has been shifting off the bad day upon their Successors 
and when they could hold it out no longer they took refuge to a General 
Court and by providing for their own Security or rather for avoiding a little 
Clamour, They have I fear put the Comp' affairs into an irretrievable 
Condition. 67 
In this atmosphere of mistrust a new and constricting form of diplomacy was imposed on 
Keene, and on the other ambassadors in Madrid. La Quadra announced that he would 
accept no further verbal representations, but wanted to have written instances only of all 
matters which he must present to the King. 
68 The change seems to have originated with 
the Spanish King himself. Philip feared that by sending only a verbal reply to one of la 
Quadra's letters, Keene was trying to overreach him, giving assurances which he would 
later deny. 69 The clerk-like Spanish minister was thus given an ideal way in which to avoid 
any personal blame for misunderstandings in the delicate negotiations which were highly 
likely to cause some royal resentment. 
For Keene, this new and stilted method was a particular blow, since many things might be 
spoken which could not be put into writing `without running the risk of offending the 
superstitious delicacy of this Court'. 
7° A further blow was that Montijo, the most tractable 
and informed of the ministers, was set aside by the influence of la Quadra's chief adviser, 
Don Casimiro Ustaritz, first commis in the War Office: 
66 `... nada la satisface no ser del todo delo clue pretende; y clue las facultades clue se ascgur6 
en aquella Corte. La verie conferido a VS., sola parece clue fueron para pretender y 
admitir ventagas, pero no para acordar lo justo. ' Simancas, Estado, Legajo 6907 
(unfoliated), la Quadra to Keene, 4 January (NS) 1739. 
67 CUL Ch (H) Corresp 2860, Keene to Walpole, 24 April (NS) 1739. 
a BL Add Ms 32800, f. 4, Keene to Newcastle, 13 January (NS) 1739. 
6' PRO SP 94/133 (unfoliated), la Quadra to Keene, 5 January (NS) 1739, Keene to la 
Quadra, 6 January (NS) 1739. 
70 Ibid. 
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And these two together have so filled their heads with the Grandeur of the 
Spanish Monarchy, the injury it receives from Foreigners and Foreign 
Commerce, and how much it has been trickt in former Negociations, with 
such like Common Place, that this Court is much more Intractable than in any 
other period of time that I have known it. 71 
This stiffness must have owed something also to the rising influence of Don Joseph 
Quintana, then a Councillor in the Supreme Council of the Indies. He was to become 
Secretary of the Indies only in March, but his signature appears alongside that of la 
Quadra on drafts of some of the crucial and inflexible letters to Keene in early January' 
Soon afterwards, la Quadra named Quintana as one of the plenipotentiaries who would 
negotiate the full settlement after the signing of the Convention. 73 
Since the Spanish court was intractable, Keene did his best to make the South Sea 
Company tractable. He failed: `Other Countries and Companies would have given as large 
a Sum as what is askt for the good will of a Court to let them carry on a winkt-at 
Commerce, but our Directors would not so much as bribe the Court of Spain with its own 
Money... '. 74 His role as ambassador did at least allow him an access on Asiento business 
to Spanish ministers which a mere Company agent would not have had. But it was a 
severe complication at such a time. He confided to the Company's factor in Havana that 
he had not been able to settle their affairs as he would wish, `nor adjust them at the same 
time with those of the Nation in general'. 75 Keene's exasperation with the South Sea 
Company, and with the public pressure in England, shows through in every private letter: 
It is with the company as with the rest of the nation; no minister can possibly 
please them, till they are happy enough to be an overmatch to all the powers 
in Christendom, and oblige them to give us all we want, and refuse them all 
they desire, be it just or not. 76 
71 BL Add Ms 32800, f. 14, Keene to Newcastle, 13 January (NS) 1739. 
n Simancas, Estado, Legajo 6907 (unfoliated); e. g. letters of 1,4 &6 January (NS) 1739. 
73 PRO SP 94/133 (unfoliated), la Quadra to Keene, 10 January (NS) 1739. 
74 PRO SP 94/133 (unfoliated), Keene to Couraud, January 1739. 
'S BL Add Ms 32800, Keene to Weiden, 28 February (NS) 1739. 
76 W. Coxe, Memoirs of the Life and Administration of Sir Robert Walpole Earl of Orford 
(1798), III, p. 521, Keene to Walpole, 24 April (NS) 1739. 
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In writing to the Directors themselves he was more circumspect than this. His letters were 
always liable to be called for and laid before Parliament, and even leaked publicly. In May, 
when he had to tell them that the Spanish court would not pay their share of the £95,000, 
he sent the letter first to the Office. This, as he told Couraud, would `give our Masters 
Time to take such Measures as they shall think proper with the Directors, before the 
whole town be acquainted with the Contents of the Spanish Answer, as they will be the 
Moment it is communicated in Broad Street. '" He confined himself in January, when it 
was clear that further negotiation was impossible, to simply informing the Directors of His 
Catholic Majesty's declaration, to be attached to the Convention, that he would suspend 
the Asiento unless the Company paid, without further negotiation, the £68,000 due. 78 This 
declaration may have seemed unavoidable in Madrid. Yet it put into the hands of the 
Directors, men constantly swayed by the London merchant community, the power to 
cause an international incident. 
On 6 January (NS) 1739, Philip V decided to sign the Convention of the Pardo, complete 
with the modifications under discussion, and laid out in la Quadra's letter of 29 
December. " The Spanish King's final declaration, reserving the right to cancel the 
asiento, and making his protest an intrinsic part of the signing of the Convention, stood 
out as the most conspicuous and easily grasped part of the whole document. Keene had 
the choice only of accepting the agreement as it stood, though, or breaking off all talks. 8° 
Like the Opposition in England, the Spanish ministers had made a stand: `Their party is 
taken; They think the honour of their Crown would be sullyed, and that it would be 
buying a Peace if They did not act as they have done. '8' On 14 January (NS) 1739 Keene 
accepted and sent home the final form of the Convention. The British ministers were later 
much criticised for accepting a convention clogged with such a condition, but their view 
was that one-sided declarations could give no new rights, and could not bind two parties. 
The King reserved the right to complain if the Asiento were to be withdrawn in an 
77 PRO SP 94/133 (unfoliated), Keene to Couraud, 18 May (NS) 1739. 
CUL Ch (H) Corresp, 2829, Keene to Peter Burrell, 13 January (NS) 1739; Geraldino 
formally informed the Company soon afterwards; ibid., 2832, Geraldino to Burrell & John 
Bristow, 3 February (NS) 1739. 
79 PRO SP 94/133 (unfoliated), la Quadra to Keene, 6 January (NS) 1739. 
80 BL Add Ms 32800, f. 9, Keene to Newcastle, 13 January (NS) 1739. 
81 BL Add Ms 32800, f. 9, Keene to Newcastle, 13 January (NS) 1739. 
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unsatisfactory way, and meantime it was not right to ruin the agreement for the sake of a 
trifle. 82 In effect, the new Convention of the Pardo was the same as the agreement signed 
the previous September, but with everything relating to the South Sea Company taken out 
for separate settlement. 83 The view of the foreign diplomatic community in London, if the 
Polish envoy is representative, seems to have been that the Company's grievances were 
only a subsidiary affair, and that the Convention would soon be signed. 84 
For some days, reported the Danish envoy, the leading ministers were so busy over the 
Convention as to be all but invisible. " Sir Robert Walpole at least seems to have believed 
that his favoured scheme had finally been a success. He thought the problem of Spain 
would soon be, over, and the ministry could turn to cultivating an alliance with Prussia. " 
The British cabinet formally read the papers, comparing them with the drafts sent to 
Keene, and noted that Geraldino was ordered to make sure that the Declaration was read 
and acknowledged by them before the Convention was signed. Despite this unusual 
stipulation, they took the formal decision to advise the King to sign on those terms. 87 A 
fortnight later the Convention had to be presented to Parliament and defended in great 
detail. This was the first point at which the Opposition would enjoy the opportunity to 
take an active part in proceedings. 
Before then, opponents had little to do other than ransack the pages of history for 
impossibly demanding precedents of national grandeur, from Henry VIII to Elizabeth, 
Cromwell and Queen Annes' Their frustration can be detected in the pages of the 
82 PRO SP 94/134 (unfoliated), Newcastle to Keene, 26 January (OS) 1739. 
83 PRO SP 107/23 (unfoliated), Geraldino to St. Gil, 27 January (NS) 1739. 
94 PRO SP 107/23 (unfoliated), Philippe Frederic Steinheil to de Debrosse, 27 January (NS) 
1739. 
85 PRO SP 107/23 (unfoliated), Sohlenthal to Scholin, 19 January (OS) 1739. 
86 Walpole, after a private conversation, confided [the French is Andri6's]; `Nous voici 
j'espbre bientot debarasses des affaires du Sud, nous penserons a Gelles du Nord'; PRO 
SP 107/23 (unfoliated), Andrie to King of Prussia, 19 January (OS) 1739. 
87 PRO SP 94/134 (unfoliated), cabinet meeting 22 January (OS) 1739. Present were 
Walpole, Newcastle, Hardwicke, Harrington, Grafton, Wilmington, Godolphin, 
Pembroke, Ilay, the Duke of Devonshire, the Archbishop of Canterbury and Sir Charles 
Wager. 
88 Ibid., 13 January (OS) 1739. 
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Craftsman, which show that the idea of a secession from Parliament was already being 
considered. In late January came the first threat that if Parliament did not endorse its 
`good advices', the Opposition Members might withdraw from the Commons. 89 The same 
issue complained that Parliament nowadays met as late as the middle of that month, and 
that even the 18 January session was now prorogued to the first of February. 90 On one 
point at least, the Craftsman was content. It emphasised repeatedly that the whole 
negotiation was Walpole's: `ONE MINISTER (in this Affair particularly, and, perhaps, in 
others) hath taken the whole Guidance and Direction upon Himself; so that the Glory, or 
Infamy of it, belongs entirely to HIM'. 91 Walpole was keenly aware of the pressure on 
him, and the special efforts being made by the Opposition over the Convention, and he 
spent the first half of February busied day and night in his preparations for the fray. 92 
When finally Parliament did meet to consider the Convention, it was made the occasion 
for an enquiry into the whole course of government action over the past months of 
recess. 93 The most notable challenge came from the House of Lords, still usually regarded 
as the senior chamber, and where the ministry was relatively weak, while the Opposition 
could draw on the formidable debating skills of such men as Carteret and Chesterfield. 94 
The considerable independence of many wealthy magnates, as well as the occasional 
presence of the Prince of Wales, made the Lords unpredictable to manage. The 
Convention was first laid before the Lords on 5 February (OS) 1739.99 Clumsily, the 
ministry tried to have the Convention received without Philip V's damaging protest 
annexed to it. Carteret opened the debate by putting skilful pressure repeatedly on 
Newcastle to admit the existence of such an annexed declaration by Spain. Finally 
89 Craftsman, 27 January (OS) 1739. 
90 Ibid.. 
91 Ibid.. 
92 PRO SP 107/24 (unfoliated), Andri6 to King of Prussia, 13 February (OS) 1739. 
93 BL Add Ms 33033, if. 392-405 details the proceedings on the Convention. 
94 The role of the Lords is persuasively reevaluated in J. M. Black, `The House of Lords and 
British Foreign Policy, 1720-48', in A Pillar of the Constitution. The House of Lords in 
British Politics, 1640-1784 (1989), ed. C. Jones, pp. 113-36. 
93 E. Timberland, The History and Proceedings of the House of Lords, from the 
Restoration in 1660 to the Present Time (1740), 6, pp. 1-16. 
96 Ibid., pp. 1-8. 
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trapped into the admission, and into promising to table the Spanish protest, Newcastle 
made the best of his case by pleading something that had been his constant refrain in 
negotiation. The South Sea Company's affairs were a separate issue, and `we can never 
suppose that their private Transactions, and the Concerns of the Nation, depend upon one 
another'. "' But patently they did. The Spanish protest was duly produced on 22 February 
(OS) 1739, and caused enormous indignation, as it was believed to invalidate the whole 
preceding Convention. 98 
The next day, the Lords first tabled a stiff petition from the merchants of the City of 
London, and decided to hear in four days' time the case of those who had suffered by 
Spanish depredations. ' By 27 February, the upper House had laid before it a formidable 
body of papers, letters and representations. 1°° The House then called before it Arthur 
Stert, and injured merchants and seamen, notably Copithorne and Vaughan. 1°' It also 
heard petitions from merchants and planters, the trustees of Georgia and the Lord Mayor, 
Aldermen and Common Councillors of the City of London. 102 The Prince of Wales 
ostentatiously attended in person, from early in the morning, to hear them. 103 The need for 
a complete freedom of navigation, without which all trade to Britain's colonies would be 
impossible, was an article of faith for the West India lobby, and was the main demand 
running through the hearings. 104 
The case of Vaughan and the Sarah was still the most contentious and topical at this 
sensitive point. The Lords hearing began with the petition of Richard Copithorne, whose 
Betty galley was seized in the Mediterranean in 1727, and went directly on to the newest 
case in the King's reign, hearing a sworn statement from the mate of the Sarah, John 
9' Ibid., p. 9. The arguments against Newcastle were skilfully rehearsed later in [W. 
Pulteney], A Review of All that hath pass 'd between the Courts of Great Britain and 
Spain... (1739), pp. 56-8. - 
99 Ibid., pp. 23-34. 
99 Journal of the House of Lords, 25, pp. 304-5. 
10° Among others, Journal of the House ofLords, 25, pp. 295,299,303. 
101 Journal of the House of Lords, 25, pp. 304-5. 
102 BL Add Ms 33033, if. 392-99. 
103 London Evening Post, 1 March (OS) 1739. 
104 BL Add Ms 33033, f 400, proceedings of Parliament, 19-27 February (OS) 1739. 
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London, and a letter from Vaughan in prison. 10S The issue of the Sarah also complicated 
the negotiations with Spain. Representations were forcibly being made to the Spanish 
court, to their no small irritation, while Keene had also to persuade them to comply with 
the conditions laid down in the agreement-106 These two types of diplomatic approach did 
not go well together. Seen from the Opposition viewpoint, the Vaughan case gave perfect 
support to their argument that the Spanish crown was not willing to enforce any 
convention, or to control its servants overseas. 
This point was expressly made in the next phase of the adjourned debate, on 1 March 
(OS), in a protest against the address to the throne accepting the Convention. The protest 
also laid great stress on freedom from search and on the lack of satisfaction given by the 
Convention for past depredations. 107 This angry document, in ten heads, was presented by 
the Duke of Bedford, on behalf of the merchants of the City of London, who thronged the 
entrance to the House and noisily lobbied peers as they entered. 108 When eventually the 
protest was voted down, Bedford put forward a dissentient motion. Supported by the 
Prince of Wales, voting as Duke of Cornwall, this critical resolution in turn attracted forty 
supporters. 109 In the course of the debate, Lord Chesterfield used the Armada, and 
Elizabeth's naval greatness, to striking effect. About nine at night, said the Bishop of 
Bangor, he enlivened the spirits of all with his speech: 
One of his Arts was to turn ye Eyes of ye Audience upon ye Tapestry, & bid 
them remember ye transactions of that immortal Navy & then he ask'd, 
whether there were any History looms at work now - He hop'd not, with 
great emphasis. ' ° 
los BL Add Ms 33033, if. 398-9, papers of proceedings in Parliament, 27 February (OS) 
1739. 
106 BL Add Ms 32800, f. 229, Newcastle to Keene, 20 March (OS) 1739. 
107 Journals of the House of Lords, 25, pp. 307-9. Vaughan's case was point five of the 
protest, ibid, p. 308. 
108, Timberland, History and Proceedings, 6, pp. 35-9. The debate is given extensively in 
ibid., pp. 35-185. His date of 23 February (OS) for the whole proceedings is an error. 
109 BL Add Ms 33033, if. 344-6, Newcastle's notes of proceedings in Parliament, 1 March 
(OS) 1739. Timberland's printed account of the vote (History and Proceedings, 6, p. 
188) gives only 39, omitting Bridgewater. 
110 BL Add Ms 35605, f. 11, Bangor to Philip Yorke, 2 March (OS) 1739. See Timberland, 
History and Proceedings, 6, p. 131. 
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The ministry won the Lords vote on a humble address of thanks by 95 to 74, but a 
powerful discontent was building up. l" On the same day, Vaughan arrived in London 
from his Spanish prison, and less than a week later he and his crew in person gave 
evidence of their treatment to the House. 112 In the Lords debates over the Convention, 
some previously staunch Court supporters now moved over to the Opposition. "' On the 
crucial Convention vote itself, though, four of them went back to the Court: Lord 
Strafford calculated that but for this, the ministry's majority in the chamber would have 
been only five, rather than thirteen. 114 Feelings ran so high that ministerial supporters and 
foreign envoys were insulted by the populace, and managed to leave the House only after 
eleven at night. The fracas outside the Lords which led to this was caused by the brawls 
of coachmen in the crowded street. The sedan chair of the Prince of Wales was 
overturned and smashed, though he was not hurt, and the fighting and chaos which 
ensued did not end until after midnight. "' It was a revealing episode, at a time when the 
Opposition were still pressing, with little hope, for an increase in the Prince's allowance. 
In the Commons, too, the debates aroused great interest and were seen as a great crisis 
which Walpole would require all his stability to survive. 16 The view from within the 
ministry is caught in some comments by Admiral Wager, scrawled on a copy of the 
Spanish declaration. The people of England, he said, were never united for the Glorious 
Revolution. That is to say, they did not know what was good for them: 
What assistance did they give the Prince of Orange or what would they have 
done had he brought no troops with him[? ] They ran mad for Dr. Sacheverell. 
For the Excise and now for no search, tho knew nothing of either. 117 
III BL Add Ms 35875, f. 428, Hardwicke's notes on session of 1 March (OS) 1739. 
112 London Evening-Post, 3 March (OS) 1739; their evidence was presented to a Committee 
of the whole House on 6 March; The National Dispute; or, the History of the Convention 
Treaty (1739), p. 35. 
113 PRO SP 107/25 (unfoliated), Sohlenthal to Schulin, 3 March (NS) 1739: he named 
Argyle, Essex, Scarborough, Lovel, Limerick and four bishops. 
114 BL Add Ms 31149, if. 416-8, `A list of Lords present at the Convention'. Strafford 
named the waverers as Lothian, Lymington, Essex and Lovell. Thirteen was the majority 
of Lords actually present, the vote being 71 to 58; including proxies, it was 95 to 74. 
"s Ibid., Andrie to King of Prussia, 6& 20 March (NS) 1739. 
116 Ibid., Sohlenthal to Schulin, 6 March (NS) 1739. 
117 BL Add Ms 19030, f. 398. 
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Whether they understood it or not, the masses certainly took the slogan to heart. James 
Murray, concerned at possible popular reaction to a Jacobite invasion supported by 
Spanish troops, advised the Pretender, on landing, to make a declaration of free 
navigation. "8 The pressure on the ministry was increased by the first rumours of an 
Opposition campaign to animate the spirit of the merchants, in London and the other 
leading towns. The plan was to persuade them to hold meetings which would approve 
specific written instructions to their MPs. 119 This dangerous intrusion of the provinces into 
Westminster politics shocked Geraldino, though the full impact of it was bound to be 
delayed, as such a major protest took time to organise. 120 Even the beginnings of 
orchestrated discontent in London, though, must have been an irritant to the ministry at 
the height of its efforts to persuade the public of the merits of the Convention. Those 
efforts were sardonically summarised by the London Evening-Post: 
Within these few Days near 20,000 Ministerial Pamphlets, in Defence of the 
Convention &c, have been dispersed, and given away gratis among the 
Excisemen, Custom House Officers, and other Officers, Civil, Ecclesiastical, 
Military, &c. which has fallen the Price of Waste-Paper. '2' 
An incident reported in that same week shows that, among the seafaring community at 
least, the press had succeeded in making freedom from search the paramount issue. It also 
gives an authentic glimpse of the rude politics of the lower orders: 
Last Week a Sailor belonging to a West-India Man was married; and his 
Brother Sailors that attended as Bridesmen wore Cockades in their Hats, 
inscribed thereon, NO LIMITS; and the Women that walked as Bridesmaids 
had on their Breast Knots, NO SEARCH BUT IN PORT. 122 
The news of all this furore over the Convention found Keene in despairing mood. He 
confided to Walpole; `this single Instance of the Heigth (sic) of the Folly and Madness a 
sensible Nation may be pusht to against its evident Interest, is sufficient to disgust me 
against all publick Business for the future... '. 
123 
! 'S Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 220/73, James to Ormonde, 2 February (NS) 1740. 
119 PRO SP 107/24 (unfoliated), Sohlenthal to de Schulin, 24 February (NS) 1739. 
120 PRO SP 107/25 (unfoliated), Geraldino to St. Gil, 10 March (NS) 1739. 
121 London Evening Post, 6 March (OS) 1739 
122 The London & Country Journal, 6 March (OS) 1739. 
123 CUL Ch (H) Corresp, 2860, Keene to Walpole, 24 April (NS) 1739. 
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Something like a disgust infected even the administration. The Prussian envoy reported a 
serious argument between Newcastle and Walpole. Newcastle was angry that Walpole 
had intervened so much in negotiating the Convention, which should have been the 
responsibility of the Secretary of State for the South. Walpole in turn saw such protests as 
a challenge to his dominance -a language which he is more than once reported as using - 
and demanded to know if Newcastle wanted to combat him? Significantly, if this report is 
true, Walpole went straight to George H to apply the necessary discipline. It took'a threat 
of dismissal by the King to bring Newcastle to heel, and Andrie heard that for four hours 
the Duke was indeed removed from office. One cannot rely on the details of Court 
rumours, but it seems at least quite clear that there was a serious rift in government 
support for the Convention: `le Duc veut absolument la Guerre avec I'Espagne, et 
plusieurs autres du parti de la Cour s'en sont detaches pour desapprouver la Convention 
avec 1'Espagne'. 124 
Despite the discontent manifested on the streets, in the provinces, in the cabinet and in 
both Houses, though, the ministry did win the debate in the Commons on 8 March (OS) 
1739 over the Convention. 125 It was, according to Edward Harley, who was in the 
Commons for seventeen hours, `the fullest House and the longest sitting that has been 
known of many years'. 126 The debate was led off for the government by Horace Walpole 
(in a speech of two hours) and concluded by Sir Robert, supported by twelve other 
speakers, among them Henry Fox, Henry Pelham and Sir Charles Wager. The Opposition 
case was laid out by Sir Thomas Saunderson, with Sir William Wyndham rounding off the 
debate, after the contributions of eleven speakers including William Pitt, Sir John Barnard 
and -William Shippen. The Prince of Wales was for some time in the gallery, and his 
presence was cleverly played on by his chief supporter, George Lyttelton. 127 The ministry 
won by 260 votes to 232. The report stage of the debate followed a similar pattern, with 
124 PRO SP 107/25 (unfoliated), Andrie to King of Prussia, 6 March (NS) 1739. 
'u R. Chandler, The History and Proceedings of the House of Commons from the 
Restoration to the Present Time (1743), XI, pp. 1-70. 
126 CUL Add. 6851, f. 115, Edward Harley, parliamentary journal, 8 March (OS) 1739. 
127 Chandler, History and Proceedings of the House of Commons, XI, pp. 35-6. 
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Pulteney speaking for the first time in opposition to the motion, and the ministry won the 
vote by 244 to 214.12$ 
Opposition spokesmen, though on the losing side, managed, so far as one can see from 
the surviving accounts, to win the oratorical contest. Once again, the Vaughan case was 
adduced as proof of Spain's intent to give up none of her old ways. William Pitt, in a 
passionate harangue, urged; `You have heard from Captain Vaughan at your Bar, at what 
Times these Injuries and Indignities were continued, as a kind of explanatory Comment 
upon the Convention Spain has thought fit to grant you'. 129 Referring such matters of 
undoubted right as freedom of navigation to plenipotentiaries was bad in itself. After all, 
as Pitt declared, this was judging, as if on the same footing, two entirely different kinds of 
thing: 
On the Part of Spain, an Usurpation, an inhuman Tyranny claimed and 
exercised over the American Seas; on the Part of England, an undoubted 
Right by Treaties and from God and Nature, declared and asserted in the 
Resolutions of Parliament... 130 
And furthermore these rights, added Pulteney, were being referred by Walpole to Keene 
and Castres, `two Creatures of his own, distinguished by no one Qualification, but a blind 
Obedience to his Commands'. 131 Pulteney's, and the whole Opposition's, alternative to 
the Convention was war. `Under Queen Elizabeth, Sir, we neither had, nor did we stand 
in need of Allies ... 
Let us for once change our sneaking Conduct, and all will be well. '132 
Alderman Willimot, one of the four London MPs, gave a pithy endorsement of this 
belligerent stand; `A just 'and well conducted War can never bring our Trade into any 
Danger'. 133 
12J BL Add Ms 35875, ff. 432-3, `Speakers in House of Commons', 10 March (OS) 1739; 
HMC Fourteenth Report, Trevor Mss, p. 26, H. Walpole to Trevor, 9 March (OS) 1739; 
PRO SP 107/25 (unfoliated), Sohlenthal to Schulin, 9 March (OS) 1739. 
129 Chandler, History and Proceedings of the House of Commons, XI, p. 33. 
130 Chandler, History and Proceedings of the House of Commons, XI, pp. 32-3. 
13' Ibid., p. 62. 
132 Ibid., p. 64. 
133 Ibid., p. 68. 
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The ministry's victory could not disguise the fact that they had passed the measure in the 
face of all that was known about popular opinion. It could fairly be said that, right or 
wrong, the bulk of the nation were against the Convention, while their supposed 
representatives voted for it. Crucial to this government majority were the votes of around 
two hundred placemen and office-holders. The Convention vote had turned into the 
clearest exemplar of Patriot arguments about corruption and tyranny. The most 
devastating tactic of the Opposition at this time was the simplest: the widespread 
publishing of the division list on the Convention, with added comment. Annexed to the 
name of each MP who voted for it was the office, pension or other tie which bound him 
to the Court. 134 It was a device far more eloquent than the shrill rhetoric of place and 
corruption, liberally spattered with capital letters, which had become such an accustomed 
diet. This was corruption at work, in a specific instance, and it meant that subservient 
placemen were humbling the nation before the cowardly Spaniards. The demonologising 
of the Convention meant that nothing less than a full performance of its terms by Spain 
could keep the administration safe from criticism. 135 
The almost immediate result of the passing of the Convention was that the Patriots, 
Tories and supporters of the Prince of Wales carried out their threat to secede from 
Parliament. Going so far as to allege that the whole House was bought, and that they 
could therefore do nothing in it, Pulteney and Wyndham carried the rhetoric of the Place 
Bill to its ultimate conclusion. 136 Foreign observers feared that the secession might lead 
even to rebellion. 137 Bolingbroke certainly expected a good deal from it, on the grounds 
that it would `bring the dispute to fix on this single point, the personal interest of Walpole, 
134 Printed in pamphlet form and in several journals, e. g. Gentleman's Magazine, 9,1739, 
pp. 304-10. 
135 Trevor had already predicted that non-performance by Spain would `throw Oil upon the 
Flame of the Nation', and `leave no more room for calm, & prudential Counsels'; BL Add 
Ms 32800, f. 136, Trevor to Keene, 26 February (NS) 1738. 
136 PRO SP 107/25 (unfoliated), Philippe Frederic Steinheil to King of Poland, 24 March 
(NS) 1739. 
137 PRO SP 107/27 (unfoliated), Fagel to Hop, 5 May (NS) 1739; PRO SP 107/29 
(unfoliated), de Wasner to Prince de Lichtenstein, 6 July (NS) 1739; PRO SP 107/28 
(unfoliated), Wasenberg to Gyllenborg, 26 June (OS) 1739. 
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in the eyes of the whole kingdom'. 13' This tactic, though, was bound to arouse at least 
ambiguous feelings among parliamentarians, and it must have been in reality a godsend to 
Walpole, who was both a wily adversary and a good House of Commons man. It was 
noted by one closer to the scene of action than Bolingbroke that the secession played into 
the hands of the ministry. It allowed them to close the Parliamentary session early, and 
escape embarrassment as the deadline for the Spanish settlement drew nearer without any 
sign of payment. 139 Harley, though a constant opponent of the administration, called it `an 
Idle Project, contrary to all the Rules & Being ofParlt. & not approved of without Doors 
& in the Country'. 140 It was indeed unpopular in the country, and difficult to defend. Not 
only were Members absenting themselves from their duties, but they were acting as a 
faction. A pamphlet produced in the autumn to explain and gloss the secession was 
reduced to denying that it had been an organised party measure at all: 
It was only a Kind of silent Protest, and in the most decent Way, to recover 
That, without which all must be lost. Besides, I am assur'd that it arose from 
no previous Concert amongst any of the Members, but was the Result of 
every Gentleman's private Judgement of Things, and the impossibility of 
stemming the Torrent. '4' 
When Wyndham and his supporters and allies announced their withdrawal, Sir Robert was 
stimulated to a remarkable performance in the House. According to his brother; `Sir R. 
We. in a more masterly dextrous and able manner than I ever heard him, answered Sir W. 
Win. 's speech to the satisfaction and great applause of the whole House and even of his 
enemies, without carrying things to extremities. ' 142 So extreme was Wyndham's own 
speech that rumour said it was designed to put him in the Tower, and so inflame the 
mob. 143 Party feeling was certainly intense enough for this to be plausible. One London 
138 W. Coxe, Memoirs of the Life and Administration of Sir Robert Walpole Earl of Orford 
(3 Vols. 1798), III, p. 525, Bolingbroke to Wyndham, 23 July (NS) 1739. 
139 PRO SP 107/27 (unfoliated), Utterodt to King of Poland, 5 May (NS) 1739. 
140 CUL Add 6851, f. 116, Harley parliamentary journal. 
141 [B. Robins], An Address to the Electors ... Occasion 'l by the late Secession... (1739), p. 
56. The pamphlet ran through four editions in 1739, which may indicate the interest in its 
subject rather more than the strength of its arguments. 
142 HMC Fourteenth Report, Trevor Mss, p. 26, H. Walpole to Trevor, 16 March (OS) 
1739. 
143 PRO SP 107/25 (unfoliated), Hop to Fagel, 24 March (NS) 1739. 
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lawyer believed that only the seventeenth century could show `more melancholy instances 
of party rage than the present'. 144 
At this time, though, Walpole at least seems to have thrived on the conflict, and been in 
high spirits. He was on his best form in Parliament. "" His resilience is probably the 
explanation for an odd episode in which Walpole played a joke on the Jacobites. While the 
Jacobite agent Carte was in Boulogne, he was sent for, on 1 April, by `Jeremy' (Walpole), 
on a very exciting errand. Walpole urged him to lose no time in going to Rome to consult 
the Pretender about securities for the protestant religion, and for good treatment of 
George II's family, `a qui Jeremy avoit tant d'obligations, mais qu'il ne pouvoit plus 
soutenir encore longtemps'. 146 Within three weeks, though, he went abruptly from good 
health to a violent illness in which his life was despaired of. ' The joke upon the 
Pretender's party lasted longer than the buoyancy which created it. Carte persisted in 
believing that this was a serious approach, though O'Brien in Paris did his best to 
disabuse him. Curiously, James did write a letter to show to Walpole, and Carte returned 
with it in late August, hoping soon to be able to fix the date of James's restoration. 148 This 
was in any case a time of high Jacobite hopes, with war between Britain and Spain 
imminent. The Pretender's adherents in Spain were jubilant, spreading rumours of a 
powerful new expedition to be mounted against England. 
19 Prince Charles had even 
ordered a set of highland clothes. 
"o To have suborned the leading Hanoverian minister 
would have made success seem doubly sure. It was probably this odd episode which 
reached the ears of the exiled Bolingbroke at the opening of the war. He gave dark hints 
that Walpole was in league with the country's enemies, in his preparations to avoid justice 
144 BL Add Ms 35605, f. 12, Thomas Clarke to Yorke, 31 March (OS) 1739. 
las PRO SP 107/25 (unfoliated), Hop to Fagel, 24 March (NS) 1739. 
16 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 216/39, `St. Quentin' [O'Brien] to James, 8 June (NS) 1739. 
147 PRO SP 107/27 (unfoliated), Alt to Prince William, 1 May (NS) 1739, Wasner to 
d'Ulfeld, 1 May (NS) 1739; PRO SP 78/222, f. 149, Waldegrave to Couraud, 6 May 
(NS) 1739. 
148 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 217/13 & 32, `St. Q' to James, 24 August (NS) 1739, Carte to 
James, 31 August (NS) 1739. 
149 BL Add Ms 32692, f. 233, Consul Parker to Newcastle, 13 August (NS) 1739. 
150 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 218/35, Drummond to Edgar, 9 November (NS) 1739. 
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for his `treachery'. 151 Though this language of conspiracy and corruption was common in 
Opposition letters, Bolingbroke may well have been persuaded by his Jacobite informants 
that Walpole was literally a traitor. Cardinal Fleury was more realistic, and was decidedly 
of the opinion that the `Jeremy' affair was a trick, but a harmless one. 152 Only nine months 
after the initial approach, though, did James finally abandon hope of Walpole's good 
intentions. 153 
It was easier for Walpole to sew confusion among the Jacobites than to bring the 
Convention to a safe conclusion. In the fevered atmosphere of the Parliamentary debates 
and the agitation over the Sarah, the South Sea Company finally resolved not to pay the 
£68,000 due from them on behalf of the crown of Spain. The decision was made on 1 
March (OS), the day of Vaughan's arrival in London and of the long and passionate Lords 
debate on the Convention. It was communicated to Keene on the day when the 
Opposition seceded from the House. '54 Nothing could subsequently move the Company 
from its resolve. Walpole himself spoke to the Directors of the South Sea Company, but 
could not persuade them to pay the £68,000. Ignoring considerations of national interest, 
they persisted in their objections to the cedulas which Geraldino showed them. '55 
The rage of party was a great complication in the work of diplomacy. Even uncontentious 
initiatives could be thwarted by the petty accidents of political life. Ministers were 
sounding out the prospects of a defensive alliance with Portugal, which still had disputes, 
notably over Buenos Aires, with Spain. These overtures, however, met with an 
unfortunate check at the very beginning. The Portuguese ambassador was taking his leave 
of the Court of St. James's, and was disobliged by the size of his leaving present. On the 
casual advice of the Duke of Grafton, it had been set at £350, whereas the French and 
15' W. Coxe, Memoirs of the Life and Administration of Sir Robert Walpole, Earl of Orford 
(3 Vols. 1798), III, pp. 549-50, Bolingbroke to Wyndham, 1 November (NS) 1739. 
152 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 217/44, O'Brien to James, 3 September (NS) 1739. 
15' Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 219/111, James to O'Brien, 5 January (NS) 1740. The rumour 
of Walpole's dealings with the Pretender is examined in P. C. Yorke, The Life and 
Correspondence of Philip Yorke Earl of Hardwicke (3 Vols 1913), I, pp. 204-5. He did 
not have access, though, to most of the evidence cited above. 
154 BL Add Ms 19030, if. 410-12, Royal Assiento Company Directors to Keene, 17 March 
(OS) 1739. 
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Spanish ambassadors received £500. Though the sum was changed, after a Portuguese 
protest, to give equal standing to their envoy, the incident was noted. '56 Newcastle 
continued, though, to cultivate the new ambassador, Sebastiäo Joseph de Carvalho e 
Mella (later Marquis of Pombal). A series of confidential talks with Carvalho and 
Azevedo culminated in a dinner at Lord Harrington's, along with the Walpoles, Wager 
and Stert. They began the meal at 3 pm, and with the cloth taken away, Wager and Stert 
retired, while the innermost circle, complete but for Hardwicke, discussed a possible 
league with Portugal against Spain; `those Ministers, assuming the voice of the King their 
Master, made us a formal tho' general overture of the said Alliance'. 157 Though destined 
to failure, this overture does reveal the workings of this kind of diplomacy, and the 
thinking of the ministry, at a time when Britain badly needed allies. 
The negotiations of the commissaries in Spain went on, and one long-standing technical 
problem at least was solved. Hitherto, Geraldino's mail had been arriving from Madrid 
several days ahead of Newcastle's letters of the same date. This was because despatches 
by the Spanish ordinary went via Waldegrave in Paris, for his information, an arrangement 
which meant that they lost a post in arriving in England. From late March 1739 the 
Spanish mail was finally to go direct, though Keene was charged to send to Waldegrave 
copies, or at least summaries, of all important mail. 158 This minor advance was vastly 
outweighed by the ministerial changes in Spain. La Quadra and Ustariz managed a kind of 
coup when Torrenueva assured Queen Elizabeth that the revenues were in a very poor 
state, and that the money which she needed for the proposed royal marriages could not be 
found. His two rivals managed to float a loan among their own friends of the two million 
ducats needed, and Torrenueva found himself removed from most of his duties. 139 
The man who took his place as Secretary of State for the Indies was Quintana, which was 
bad news for Keene, already struggling with him as a commissary under the Convention 
of the Pardo. Quintana was `an Enemy to all Strangers, and has his head full of Spanish 
Smoke', and was likely to be extremely rigorous in his treatment of the South Sea 
156 CUL Ch (H) Corresp, 2889, Carvalho to Guedes Pereira, 28 June (NS) 1739. 
157 CUL Ch (H) Corresp, 2890, Carvalho to Guedes Pereira, 30 June (NS) 1739. 
158 BL Add Ms 32800, f. 227, Newcastle to Keene, 20 March (OS) 1739. 
159 BL Add Ms 32800, if. 174-5, Keene to Newcastle, 9 March (NS) 1739. 
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Company. 160 The new appointee as Minister of Finances in succession to. Torrenueva also 
brought an unwelcome shift in the Spanish ministry. Ituralde, a newcomer in politics of 
whom at first Keene knew only that he was very old and very rich, proved to be an 
effective new broom. He cut down profiteering on government contracts so sharply that 
several leading commercial houses went bankrupt. He also banned the holding of two or 
more offices under the crown, a practice so common that he became instantly 
unpopular. 161 Small as these beginnings were, they gave an immediate boost to the royal 
revenues. Keene believed that these savings had a great influence on the thinking of the 
leading ministers, encouraging them to believe that they could at least hold out for a long 
defensive war against Britain. 162 Spain, he feared, was to be ruled by three or four mean 
and stubborn people who thought they had revived the grandeur of the monarchy, and 
whose heads were full of `Romantick ideas they have found in old Memorials and 
Speculative Authors'. 163 If Spanish ministers were swayed by the allure of grand gestures, 
so were the British people `out of doors'. A great naval appropriation had been made in 
1738, yet only inglorious talks seemed to follow. Public irritation at this was pronounced: 
`Was a Hundred sail of Ships fitted out with no other View, but to induce the Spaniards 
to treat? 9164 
The British commissaries came under mounting pressure from opinion in both countries, 
while they pursued the detail of complex and sensitive commercial rights. Typical of the 
scope for evasion and misunderstanding was Newcastle's rather disingenuous quibble on 
the wording used by the Spanish commissaries. He instructed Keene and Castres to clarify 
what their opposite numbers meant by searching for contraband goods, resting his case on 
the fact that the plentiful trade between British subjects and the Spanish colonies was all 
illicit, and so technically did not exist: `As there is no Trade, there can be no Contraband 
Goods, And consequently no Right to look, or search for any'. 165 As months of such 
160 Ibid., f. 175. Quintana had been the main influence in policy towards the Company since 
the death of Patil%o; ibid., f. 180, Keene to Burrell & Bristow, 9 March (NS) 1739. Sec 
above, p. 22. 
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165 PRO SP 94/134 (unfoliated), Newcastle to Keene and Castres, 8 May (OS) 1739. 
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fruitless talks passed, Keene found the struggle harder. He complained to Stone in April; 
`I am laying in a stock of Patience and Resolution to go thro' the rest of the fiery Tryal 
and give me what appointments you please I am sure there is not a sensible man in Europe 
that will envy my situation'. 166 His situation became worse in the following month, when 
Newcastle obtained intelligence of a treaty being negotiated between France and Spain. 
Keene was now told of `another Circumstance, of which you have been hitherto 
uninformed', that the Office had had, since 1734, a copy of the 1733 Family Compact 
between the Bourbon powers, and that its provisions were clearly directed against Britain: 
Which is a Proof, that the Views of Spain against his Mty., & his Dominions, 
were always the Same, whenever they could hope to have an Opportunity of 
compassing them; and that offensive Engagements against the King, & his 
Subjects, were always the Cement of their Union with France. 16' 
Despite the scale of his responsibilities, Keene was still left to hint in vain for promotion 
or some other financial assistance, and to deplore his uncomfortable position. He told 
Stone; `What I am sure to have enough of is, Ribbaldry and Scurrility from the publick in 
return for the uneasiest Life Man ever yet passed in the Service'. 168 Though he assured 
Couraud that he hated `whining and complaining', he was driven to do a good deal of 
it. 169 He certainly continued to be the target of ribaldry and abuse. The Craftsman 
attacked him for being too lowly in rank to make a fitting ambassador: 
In former Times it was always usual, upon such important Occasions, to 
employ Men of the highest Rank and Eminence; who, by their Dignity, might 
add a Weight to their Negotiations abroad; and, by their Fortunes, give a 
Pledge to their own Country for the Integrity of their Conduct - This was 
certainly a wise Precaution, which ought always to be observ'd; for a Man of 
mean Birth, and low Fortune, may be tempted to sacrifice the publick Interest 
to his own; or, at least, become the subservient Tool of a Minister, by whose 
indulgent Hand He was rais'd. 170 
In the English press and satirical prints Keene was firmly established as 'Don Benjamino', 
the underhand servant of Spain and accomplice of Walpole and Geraldino in evil designs 
166 PRO SP 94/133 (unfoliated), Keene to Stone, 24 April (NS) 1739. 
167 PRO SP 94/134 (unfoliated), Newcastle to Keene, 8 May (OS) 1739. 
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to betray the nation. "' All that was needed to complete the picture of his bad faith was 
that Spain should renege on the Convention which this trio had designed. Gradually it 
became clear that this, too, would happen. On 19 May (NS) 1739 the Austrian envoy at 
The Hague heard from normally good sources in Madrid that there was now no intention 
of paying the L95,000.172 At home, the ministry had to adjust to the growing likelihood 
that the Convention would fail. Their best hope was to deal with the breakdown of the 
agreement without the added pressure of a Parliament in session. Though Parliament was 
due to rise in early June, many Bills still depended on the approval of the Lords. Though 
the secession of the Opposition had nullified the Commons, the mood in the Lords 
continued resolute and angry: in late May a motion was made there upon the Spanish 
delay in paying. 173 The resolution that this was a high indignity to his Majesty was staved 
off only by putting the previous question. Those in the know feared that there would be 
no further room for `management' if the Spanish despatch bearing the resolve not to pay 
should reach London before the end of the sitting. 
'74 
The crisis of the negotiations soon came, though it did fall in the parliamentary recess. 
Just as the plenipotentiaries in Spain finally gathered for their first meeting in form, their 
tentative agreements were shaken by Newcastle's fateful decision to keep Admiral 
Haddock's fleet in the Mediterranean. '75 Newcastle seems at first to have hoped that this 
move would placate the public at home, but be overlooked by Spain. He first told Keene 
of the decision late in March, but asked him to take no notice of it to his court. Though 
Geraldino was alarmed about it, Newcastle had assured him that no aggressive measures 
were being planned, and if necessary the Spanish court could be told the same thing by 
Keene. 176 It had been assumed in Spain, however, that the fleet would be withdrawn, its 
presence made necessary only by disputes which the Convention was meant to resolve. 
171 E. g. Craftsman, 13 October (OS) 1739. See for example the print of January 26 (OS) 
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The Spanish court themselves had sent pacific orders to the Indies, and stood down their 
own forces in Europe. The countermanding of Haddock's orders to leave the 
Mediterranean was bound to be damaging, when the Spanish court was already irritated 
with the South Sea Company, and could little afford to lose face or to seem intimidated by 
Britain. The loss of face would be real, as Keene commented: 
The truth is, that they have unarmed the greater part of their Ships, given 
liberty to their Officers to leave their Regiments and their Destinations, and 
will be ashamed either to trust to our Word, or to discover their lightness in 
having altered their military measures before the Departure of Admiral 
Haddock, by being obliged to renew them. 177 
The Spanish ministers were `most heartily nettled', and their resolve not to pay the 
£95,000 stipulated in the Convention was first made explicit in response to this naval 
gesture. 178 Keene spoke to Vilarias and Quintana at Aranjuez, and was told that `his 
Catholick Majesty could not pay that Sum as long as our Squadrons remained upon his 
Coasts, ready at a moment's warning to fall upon Him'. 179 Quintana defended their action 
by arguing simply that they could not be seen to be browbeaten. 180 The Spanish view was 
the very plausible one that Haddock's squadron was being maintained in the 
Mediterranean as a sop to British popular feeling. 18' If this was really Newcastle's 
motivation, then he paid a high price for the chance of a little popularity out of doors. The 
threat posed by Haddock had its most profound effect on Philip rather than on the 
London multitude. Further arguments were put forward on the Spanish side, Montemar 
claiming that the size of the British fleet (twenty-seven warships) meant that Spanish ports 
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had to be closed, and Spanish ships had to be fitted out, in all costing far more than the 
£95,000.1 
This was not the nub of the matter, however. Contemporaries saw the whole dispute over 
depredations in terms of the honour code of gentlemen. Trevor commented; `The 
Dilemma between a senseless Quarrell, & an ignominious Discretion does not appear to 
me less delicate in Publick than in Private Life'. 
193 Spain's position was a response of 
pride to intimidation. Geraldino did his best to persuade the British ministry that his 
Catholic Majesty could not help resenting Haddock's fleet being continued on its station, 
but could not `beat out of their heads that Chimera, that we had other objects in view, and 
that the complaint about the Squadron was but a pretext'. 184 The Spaniards were now 
asserting that they had always made it clear that the money would not be paid so long as 
the British fleet remained in the Mediterranean and the West Indies. 189 At this point war 
became all but inevitable. Newcastle, very angry over what he regarded as a new principle 
enunciated by the Spanish ministers, ordered Keene to have no further meetings with the 
Spanish plenipotentiaries, since the deadline for payment had passed. No further answers 
were needed, since George II had now decided `immediately to pursue hostile Measures 
for doing Himself and the Nation justice'. 186 Diplomacy was at an end, and the question 
was simply when war would be formalised, and what form war would take. 
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Chapter 8 The Harvest of War 
The first planning for war had already taken place in cabinet. Even Walpole agreed that it 
would be better to act at once than to have Spain belatedly pay the £95,000 (and remove 
Britain's chief grounds for war) but cancel the Asiento. Haddock was to be ordered at 
once to he off Cadiz and `comfit all kinds of Hostilities at Sea', with similar orders to 
Commodore Brown's squadron, which was also to try to seize the galleons or flota. l 
Reprisals were once again publicised. A proclamation was printed in the London Gazette 
that letters of marque and reprisal would be granted against Spanish subjects and also 
other nationals living in Spanish possessions - `cosa sin exemplar', said Geraldino, and 
likely to cause a stir. 2 A last pamphleteering attempt was made to conquer the anti- 
Spanish prejudices of the masses, and their predilection for war, one especially vehement 
production being Examination of the Popular Prejudices. 3 That, and many of these 
papers, according to Horace Walpole, were actually `wrote at the instigation and 
encouragement of Geraldino', though `fathered upon the Ministers and their friends'. 4 
Further publications attempted to promote the case of Spain. The British reprisals 
prompted in Spain a declaration of retaliation, issued at San Ildefonso on 20 August (NS) 
1739, and soon afterwards published. 5 It was an important self justificatory summary of 
the position of the Spanish court. The essential points, it argued, were that England, 
`agitada de sus intestinas divisiones', had sent back Haddock to Gibraltar with manifest ill 
intent, and had supported the unjust pretensions of the South Sea Company. The 
document was expanded and printed in London, almost certainly at the instigation of 
I BL Add Ms 32692, f. 64, Hardwicke to Newcastle, 2 June (OS) 1739. 
2 PRO SP 107/30, Geraldino to St. Gil, 24 July (NS) 1739. 
3 Attacked in the Craftsman, 31 March (OS) 1739. 
° HMC Fourteenth Report, Trevor Mss, p. 37, H. Walpole to Trevor, 30 November (OS) 
1739. 
`Hemos detenninado, que igualmente se represalien en nuestros Dominios, y por nucstros 
Vassallios, en los parages que los encuentren, los Navios, bienes, y efectos del Rey, y 
Subditos de la Gran Bretafia. ' Gaceta de Madrid, 34,25 August (NS) 1739, in PRO SP 
94/133 (unfoliated), Keene to Newcastle, 31 August (NS) 1739. 
Geraldino, in fifty-three pages of parallel French and English texts. 6. This manifesto 
induced gloomy forebodings in the Craftsman, which had so long agitated for war. Now, 
it felt, war was `a melancholly Consideration, in our present Circumstances, laden with an 
heavy Debt, oppress'd with a Multitude of grievous Taxes, depriv'd of many valuable 
Branches offoreign Trade, and consequently declining in our Manufactures at home'. 7 
As well as reprisals and naval preparations, military precautions were taken in England 
itself. Eight regiments of foot were brought over from Ireland and augmented to full 
strength, and pressing for the navy was put in force! It was perhaps natural that 
speculation immediately began about the purpose of the army: it was rumoured that the 
ministry knew of a Jacobite plot. 9 Certainly that danger was not far from the minds of 
ministers. Horace Walpole, when in company with the Dutch ambassador, burst out 
revealingly `that the greatest part of the Malecontents were Jacobites in their heart'. '° 
Another decision taken at this early stage was to put the coasts on a war footing by 
placing an embargo on all shipping. 11 The nature of elite government could hardly be 
better revealed than by the way in which this measure was abandoned. The Duke of 
Richmond was greatly involved in the Newcastle collier fleets, having inherited a duty of 
eight pence per ton on all the output of the Great Northern coalfield. He wrote to his 
closest friend the Duke of Newcastle to ask for urgent help. His `farmer' of the coal vend 
duties told him that unless the embargo was lifted at once, he would be bankrupted, in 
which case Richmond stood to lose at least £3,125, `& then your humble servant is f-k'd 
... pray thinke of 
this, & procure me redress of my greivance, which if not done imediatly, 
that which I have told you will inevitably happen'. 12 Ten days later, following three 
meetings of the cabinet in one day, the embargo on shipping was lifted. " 
6 His Catholick Majesty's Manifesto, Justifying his Conduct in relation to the late 
Convention, with his Reasons for not paying the 05,000 (1739). 
7 Craftsman, 15 September (OS) 1739. 
= BL Add Ms 32692, if. 64-5, Hardwicke to Newcastle, 2 June (OS) 1739. 
PRO SP 107/28 (unfoliated), Wasenberg to Gyllenborg, 26 June (NS) 1739. 
10 PRO SP 107/30 (unfoliated), Hop to Fagel, 31 July (NS) 1739. 
it BL Add Ms 32692, ff. 77-9, papers. 
12 BL Add Ms 32692, f. 158, Richmond to Newcastle, 20 July (OS) 1739. 
13 PRO SP 107/31 (unfoliated), Carvalho to Guedes, 11 August (NS) 1739. 
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With the decision taken to commit hostile acts against Spain on the seas, the role of 
chance in foreign affairs came to the fore. The chance of winning the prize of Spanish 
treasure was part of the uncertainty: a lucky seizure of the azogues might have brought 
Spain to settle at once. 14 One foreign envoy believed that the ministers had been counting 
on capturing the treasure ships. 
" Against that, Trevor equably commented that by missing 
the azogues the British insurers had kept their profits, and we had not provoked the 
French; `Our insurers put 30 percent into their pocketts, instead of losing 70; and the old 
Cardinal will be less teased and animated by his countrymen to make a common cause 
with Spain ... 
'. 16 France was equally likely to contemplate joining the war if Britain were 
to be too lucky in its conquests. A decisive defeat of Spain might be impossible for the 
French minister to tolerate. In 1738, la Mina had roundly asked Fleury; `laisserez vous 
ecraser l'Oncle du Roy? '. The Cardinal could not entirely dismiss this appeal to Bourbon 
pride. " Nor did he wish to see Britain extend its empire at the cost of Spain. The 
Secretary of State's office began keeping a tabulated record of Fleury's comments to 
Waldegrave about British gains in the Indies. " 
The Cardinal's stand was unchanged so long as the British were active in that region. He 
was content to see British seizures of ships and goods, he told Waldegrave, but could not 
countenance any colonial gains, which would disturb the existing balance; `Pillage and 
plunder as much as you can, but don't possess yr. selves of any places belonging to the 
Spaniards - this he added was his Doctrine and what he consented to with all his 
heart ... 
'. 19 It was a consistent doctrine, and it was one of the risks of the great expedition 
later planned to the Indies that, if it succeeded, it would almost certainly draw France into 
14 This was one of the considerations put forward in an intelligence report of June 1738; BL 
Add Ms 19036, f. 7. 
Is 'C'est un grand coup de manque pour 1'Angleterre que de n'avoir pas se saisir des 
vaisseaux des Assogues, cette cour en a ete d'autant plus fach6e qu'Elle ne doutoit point 
qu'ils ne lui echaperoient pas', PRO SP 107/32 (unfoliated), Ossorio to de Solar, 2 
September (NS) 1739. 
16 HMC, Fourteenth Report, Trevor Mss, p. 541, Trevor to H. Walpole, 20 August (OS) 
1739. 
17 PRO SP 78/218, f. 166, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 11 June (NS) 1738. 
Is PRO SP 78/221, if. 276-9. 
19 PRO SP 78/222, f. 233, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 3 April (NS) 1740. 
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the war. Walpole was warned by `101' that if Britain succeeded in capturing and 
garrisoning Cartagena then Fleury would be compelled to go to war. 20 
From another viewpoint, though, the chances of an unintended conflict with France 
looked less if war were to be conducted in the Caribbean than in Europe. Small clashes of 
French and British ships were already happening in home and Mediterranean waters in the 
autumn of 1739. Haddock in his blockade of Cadiz was stopping and searching French 
vessels, while armed French merchantmen were firing on British merchant ships `out of a 
gaite de coeur'. 21 When the French ambassador protested against having vessels searched 
and papers confiscated, the British reply was firm, yet included reassurances about abiding 
strictly by existing treaties. u Such conflicts, though, could easily escalate. The French 
Jacobites were certainly excited at the prospect of a rupture between Britain and France 
over the episode. This was the fear also of the influential Hardwicke, who in August told 
the Duke of Newcastle that : 
As to the Question, what should be done with the Fleet after the Affair of the 
Azogues is over, I wish you would turn it in your thoughts whether, in regard 
to our Situation with France, any Hostilities, by way of Revenge or Vindictive 
Justice, may not be more advisably carried on in the West-Indies than in 
Europe, -I mean against the dominions of Spain. 24 
The affair of the azogues meanwhile suspended other planning. Walpole told his brother; 
`We think and talk of nothing but the Azogues: a few days must clear that point, and then 
we must look forward'. u The azogues arrived safely in Spain on 13 August (NS) 1739 
with cargoes worth seven millions of hard dollars, putting into Santander rather than 
Cadiz, their usual port . 
26 Two lateen-rigged advice boats, tartans, had been sent out to 
20 PRO SP 36/56, f. 110, Newcastle to Harrington, 12 June (OS) 1741. 
21 ' BL Add Ms 19030, if. 434-5, draft of `An Answer to Mons. Cambis', September 1739. 
22 BL Add Ms 32801, if. 252-4, Couraud to Waldegrave, 6 September (OS) 1739. 
23 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 217/111, George Robinson to James, 28 September (NS) 1739. 
24 BL Add Ms 32692, f. 235, Hardwicke to Newcastle, 13 August (OS) 1739. 
25 W. Coxe, Memoirs of the Life and Administration of Sir Robert Walpole, Earl of Orford 
(3 Vols. 1798), III, p. 534, Walpole to H. Walpole, 28 August (OS) 1739. 
26 BL Add Ms 32801, Keene to Newcastle, 17 August (NS) 1739. 
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warn them to change their course for the harbours of Galicia. 27 For a little while it was 
thought that Admiral Vernon's fleet might attack the azogues in harbour, and insurance 
was taken out in London on the ships as they lay in port, but nothing came of it. 23 With 
the chance of early treasure seizures gone, Hardwicke pressed the case for some 
Caribbean attack still further: 
I entirely agree with Your Grace that in some Way or other our Fleets should 
be put upon action. You know my notion is, in ye West-Indies, and, as they 
have no winter there, the Season of the Year makes that the more proper. But 
Your Grace &I can only press that in general, and, if our Admirals & Men of 
Skill in that Way do not reduce it to some precision, & fix on some particular 
Designs, it will be of little effect " 
Despite agreement on the first military preparations, the splits within the ministry 
continued. Walpole was still against war, and could express himself with spirit. In mid- 
June he found himself by chance next to Lord Strafford, one of the plenipotentiaries 
responsible for signing the Peace of Utrecht, and an assiduous courtier who nonetheless 
always voted against the ministry. Strafford asked Walpole why he was so opposed to 
war, `sur quoi le premier repondit avec energie, c'est pour ne pas faire une aussi mauvaise 
paix que Celle d'Utrecht'. 30 Though Hardwicke was generally seen as being in the Duke of 
Newcastle's camp, he did still try to exert his influence to bring unity to the squabbling 
cabinet. His best chance came at the point when the Convention broke down over Spain's 
refusal to pay. In a private meeting `to settle what should be proposed tomorrow night in 
Cabinet', Hardwicke heard Walpole begin in a `strain of melancholly & complaints': 
I endeavoured to show him that his difficulties arose chiefly from a fixed 
opinion in many, & from a Suspicion in some of his Friends, that nothing 
would be done against Spain - that this might be discerned from the 
differences in our Divisions upon matters relative to that great affair & any 
other Court points. 31 
27 PRO SP 107/30, Vander Meer to States General, 23 July (NS) 1739. Despite this 
intercept, which told British ministers of their intentions, these fast-sailing vessels were the 
only ones encountered by the azogues. 
28 BL Add Ms 32692, f. 256, Hardwicke to Newcastle, 26 August (OS) 1739. 
29 BL Add Ms 32692, f. 257, Hardwicke to Newcastle, 26 August (OS) 1739. 
30 PRO SP 107/28 (unfoliated), Utterodt to Count de Bruhl, 15 June (OS) 1739. 
31 BL Add Ms 32692, f. 64, Hardwicke to Newcastle, 2 June (OS) 1739. 
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This effect of cabinet disunity was indeed a serious one. Disagreements persisted over the 
military options available. Haddock's fleet was penning up the outward-bound iota in 
Cadiz. That fleet had aboard so much cargo belonging to French merchants that seizing it 
would be likely to cause a war with France. Walpole, supported by Harrington, wanted 
Haddock to be ordered into the Mediterranean, to allow the iota to sail unmolested and 
perhaps even persuade Fleury to sign a formal neutrality. 32 Newcastle called this `a 
strange Notion, which he must be beat out Of . 
33 He and Hardwicke wanted Haddock to 
seize the richly laden fleet, a capture which would delight the public. In the event, by the 
chance of the sea, the Jota escaped. People began to learn that; `the Sea is so large, the 
Winds are so uncertain, and the Routes so different wch. Ships may ... take, that the 
Chance of taking prizes is very doubtful & precarious'. 34 If a `blue water' strategy was to 
be employed, it had to produce some gain. As time went by, the demand grew for some 
return on the vast expense of military preparations. `Mankind is now convinc'd', wrote 
Chesterfield, `that neither our Land nor Sea forces are to be made any other use of, than 
to make the Nation feel some of the expence of a War, to make them the more willing to 
accept of a very bad Treaty... '35 Something positive, Newcastle was convinced, needed 
to be done: 
For Godsake, My Dear Lord, lett us putt our Fleets upon some Action, some 
where, or all will be called a Farce, & we shall be said, to have delayed 
Vernon, yt the Azogues might escape. 36 
By the summer of 1739, the divisions within the ministry were public knowledge, at home 
and abroad. Trevor wrote to Horace Walpole of how `the opinion of the chancellor's and 
the Duke of Newcastle's having not only a sett of ideas, but of friends too, distinct from 
those of your excellency and your brother, is so prevelent here [The Hague], even 
32 BL Add Ms 35406, f. 138, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 12 August (OS) 1739. 
33 BL Add Ms 35406, f. 137, Newcastle to Hardwicke, nd, c. 6 August (OS) 1739. 
34 Wolterton (Walpole) Mss, Political Tracts, `Note of facts relating to ye Expeditions for 
America', f. 9. 
35 Wolterton (Walpole) Mss, Letters and Papers of Sir Robert Walpole (unfoliated), 
Chesterfield to Stair, 22 July (OS) 1739. 
36 BL Add Ms 35406, f. 141, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 26 August (OS) 1739. 
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amongst sensible and unbiassed men'. 37 It may be true, as Reed Browning has said, that; 
`There is no evidence that the duke ever tried to have Walpole ousted' 38 But Newcastle 
does seem to have decided that Walpole was losing the will to continue at the head of 
affairs. In the Duke's letters at this time, even amid the insecurities and anxiety, one can 
discern also the kind of decisiveness and self-belief that can come in mid-career to holders 
of high office. On many disputed points, he was confident that he was right, and that 
Walpole was wrong. In 1739, Newcastle was forty-six years old, while Walpole was 
sixty-four. A comparison of the two men in the hunting field would provide a fitting 
eighteenth-century analogy for their relative strengths at this time. Newcastle was still 
riding vigorously, and was one of only five riders to be up with the hounds after a 
headlong chase of ten miles. 39 Walpole, a passionate lover of the chase, could still manage 
to get in at the kill, no longer by hard riding, but by his intimate knowledge of the country 
around Houghton and of the habits of foxes. 40 Newcastle had an appetite for political 
business and for power which was hardly to flag for the remaining twenty-nine years of 
his life. He had furthermore the pressure of his huge debts; he needed the emoluments and 
the credit of high office. Walpole, by contrast, his zest for the struggles of politics 
weakened by the loss of his wife and by intermittent bouts of severe illness, must have 
seemed to be reaching the end of his public career. 
Newcastle was looking forward to new combinations of ministers, and increasingly 
influenced by his friends among the Opposition, especially Carteret and Argyll. 41 He was 
also in fundamental disagreement with Walpole's reading of the public temper. Sir Robert 
was still trying to defend or even revive the Convention, and seeking to avoid war. 
Newcastle was certain that it was too late for any further attempts at compromise: 
37 W. Coxe, Memoirs of the Life and Administration of Sir Robert Walpole, Earl of Orford 
(3 Vols. 1798), 111, p. 542, Trevor to H. Walpole, 28 August (OS) 1739. 
38 R. Browning, The Duke of Newcastle (1975), p. 103. 
39 T. J. McCann (ed), The Correspondence of the Dukes of Richmond and Newcastle 1724- 
1750 (1984), Sussex Record Society Vol. 73, p. 26, Newcastle to Richmond, 28 
November (OS) 1738. 
40 W. Coxe, Memoirs of the Administration of the Right Honourable Henry Pelham (2 
Vols. 1829), I, p. 12, Pelham to Newcastle, 15 November (OS) 1738. 
41 Hervey, Memoirs, III, pp. 733-4. 
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The Times won't bear it... And if we go on in despising what people think & 
say, we shall not have it long in our power, to direct what Measures shall be 
taken... A little yielding to times, a plain dispassionate State of our Case, with 
proper assurances to the Publick, that right Measures & vigorous Ones, shall 
be undertaken against Spain, might have a good Effect before the parliament 
meets, but if we are to go on in extolling the Convention, I say it with great 
Concern, it will not do, & we shall feel ye consequences of it. 42 
Pushing ambitiously forward within the ministry, and looking to new allies, Newcastle 
was touchier than ever, and felt betrayed at any sign of desertion by his old friends. It was 
enough for Hardwicke to be reserved with him about a private conversation which he had 
shared with Walpole to draw forth an impassioned letter of remonstrance. 43 Glimpses of 
his manoeuvring can be caught, for instance in the correspondence between the two 
Secretaries of State. It was customary for letters from and to the Secretaries to be shown 
to Walpole, and indeed read in cabinet. Newcastle and Harrington, however, were 
exchanging letters on policy so entirely private that if Harrington wanted Walpole to 
know their thoughts about France, he had to write a separate, spurious, letter which could 
be shown without revealing what else the original had contained. 44 Once the decision for 
war was inevitable, though, there was a temporary harmony. Walpole seemed to recover 
his spirits and the most striking splits in the ministry were for a while bound together. 
Newcastle observed to Hardwicke at Michaelmas that `Sr. R. is in seeming good Humour 
with us'. as 
This good humour was destroyed by that bane of eighteenth-century political life, contests 
over appointments. The promotion of Lord Hervey, Newcastle's enemy, was the first 
such incident. In the autumn of 1739, Walpole proposed to make Hervey Lord Privy Seal, 
in succession to the Earl of Godolphin. After more than ten years as Vice-Chamberlain, 
spent in often highly tedious and yet sensitive attendance on the King, Hervey could 
hardly be denied his post. Indeed, he was entitled to feel disobliged at waiting until 1 May 
1740 to take up his new appointment. Newcastle, however, feared that the balance of the 
inner circle would tip against him if Hervey had entree to the cabinet. Even more, he 
42 BL Add Ms 35406, f. 159, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 30 September (OS) 1739. 
43 BL Add Ms 32693, f 28-30, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 9 January (OS) 1740. 
44 BL Add Ms 32693, f. 472, Newcastle to Harrington, 11 July (OS) 1740. 
45 BL Add Ms 35406, f. 155, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 28 September (OS) 1739. 
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feared that Hervey, and not himself, would come to be the chief government spokesman 
in the House of Lords. 46 His arguments to Hardwicke were the ad hominem pleas of 
political in-fighting. Hervey was, he said, the only man who had `ever presumed to behave 
indecently' to Hardwicke in the Lords, and had behaved notoriously badly to Grafton. 
Together with Pelham and Newcastle himself, he hinted, these two were the targets of 
Walpole's malice. The leading minister, knowing that he was on the way out through 
`age, Health or other Circumstances', designed to make life uncomfortable for the four of 
them when he was gone. 47 They should all four offer to resign, and force Walpole to give 
up Hervey's appointment. 
Though Newcastle's fluttering anxieties were not without their ludicrous side, this threat 
of group resignation by a connection within the ministry, forcing the hand of both 
Walpole and the King, was part of the range of high politics at this time. The scheme 
came to nothing, and indeed Newcastle's financial circumstances would not permit him to 
offer his resignation at all seriously, even if he had managed to persuade his colleagues 
that the occasion warranted the step. Nonetheless the incident reveals very serious 
tensions within the administration. The Duke, as always, felt slighted by his friends, who 
automatically assumed that he was in the wrong. Sir Robert cared nothing for making a 
breach in the ministry, said Newcastle, thanks to the `Profest disinclination, and 
dissatisfaction, that he has with me'. And in a holograph postscript he believably added; 
`$ `these are my own pure, genuine, thoughts'. 
This contest over Hervey soured relations within the ministry at the very time when the 
declaration of war with Spain was being considered. The framing of the declaration of 
war itself was handled by Newcastle in such a way as to largely bypass the Walpoles and 
cause further bad feelings between him and them. Newcastle's draft, approved by the 
cabinet, laboured the issue of Spain's alleged infractions of the 1670 treaty, and played 
down the central role of the Convention of the Pardo as an attempt to resolve these 
grievances. In Horace Walpole's view, the declaration as drafted by Newcastle, as well as 
46 BL Add Ms 35406, f 164-5, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 14 October (OS) 1739. 
47 Ibid., if. 165-6. 
48 Ibid., if. 168-9. 
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being ill-organised and illogical, reflected the views of Carteret and others by whom the 
Duke was increasingly influenced. Horace Walpole was angered by: 
his Grace's unkind intentions in passing ye Draught, in this manner; I can't 
forbear saying that I was struck extreamly much with the perusal! of it, as 
what seem'd to favour & support ye notions of some favourite Lords to his 
Grace, that are in opposition, rather than to justifye the advice & proceedings 
of those with whom he is tyed in ye ministry. 49 
However it was drafted, there was no doubt of the popular acclaim waiting to greet the 
declaration of war. The Swedish envoy was shocked by the glee with which the public 
greeted what was normally regarded as a calamity; `on ne scauroit exprimer la joye et le 
contentement que la populace a temoigne sur un evenement qu'on regarde d'ailleurs 
comme un des plus grands malheurs qui peut arriver ä une Nation'. S° The patriotism 
which was investing the name of Britons with such resonance was bound to be boosted by 
the prospect of a foreign war. Even small incidents contributed to augment it: 
On Tuesday last when Windsor Herald at Arms read his Majesty's 
Declaration of War against Spain, at the Royal Exchange, there was a 
Circumstance that many People, who observ'd it, were greatly pleas'd with, 
viz. the Moment that he had pronounced the last Words, the `Change Clock 
struck, and the Chimes play'd, 
Britons strike home, 
s1 Revenge, Revenge, your Country's Wrongs. 
Scenes of glee and public rejoicing were reported when the news reached Oxford, and 
when the Declaration was read in Portsmouth the band also played `Britain strike 
home'. 32 This did not mean, however, that the nation was now united behind the 
administration. The discontent with the ministry augmented even with the coming of war. 
Part of the explanation may have lain in the sudden change to very severe weather, the 
worst of the century. Two bad winters, in 1739-40 and 1740-41, with a failed harvest 
between them, were sure to increase dissatisfaction with the government. So, at least, the 
49 BL Add Ms 35586, f. 205, H. Walpole to Hardwicke, 14 October (OS) 1739. 
50 PRO SP 107/33 (unfoliated), Wasenberg to Gyllenborg, 23 October (NS) 1739. 
31 London Evening Post, 23-5 October (OS) 1739. 
52 Ibid., 27-30 October (OS) 1739. 
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Jacobites hoped. 53 High prices and severe conditions certainly led to riots, like the ones at 
Peterborough and Kettering. 54 One foreign envoy believed that there was a `general 
discontent all over the Nation'. 55 Another more accurately commented; `La Ville de 
Londres n'a pas depuis longtemps donne des preuves si remarquables de son 
mecontentement, et 1'on fuge par lä des sentiments du reste du Royaume'. 56 
One challenge at least served to bolster the standing of the ministry. Pulteney put down a 
motion in February for an address to the King, to lay before the House all the papers 
concerning the Convention. He made it clear that it would lead to a secret Committee of 
Enquiry. The debate was a triumph for Walpole, who applied the threat personally to 
himself. `When the Affair was over Sr Ro. thanked many of the Members for their 
Attendance & accepted of their congratulations, as if He had been really tryed & 
acquitted'. " One striking performance was not enough, however, and as discontent 
continued, so did cabinet divisions. During the whole of 1740 the continuing splits within 
the ranks of the administration occupied a great deal of time and nervous energy in high 
places. In March, Newcastle managed, without benefit to himself, to disoblige the 
Walpoles. Horace Mann, recommended by his patron, Horace Walpole senior, after 
whom he was named, gained an appointment as envoy in Florence in March 1740.58 But 
the confirmation of his post was delayed, and caused an angry and revealing outburst 
from the premier minister's brother: 
some personall management that you have for some body else (a Principle 
that runs thro' ye conduct of publick business preferable to any other 
53 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 221/163, Cockburn to Edgar, 14 April (NS) 1740. There was 
appalling dearth and sickness in France also; PRO SP 78/223, f. 16, Waldegrave to 
Couraud, 16 May (NS) 1740. 
54 The Kettering corn riot was organised under cover of a 500-a-side football match. PRO 
SP 36/50, f. 418, John Creed to Newcastle, 19 May (OS) 1740. 
ss PRO SP 107/32 (unfoliated), Hop to Fagel, 18 September (NS) 1739. 
56 PRO SP 107/33 (unfoliated), Wasenberg to Gillenborg, 2 October (NS) 1739. 
57 CUL Add. 6851, f. 3, Harley journal, 21 March (OS) 1740. 
58 BL Add Ms 32802, f. 87, Horace Mann to Newcastle, 6 March (NS) 1740. Mann, who is 
best known to history for his forty-six year correspondence with Horace Walpole junior, 
was frorgi a Suffolk family related to, and dependent on, the Walpoles. W. S. Lewis, W. H. 
Smith & G. L. Lam (eds), Horace Walpole's Correspondence with Sir Horace Mann, I, 
(1954), pp. xxix-xl. 
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consideration) will at last ruin this young Gentleman for being unfortunately 
related to our family, this is not warmth, these are cool deliberate thoughts, 
and it is indeed come to pass, that neither my Brother Walpole nor my seife 
dares propose any thing, or speak in favour of any person directly, where 
your Grace is concerned... knowing shat our recommendation purely for 
being ours must be a clog to ye thing... 
In June, Horace Walpole was busy trying to persuade Hardwicke to change the 
`unaccountable behaviour' of Newcastle towards Sir Robert. Hold back for a year, at 
least, was his message, and do not force the leading minister to resign with an election in 
the offing. 60 The cabinet squabbles were all the more open because George II was absent 
in Hanover. Hardwicke called for a show of unity on that account: 
It is my firm Opinion that now especially whilst the King is abroad (who when 
he was here was a kind of Centre of Unity, at least his final opinion concluded 
every body else) ye utmost Endeavours should be us'd to preserve harmony 
61 & good Agreement. 
Newcastle, though, was becoming too confident of his supporters to listen to such advice, 
especially in July 1740, after he had seen a flattering letter written by Hardwicke to the 
Duke of Somerset, supporting Newcastle and Pelham. 62 Henry Pelham added his voice to 
that of Hardwicke, trying to placate both Newcastle and the Walpoles. 63 Neither party 
was getting its way fully in cabinet, and this was bound to lead to frustration with the 
process of decision-making. Newcastle, complaining in October that Sir Robert was 
putting criticisms of him into the King's head, stood up for his right to argue in cabinet, 
and received a telling reply: 
I said to him, Lord Harrington present, `When measures are agreed amongst 
us, it is very right that every body should support them; but not to have the 
liberty of giving one's opinion before they are agreed, is very wrong. ' He said 
shortly `What do you mean? This war is yours, you have had the conduct of 
it. I wish you joy of it. '" 
59 BL Add Ms 32693, f. 203, H. Walpole to Newcastle, 13 April (OS) 1740. 
60 BL Add Ms 9176, f. 56, H. Walpole to Hardwicke, 16 June (OS) 1740. 
61 BL Add Ms 32693, f. 326, Hardwicke to Newcastle, 8 June (OS) 1740. 
62 BL Add Ms 35406, f. 209, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 19 July (OS) 1740. 
63 BL Add Ms 9176, if. 557-8, H. Pelham to Hardwicke, nd. 
64 BL Add Ms 9176, f. 145, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 25 October (OS) 1740. 
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An active Jacobite officer reported to the Pretender's secretary in autumn 1740 that the 
Council of Regency were completely divided, `suspecting and blaming each other's 
ply, 65 
The cleavages in the ministry were aggravated by calling in the influence of George II. 
Walpole still had the ear of the King, and criticised Newcastle in the closet when he could 
not defeat him in cabinet. The Duke in his turn did his best to turn the King against 
Walpole's supporters. The favour of the King, `he that governs all', was most mercurial 
where Hanover interests were concerned. 66 Horace Walpole, in one of many complaints 
of this period, offered a clear idea of how these rivalries and tensions were played out 
around the King's apartments: 
I give, when in town, my Opinion of foreign matters, in the private 
conferences; but as it is not always agreeable to narrow electoral views, it is I 
believe, seldom followed, and indeed minded till it is too late; and when it is 
not agreeable, by what another person [Sir Robert] hears in the closet about 
me, care is taken by the reporters to let me have the merit of it. 67 
It was easy to make court to the King where cabinet decisions were disagreeable to him. 
Horace Walpole commented on this kind of behaviour; `Some few of us meet and seem 
entirely to [agree], but a different language or at least deference governs some in the 
Closet afterwards'. 68 Splits between ministers on personal grounds made the problem 
worse, and Horace was almost certainly aiming his criticism at Lord Harrington. Though 
Harrington owed Horace Walpole obligations, they were no longer friends by 1740.69 It 
was Harrington, Horace thought, who most `has either disliked or made an ill use of my 
thoughts, and sometimes has done both'. 70 By that Spring, Horace was entirely 
disillusioned with the `weak, absurd, distracted, and contradictory counsels and motions 
63 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 227/44, Col. Arthur Bret to Edgar, 10 October (OS) 1740. 
66 Quotation, ibid., p. 243, same to same, 22 August (OS) 1741. 
67 W. Coxe, Memoirs of Horatio, Lord Walpole (3rd. ed., 2 Vols. 1820), I, p. 230, H. 
Walpole to Trevor, 15 July (OS) 1741. 
69 HMC, Fourteenth Report, Trevor Mss, p. 61, H. Walpole to Trevor, 18 November (OS) 
1740. 
69 HMC, Fourteenth Report, Trevor Mss, p. 55, H. Walpole to Trevor, 30 September (OS) 
1740. See above, pp. 55,69-70. 
70 Ibid., p. 64, same to same, 6 January (OS) 1741. 
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of those whose steadiness and union is more necessary than ever for the preservation of 
" the whole'. 
Those counsels were particularly distracted over the wisdom of a large combined 
expedition to the West Indies. It was not clear to the Walpoles that any kind of military 
action was the answer to the British grievances. British demands arose from their abuse of 
a weakness in the Spanish imperial system of trade. Full commercial negotiations, and 
workable treaties, were the only real solution. 
n To produce that solution, the fear of 
losses in Italy was more likely to work upon Elizabeth than any attacks in the Indies. In 
October 1742 the fear of joint British-Austrian ventures in Italy led at once to offers to 
Carteret, through St. Gil, of conciliatory treaty terms. Spain expressly offered to concede 
to British ships the right of free navigation. ' If military force were the only way to 
compel a full negotiation, though, it was still not clear that an unprecedentedly large and 
costly expedition was the best means available. Keene cautioned that it was impracticable, 
in view of the fortifications of the main Spanish strongholds, and the fact that disease and 
climate ruled out the use of sieges. A privateering war, and annoyance of the coasts both 
of Old and New Spain, he argued, was what Spain most feared. 
" The views of the two 
most important ministers were highly polarised. Walpole wanted above all to maintain 
forces at home sufficient to defend the country, while Newcastle was strongly attracted to 
the idea of a major Caribbean expedition. A range of plans was being considered, 
including an attack on St. Augustine and ventures into the South Seas to take the 
Acapulco ships in the Philippines. 75 Walpole preferred this Manila expedition, as it would 
involve less weakening of British defences than the combined expeditionary force that 
would be required to take the Havana, Cartagena or any other desirable Spanish 
possession in the Caribbean. 
76 The Jamaica merchants were urging that a large fleet be 
71 Ibid., p. 73, same to same, 27 May (OS) 1741. 
n PRO SP 94/206, f. 111, St. Gil to Geraldino, 25 March (NS) 1738; BL Add Ms 35406, f. 
55, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 22 October (OS) 1738. 
73 BL Add Ms 32082, f. 348, Intercept, Marquis de Villarias to St. Gil, 22 October (NS) 
1742. 
74 BL Add Ms 32801, if. 118-22, Keene to Newcastle, 14 July (NS) 1739. 
75 BL Add Ms 19030, f. 432, Wager, minute, 6 September (OS) 1739; BL Add Ms 33004, 
f. 10, cabinet minute 6 September (OS) 1739. 
76 BL Add Ms 28132, if. 59,82, Norris journal, 23 October & 22 November (OS) 1739. 
The best discussion of all the options, detailed and carefully considered, is R. Harding, 
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sent to the West Indies at once, to `make such an Eclat in that Part of the World, that ... 
the Spanish Ships will be embargoed'. " 
The mere sending of a fleet, though, without some effective plan of conquest, was not 
enough. Both ministers and their opponents still had keen memories of Admiral Hosier's 
fleet, blockading the flota and rotting ingloriously off Portobello in 1726-7 as yellow fever 
decimated its numbers. 78 What could be produced as a better plan was still unclear. The 
loose and hopeful nature of the early planning discussions can be seen in Admiral Norris's 
note of the thinking in October about what came to be the Anson expedition to the South 
Seas: 
it was the general sentiment that about three Ships properly maned mout 
maintain them selves for some time in the severall parts of the South Sea, and 
very much annoy the Spanish coasting trade, ... 
in those Seas and get a good 
dole of buty to maintaine thems selves: and mout find some proper Hand; to 
carrene [haul down ships and clean their hulls] and be of yoose to them; and if 
in their complyments they had five hundred soldiers; it would often be of 
youse to compell towns on the Sea Cost to submit to them and raise great 
Contribution. 79 
The King was pressing his ministers for some `undertaking of consequence'. 80 Handwicke 
became tired of their piecemeal way of discussing the war, at broken hours, and always at 
odds. He proposed in December a small steering group to put forward concrete 
proposals. 8' Newcastle meanwhile read attentively Swift's classic pamphlet statement of 
the `blue water' policy, The Conduct of the Allies (1711), and moved a step closer to the 
Tory way of thinking. "' He was becoming increasingly concerned about the government 
Amphibious Warfare in the Eighteenth Century. The British Expedition to the West 
Indies 1740-1742 (1991), pp. 20-42. 
77 BL Add Ms 32692, f. 290, William Wood to Newcastle, 12 September (OS) 1739. 
78 Sir H. W. Richmond, The Navy as an Instrument of Policy 1.558-1727 (1953), pp. 382-7, 
offers a good account of the Hosier debacle, in which 4,000 seamen, including Hosier 
himself, died. 
79 BL Add Ms 28132, f. 52, Norris journal, 16 October (OS) 1739. 
80 Ibid., if. 52-3. 
V. BL Add Ms 32692, if. 523-4, Hardwicke to Newcastle, 16 December (OS) 1739. 
82 BL Add Ms 35406, f. 157, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 30 September (OS) 1739. 
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having been granted so much money in Supply, without any tangible gain to show to the 
public: 
I dread the Consequences, of an Expensive but necessary preparation, 
without having done any Thing, or seeming to have any real solid plan for that 
purpose. It can only be done in the W. Indies, & there the author of the 
Conduct of ye Allies, says we should have carried our Arms ye last Warr. ... I 
am always answer'd, that it is improper to say we will undertake some Thing, 
or some Expedition in the W. Indies, till we know what. Lett us determine to 
do something; we shall soon find out what may be undertaken. 83 
Pressure for results was increasingly felt. It was expressed at its simplest in a letter from 
`Jack Meddler' early in the new year; `What is the Reason that, with such a formidable 
Naval Force as we have fitted out, so little has hitherto been done against Spain? i84 The 
ministry's answer was by then finally decided. In mid-December a Caribbean expedition 
was fixed upon, to be led by Lord Cathcart, with an escort squadron of twenty-five ships 
under Sir Chaloner Ogle. 85 The precise objectives of the expedition were left, wisely and 
in accordance with precedent, to the judgement of the commanders in the field. Richard 
Harding has successfully refuted the classic, and highly critical, account given by Admiral 
Richmond of this slow and erratic exercise in planning. `The six months delay between 
June and December 1739, which looks, superficially, like a case of appalling 
mismanagement, is much more understandable when viewed against the conditions 
prevailing in the summer and autumn of 1739. '86 Harding's work illuminates the huge 
financial and logistical problems in the way of an eighteenth-century administration 
seeking to plan a major war offensive. He rightly argues that the Walpole ministry could 
not have begun to build up material and armaments on the necessary scale, without 
83 BL Add Ms 35406, f. 158, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 30 September (OS) 1739. 
34 The Daily Post, 4 January (OS) 1740. A series of issues of the paper derided the 
argument of the ministerial pamphlet The Grand Question... and pressed for a substantial 
combined operation in the Caribbean; ibid., 8,10,15 January (OS) 1740. 
85 BL Add Ms 28132, if. 100-01, Norris journal 17 December (OS) 1739. The detailed 
planning was handed over to a small group of leading army and navy commanders, 
including Cathcart. 
36 Harding, Amphibious Warfare in the Eighteenth Century, p. 38. H. W. Richmond, The 
Navy in the War of 1739-48 (3 Vols, 1920), I, pp. 76-81. 
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prejudicing diplomatic efforts by alienating Spain, and indeed without raising to fever 
pitch the expectation of the public. 87 
However, this argument is not meant to explain away all the very considerable delays in 
planning. War was overwhelmingly likely from April 1739. Horace Walpole had first 
presented a long and important discussion of the possible war options to the cabinet in 
January 1738.88 The fact that detailed planning was handed over to a steering group only 
in mid-December 1739 does suggest serious flaws in the efficiency of cabinet government 
at this date. All major decisions were concentrated in a few hands, and there was some 
truth in the belief of opponents that too few hands were involved. Plans for waging war 
were discussed in a small group, Hardwicke arguing that it had never been the practice to 
bring such secret matters before a large number of ministers. 89 The benefits of 
specialisation of function were not achieved, and nor was there an adequate body of 
crown servants able and free to provide detailed analyses of the various options favoured 
by ministers. Senior secretaries such as Stone and Couraud spent vast amounts of time on 
routine labours of translation, judicial applications and patronage matters. Walpole, the 
great all-rounder, and Handwicke, torn in so many directions at once, both men strongly 
preoccupied by domestic politics, symbolise the shortcomings of ministerial decision- 
making in foreign policy. The division of the office of Secretary of State into a Northern 
and Southern Department, each combining foreign and domestic policy, of course made 
decisive action less likely. 90 Newcastle, dealing with foreign affairs amidst a welter of 
concerns for his own finances, his friends and his ambitions in the inner circle, had also to 
deal with a mountain of papers on everything from criminal appeals to clerical 
patronage. 9' Such a system made coherent planning difficult, and where ministers were 
87 Harding, Amphibious Warfare in the Eighteenth Century, pp. 22-6. 
$$ P. L. Woodfine, `Horace Walpole and British Relations with Spain, 1738, Camden 
Miscellany, XXXII, (1994), pp. 277-311. 
89 BL Add Ms 32692, ff. 538-9, Hardwicke to Newcastle, 27 December (OS) 1739. 
90 For comment on Newcastle as a `classic instance' of the problems which this posed, J. M. 
Black, British Foreign Policy in the Age of Walpole (1985), pp. 57-8. 
91 An exhaustive statistical discussion of clerical income and patronage, though one weighted 
heavily to the end of the reign of George III, is P. Virgin, The Church in an Age of 
Negligence: Ecclesiastical Structure and Problems of Church Reform 1700-1840 (1989). 
More up-to-date and widely based discussions can be found in the work of Stephen 
Taylor: e. g. `Whigs, Bishops and America: the Politics of Church Reform in Mid- 
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divided by rivalries it was almost impossible. It is hard to believe that a unified ministry 
would have failed to reach, by the summer of 1739, some consensus on which 
contingency plans to explore in anticipation of war. Newcastle, in substance, was right; 
had they determined to do something, they would have been better able to find out what 
was feasible. 
The fact that he was right to insist on decisive planning has been obscured by the fact that 
the scheme which he so much favoured, a large combined operation in the West Indies, 
turned out so very unsuccessfully. The 6,000 men embarked in Lord Cathcart's 
transports in early August 1740 left the Channel only at the end of October. They 
straggled to their Caribbean rendezvous finally just before Christmas, over a year after 
Vice-Admiral Vernon's exploit of sacking Portobello at the very start of the war. By the 
time they were all gathered, Cathcart had just died, replaced by the efficient but self- 
doubting Brigadier-General Wentworth, who proved incapable of coping with Vernon's 
highly politicised and obstructive ideas of what should be done. Vernon's priority at this 
time was to keep his fleet manned and ready for any possible attack by a French fleet 
which might be sent against him. The expeditionary force attacked Cartagena in early 
March 1741, and after a flattering initial naval success, failed when Vernon more or less 
coerced the army commanders into a suicidal attack on Fort St. Lazar. By May 1741 the 
troops were back in Jamaica, and from mid-July to early December 1741 they were tied 
up in a fiuitless attempt to capture Cuba. The design was to take Santiago, but Vernon 
would only land the army impossibly far away in the good anchorage of Guantanamo Bay. 
In mid-January 1742 there arrived 3,000 recruits, to make good the extensive losses by 
disease, and to produce some success from such an enormous venture. They were used 
only in the least promising of all the schemes attempted, an attack on Portobello which 
Vernon deliberately sabotaged. Around 7,000 soldiers, British and American, died (over 
ninety percent of them from disease) for no gain at all and at great expense. The remnant 
finally returned to England in January 1743, by which time the separate `blue water' war 
had been swallowed up in the Continental campaigning which was soon to lead to victory 
Eighteenth-Century England', Historical Journal, 36,2, (1993), pp. 331-356; The 
Church of England c. 1689-c. 1833. From toleration to tractarianism (1993), eds. J. 
Walsh, C. Haydon & S. Taylor. 
92 The best account of the campaign is R. Harding, Amphibious Warfare in the Eighteenth 
Century. The British Expedition to the West Indies 1740-1742 (1991). 
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for George II in person at Dettingen. The expedition was certainly a failure. Despite 
Vernon's great success in throwing the odium on Wentworth, and releasing to the public 
his own highly unreliable gloss on events, it was seen to be a failure for the navy. The 
imagined world-beating power of Britain's mighty ships proved to be deceptive. Two of 
Hardwicke's correspondents were disgusted that `a Nation that has a Royall Navy able to 
defie all ye Popish Powers in Europe' should have done so little. 93 Meanwhile, the success 
of Spanish privateers on the lucrative British trade in home waters was very notable, and 
led to loud merchant protests. 94 Despite the pride in the nation's great warships, those 
`floating animated castles' could only succeed if they were correctly deployed. 93 
The expedition, once resolved on, and even before its cost and failure became apparent, 
brought further and truly irreconcilable divisions. The ministry was already plagued by 
breaches and hurt feelings. In small face-to-face meetings, opposing views were bound to 
be more starkly polarised, and clashes more frequent, than they might have been in a 
larger cabinet. Walpole could contain himself no longer when the Council of Regency (the 
King still being in Hanover) discussed the ships needed for Ogle's expedition. An accident 
to the clean and sheathed Grafton (70 guns) led Wager to propose sending the 50 gun 
Salisbury instead: 
Sr. R. W. upon that peevishly & with an air of discontent, said, What; may 
not one poor Ship be left at home? Must every Accident be repaired for ye W. 
Indies, & none be consider'd that relates to what will be left here? 96 
This was the introduction to a harangue of twenty minutes, always ending in the point that 
Walpole believed the French fleet might attack England, and wanted to keep some ships 
back from Ogle's fleet - but dare not. Newcastle was clearly right to lament this display 
of temper as bad for cabinet government: 
When the first Minister shall arraign all ye measures, & declare He will not He 
dare not have them altered, _& these 
Declarations made, not to private 
Friends, but unnecessarily, uncalled for, at a publick Meeting, of the Regents 
93 BL Add Ms 35586, f. 261, A&B to Hardwicke, 23 July (OS) 1740. 
94 E. g. CUL Add 6851, f. 10, Harley journal, 21 March (OS) 1740. 
95 BL Add Ms 35605, f. 23, Yorke to Lord [? ], 27 August (OS) 1739. 
96 BL Add Ms 35406, f. 237, Newcastle to Hardwicke, I October (OS) 1740. 
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of the Kingdom, who are not to advise the King, but have the Executive 
power lodged by his Majesty in them. 97 
When the King returned he tried to scold his ministers into harmony, telling Newcastle 
and Hardwicke: 
As to the Business in Parliament, I don't value the Opposition, if all those in 
my service act together, & are united, but if they thwart one another & create 
difficulties in the carrying on the publick Business, then indeed, as to that 
purpose, it would be another case. 
98 
As Walpole had just emerged in high spirits from an hour in the closet, Newcastle `easily 
saw, from whom this came'. ' Though the Duke was disingenuous to fix all the blame on 
Walpole and Hervey, he was right to deplore the state of animosity and confusion which 
existed: 
How can Business go on this way, What is agreed amongst us, is often 
equally overhauled afterwards, both by Lord H. & Sr. R. if it is not quite 
agreeable to their own Inclinations. And, when we have reason to fear, that 
our united Credit with the King, may hardly be sufficient to induce His 
Majesty to do quite right, in this great Conjuncture, One will govern all, & fill 
the King's Head with complaints & unreasonable jealousies of part of his 
servants. 100 
Nor does the premier minister seem to have become reconciled to the war or the 
expedition. Even after the die was cast, and the costly expedition had begun to be 
mounted, Sir Robert did not abandon hopes of a settlement with Spain. He conducted a 
private negotiation through Geraldino in Spain, employing Walpole's `very devoted man', 
Sir Robert Brown. '°' 
Pressure from outside the ministry did not relax. Typical of the press interest in the war 
was the set of detailed proposals put forward in the Gentleman's Magazine, including 
9' Ibid., f. 239. 
98 BL Add Ms 35406, f. 271, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 25 October (OS) 1740. 
99 Ibid.. 
10° Ibid., f. 272. 
101 Quotation Egmont Diary, ii, p. 286. BL Add Ms 32802, f. 12, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 
21 January (NS) 1740. (Confirmed by an extract of it taken by Coxe, BL Add Ms 9176, 
f. 6. ) On Brown, see R. Sedgwick, House of Commons, I, p. 496. 
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plans of the main enemy harbours in Central America, special pull-out maps of the region, 
and details of both British and Spanish defences. 102 The early phase of apparent 
government inaction had made an easy target for Opposition critics. The Convention of 
the Pardo had already made the ministry extremely unpopular. Now the people had to 
bear higher taxes, without any apparent sign of military results. The secession of the 
Opposition from Parliament had not done them any good in the country, but they now had 
great hopes of the campaign to send instructions to MPs. This campaign, mooted as early 
as February 1739, was given fresh impetus by a struggle within the City of London. Sir 
George Champion, MP for Aylesbury and also an Alderman, next in line of seniority to be 
Lord Mayor, had voted in favour of the convention of the Pardo. This brought to a head a 
long-standing conflict between the Common Council and the pro-ministerial Aldermen. "' 
In the mayoral election of September 1739, Champion was set aside. The liverymen took 
part in a campaign for greater political influence, of which instructions to MPs were an 
offshoot. The Lord Chancellor was confident that Champion had been displaced for 
reasons specific to the City's power conflict, as much as for his support of the 
Convention. He urged Newcastle not to be too melancholy; `And this one may venture to 
be sure of, that it will be impossible, at the next Election, to make that Cry go so far out 
of London as the Excise'. '°4 
If the cry did not resound through the country, it was not for want of trying. The 
campaign began on 1 October (OS) 1739, with the instructions to the four London 
Members; this was followed by York on 6 October, where the Common Council 
specifically said that they were inspired by the London example. 105 Without prior 
planning, such a prompt response would have been impossible. Sixteen constituencies, 
mostly those with large electorates, presented instructions before the end of the year, with 
a view to forcing through a Place Bill in the 1740 session of Parliament. 106 The tactic so 
102 Gentleman's Magazine, X, March 1740, pp. 143-9, May 1740, pp. 241-3. 
103 The clearest short discussion is N. Rogers, Whigs and Cities. Popular Politics in the Age 
of Walpole and Pitt (1989), pp. 59-66. 
104 BL Add Ms 32692, f. 350, Hardwicke to Newcastle, 1 October (OS) 1739. 
los The Second Part of Great Britain's MEMORIAL. Containing a Collection of the 
Instructions, Representations &c &c (London, J. Watson, 1742), pp. 49-56. 
106 A useful table of the constituencies which sent instructions at various dates is in N. 
Rogers, Whigs and Cities. Popular Politics in the Age of Walpole and Pitt (1989), p. 
244. 
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nearly succeeded that the Bill was lost by only sixteen votes. The debate went on until 
eleven o'clock at night, `with a great deal of obloquious declaration, especially by the 
youngsters of the Prince's family in behalf of it'. 1°7 Ministers were driven to using all the 
disciplinary aids they had. Newcastle wrote a very stiff letter to one cool Court Member 
remaining in the country. He reminded him of his obligations to the Duke and pointed out 
that if he did not cooperate it would be noticed; `I have told the King, that I would send a 
Messenger down to You; I have promised Sir Robert Walpole, to use my utmost Credit 
with you, to bring you up'. '°8 
Another series of instructions, in July and August 1740, followed the failure of the Place 
Bill. 109 A yet more strident instruction was given by the City in the autumn of 1742, in the 
aftermath of the collapse of the Patriot coalition. The Lord Chancellor's son thought this 
document `a chef d'oeuvre for fury, & disaffection. I think the Rulers of the Half-Moon- 
Club have exhausted all their venom in it'. 110 It was so violent indeed that the French 
ministry promised itself great advantages from Britain's internal divisions. "' The 
instructions sent by the various provincial towns in 1739-40 all bore a distinct family 
resemblance, and were a kind of summary of Patriot views. In particular they stressed the 
need for MPs to voice the genuine views of their constituents, uninfluenced by places or 
pensions. They appealed in general to their MPs to stem the `Flood of Corruption and 
Court influence, which for many Years has prevail'd, and almost overspread the Land'. ' 12 
Instructions sent from constituencies to guide their Members on important political issues 
were a method used at times since the Exclusion Crisis, though not without some disquiet 
107 BL Add Ms 9176, f. 25, H. Walpole to Trevor, 1 February (OS) 1740. 
108 BL Add Ms 32693, if. 51-2, Newcastle to Sir William Ashburnharn, 1 February (OS) 
1740. 
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Britain seems to be that in the Wren Library, Trinity College, Cambridge. I am grateful to 
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over their propriety. "' MPs were not supposed to be simply the obedient agents of their 
constituents, but were held to speak for the sense of the nation. 114 There can be no doubt, 
though, that instructions did place pressure on MPs to stand out in opposition to the 
Government. Further, like the increasing prominence of the press, the use of instructions 
in this systematic way widened the boundaries of the political world. Polemical 
constituency campaigns brought more people within the ambit of active political 
discussion, and made managerial politics harder. The tactic caught the imagination of the 
Jacobite historian, Carte. By using it, he assured the Pretender, the Opposition would be 
masters of the kingdom within a year. He proposed the `setting up in all Market Towns or 
larger Parishes Clubs of Independent Electors (for that is the spirit which will take and 
spread like wildfire at this time, and ffree parliaments may be the cry), for conveying 
instructions to them... '. lls 
The instruction campaign did indeed spread, though it did not meet with the success in 
Scotland that was proposed for it, under the aegis of the Duke of Argyll, who had become 
increasingly estranged from the ministry! 16 Argyll had been rumbling discontentedly since 
1737, when he attacked Walpole's punishment of the city of Edinburgh in the aftermath of 
the Porteous riots. He had opposed the Court in the March 1738 debates on depredations. 
Deprived of his offices in 1740, he was a dangerous opponent in the House of Lords. 
Argyll's military experience made him more than normally influential when he passed 
strictures on the government's plans and record. And his experience of cabinet 
government gave an authority to his strictures on the faulty working of the ministry. In 
December 1740, in a debate on a motion to call for all the instructions sent to Haddock 
(in order to find out why he had done so little), Argyll not only reviewed all the failures of 
the ministry, but placed the whole blame on the practice of having a small inner cabinet of 
113 Useful short discussions can be found in H. T. Dickinson, Liberty and Property (1977), 
pp. 157-9; N. Rogers, Whigs and Cities. Popular Politics in the Age of Walpole and Pitt 
(1989), pp. 240-2. 
114 The fullest recent discussion of these ideas is P. Kelly, `Constituents' Instructions to 
Members of Parliament in the Eighteenth Century', in Party and Management in 
Parliament 1660-1784 (1984), pp. 169-89. Kelly does not explore the instructions of 
1739-41 themselves, but does offer a valuable context in which to set them. 
115 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 216/109, Carte plan, July 1739. 
116 Wolterton (Walpole) Mss, Letters and Papers of Sir Robert Walpole (unfoliated), Stair to 
Chesterfield, 10 July (OS) 1739; Chesterfield to Stair, 22 July (OS) 1739. 
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ministers, dominated by one man. The Privy Council of old, in which gentlemen of rank 
could lend their weight to national proceedings, had been usurped by `Men who have 
neither Birth, Quality, nor Character ... 
for the sake of multiplying Salaries and gaining 
Votes'. 117 
This was the characteristic voice of those who led the campaign for instructions, though 
in the event Argyll may have disappointed their hopes. The Patriots do seem to have been 
really agitated by the darkest fears for the constitution. Stair, busily planning the 
manoeuvres, wrote to the Duchess of Marlborough: 
old as I am, I am afraid there is appearance that I may live longer than my 
Country's Liberty, in ye mean time whilst there is room to work I shall 
contribute my small endeavours for preserving our Country with spiritt & 
activity, if other people of more weight do their parts as becomes them, no 
body can tell what may happen, at any rate tis better dye like men than 
indolently to repent our fate. "s 
The instruction campaign was belittled by the supporters of the ministry, who did their 
best to present it as an unparliamentary interference of low people in the affairs of the 
nation. One clever sixpenny ballad blamed the petitioning scheme on Bolingbroke. The 
purpose of the campaign was clear; `Let ENGLAND be ruin 'd but WALPOLE must 
fair. "' And the commercial towns were simply puppets jerked about on a former traitor's 
strings: 
Let Petitions be drawn - let L-D-N begin, 
Each Port in the Nation will follow, but Lynne. 
What the City shall say, Myself will prepare, 
And it will be approv'd, - for I'm sure of the M-r. 12° 
Of course, the instructions were not spontaneous outpourings of urban sentiment. They 
required careful organisation and tactical planning by people who knew local issues and 
117 E. Timberland, The History and Proceedings of the House of Lords from the Restoration 
in 1660, to the Present Time (1742), p. 572, debate of 8 December (OS) 1740. Argyll's 
speeches were regular and usually protracted. See ibid., pp. 675-93. 
Wolterton (Walpole) Mss, Letters and Papers of Sir Robert Walpole (unfoliated), Stair to 
Duchess of Marlborough, 28 July (OS) 1739. 
19 Lord B-ke's SPEECH Upon the Convention. To the tune ofA Cobler there was (1739), 
p. 7. 
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local figures. 121 But the feelings on which the organisers drew were real enough; anti- 
Hanoverian, and espousing the cause of trade against the sneers of wealthy, mostly 
landed, placemongers. The ministerial ballad's depiction of the City merchants, as `makers 
of scales' and `sellers of leather', was part of a regular denigration of trade and of the 
merchant opposition. The administration scornfully published a list of the Common 
Councilmen of London and their trades, in which Virginia merchants of (30,000 and more 
a year were called `tobacconists', and Scarlet Dyers called `rag dyers'. '22 These 
antagonisms augmented the fury of xenophobia and the assertive sense of national history 
and pride which drove the public to reject the whole basis of the ministry's dealings with 
Spain. 
As war plans began to be put into action, yet more opportunities arose for the Patriots, 
whose efforts were entirely directed at winning the 1741 General Election, and 
overthrowing Walpole. The French ministry were very keen to follow the movements of 
the Opposition at this crucial time, as the ministry found out. The French merchant, 
Silhouette, who had been introduced for the purpose, was in the confidence of the leading 
Patriots, and sent intelligence from them under cover of the French diplomatic mail direct 
to ` 101'. Bussy, however, did not reveal that to Newcastle, who learned it from another 
agent at the French court, Guyot. '23Such interference by foreign diplomats in the internal 
affairs of other countries was by no means unusual, as Black has shown. 124 On this 
occasion, however, it put the French ambassador, de Cambis, in a difficult position, and 
he duly had discretion imposed upon Silhouette. ' Though the Opposition gained nothing 
from their flirtation with France, their numbers were usefully increased by the defection in 
spring 1740 of George Bubb Dodington, disappointed by Walpole's refusal to support 
him for a peerage. 126 
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Dodington saw that unity among the Opposition was essential, and that this meant taking 
in the Tories in a generous spirit rather than grudgingly using them and making empty 
promises of office. He drew up a long paper on the tactics for the 1741 General Election, 
which is a shrewd and practical document, despite being driven by an animus against 
Walpole, `a Genius nothing superior in Manners, or Abilities, to a shrewd country 
Attorney'. 127 Dodington put forward various ideas for boosting parliamentary attendance 
and promoting a spirit of unity through clubs, frugal entertainment, and offering 
accommodation to poorer Country MPs. The key method for achieving unity, though, 
was to change the language of party: 
There is but one Point more that occurs to me, and that calls for our most 
serious, and most united Endeavours, & will, I fear, baffle them all. It is to 
extirpate the name of Whig & Tory from amongst us. Those two simple 
sounds have cost the Nation above 100 millions, & will, if not timely 
prevented, cost us our Liberties at last. There is a fascination in them, that is 
astonishing. 128 
He appealed in the meantime for a real and generous unity of both parties, and the 
dropping of one kind of common Patriot discourse. `I mean that of what immaculate 
Whiggs we are, tho' we act against the Court; how unsullied, how unpolluted with 
Toryism, tho' we act with the Tories; that we desire as little as the Minister, to see any of 
them in power... ' 129 These expressions are an interesting comment on the reality of the 
much-vaunted Patriot alliance. This was not the longed-for goal of a genuine non-party 
coalition concerned only for the national good. In the event, though the Opposition saw 
Walpole driven into war, and later forced from office, they did not succeed in doing away 
with party names and party loyalties. 
Ministerial Whigs were quite clear about the vitality of the Tory party, and saw it as a 
Jacobite one. `It is usually said take away the Torys that joyn them & the Jacobites would 
make a very slender appearance. I am just of the contrary opinion take away the Jacobites 
127 BL Add Ms 9175, f. 110, `Scheme for an Association to redress Grievances and the 
Tyranny of a Minister', 29 May (OS) [1741]. 
12$ Ibid., f. 117. 
129 Ibid., f. 118. 
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& where will you find a Tory. i13° The Jacobite view of the Tories was more inclusive; 
`The Tory Party (if they can properly be called a party who have the body of the people of 
a Kingdom on their side) consists of all the true & sincere members of the Church of 
England'. 131 Bolingbroke by contrast insisted that Jacobitism, `this trite expedient', was a 
stale device of the ministry to smear opponents. 132 Walpole, he said, `must know that the 
Jacobite party in Britain is an unorganized lump of inert matter, without a principle of life 
or action in it,. 133 This was not too far removed from the assessments given to the 
Pretender, at least of the English Jacobites, with their `unhappy tendency to sloth and 
melancholy'. '34 But though it was unlikely that an invasion would ever be heartily 
supported in England, it did not mean that one would not be attempted, at least in 
Scotland, the focus of much of the Pretender's planning. 135 The ministry certainly had to 
take a close interest in the movements of those attached to the exiled Stuart court. 136 The 
events of 1745 seem to discredit Bolingbroke's appraisal of the Jacobite threat, but in 
early 1740 he was probably correct. James himself sadly concluded in February: 
It was right in me to provide for all events, but I own I am now fully 
persuaded that there is no real design of serving my Cause by what is doing in 
Spain, & that all that is only meant to give jealousy to the English Governmt. 
& perhaps to hinder in particular their sending Troops to America. 137 
Bolingbroke went further in his dismissal of Jacobite sentiment, and continued to labour 
the idea that party feeling as such was extinct. He wrote to Marchmont at the beginning 
of 1740 that `these Partys subsist no longer, neither in appearance, nor reallity, tho' 
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knaves & fools amuse & are amus'd by ye names'. 138 On the same page, though, he 
inconsistently denounced the `obstinate Torys' as deserving no consideration. And a year 
later he made it clear that the opposition was really a coalition of parties. He was 
complaining of the breakdown of that coalition over the unsuccessful motion to remove 
Walpole from the King's presence and councils. It was an ill-managed attempt, in which 
even Pulteney, the leader of the debate, was seen to be half-hearted. Edward Harley and 
his brother, sons of the Earl of Oxford who had himself been impeached and imprisoned 
through the influence of Walpole, denounced the motion and left the House. 139 Like them, 
and to Bolingbroke's annoyance, many of the Tories could not brook any measure which 
looked like a bill of pains and penalties: 
The conduct of ye Torys is silly, infamous, & void of any colour of excuse; 
and yet the truth is, yt the behaviour, & language of some of those who 
complain, I dare say, very lowdly on this occasion, has prepared it, and given 
Shippen, who disliked ye Coalition from ye first as much as Walpole, a 
pretence to make his fools break it. 140 
Bolingbroke knew that the Opposition was in truth a coalition, and, like Dodington, he 
wanted fair treatment for the Tories. They, and the true Country Whigs, were likely to be 
abused by ambitious courtiers out of place, such as Carteret and Pulteney: 
Long before I left Britain it was plain that some persons meant that the 
opposition should serve as their scaffolding, nothing else; and whenever they 
had a glimpse of hope that they might rise to power without it, they shewed 
the greatest readiness to demolish it'. 14' 
The death of Sir William Wyndham, by a fall from his horse in July 1740, was a serious 
blow to those who hoped for systematic opposition. Only his influence, Lyttelton 
believed, had kept the Tory party united behind national measures; `it is much to be feared 
that Resentmt. Despair, & their Inability of conducting themselves, may drive the Tories 
back into their old Prejudices heat & Extravagance'. 142 For the critical period, though, 
Tory cohesion persisted. It was thanks to Patriot assurances, seconded by the rising heir, 
138 BL Add Ms 37994, f. 1, Bolingbroke to Marchmont, 1 January (NS) 1740. 
139 CUL Add 6851, if. 24-6, Harley journal, 13 February (OS) 1741. 
140 BL Add Ms 37994, f. 1, Bolingbroke to Marchmont, 26 March (NS) 1741. 
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256 
Prince Frederick, `that the tones turned up to vote in such numbers and with such partisan 
unanimity in December 1741 and January 1742'. 143 The Prince of Wales, through his 
symbolic leadership of the Patriots, his courting of the Tories, and his powerful influence 
in Cornwall, was crucial to the effective defeat of Walpole in the 1741 General Election. 
Without Tory organisation and commitment, Walpole's untenably narrow majority would 
have been much wider. However, the fears of Dodington and Bolingbroke were amply 
realised after the fall of Walpole, when it quickly became plain that the Tory scaffolding 
was indeed to be demolished. 1" Hanbury Williams was with Lord Longsdale in Bath in 
the summer of 1742, and found; `He laughs very much at the Scheme of a Broad bottom 
& says tis the most impudent thing that can be utterd to say there are no partys left in this 
Kingdom'. 14' The break between Argyll and Carteret caused the old Whig-Tory animosity 
to break out anew, according to the information received by Cardinal Fleury. '" 
So long as the Patriot coalition held together, though, both success and failure would 
serve their cause. They could hardly lose ground by anything other than a sweeping and 
total victory over Spain, since popular belief in the might of the fleet was so extravagant. 
The same belief caused some ministerial writers to be optimistic about the event of war. A 
poem attacking Pulteney asserted that success for Cathcart would ruin the Patriots: 
But if mean while shou'd Happy Fate, 
And Stars benign consent to wait, 
On Cathcart's Expedition: 
Most will rejoice at the Success, 
B-b's Friends increase, and yours grow less - 
Then Farewell Opposition. 147 
Expectations of the British navy were high, even among seasoned diplomats. Sir Everard 
Fawkener wrote from Constantinople: 
143 L. Colley, In Defiance of Oligarchy. The Tory Party 1714-60 (1982), p. 231. 
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A tryal of what our Fleet can do may bring us to a more fixt Dependence on it 
than at certain times we have been disposed to have, to me it seems as 
essentially necessary to our Safety and Welfare as Parliament or Magna 
Charta, and I should be glad to see it wove into and become a fundamental 
part of our Constitution. '"' 
Bringing the fleet to a trial, however, proved far from easy. The first disappointment was 
that the azogues were missed. Next, the Cathcart expedition was slow to sail; as the 
Opposition alleged, `withheld by Orders, to their Country's Shame'. 149 Military 
preparations took a great deal of time, and it was not possible with. wooden sailing ships 
to keep the seas at all times, and to be sure of encountering the enemy at the right time 
and in favourable conditions. So long as the navy was inactive or unsuccessful, the 
ministry was the target of abuse. The long delays in the sailing of the Cathcart expedition 
aroused great discontent. 150 Due to an exceptional run of adverse winds from mid-June to 
the end of October, Norris and Ogle were unable to sail farther than Torbay. 131 Walpole 
kept among his papers an anonymous tirade against naval inaction; `We have a fine Fleet. 
What do they do? Why they fight at Spithead. Twenty or 30 Men of War go to the 
Mediterranean to see what o'Clock it is, & as many to the West Indies on the same 
Errand'. 152 The most successful Opposition pamphlet of the day began with this same 
point: 
Is She, who for so many Ages rode 
Unquestion'd Monarch of the Water Flood... 
Is She now sunk to such a low Degree, 
That Gaul or Spain must limit out her Sea? 
That she must ask what Winds her Sails shall fill, 
And steer by Bounty who once steer'd at Wilt? 
Whilst the vast Navies rais'd for her Support, 
Nod on the Main, or rot before the Port. 53 
148 BL Add Ms 9176, f. 17, Fawkener to Trevor, 12 January (OS) 1741. 
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Adverse winds caused the return of the fleet in July 1740, which `raised a more hellish 
spirit in the Citty, than what was before'. '54 It was believed that the ministry was trying to 
patch up a peace and call off hostilities. The darkest visions were entertained by Patriot 
opponents. Pulteney wrote to Swift that the nation was becoming an armed camp, with 
forty thousand troops and four million pounds raised, yet `in all probability nothing will be 
done; I have not the least Notion that even our own Expedition under Lord Cathcart is 
intended to be sent, any where'. '" He summed up his gloomy forebodings: 
our Situation is very extraordinary, Sr Robt. will have an Army, will not have 
a War, & cannot have a Peace; that is the People are so averse to it, that he 
dares not make one. But in one year more, when by the Influence of this 
Army, & our Money, he has got a new Parliament to his liking, then he will 
make a Peace, & get it approved too be it as it will; after which I am afraid 
we shall all grow tired of struggling any longer, & give up the Game. '56 
One young officer on the Cathcart expedition celebrated the eventual sailing of the fleet in 
derivative, but therefore revealing terms. His verses, banal as they were, are interesting 
for their blend of contempt for Spain, an appeal to Elizabethan achievements, and a 
distrust of the ministry: 
From the charm'd Port escap'd at last, 
Each Fear of peaceful Orders past, 
BRITANNIA's awful Navy rode the Main... 
Shall the weak Spaniard, in Decay, 
The feeble Evening of his Day, 
With you amid the stormy Deep contend? 
He, whom in his meridian Height, 
While yet but dawn 'd your Naval Might, 
My HOWARDS, DRAKES, and RALEIGHS taught to bend? 's' 
In brisk contrast to ministerial lethargy was the capture of Portobello by Admiral Edward 
Vernon, `the godlike Man', in October 1739.158 Vernon had claimed in 1729, after the 
failure of Hosier's expedition against Portobello, that he could take the place with six 
154 Windsor RA Stuart Mss, 226/48, Cockburn to Edgar, 24 July (NS) 1740. 
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ships and three hundred men. He was brought out of half-pay retirement in July 1739 at 
the instance of his patron Wager, and placed in charge of the Caribbean fleet. The hopes 
of the Opposition rested on Vernon, as Pulteney piously assured him: `God prosper our 
arms with success & make you the instrument of retrieving the honour of your 
country'. '59 On 22 November (OS) he did exactly what he had promised a decade before, 
taking the surrender of Portobello after an attack with just six ships. 160 This feat, so 
conformable to current notions of the power of Britain's fleets, was also an implicit 
riposte to the ministry of which Vernon was such a critic. The Lords address of 
congratulation did not fail to include this important detail. 161 In the very first month of the 
war (and not least because of the unprepared state of the Portobello garrison) a signal 
naval victory had been won, in just the fashion which the Patriots had declared to be the 
birthright of Britons. Cardinal Fleury ('Mr. Wilkins' in Jacobite code) was said to be 
greatly struck by the victory; `I did not imagine that he would have been so much affected 
as he really was upon the news of their having taken Porto Bello, and of the shouts of joy 
that his correspondent wrote were echo'd through London on the occasion'. 162 
The unbounded acclaim for Vernon's exploit was increased by the fact that he was a 
Patriot Whig critic of the government, and was widely believed to have been sent to the 
West Indies by Walpole only because he was expected to fail, or in order to get him out 
of the way. The victory was celebrated in a variety of pottery forms and gave its name to 
the Portobello Road in London, while Vernon's head appeared on inn signs all over the 
country. 163 The eventual failure of the combined expedition, and Vernon's return home, 
prompted in Charles Hanbury-Williams the wishful thought that `it may be as useful to the 
Patriots to cry him down as it has been to cry him up & it may be as necessary to hang 
him on a gallows as it has been to hang him on a sign post'. 1" Kathleen Wilson has 
159 B. McL. Ranft (ed), The Vernon Papers, Navy Records Society, XCIX, (1953), p. 39, 
Pulteney to Vernon, 25 November (OS) 1739. 
160 Ranft (ed), The Vernon Papers, pp. 30-7. 
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demonstrated the role of imperial sentiment in this popular acclaim, and shown that `the 
Vernon agitation was a crucial factor in the constellation of forces bringing down 
Walpole's ministry in 1742'. 165 Immediately, as Gerald Jordan and Nicholas Rogers have 
shown, Vernon, with his supposed bluff and frank character, was eulogised in a highly 
political way. 1 The fortunate admiral was depicted as `the embodiment of patriotism in 
the classical sense of the term. He was valorous, incorruptible, public spirited, a 
counterpoint to Court corruption and timidity, detested by "sly State Rogues"'. '67 
Specifically, Vernon's success was celebrated as a blow against Walpole. Among the 
many medals struck to celebrate the capture was one which shows on the reverse; `The 
British glory revived by Admiral Vernon and Commodore Brown', in the form of a 
depiction of the two men. The obverse of the medal, however, is more striking. It shows 
the Admiral pushing aside a devil, complete with cloven hooves, pitchfork and horns, with 
the legend; `Make room for Sir Robert', and below it, `No Excise'. 168 
it was not surprising that constituencies vied with one another in 1741 to have Vernon for 
their Member, and that he was elected for three seats. Belief in him persisted, even after 
his eventual failure in the West Indies, which he did his best to blame upon his opposite 
number, the pro-ministerial General Wentworth. 
169 Vernon's first exploit was still being 
celebrated, and used to attack the govenment. In 1743 Thomas Birch saw, in the 
workshop of the sculptor Rysbrack, a bust of Vernon commissioned by the Duchess of 
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Marlborough, a veteran and bitter antagonist of the Walpole ministry. 170 The long 
inscription praised Vernon, while accusing the ministry of treason, concluding; -while the 
British Counsels were under the influence of France, Vernon humbled both her & Spain". 
You may be sure, her Grace has not omitted the usual Cant of Six Ships only'. "' 
Vernon's next success was given the same treatment. When the outworks of Cartagena 
were taken, Vernon sent news of his capture hastily - too hastily - home. 172 The Admiral's 
brave and celebrated counterpart, the lieutenant general of the Spanish fleet and 
commander of Cartagena, Don Blas de Lezo, became briefly an embodiment of the 
defeated Spanish poltroon of Patriot myth. `Don Blass' was burned in effigy on bonfires 
and satirised in medals. 173 Pro-Vernon celebrations remained a form of anti-ministerial 
protest. In Rochester even a year later, when hope and rumour alike must have grown 
tired, Vernon was given a peal of bells for the supposed surrender of Cartagena, and 
voted a peer by the title of Earl of Orford. In Maidstone and other towns in Kent there 
were illuminations for King Charles' festival, with the oak boughs and other Jacobite 
symbols made over to Vernon. 174 
The passions and favourite themes of the Opposition still dominated the way in which the 
public received, and understood, the news of the war which they had been so eager to 
begin. Only slowly did they begin to see that naval action was not the answer to Britain's 
commercial grievances, any more than the fall of Walpole was the single answer to the 
nation's political ills. 
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Conclusion 
A sense of disillusioned moralism is the characteristic note of those who looked back, 
even over the space of only a few years, to the end of the Walpole ministry and the 
hysterical campaign against Spanish depredations. With hindsight, the black and white 
issues of depredations and freedom of navigation began to look more disputable. 
Commodore Walker reflected on the storm over a French polacre which he had taken in a 
Moorish port in the mid-1740s, an act which was held to infringe existing treaties. His 
remarks say much about the experience of his generation: 
Such rencounters abroad are generally acted in a disputed latitude, and are a 
latitude of dispute to their owners at home; whilst king, minister, and people 
must take their word at the first instance of the hair-breadth distances in 
debate, or measurements at sea. Restitution is then the word, before the right 
is proved. At the partial disappointment, the Antigallic nation is told to cry 
revenge; and if the minister still kee? s his temper, a Cromwell's ghost is 
wanted to take upon him the new war. 
The grievances of the South Sea Company, too, lost in hindsight their emotive appeal. 
The intransigence of the Company, heightened by the assertive merchant community of 
London, was seen to have been destructive of normal diplomacy. At the end of the War of 
Austrian Succession, in which the Spanish war was subsumed, Lord Hardwicke drew the 
lesson that the nation had been gulled by their self-interested obstinacy: 
We have tried Negociation for above Twenty Years, two references to 
Commissaries, &a War, partly on their account, & all in vain. And I suppose 
no Man in his Sences will think of Entering into another War to prove the 
pretended Ballance of their Accounts. 2 
The bravado of the 1730s, with its aggressive belief in the might of the British navy and 
the cowardly inferiority of the Spaniards and French, gave way also to a more sombre and 
doubting note. Even a spokesman for the London merchant community, when towards 
the end of the war he gave an account of the evolution of power and commerce, had only 
a gloomy and negative summary to offer of Britain's current position: 
' H. S. Vaughan (ed), The Voyages and Cruises of Commodore Walker (1928), p. 102. 
2 BL Add Ms 9132, f. 157, Hardwicke to H. Walpole, 13 December (OS) 1750. 
the Nation in general accumulated Riches at Home, and commanded Respect 
abroad; a new Scene of Power started out of Commerce, and the wide Ocean 
owned the Sovereignty of Imperial Britain; a Dominion which some few 
Years ago was not purely chymerical. There was a Time when our Superiority 
at Sea was uncontestable, and the Influence that had upon the other Powers 
of Europe very conspicuous. 3 
The clamour `without doors', whipped up by the Opposition for its own ends, and which 
had been such a striking part of the context of foreign policy, now seemed wholly 
destructive. Edmund Burke, looking back over the century, found only one war to have 
been `the fruit of popular desire', the war with Spain in 1739. He claimed to have 
carefully examined the original documents: 
They perfectly satisfied me of the extreme injustice of that war... Some years 
after, it was my fortune, to converse with many of the principal actors against 
that Minister, and with those, who principally excited that clamour. None of 
them, no not one, did in the least defend the measure, or attempt to justify 
their conduct, which they as freely condemned as they would have done in 
commenting upon any proceeding in history, in which they were totally 
unconcerned. ` 
Though Burke, fearing the turbulence of revolutionary contagion, saw the popular 
clamour of the 1730s as wrong and manipulated, one can also discern in it a longer-term 
trend. The voice of the public, misguided and jingoistic as it might have been, was an 
authentic echo of an under-educated populace. One of the striking features of a polity 
controlled by the nation's aristocracy was that this voice, the cry of `our governors the 
mob', was so attentively listened to in the domain of high politics. 
5 In seeking constantly 
to placate the public, Newcastle differed only in degree from Walpole's more managerial 
approach to politics. For both men, the opinions of the masses were an inescapable part of 
the political calculations which they had to make. 
The sustained political onslaught of those years of opposition, and the self-interested 
character of some of the leading opponents, led to a kind of moral hangover. The effects 
3 R. Campbell, The London Tradesman (1747), p. 285. 
4 E. Burke, Thoughts on the Prospect of a Regicide Peace, in a series of Letters (1796), p. 
24. 
S T. J. McCann (ed), The Correspondence of the Dukes of Richmond and Newcastle, 1724- 
1750, Sussex Record Society, 73, (1984), p. 162, Richmond to Newcastle, 9 January 
(OS) 1745. 
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were felt almost at once, with disillusioned contemporaries complaining; `how miserably 
have our new Ministers conducted our Affairs both at Home and Abroad, since, from 
masked Patriots, they are become unmasked Courtiers? 
6 Henry Etough in his journal 
recorded, when he came to the year 1739; `This Year is ever to be remembered with 
horror and aversion. From hence we can date a series of Woes and calamities ineffable 
and intolerable'. ' Lord Egmont, surveying in a combative speech the havoc caused by 
taking into the administration the leaders of the Opposition, demanded to know: 
What could be expected from a Change like this founded not on ye Reason 
but ye Passion of Mankind, framed not out of Abilities to do service to ye 
Publick, but out of faculties only qualified for Mischief?... Nothing from that 
Hour has been done steadily, nothing wisely, nothing successfully, nothing 
nobly... ' 
Yet the Whig `old corps' survived the fall of Walpole, and by the mid-1740s their 
dominance under Henry Pelham was once again secure. To combat Carteret in December 
1744, Hardwicke calmly proposed to the Cabinet the same strategy that had led in 1742 
to the downfall of Walpole; bring in the Tories, but placate the Whigs by allowing their 
new allies no real prospect of office. 
9 The managerial continuity of the King's ministers 
was reinforced by the success of the Hanoverian regime in 1745-6, in beating off the most 
sustained armed challenge which the Jacobite claimants to the throne were ever to mount. 
A regretful moralism may not be the appropriate note. Not all the problems which faced 
Britain's navy in the 1730s could be solved, but by and large the government adapted 
traditional practice to good effect. 1° Ministers and naval administrators learned useful 
lessons, and the logistical improvements of the 1740s paved the way for the successful 
6 Seventeen Hundred Forty-Two. Being a Review of the Conduct of the New Ministry the 
last Year, (1743), p. 51. 
BL Add Ms 9200, f. 63. 
BL Add Ms 47091, f. 6, Egmont, undated note of speech [c. 1746]. 
9 BL Stowe Ms 254, f. 1, `Minute of a Cabinet Paper'. 
10 D. A. Baugh, British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole (1965); D. Crews, 
Yellow Jack and the Worm. British Naval Administration in the West Indies, 1739-1748 
(1993); J. West, Gunpowder, Government and War in the Mid-Eighteenth Century 
(1991); J. Brewer, The Sinews of Power. War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 
(1989). 
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operations of the Seven Years' and Revolutionary Wars. l l The balance of national policy 
did ultimately tip towards empire, and overseas conquest. Nor was the pressure of 
misguided public opinion the only cause of the war, or of the defeat of the Walpole 
ministry. Developments in Spain, as well as in England, were intrinsic to diplomacy, and 
to the failure of compromise. The delicate nature of royal prestige, ill adapted to 
commercial negotiations and concessions, was part of the story. The personalities 
involved in discussions, from the monarchs to the ministers to the envoys, all had their 
changing contribution to make to the outcome. The nature of the international situation, 
including the attempted revival of Spanish power, the dominant position of France, and 
Britain's loss of allies or significant support abroad, was the essential context. Spanish 
doctrines of imperial monopoly were an inflexible element which bedevilled all the talks. 
The threat from the exiled Stuart court, and the use made of it by France and Spain, as 
well as by political opponents in Britain, had an influence. The role of the Prince of Wales 
in the Opposition made splits within the British royal family important, just as the 
maternal ambitions of Queen Elizabeth in Italy, and the illness and waywardness of Philip, 
swayed events. 
So many elements of diplomacy were out of the hands of the British ministers. Equally, 
they did contribute to their own ill luck. Newcastle's unlucky stumbles in stressing the 
(inapplicable) Treaty of 1667 in his first major memorial to the Spanish court, and in 
ordering Haddock's fleet to stay in the Mediterranean in the spring of 1739, both 
provoked and unsettled the Spanish court. Cabinet divisions were widely rumoured, 
bolstering the confidence of domestic critics and giving heart to the most absentee 
Opposition MPs. Those same divisions gave encouragement to Jacobites at home and 
abroad, and to Spanish ministers who had pressures of their own with which to contend. 
Leaks from the cabinet, not least those from Walpole, confiding his own view of policy to 
Geraldino, made matters worse. Conflicting arguments were put to the King, which 
tended to clog diplomacy. In general, one senses in the British ministry a certain 
irresolution and vulnerability. Ministers were unable to control the powerful City, and in 
Harding, Amphibious Warfare in the Eighteenth Century, pp. 198-201; R Middleton, 
The Bells of Victory: the Pitt Newcastle Ministry and the Conduct of the Seven Years 
War, 1757-1762 (1985); D. Syrett (ed), The Siege and Capture of Havana: 1762, Navy 
Records Society, 114, (1970); M. Duffy, Soldiers, Sugar and Seapower: The British 
Expeditions to the West Indies and the War against Revolutionary France (1987). 
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general gave the Opposition the sense that, finally, it might be possible to win. These 
intangibles of the personalities and interactions of ministers were as real as, and helped to 
shape, the undoubted pressures of the populace, and the tactics of Opposition. These and 
other contributory factors cannot be easily summarised in order of importance, but in a 
chronological examination of diplomatic exchanges I have tried to show their significance 
as it varied over time. Even so, the heated negotiations over smuggling and depredations 
very nearly succeeded in producing a workable commercial and diplomatic settlement. 
With all these complicating elements, the remarkable thing is how very narrow was the 
failure of the pragmatic and compromising policy backed by Walpole. 
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Appendix 1 
The Merchants' Petition of 11 October (OS) 1737 
The Humble Petition of the Merchants and Planters in behalf of themselves and others 
trading to, and interested in the British Colonies in America 
Sheweth 
That the fair and lawfull Trade of your Majesty's Subjects to the British Plantations in 
America, hath been greatly interrupted for many Years past, not only by their Ships 
having been frequently stopt and searched but also forcibly and arbitrarily seized on the 
high Seas by Spanish Ships fitted out to cruise, under the plausible pretence of guarding 
their own Coasts. 
That the Commanders thereof with their Crews have been inhumanly treated, and the 
Ships carryed into some of the Spanish Ports, and there condemned, with their Cargoes, 
in manifest Violation of the Treaties subsisting between the two Crowns. 
That notwithstanding the many Instances made by your Majesty's Ministers at the Court 
of Madrid against the Injurious Treatment, the late and repeated insults of the Spaniards 
upon the persons and properties of your Majesty's Subjects lay your petitioners under the 
Necessity of applying again to your Majesty for Relief. 
That by these violent and unjust proceedings of the Spaniards the Trade to your 
Majesty's Plantations in America is rendred very precarious, and if any Nation be 
suffer'd thus to insult the Persons of your Majesty's Subjects, and plunder them of 
their property, your Petitioners apprehend it will be attended with such an Obstruction 
of that valuable Branch of Commerce, as will be very fatal to the Interest of Great 
Britain. 
Your Petitioners therefore humbly pray your Majesty, that your Majesty will be 
graciously pleased to procure speedy and ample Satisfaction to your Subjects for the 
Losses they have sustained. That no British Vessels be detained or Searched on the 
High Seas by any Nation, under any pretence whatsoever. And that the trade to 
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America may be rendered secure for the future by such Means, as your Majesty in your 
great Wisdom shall think fit. 
And your Petitioners shall ever pray &c. 
List of the Petitioners: 
Pr. Delamotte Beeston Long 
Wm. Baker Thos. Tryon 
Jo. Harries Alexr. Dundas 
John Leale Thomas Butler Senr. 
Nath. Basnett John Wilmer 
Roger Drake Thomas Hyam 
James Knight Richard Fenton 
Jno. Ashley John White 
James Douglas H. Douglas 
Geo. Spence Wm Fenton 
R. Boddicott Benj. Ball 
Steph. Winthrop Ant. Hooper 
Charles Hallifax David Mike 
Tho. Somers David Barclay Junr. 
David Barclay & Son R. Cooke 
Jno. Scott E. Wright 
Wm Black Robert Scott 
Samuel Stanfield Richard Buller 
Saml. Sidebotham Bob. Bostork 
Jno. Chapman Thomas Pitts 
J. Bowers Alexander Johnston 
Isaac Diaz Fernandes Wm Higgins 
Moses Nunes Brandon Wm Bendysk 
Judah Supino &Son Richard Friend 
Samuel Baker Thos. Delamotte 
Wildur Rider Benononi Hancock 
Robert March Jno. Locke 
Simon Jacob Smith & Bonovrie 
Robert Holmes Augustus Boyd 
Henry Davy Robt. Lidderdale 
David Wilkie Wm Tryon 
Edwin Somers Wm Barnett 
S. Bethell Colin Campbell 
John Warner John Keith 
Thos. Herbert Wm Perrin 
Saml. Turner Sam. Bonham 
David Currie Ri. Coope 
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Wm Coleman Junr. Wm Bowden 
Abram. Payne Saml. Osborne 
Samuel Pennant Wm Crombies 
A. MacDowall Benj. Fisher 
John Paul Thos. Ayscough 
Alexd. Roberts James Kenchell 
David Crichton John Tomlinson 
Tim. Cockshutt Jno. Dover 
Tho. Sandford Tho. Truman 
Wm Jones John Curtin 
Edm. Boehin Daniel Flezney 
Henry Norris Jr. Thos. Sentence 
Marmd. Hilton Eliahm Palmer 
Lane & Smethurst Saml. Pitte 
James Buchanan Hen. Barham 
Moses Lainces Calverley Bewicke 
John Gregory Jer. Allen 
Plomer Gardiner & Rolleston Richard Beckford 
Alexander Coutts Henry Long 
Da. Barclay John Beach 
John Spieker Edwd. Clarke Parish 
Wm Adair John Fowler 
John Browne T. Hanbury 
George Newland Geo. Lewen 
Rond. Frye Jno. Gibbon 
Richd. Wainhouse Wm Whitaker 
Law. Williams Davy Dreholt 
Clere Talbot Abel Tonnereaux 
Henry Lyons P. Simond 
Barrington Buggin John Godfrey 
Peter DuCane Wm Coleman 
James Randall Wm Dunbar 
Richard DuCane Junr. Wm Wilson 
John Bell Sam. Frys 
Cha. Pole Jno. Elliot 
Thos. Beckford John Small 
Francis Garissen Wm. Brannd 
Papillon Ball 
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Appendix 2 
Projet du Memoire ä presenter par Mons. Keene au Roy d'Espagne 
Le soussigne Ministre Plenipotentiaire de Sa Majeste Britannique a recu Ordre du Roy, 
son Maitre, de representer ä Votre Majeste, Que, nonobstant les Instances reiterees, qu'Il 
a faites ä Votre Majeste, par Ordre de sa Cour, pour la Restitution des Vaisseaux et Effets 
des Sujets de Sa Majeste, qui leur ont etes injustement enleves, et la Satisfaction et le 
Dedommagement des Violences, Depredations, Duretes et Cruautes, qui ont etes exercees 
contre eux en Violation du Droit des Gens, et des Traites, qui subsistent entre les deux 
Couronnes, par les Gardes de Cotes de Votre Majeste, ou Vaisseaux munis de 
Commissions Espagnoles, ou portant Pavillon Espagnol, aux Indes Occidentales, nulle 
Restitution ou Satisfaction n'a ete obtenue jusqu'ä present, quoique des Assurances et des 
Promesses, ä cet effet, aient ete frequemment donnees. Et c'est avec une extreme 
Douleur, que le Soussigne se trouve oblige en consequence des Ordres du Roy son Maitre 
de representer ä Votre Majeste, que les differents Ordres et Cedules, qu'elle a bien voulu, 
par un effet de sa haute Sagesse & Justice, donnner, et ensuite renouveller, sur les 
Representations et Reparation dans plusieurs Occasions notoires, qui, par la Nature de 
leur Cas, et les preuves, qui en ont ete apportees, paroissent ä Votre Majeste le demander, 
ont ete eludes, evades, ou rendus entierement inefficaces pour I'Accomplissement des 
Vues equitables de Votre Majeste, dont Il est en etat de donner un Detail circonstancie de 
teile Maniere, et ä telles Personnes, qu'il plaira ä Votre Majeste d'Ordonner. 
Le Mecontentement que Votre Majeste avoit bien voulu temoigner de ces injustes et 
violents procedes avoit donne au Roy le plus grand Sujet d'esperer qu'ils auroient 
entierement cesses. C'est donc avec autant de Surprise que de Chagrin, que Sa Majeste 
vient de recevoir des Avis, que ces Violences ont ete renouvellees et reiterees, I'Annee 
Derniere, d'une Maniere aussi peu soutenable que par le passe, par ou le Commerce 
legitime des Sujets de Sa Majeste aux Indes Occidentales, et la libre Navigation de ces 
Mers'lä, auxquels ils ont un Droit incontestables, se trouvent extremement genes et 
interrompus, comme il paroitra evidemment par les Pieces, qui accompagnent ce 
Memoire. 
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Le Soussigne a Ordre du Roy, son Maitre, de faire aussi remarquer ä Votre Majeste, que 
les Manieres Illicites, pratiquees par les Gardes de Cotes, ou autres Vaisseaux, munis de 
Commissions Espagnoles, ou portant Pavillon Espagnol, en arretant, examinant et 
detenant les Vaisseaux appartenant aux Sujets de Sa Majeste, en pleine Mer, et sous 
pretexte d'examiner, s'ils n'ont point de Marchandise de Contrabande abord, sont la 
Source principale de toutes ces plaintes; procede, qui est directement contraire ä ce qui 
est prescrit par 1'Article 14 du Traite 1667, comme la Regle, qui doit etre observee par 
tous les Vaisseaux des deux Nations, qui pourroient se rencontrer dans des Bayes, ou en 
pleine Mer; comme on peut voir plus amplement par le dit Article, qui est icy insere mot ä 
mot. 
Art 14 
Quod Naves Bellicae, sive ad Regum praedictorum alterutium, sive ad Instructores 
privatos eorundem alterutri Subditos spectent, obviam factae Navibus Mercatoriis, auf 
Stationem aliqud agentibus, auf in alto Mari Vela facientibus, extra Torments Majoris 
Jactum subsistent, neque proprius (ut hdc Distantid Spolii et Violentiae Occasio omnis 
praecidatur) accedent: Scapham vero, si lubel, duosque auf tres solummodo Classiarios 
ad Mercatoriem emittent, quibus, ubi Navem Conscenderint, Literas Salvi-conductus 
exhibit Navarcha vel Patronus, Chartarum etiam Marinarum juxta Formulam in Calce 
hujus Tractatus subjiciendam conceptarum Copiam faciet; ex quibus non solum de 
Mercimoniis, quibus onusta est Naves, sed etiam de Domschis et Residentiae in 
atteurtrius Regis Dominiis loco, ut et de Navarchae auf Patrons, necnon Navis ipsius 
Nomine certiores fient; duabus quippe Patronibus hisce, quales sint Merces Navi 
impositae, au interdicte scilicet, sive Contrabandae, quis Magister vel Patronus, qualis 
denique Navis ipsa sit, satis dignosci poterit; Tales porno Literae et Chartae Marine 
Fide et Authoritate eo Magis indubitatd valebunt, quod tim ex parte Regis Hispaniarum 
Certificationibus quibusdem contra signatis (si necessefuerit) munientur, quarum virtute 
authenticae magisfient, et adulterinae pro veris nemini obtrudi poterunt. 
Le Roy ne doute nullement, que Votre Majeste, dont la Justice et la Disposition ä 
observer les Traites, sont si bien connus, ne donne sans delai, les Ordres les plus efficaces 
a tous Vaisseaux authorisees par Votre Majeste, ou par ceux, qu'Elle employe, ou aux 
Vaisseaux qui jouissent, en aucune maniere, de la protection du pavilion de Votre Majestd 
de s'abstenir de tels procedes ä l'avenir, et de se regler, ä cet egard, selon ce qui est si 
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amplement, et si clairement, prescrit par le dit Traite, comme Its en seront responsables i 
leur peril. 
Le Soussigne a encore 1'Honneur de representer ä Votre Majeste, que l'usage, que l'on fait 
d'une teile Visite, est aussi peu ä justifier que la Visite eile meme; Comme par Exemple, 
ainsi qu'il est arrive tres souvent, de saisir et detenir un Vaisseau et sa Cargaison, sans 
aucun pretexte ou Ombre de Raison que ce soit; Et dans d'autres Occasions de saisir et 
confisquer un Vaisseau et toute sa Cargaison, parce qu'on ya trouvd quelque 
Marchandise en quelque petite Quantite que ce fut, d'une Espece, qui est du Crü des 
Colonies Espagnoles; Laquelle Circonstance ne suffit pas pour decider que teile 
Marchandise soit prohibee ou de Contrabande; Et meme en cas que des Marchandises, 
veritablement de Contrebande, fussent actuellement trouvees abord, Il est pourvfi par les 
Termes expres des Articles 15 et 23 du Traite 1667, que ni le Vaisseau, ni aucune partie 
de sa Cargaison, hormis les Marchandises de Contrebande memes, sera confisque, comme 
il paroit par la copie suivante des dits Articles. 
Art 15 
Si quae Merces auf Bona prohibita e Regnis, Dominiis auf Terrotoriis alterutrius Regis 
exportantur per populos auf Subdilos alterius, in isto Casu, solo Bona prohibita, et nulla 
alia Fisco addicentur, neque etiam praeter hanc paenam incurret istiusmodi Delinquens, 
in forte e Regnis auf Dominiis Regis Magnae Brianniae Nummos auf Monetam Regions 
propriam, auf Lanam, auf etiam Terram quam vocant Fullorum; ex Dominiis verd Regis 
Hispaniarum Aurum auf Argentum, sive signalum sit, sive non signatum, subducat, auf 
exporter; In quibus Casibus Regionis cujusque hinc inde Leges vim suam et effectum 
debitum obtinebunt. 
Art 23 
Et casu quo in Navibus istiusmodi Merces prohibitae, Vulga Contrabandae infra 
designatae mediantibus Rationibus supradictis, deprehendi contigerit, Nave extrahentur, 
denuntiabuntur, et coram Judicibus Admiralitata auf aliis competentibus Fisco 
addicentur; ita tarnen ut Navis ipsa aliaeque libera Merces et permissae quae in 
istiusmodi Navi reperiuntur, nullatentus ex eä Causd, arrestentur auf confiscentur. 
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Le Soussigne a aussi l'Honneur de remarquer, a cette Occasion, que les Articles 
susmentionnes sont si clairs et precis en prescrivant la Methode de parvenir ä la 
Decouverte des Marchandises de Contrebande en cas qu'il s'en trouve abord des 
Vaisseaux de l'une ou de lautre Nation et en fixant les Amendes et Peines qui doivent 
s'ensuivre, que le Roy son Maitre est pleinement persuade, que Votre Majeste fera donner 
incessamment les Ordres les plus efficaces pour qu'on ait soin qu'ä 1'avenir le dit Traite 
soit ponctuellement observe aussi ä cet egard: Et le Soussigne ne sauroit se dispenser de 
remarquer que la Conduite des Gardes de Cotes Espagnoles, et des autres Vaisseaux 
susdits a souvent ete accompagnee de plusieurs Circonstances les plus aggravantes et les 
plus enormes, en ce qu'ils n'ont pas seulement viole les Traites les plus solennels qui 
subsistent entre les deux Nations, mais meme ont agi, en plusieurs Rencontres, d'une 
Maniere barbare et inhumaine envers les Sujets de Sa Majeste, lorsque meme apres la 
Recherche la plus rigoureuse et la plus exacte, Its ont trouve a propos de relacher leurs 
Vaisseaux. 
Le Soussigne ayant ainsi eu l'Honneur d'exposer ä Votre Majeste les Griefs et Torts que 
les Sujets de Sa Majeste ont soufferts de la part des Gardes de Cotes Espagnoles &c 11 ne 
lui reste qu'ä ajouter, qu le Roy, son maitre se promet de la Sagesse, piete et bonne Foy 
connus de Votre Majeste et de sa Disposition a observer ponctuellement les Traites, qui 
subsistent entre les deux Couronnes, qu'on aura soin de faire punir exemplairement, et 
sans Delai, les Auteurs de ces Actes de Violence et de Barbarie, afin d'empecher que 
d'autres n'osent commettre de tels Exces ä l'avenir; Et que Votre Majeste fera rendre, de 
la Maniere la plus of iicace, la Satisfaction requise aux Sujets du Roy, pour toutes leurs 
pertes et Dommages; et qu'Elle donnera les Ordres les plus precis pour prevenir de tels 
procedes, et pour faire observer ponctuellement les Traites; lesquels doivent servir de 
Regle aux Sujets des deux Couronnes. C'est dont le Roy, son Maitre, ne doute pas que 
Votre Majeste ne reconnoisse la Necessite, pour faire cesser les frequentes et justes 
plaintes des Sujets de Sa Majeste, et pour assurer, et affermir l'Harmonie et I'Amitie, qui 
subsistent si heureusement entre les deux Couronnes. 
Si, contre toute Attente, ces Instances, qui sont fondees sur la Justice, et les Traites, 
n'auroient pas 1'Effet desire, le Roy, son Maitre, se trouvera dans la Necessite de procurer 
ä ses Sujets la Satisfaction qu'ils sont en droit de demander, en vertu des Traites, et du 
Droit des Gens. 
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Appendix 3 
London Evening Post, 30 December -1 January (OS) 1737. 
Extract of a Letter from an English Gentleman at the Havanna to several Merchants in 
Bristol, dated Aug 26,1737 
Gentlemen, 
I make bold to trouble you with this, to make you sensible I am not negligent of 
embracing all Opportunities of Writing, more than for what good News I can acquaint 
you with. Our Affair here goes on very slowly, but am afraid the Spaniards will make our 
Vessel a Prize; for they stick at nothing, notwithstanding my Plea, that I receiv'd what 
Money they found on Board from the Company's Agents at Jamaica. I acquainted you in 
my last Advices after what Manner and where we were taken; the same Cruizer has since 
taken and brought into this Place, the Loyal Charles, Capt. Way, and the Dispatch, Capt. 
de la Mott, both from Jamaica, bound for London, and they will make Prizes of them 
both, altho' they have not found anything contraband on board them: So, Gentlemen, I 
can't tell how things may be at Home, whether Peace or War, but I am sure 'tis open War 
here on their Parts. I should have come away by this opportunity, were it not to wait the 
Issue of my Trial, and to have something to satisfy the Insurers, tho' I don't know but at 
the same Time I run a Risque of my Liberty; for if a War breaks out I am doom'd to 
imprisonment: I shall take the next Opportunity that offers to come home, or go any 
where rather than stay here. I am now on Shore at the English Factory, which gives me a 
more convenient Opportunity of writing than when on Board. 
P. S. Since my Arrival here there have been no less than 8 or 900 soldiers imported, and 
more expected, who are now going to embark on a Vessel for Cape St. Augustine; so that 
it's time for Carolina and Georgia to keep a good Look-out. 
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Appendix 4 
The Convention of the Pardo, January 1739 
Whereas Differences have arisen, of late Years, between the two Crowns of Great-Britain 
and Spain, on account of the Visiting, Searching, and Taking of Vessels, the Seizing of 
Effects, the Regulating of Limits and other Grievances alledged on each Side, as well in 
the West Indies, as elsewhere; which Differences are so serious, and of such a Nature, 
that, if Care be not taken to put an entire Stop to them for the present, and to prevent 
them for the future, they might occasion an open Rupture between the said Crowns: For 
this Reason his Majesty the King of Great Britain, and his Majesty the King of Spain, 
having nothing so much at heart as to preserve and corroborate the good Correspondence 
which has so happily subsisted, have thought proper to grant their Full Powers, viz. his 
Britannic Majesty to Benjamin Keene, Esq; his Minister-Plenipotentiary to his Catholic 
Majesty, and his Catholic Majesty to Don Sebastian de la Quadra, Knight of the Order of 
St. James, Counsellor of State, and First Secretary of State and of the Dispatches; who, 
after previously producing their Full Powers, having conferred together, have agreed 
upon the following Articles. 
Art. I. Whereas the ancient Friendship, so desirable and so necessary for the reciprocal 
Interest of both Nations, and particularly with regard to their Commerce, cannot be 
established upon a lasting Foundation, unless Care be taken, not only to adjust and 
regulate the Pretensions for reciprocal Reparation of the Damages already sustained, but, 
above all, to find out Means to prevent the like Causes of Complaint for the future, and to 
remove absolutely, and for ever, every thing which might give Occasion thereto; it is 
agreed to labour immediately, with all imaginable Application and Diligence, to attain so 
desirable an End; and for that Purpose there shall be named on the part of their Britannic 
and Catholic Majesties respectively, immediately after the signing of the present 
Convention, two Ministers-Plenipotentiaries, who shall meet at Madrid within the Space 
of six Weeks, to be reckoned from the Day of the Exchange of the Ratifications, there to 
confer, and finally regulate the respective Pretensions of the two Crowns, as well with 
regard to the Trade and Navigation in America and Europe, and to the Limits of Florida 
and of Carolina, as concerning other Points, which remain likewise to be adjusted; the 
whole according to the Treaties of the Years 1667,1670,1713,1715,1721,1728, and 
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1729, including That of the Assiento of Negroes, and the Convention of 1716; and it is 
also agreed, that the Plenipotentiaries so named, shall begin their Conferences six Weeks 
after the Exchange of the Ratifications, and shall finish them within the Space of eight 
Months. 
Art II. The Regulation of the Limits of Florida and of Carolina, which, according to 
what has been lately agreed, was to be decided by Commissaries on each Side, shall 
likewise be committed to the said Plenipotentiaries, to procure a more solid and effectual 
Agreement; and during the Time that the Discussion of that Affair shall, last, Things shall 
remain in the aforesaid Territories of Florida and of Carolina, in the Situation they are in 
at present, without increasing the Fortifications there, or taking any new Posts; and for 
this Purpose, his Britannic Majesty and his catholic Majesty shall cause the necessary 
Orders to be dispatched immediately after the signing of this Convention. 
Art. III. After having duly considered the Demands and Pretensions of the two Crowns, 
and of their respective Subjects, for Reparation of the Damages sustained on each Side, 
and all Circumstances which relate to this important Affair; it is agreed, that his Catholic 
Majesty shall cause to be paid to his Britannic Majesty, the Sum of 95,000 1. Sterling, for 
a Balance, which has been admitted as due to the Crown and the Subjects of Great- 
Britain, after Deduction of the Demands of the Crown and Subjects of Spain; to the End 
that the above-mentioned Sum, together with the Amount of what has been 
acknowledged on the Part of Great Britain to be due to Spain on her Demands, may be 
employed by his Britannic Majesty for the Satisfaction, Discharge, and Payment of the 
Demands of his Subjects upon the Crown of Spain; it being understood nevertheless, That 
it shall not be pretended, that this reciprocal Discharge extends, or relates to the Accounts 
and Differences, which subsist, or are to be settled between the Crown of Spain and the 
Company of the Assiento of Negroes, nor to any particular or private Contracts that may 
subsist between either of the two Crowns, or their Ministers, with the Subjects of the 
other, or between the Subjects and Subjects of each Nation respectively; with Exception, 
however, of all Pretensions of this Class mentioned in the Plan presented at Seville, by the 
Commissaries of Great Britain, and included in the Account lately made out at London, 
of Damages sustained by the Subjects of the said Crown, and especially the three 
particulars inserted in the said Plan, and making but one Article in the Account, 
amounting to 119,512 Piasters, 3 Reals and 3 Quartils of Plate; and the Subjects on each 
Side shall be entitled, and shall have Liberty to have Recourse to the Laws, or to take 
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other proper Measures, for causing the abovesaid Engagements to be fulfilled, in the same 
Manner as if this Convention did not exist. 
Art. IV. The Value of the Ship called the Woolball, which was taken and carried to the 
Port of Campechy in the Year 1732, the Loyal Charles, the Dispatch, the George, and 
the Prince William, which were carried to the Havanna in the Year 1737, and the St. 
James to Porto Rico in the same Year, having been included in the Valuation that has 
been made of the Demands of the Subjects of Great Britain, as also several others that 
were taken before; if it happens, that, in consequence of the Orders that have been 
dispatched by the Court of Spain for the Restitution of them, Part, or the Whole of them 
have been restored, the Sums so received shall be deducted from the 95,000 1. Sterling, 
which is to be paid by the Court of Spain, according to what is above stipulated: It being, 
however, understood, that the Payment of the 95,000 1. Sterling shall not be, for that 
Reason, in any manner delayed; saving that what may have been previously received shall 
be restored. 
Art V. The present Convention shall be approved and ratified by his Britannic Majesty 
and by his Catholic Majesty; and the Ratifications thereof shall be delivered and 
exchanged at London within the Space of six Weeks, or sooner, if it can be done, to be 
reckoned from the Day of the signing. 
In witness whereof, We the under-written Ministers-Plenipotentiaries of his Britannic 
Majesty and of his Catholic Majesty, by Virtue of our Full Powers, have signed the 
present Convention, and caused the Seal of our Arms to be affixed thereto. Done at the 
Pardo the 14th Day of January, 173 9. 
B. Keene, 
S. de la Quadra 
First Separate ARTICLE. 
Whereas it has been agreed by the first Article of the Convention, signed this Day, 
between the Ministers-Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain and Spain, that there shall be 
named on the Part of their Britannic and Catholic Majesties respectively, immediately 
after the signing the abovesaid Convention, two Ministers-Plenipotentiaries, who shall 
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meet at Madrid, within the Space of six Weeks, to be reckoned from the Day of the 
Exchange of the Ratifications; their said Majesties, to the End that no Time may be lost in 
removing, by a solemn Treaty, which is to be concluded for that Purpose, all Cause of 
Complaint for the future, and in establishing thereby a perfect good Understanding, and a 
lasting Friendship between the two Crowns, have named, and do by these Presents name, 
viz. his Britannic Majesty, Benjamin Keene, Esq; his said Majesty's Minister- 
Plenipotentiary to his Catholic Majesty, and Abraham Castres, Esq; his said Britannick 
Majesty's Consul-General at the Court of his Catholic Majesty, his Plenipotentiaries for 
that Purpose; and his Catholic Majesty, Don Joseph de la Quintana, his Counsellor in the 
supreme Council of the Indies, and Don Stephen-Joseph de Abaria, Knight of the Corder 
of Calatrava, Counsellor in the same Council, and Superintendant of the Chamber of 
Accounts, who shall be immediately instructed to begin the Conferences: And whereas it 
has been agreed by the third Article of the Convention signed this Day, that the Sum of 
95,000 1. Sterling, is due, on the Part of Spain, as a Balance to the Crown and Subjects of 
Great Britain, after Deduction made of the Demands of the Crown and Subjects of Spain; 
his Catholic Majesty shall cause to be paid at London, within the Term of four Months, to 
be reckoned from Day of the Exchange of the Ratifications, or sooner if it be possible, in 
Money, the above-mentioned 95,000 L Sterling, to such Persons as shall be authorized, 
on the Part of his Britannic majesty, to receive it. 
Second separate ARTICLE 
Whereas the underwritten Ministers Plenipotentiaries of their Britannic and Catholic 
Majesties have this Day signed, by Virtue of full Powers from the Kings their Masters for 
the Purpose, a Convention for settling and adjusting all the Demands, on each Side, of the 
Crowns of Great Britain and Spain, on Account of Seizures made, Ships taken, etc. and 
for the Payment of a Balance thatis thereby due to the Crown of Great Britain; it is 
declared, that the Ship called the Success, which was taken on the 14th Day of April 
1738, as she was coming out from the Island of Antigua, by a Spanish Guarda Costa, and 
carried to Porto Rico, is not comprehended in the aforesaid Convention; and his Catholic 
Majesty promises, that the said Ship and its Cargo shall be forthwith restored, or the just 
Value thereof to the lawful Owners; provided that, previous to the Restitution of the said 
Ship the Success, the Person or Persons interested therein do give Security at London, to 
the Satisfaction of Don Thomas Geraldino, his Catholick Majesty's Minister 
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Plenipotentiary, to abide by what shall be decided thereupon by the Ministers 
Plenipotentiaries of their said Majesties, that have been named for finally settling, 
according to the Treaties, the Disputes which remain to be adjusted between the two 
Crowns; and his Catholic Majesty agrees, as far as shall depend upon him, that the above- 
mentioned Ship the Success, shall be referred to the Examination and Decision of the 
Plenipotentiaries; his Britannic Majesty promises likewise to refer, as far as shall depend 
upon him, to the Decision of the Plenipotentiaries, the Brigantine Sancta Theresa, seized 
in the Port of Dublin, in Ireland, in the Year 1735. And the said underwritten Ministers 
Plenipotentiaries declare by these Presents, that the 3d Article of the Convention signed 
this Day, does not extend, nor shall be construed to extend to any Ships or Effects that 
may have been taken or seized since the 10th Day of December 1737, or may be hereafter 
taken or seized; in which Cases, Justice shall be done according to the Treaties, as if the 
aforesaid Convention had not been made; it being however understood, that this relates 
only to the Indemnification and Satisfaction to be made for the Effects seized, or Prizes 
taken, but that the Decision of the Cases, which may happen, in order to remove all 
Pretext for dispute, is to be referred to the Plenipotentiaries, to be determined by them 
according to the Treaties. 
These separate Articles shall have the same Force as if inserted Word for Word in the 
Convention signed this Day: And shall be ratified in the same Manner. 
In Witness whereof, We the underwritten Ministers Plenipotentiaries of his Britannick 
Majesty, and of his Catholick Majesty, by Virtue of our full Powers, have signed the 
present separate Articles, and have caused the Seals of our Arms to be affixed thereto. At 
the Pardo, Jan. 14,1739. 
B. Keene 
Sebastian de la Quadra. 
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Copy of the Declaration made on the Part of the King of Spain, before he ratify'd the 
Convention. 
Don Sebastian de la Quadra, Counsellor and first Secretary of State of his Catholic 
Majesty, and his first Plenipotentiary for the Convention which is treating with the King of 
England, by Order of his Sovereign, and in Consequence of his repeated Memorials and 
Conferences that have pass'd with Don Benjamin Keene, Minister Plenipotentiary of his 
Britannic Majesty, and having agreed therein with reciprocal Accord, that the present 
Declaration shall be made as the essential and precise Means to overcome the so much 
debated Disputes, and, in order that the said Convention may be signed, does declare, in 
due Form, that his Catholic Majesty reserves to himself, in its full Force, the Right of 
being able to suspend the Assiento of Negroes, and for dispatching the necessary Orders 
for the Execution thereof, in case the Company does not subject herself to pay, within a 
short Term, the 68,000 1. Sterling, which the has confess'd is owing on the Duty of 
Negroes, according to the Regulation of Std per Dollar, or on the Profits of the Ship 
Caroline; and likewise declare, that under the Validity and Force of this Protest, the 
signing of the said Convention may be proceeded on, and in no other Manner. Wherefore, 
upon this firm Supposition, and that it may not be eluded on any Motive or Pretext 
whatsoever, his Catholic Majesty has been induced thereto. 
Pardo, 10th of Jan. 173 9. 
Don Sebastian de la Quadra. ' 
The Convention and separate Article, were ratify'd under the Hand of His Britannic 
Majesty, Jan. 24; and of his Catholic Majesty January 15. N. S. 1739, and were concluded 
pursuant to full Powers dated at St. James's, Nov 9,1738, at the Pardo, January lo, 
1739. 
281 
Bibliography: Primary Sources 
Manuscript Sources 
British Library 
Newcastle Papers 
Add. Ms. 32690 -8 
Add. Ms. 32774 
Add. Ms. 32788 -9 
Add. Ms. 32794 - 32802 
Add. Ms. 32993 
Add. Ms. 33004 
Add. Ms. 33007 
Add. Ms. 33028 
Add. Ms. 33032 
Add. Ms. 33033 
Home correspondence 1735-1741 
Diplomatic correspondence 1731 
Diplomatic correspondence 1735 
Diplomatic correspondence 1737-1742 
Memoranda, cabinet minutes 
Minutes of Privy Council 
Diplomatic negotiations 1735-1742 
Military papers 1701-1740 
Papers about the South Sea Company 
Papers of proceedings in Parliament 1689-1740 
Hardwicke Papers 
Add. Ms. 35353 Correspondence, Lord Hardwicke & his son Charles 
Yorke, 1739- 1764 
Add. Ms. 35360 Correspondence, 2nd Lord Hardwicke & his brother 
Charles Yorke, 1740-1760 
Add. Ms. 35387 Sir Joseph Yorke & Lady Anson, 1739-53 
Add. Ms. 35396 Correspondence, 2nd Lord Hardwicke & Rev Thomas 
Birch, 1741-1744 
Add. Ms. 35406 -7 Political correspondence, 1723-1743 
Add. Ms. 35586 -7 General correspondence, 1737-1744 
Add. Ms. 35605 Papers of 2nd Lord Hardwicke, 1737-1750 
Add. Ms. 35870 Cabinet notes & papers 
Add. Ms. 35872 -4 Original orders in council etc. 1726-1756 
Add. Ms. 35875 -6 Parliamentary collections 1720-1749 
Add. Ms. 35884 Diplomatic papers re Spain 1738-1757 
Add. Ms. 35893 Army papers 1715-1759 
Add. Ms. 35898 Lord Elibank's journal 
Add. Ms. 36051-2 Notebooks 1741-1742 
Add. Ms. 36248 Pedigrees of Yorke family 
Miscellaneous 
Add. Ms. 3970 An Account of Admiral Vernon's Attempt upon Carthagena 
Add. Ms. 4224 Birch; biographical anecdotes 
Add. Ms. 4306 Birch 
Add. Ms. 4312 Birch 
Add. Ms. 4320 Birch 
Add. Ms. 4806 Pulteney et al to Swift 
282 
Add. Ms. 9082 Coxe; ciphers 
Add. Ms. 9131 -2 Coxe, H. Walpole, re Spanish depredations 
Add. Ms. 9152 Coxe; political letters & papers 1724 
Add. Ms. 9175 Coxe; letters & papers re political history of Great Britain 
1714-1756 
Add. Ms. 9200 Collections of Rev Henry Etough 
Add. Ms. 12099 Miscellaneous autograph letters 
Add. Ms. 15855 Anson; book of orders 
Add. Ms. 15946 Letters of English statesmen 1702-1751 
Add. Ms. 18915 Pulteney 
Add. Ms. 19030 Wager; papers re navy 1734-1739 
Add. Ms. 19036 Military; intelligence re France & Spain 
Add. Ms. 22256 Strafford; letters to Lady Anne Campbell, 1735-1740 
Add. Ms. 22526 Carteret 1742-1744 
Add. Ms. 22539 Carteret, intelligence 1742-1744 
Add. Ms. 22542 Carteret, articles, memorials, rescripts 1741-1742 
Add. Ms. 22626 Suffolk papers; letters to Lady Suffolk, 1727-1766 
Add. Ms. 22628 Suffolk; Pulteney to Hon. G. Berkeley et al 
Add. Ms. 28132 -3 Norris journal 1737-1743 
Add. Ms. 28323 1739 military establishment 
Add. Ms. 31142 Lord Strafford's correspondence 1731-1756 
Add. Ms. 31149 - 50 Strafford papers; political & ambassadorial, 1684-1739 
Add. Ms. 32628 On Pressing Seamen 
Add. Ms. 33344 Pelham 
Add. Ms. 34097 Journal of Col William Burrard 
Add. Ms. 34207 Burrard correspondence 1741-2 
Add. Ms. 35335 Papers relating to R. Walpole 
Add. Ms. 37994 Bolingbroke to Marchmont, 1740-1750 
Add. Ms. 40287 Vernon papers, 1739-1742 
Add. Ms. 43422 Keene papers, 1736-1739 
Add. Ms. 43441 Keene papers, 1740-1749 
Add. Ms. 46989 Egmont estate correspondence, 1737-1738 
Add. Ms. 47012, A&B Egmont papers; royal correspondence 1737-1750 & 
election materials 1739-1741 
Add. Ms. 47091 Egmont papers 
Add. Ms. 47159 Egmont 
Add. Ms. 51337 Holland House correspondence, 1736-55 
Add. Ms. 51340 Holland House; Digby letters 1719-71 
Add. Ms. 51345 Hervey 
Add. Ms. 51348 Holland House; general correspondence 1720-54 
Add. Ms. 51377 -8 Holland House; foreign, military & naval 1738-70 
Add. Ms. 51388 Holland House; Keene 1738,1756 
Add. Ms. 51390 Holland House; Hanbury-Williams, 1739-45 
Add. Ms. 51396 Holland House; Thos. Winnington & Hervey 1728-61 
Add. Ms. 51422 Holland House; Charlotte & Edward Digby 1732-73 
Add. Ms. 51427 Holland House; general correspondence 1721-48 
Add. Ms. 51437 -9 Holland House; Dr. Ayscough's journal, a lampoon on 
Sandys, Fox memoirs &c. 
283 
Add. Ms. 63749 - 50 
Egerton 2695 
Lansdowne 668 
Lansdowne 700 
Stowe 242 
Stowe 254 
Stowe 256 
Stowe 308 
Robert Walpole papers 
Envoy Titley's diary, 173 7-1765 
Financial Statements 
Commonplace book 
State Papers, 1713-1744 
State Papers, 1744-1772 
Phelps, correspondence 1725-1768 
Chesterfield's Characters 
British Library, India Office Library 
B/65 -6 Court Books 1738-1742 
B/164 Court Books 1736-1738 
B/256 General Court Minutes, 1734-1766 
E/1/28 -9 Home correspondence, 1737-1739 
E/1/204 Miscellanies, 1737-1741 
Public Record Office 
State Papers 
S. P. 36/45-50 State Papers Domestic 1738-1740 
S. P. 36/56-58 State Papers Domestic 1741-1742 
S. P. 41/13-14 Correspondence of Secretary at War, 1741-1743 
S. P. 41/36 Ordnance correspondence 
S. P. 42/24 Lords of Admiralty letters 
S. P. 43/19 Regencies 1736-7 
S. P. 43/20-21 Regencies 1736-7 
S. P. 43/24-25 Regencies 1737-40 
S. P. 44/183 Secretary of State Letter Books 1740-1743 
S. P. 78/217-227 A&B State Papers Foreign, France, 1738-42 
S. P. 84/369 State papers foreign, Hague 
S. P. 94/114 Spain; Benjamin Keene & the Commissaries, 1732 
S. P. 94/128-134 State Papers Foreign, Spain, 1737-39 
S. P. 94/206 Spain; intercepts 1738 
S. P. 107/21-34 Intercepts, all countries, 1736-1739 
Colonial Office 
C. O. 5/41 -2 Papers relating to the Cartagena expedition 
War Office 
W. O. 4/35 -7 Letter books 
W. O. 5/34 -5 Marching orders 
W. O. 24/189 Establishment of Officers under Lord Cathcart 
W. O. 24/193 Establishment of General Officers 1740 
W. O. 24/197 -8 Establishment of Forces 1740 
W. O. 24/206 Establishment of Forces in Plantations 1741 
W. O. 25/19 - 20 Commission Books 1735-1743 
W. O. 25/89 - 90 Commission Books 1734-1748 
W. O. 25/3021 Widows' bounty 
W. O. 55/347 Entry book 1717-1725 
284 
W. O. 71/18 General Courts Martial, 1740-1745 
W. O. 71/37 -8 General Courts Martial, 1739-1745 
W. O. 71/125 Judge Advocate-General's Office Court Martial papers 
1741-1745 
W. O. 81/3 Judge Advocate-General's Office Letter Book, 1740-1746 
Admiralty 
ADM. 1/4108 -9 Secretary of State's letters to Admiralty, 1736? -1746 ADM. 3/45 Lords Commissioners of Admiralty Minute Book, 1740- 
1742 
ADM. 50/18 Journal of Sir Chaloner Ogle 
ADM. 50/27 Journal of Vice-Admiral Edward Vernon, 1739-1741 
ADM. 51/4383 Log of the Centurion 
ADM. 96/143 Army List, 1740 
ADM. 106/2178 Navy Board letters to Admiralty 
Cambridge University Library 
General manuscripts 
CUL Add. 6851 Edward Harley's parliamentary journal, 1728-1751 
Cholmondeley Houghton Mss 
ChH Correspondence 
2667 - 3177 
ChH P17/11 
C1Ii P17/18 
ChH P73/44 
ChH P74/72 
ChH P75/12 - 13 
ChH P75/18 - 19 
Correspondence 1737-1743 
Norris, account of the winds Jun-Oct 1740 
Council of War, Marlborough, 1741 
Ms pamphlet against Bolingbroke 
List of subscribers to Craftsman, 1730 
Circulation lists of government pamphlets 
Memoranda 
Wolterton Hall: Wolterton (Walpole) Mss 
Harrington, 1737 -9 
Newcastle despatches, 1736 -9 
Waldegrave, 1738 -9 
Hague, H. Walpole, 1739 
Sir K Walpole letters & papers 2 vols 
H. Walpole original drafts, 1736-1737 
H. Walpole projects, letters, &c. 
Miscellaneous unbound papers 
Political tracts & other papers 2 Vols 
`Rapsody of Foreign Politics' 1750 
Sketch of Mr. Walpole's Conduct... 
Windsor Castle, Royal Archives 
Bootle Mss 
285 
RA 54024 - 54126 
Stuart Mss 
RA SP 204 - 229 
Archivo de Simancas 
Secretaria de Estado 
Legajo 6900 
Legajo 6901 
Legajo 6902-4 
Legajo 6905 
Legajo 6906 
Legajo 6907 
Legajo 6908 
Legajo 6909 
Legajo 6910 
Letters from Frederick, Prince of Wales & others, 1737- 
1753 
Correspondence with the Pretender, 1738-1741 
Papers generated by Keene, 173 5-7 
Correspondence of Patino and la Quadra, 173 5-7 
Correspondence of Geraldino & others, 1737-8 
Papers generated by Keene, 1738 
Documents relative to the Convention of 9 September 
Papers generated by Keene, 1739 
Correspondence of Geraldino, 1738-40 
Documents relative to the declaration of war 
Intelligence of Don Luis Terrason from London 1740-1741 
Printed Primary Sources 
Anon The Evident Advantages to Great Britain and its Allies 
from the Approaching War: Especially in Matters of 
Trade, London, 1727 
Anon Great Britain's Speediest Sinking Fund is a Powerful 
Maritime War, Rightly Managed, and especially in the 
West Indies, London, 1727 
Anon The True Interest of the Hanover Treaty Consider 'd: and 
How far FRANCE, and the rest of the ALLIES, may be 
depended upon, London, 1727 
Anon An Historical Ballad, humbly inscrib'd to the DUUMJRI, 
London, nd c. 1730 
Anon A Manifesto of the Lord Protector... Wherein is shewn the 
Reasonableness of the Cause of this Republic against the 
Depredations of the Spaniards, London, 1738 
Anon The Negotiators, or Don Diego brought to Reason, 
London, 1738 
Anon Lord B ke's SPEECH upon the Convention, London , 1739 
Anon The British Sailor's Discovery, or the Spanish Pretensions 
Confuted, London, 1739 
Anon His Catholick Majesty's Manifesto, Justifying his Conduct 
286 
in Relation to the late Convention, with His Reasons for 
not paying the £95,000, London, 1739 
Anon The National Dispute; or, the History of the Convention 
Treaty, London, 1739 
Anon The Original Series of Wisdom and Policy, Manifested in a 
Review of our Foreign Negotiations and Transactions for 
Several Years past, London, 1739 
Anon What Things? Or, an Impartial Inquiry into What Things 
are So, and What things are not so, London, 1740 
Anon An Epistle from a N-le L-d to Mr. P -y, London, 1740 
Anon The Expedition. An Ode, London, 1741 
Anon The Late Gallant Exploits of a Famous Balancing 
Captain: a New Song to the Tune of the King and the Mill, 
London, 1741 
Anon The Conduct of the Late and Present M-ry Compared, 
London, 1742 
Anon Seventeen Hundred Forty-Two. Being a Review of the 
Conduct of the New Ministry the last year, London, 1743 
Anon Observations on the Conduct of Great Britain, in Respect 
to Foreign Affairs, London, 1743 
Baugh, D. A. (ed) Naval Administration 1715-50 (Navy Records Society 120, 
1977) 
Bonham, Samuel The Case of Samuel Bonham and the other Owners of the 
Anne Galley, Joseph Spackman, Master, bound from 
Guinea to the island Jamaica, was taken by the Spaniards 
between Hispaniola and Jamaica, the 13th. of June, 1728, 
London, 1737 
Boyer, Abel The Political State of Great Britain, Vols. XLI, XLII, 
LVII, 1731 & 1739 
Bromley, J. S. ed The Manning of the Royal Navy. Selected Public 
Pamphlets 1693-1873, Navy Records Society 119,1974 
Burke, Edmund Thoughts on the Prospect of a Regicide Peace, In a Series 
of Letters, London, 1796 
Chalmers, George (ed) A Collection of Treaties between Great Britain and other 
Powers, 2 Vols. London, 1790 
Chandler, Richard The History and Proceedings of the House of Commons 
from the Restoration to the Present Time, Vols. X-XI, 
London, 1743 
Cobbett, William Parliamentary History of England, Vols IX-XI, London 
1811-13 
287 
Corbett, J. S. (ed) Fighting Instructions 1530-1816 (Navy Records Society, 
1905) 
Cowley, J. The Sailor's Companion and Merchantman's Convoy, 
London, 1740 
Coxe, William Memoirs of Horatio, Lord Walpole, 2 Vols., London, 1802 
Coxe, William Memoirs of the Life and Administration of Sir Robert 
Walpole, Earl of Orford, 3 Vols., London, 1798 
Coxe, William Memoirs of the Kings of Spain of the House of Bourbon 
from the Accession of Philip V to the Death of Charles III 
1700-1788,5 Vols, London, 1815 
Coxe, William Memoirs of the Administration of the Right Honourable 
Henry Pelham, 2 Vols., London, HMSO, 1829 
Davies, K. G. (ed) Calendar of State Papers Colonial Series, America and 
West Indies, XLIV, 1738, London, 1969 
De Coetlogon, Dennis Diogenes's Rambles: or, Humorous Characters of the Most 
noted People at present in the World, London, 1743 
De Coetlogon, Dennis Serious and Impartial Reflections on the Conduct of the 
Several Princes and States of Europe at this Present 
Conjuncture, London, 1743 
De Coetlogon, Dennis Various Ironic and Serious Discourses on the Subject of 
Physick, London, 1749 
Diaz-Plaja, Fernando Historia de Espana en sus Documentos. Siglo XVIII, 
Catedra, Madrid, 1986 
Fielding, Henry The Vernoniad Done into English, From the Original 
Greek of Homer. Lately found at Constantinople. With 
Notes ad usum, &c, London, 1741 
Firth, C. H. (ed) Naval Songs and Ballads, Navy Records Society, 33,1908 
Haines, Henry Treachery, Baseness and Cruelty display'd to the full, in 
the Hardships and Sufferings of Mr. Henry Haines, Late 
Printer of the Country Journal, or Craftsman, London, 
1740 
Hervey, John, Lord Some Materials toward Memoirs of the Reign of King 
George II, ed. Romney Sedgwick 3 Vols, London, King's 
Printers, 1931 
Historical Manuscripts Fourteenth Report, Appendix, Part IX, Manuscripts of the 
Commission Earl of Buckinghamshire London, HMSO 1896 
Historical Manuscripts Manuscripts of the Earl of Egmont. Diary of the First Earl 
Commission of Egmont (Viscount Percival), Vol. III 1739-1747, 
London, HMSO 1923 
Historical Manuscripts 78, III, Hastings, Report on the Mss of Reginald Rawdon 
Commission Hastings, London, HMSO 1934 
288 
Hughes, Helen S. The Gentle Hertford Her Life and Letters (New York, 
Macmillan, 1940) 
Jenkinson, C., A Collection of all the Treaties of Peace, Alliance and 
Lord Liverpool (ed) Commerce, between Great Britain and other Powers, 3 
Vols., London, 1785 
Dinkins, Captain Spanish Insolence Corrected by English Bravery, Being an 
Historical Account of the many Signal Naval Achievements 
Obtained by the English over the Spaniards From the Year 
1350 to the present Time, London, 1739 
Johnson, Samuel Yale edition of the Works of Johnson: Vol. VI, Poems, ed. 
E. L. McAdam, Jr., (1964); Vol. X, Political Writings, ed. 
D. J. Greene, (1977) 
Journal of the House of Commons, Vol. 23,1737-1741 
Journal of the House of Lords, Vols. 25-6,1736-1742 
Lambert, Sheila ed House of Commons Sessional Papers of the Eighteenth 
Century, 2 Vols, Wilmington, Delaware, 1975-6 
McCann, T. J. ed The Correspondence of the Dukes of Richmond and 
Newcastle 1724-1750, Sussex Record Society, 73, 
Gloucester, 1984 
'Marforio' An Historical View of the Principles, Characters, Persons 
&c. of the Political Writers in Great Britain, London, 1740 
[Miller, Rev James] Are these Things So?, London, 1740 
[Miller, Rev James] The Great Man's Answer to Are these Things So?, London, 
1740 
Morel-Fatio, A. & H. Receuil des instructions donnees aux ambassadeurs et 
Leonardon ministres de France, XII, Espagne (Paris, 1894) 
[Morris, Robert] Have at you All, being a proper and distinct Reply to three 
Pamphlets just published, intituled What of That? The 
Weather Menders, and, They Are Not, London, 1740 
[Morris, Robert] Yes, They Are: Being an Answer to Are these Things So?, 
London, 1740 
Newcomb, Thomas A Supplement to a late Excellent Poem entitled Are these 
Things So?, London, 1740 
Norton, Lucy (ed) Historical Memoirs of the Duc de Saint-Simon, III, 1715- 
1723, (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1972) 
Parry, Clive (ed) The Consolidated Treaty Series, Vols. 10,11,35, New 
York, Oceana Publications, 1969 
Philalethes The Profit and Loss of Great Britain and Spain, from the 
Commencement of the Present War, to this Time, 
impartially stated, London, 1742 
289 
Pulteney, William A Review of All that hath pass'd between the Courts of 
Great Britain and Spain, Relating to Our Trade and 
Navigation, from the year 1721, to the Present Convention; 
with some Particular Observations upon it, London, 1739 
Ranft, B. McL. (ed) The Vernon Papers (Navy Records Society, 99,1958) 
Robe, Thomas Ways and Means to Man the Navy, with not less than 
Fifteen Thousand Able Sailors, London, 1726 
[Robins, Benjamin] An Address to the Electors... Occasion'd by the late 
Secession in which is contain'd a particular account of all 
our negotiations with Spain, and their treatment of us, for 
above ten years past, London, 1739 
[Rose, George] A Selection from the Papers of the Earls of Marchmont... 
Illustrative of Events from 1685 to 1750,3 Vols, London, 
1831 
Seco Serrano, D. C. (ed) Vicente Bacallar y Sanna, Marques de San Felipe, 
Comentarios de la Guerra de EspaIla e Historia de su Rey 
Felipe V, el Animoso (Madrid, Real Academia Espaliola, 
1957) 
Shaw, William A. (ed) Calendar of Treasury Books and Papers, Vols III-V, 1735- 
1745, London, HMSO, 1901 
Smollett, Tobias The History of England from the Revolution to the Death 
of George the Second, 5 Vols., III, London, 1790 
Swift, Jonathan The Conduct of the Allies, and of the Late Ministry, in 
Beginning and Carrying on the Present War, London, 
1711 
Timberland, Ebenezer The History and Proceedings of the House of Lords, from 
the Restoration of 1660 to the Present Time, Vols. VI-VII, 
London, 1742 
Vaucher, P. (ed) Receuil des instructions donnees aux ambassadeurs et 
ministres de France, XXV, 2, Angleterre, Vol. 3,1698- 
1721 (Paris, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 
1965) 
Vaughan, H. S. (ed) The Voyages and Cruises of Commodore Walker, London, 
Cassell 1928; 1st. ed. 1760 
Walpole, Horace Jr. Memoirs of King George II, ed. John Brooke, New Haven, 
Yale U. P., 1985 
Walpole, Horace Jr. Yale Edition of Horace Walpole's Correspondence, general 
editor W. S. Lewis: Vol. 9, Correspondence with George 
Montagu, ed. W. S. Lewis, (1941); Vol. 17, 
Correspondence with Sir Horace Mann, ed. W. S. Lewis, 
W. H. Smith & G. L. Lam, (1954; 1975); Vol. 30, 
Correspondence with George Selwyn, Lord Lincoln, Sir 
290 
Charles Hanbury Williams, Henry Fox, Richard 
Edgcumbe, ed. W. S. Lewis & R. A. Smith, (1961) 
Walpole, Horatio The Grand QUESTION, Whether War, or no War, with 
Spain, Impartially Consider 'd: in DEFENCE of the 
present Measures against those that delight in War, 
London, 1739 
Walpole, Horatio The Convention Vindicated from the Misrepresentations of 
the Enemies of our Peace, London 1739 
`Whitehead, Mr. ' Manners; a Satire, London, 1739 
Wyndham, Henry P. The Diary of the Late George Bubb Dodington, Baron of 
Melcombe Regis, Dublin, 1784 
Newspapers 
The Champion; or, The Evening Advertiser, London, 1740-1742 
Common Sense, or The Englishman's Journal, London, 1738-1741 
The Country Journal, or The Craftsman, London, 1731; 1737-1743 
The Gentleman's Magazine, or, MonthlyIntelligencer, Vols. 1& 10, London, 1731, 
1740 
The Historical Register, London, 1731 
The London and Country Journal, London, 1738-40 
The London Daily Post & General Advertiser, London, 1740-1741 
The London Evening Post, London, 1738-1742 
The London Gazette, London, 1740-1741 
The London Magazine, London, 173 8-9 
The London Morning Advertiser, London, 1741-2 
The Publick Register: or, the Weekly Magazine, London, 1741 
Read's Weekly Journal, London, 1731 
291 
Bibliography: Secondary Sources 
Books 
Abbad, F. & Les intendants espagnols du XVII! (Madrid, Casa de 
pram, D. Velazquez, 1992) 
Andrews, K. R. Elizabethan Privateering. English Privateering during the 
Spanish War 1585-1603 (Cambridge, Cambridge U. P., 
1964) 
Anes, G. El Antiguo Regimen: los Borbones (Madrid, Alfaguara, 
1975) 
Armstrong, E. Elisabeth Farnese. 'The Termagant of Spain' (London, 
Longmans, 1892) 
Artola, M. (ed) La economic espaiýola al final del Antiguo Regimen, IV, 
Instituciones (Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1982) 
Battestin, M. C., Henry Fielding: a Life (London, Routledge, 1989) 
with Battestin, R. 
Baudrillart, A. Philippe Vet la cour de France (5 vols, Paris, Firmin-Didot, 
1890-1900) 
D. A. Baugh British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole , (Princeton, N. J., Princeton U. P., 1965) 
Black, J. M. (ed) Britain in the Age of Walpole (London, Macmillan, 1984) 
Black, J. M. British Foreign Policy in the Age of Walpole (Edinburgh, 
John Donald, 1985) 
Black, J. M. Natural and Necessary Enemies. Anglo-French Relations in 
the Eighteenth Century (London, Duckworth, 1986) 
Black, J. M. (ed) The Origins of War in Early Modem Europe (Edinburgh, 
John Donald, 1987) 
Black, J. M. The English Press in the Eighteenth Century (London, 
Croom Helm, 1987) 
Black, J. M. & The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the 
Woodfine, P. L. Eighteenth Century (Leicester, Leicester U. P., 1988) 
(eds) 
Black, J. M. (ed) Knights Errant and True Englishmen. British Foreign 
Policy, 1600-1800 (Edinburgh, John Donald, 1989) 
Black, J. M. Robert Walpole and the Nature of Politics in Early 
Eighteenth Century England (London, Macmillan, 1990) 
Black, J. M. A System of Ambition? British Foreign Policy 1660-1793 
(London, Longman, 1991) 
292 
Black, J. M. & Culture, Politics and Society in Britain 1660-1800 
Gregory, J. (eds) Manchester, Manchester U. P., 1991) 
Black, J. M. The Politics of Britain 1688-1800 (Manchester, Manchester 
U. P., 1993) 
Black, J. M. British Foreign Policy in an Age of Revolutions 1783-1793 
(Cambridge, Cambridge U. P., 1994) 
Black, J. M. Convergence or Divergence? Britain and the Continent 
(London, Macmillan, 1994) 
Brewer, J. The Sinews of Power. War, Money and the English State, 
1688-1783 (London, Routledge, 1989) 
Browning, R. The Duke of Newcastle (New Haven, Yale U. P., 1975) 
Browning, R. Political and Constitutional Ideas of the Court Whigs 
(Baton Rouge, La., Univ. Louisiana P., 1982) 
Cannon, J. (ed) The Whig Ascendancy. Colloquies on Hanoverian England 
(London, Edward Arnold, 1981) 
Carpio, M. J. Espana y los Ultimos Estuardos (Madrid, U. de Madrid, 
1952) 
Colley, L. In Defiance of Oligarchy. The Tory Party 1714-60 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982) 
Colley, L. Britons. Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New Haven, Yale 
U. P., 1992) 
Crewe, D. Yellow Jack and the Worm. British Naval Administration in 
the West Indies, 1739-1748 (Liverpool, Liverpool U. P., 
1993) 
Cruickshanks, E. Political Untouchables. The Tons and the '45 (London, 
Duckworth, 1979) 
Cruickshanks, E. Ideology and Conspiracy: Aspects of Jacobitism, 1689- 
(ed) 1759 (Edinburgh, John Donald, 1982) 
Cruickshanks, E. & The Jacobite Challenge (Edinburgh, John Donald, 1988) 
Black, J. M. (eds) 
Dickinson, H. T. Bolingbroke (London, Constable, 1970) 
Dickinson, H. T. Liberty and Property: Political Ideology in Eighteenth 
Century Britain (London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1977) 
Domininguez Ortiz, Sociedad y Estado en el Siglo XV111 F. spatlol (Barcelona, 
A. Ariel, 1976) 
Duffy, M. (ed) The Englishman and the Foreigner (Cambridge, Chadwyck- 
Healey, 1986) 
Duffy, M. (ed) Parameters of British Naval Power, 1650-1850 (Exeter, U. 
Exeter Press, 1992) 
293 
Duke, A. C. & Too Mighty to be Free. Censorship and the Press in Britain 
Tamse, C. A. (eds) and the Netherlands (Zutphen, De Walburg Pers, 1987) 
Egido Lopez, T. Opinion Publica y Oposicion al Poder en la F. spaila del 
Siglo XVIII (1713-1759) (Valladolid, U. Valladolid P., 
1971) 
Ellis, K. The Post Office in the Eighteenth Century. A Study in 
Administrative History (London, Oxford U. P., 1958) 
Escudero, J. A. Los Origenes del Consejo de Ministros en Espai a. La 
Junta Suprema de Estado (2 Vols. Madrid, Editoro 
Nacional, 1979), Vol. 1 
Fernandez, J. M. Officiales y Soldados en el Ejercito de America (Sevilla, 
Escuela de Estudios Hispanoamericanos, 1983) 
Fernandez, R. (ed) Fspaiia en el Siglo XVIII. Homenaje a Pierre Vilar 
(Barcelona, Editorial Critica, 1985) 
Fontana, J. (ed) La economia espaliola al final del Antiguo Regimen, III, 
Comercio y Colonias (Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1982) 
Fortescue, J. W. A History of the British Army (Vol. II, London, 
Macmillan, 1899) 
Fritz, P. S. The English Ministers and Jacobitism between the 
Rebellions of 1715 and 1745 (Toronto, Toronto U. P., 
1975) 
Garcia-Baquero Cadiz y el Atlantico (1717-1778) (2 Vols, Seville, U. de 
Gonzalez, A. Sevilla, 1976) 
Goldgar, B. Walpole and the Wits: the Relation of Politics to Literature, 
1722-1742 (Lincoln, Nebr., Univ. Nebraska Press, 1976) 
Grice-Hutchinson, Early Economic Thought in Spain, 1177-1740 (London, 
M. Allen & Unwin, 1978) 
Guinard, P. J. La Presse Espagnole de 1737 ä 1791 (Paris, Hispaniques, 
1973) 
Guy, A. J. Oeconomy and Discipline: Officership and Administration 
in the British Army 1714-63 (Manchester, Manchester U. P., 
1985) 
Hanson, L. Government and the Press, 1695-1763 (Oxford, Clarendon, 
1936) 
Harding, R. Amphibious Warfare in the Eighteenth Century. The British 
Expedition to the West Indies 1740-1742, Royal Historical 
Society Studies in History 62, (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 
Boydell & Brewer, 1991) 
Harris, F. A Passion for Government. The Life of Sarah Duchess of 
Marlborough (Oxford, Clarendon, 1991) 
294 
Harris, M. & Lee, The Press in English Society from the Seventeenth to the 
A. (eds) Nineteenth Centuries (London, Associated Univ. Presses, 
1986) 
Harris, M. London Newspapers in the Age of Walpole: a Study of the 
Origins of the Modern English Press (London, Associated 
Univ. Presses, 1987) 
Harris, R. A Patriot Press. National Politics and the London Press in 
the 1740s (Oxford, Clarendon., 1993) 
Hay, D. & Snyder, Policing and Prosecution in Britain 1750-1850 (Oxford, 
F. (eds) Clarendon, 1985) 
Haydon, C. Anti-Catholicism in Eighteenth Century England, c. 1714- 
1780. A political and social study (Manchester, Manchester 
U. P., 1993) 
Henderson, A. J. London and the National Government 1721-1742 (Durham, 
N. C., 1945) 
Houlding, J. A. Fit for Service. The Training of the British Army, 1715- 
1795 (Oxford, Clarendon, 1981) 
Howard, M. War in European History (Oxford, Oxford U. P., 1976) 
Holmes, G. & The Age of Oligarchy. Pre-industrial Britain 1722-1783 
Szechi, D. (London, Longman, 1993) 
Horn, D. B. Great Britain and Europe in the Eighteenth Century 
(Oxford, Clarendon, 1967) 
Horn, D. B. The British Diplomatic Service 1689-1789 (Oxford, 
Clarendon, 1961) 
Horn, D. B. (ed) British Diplomatic Representatives 1689-1789, Royal 
Historical Society, Camden Series, XLVI (London, 1932) 
Hussey, R. D. The Caracas Company, 1728-1784. A Study in the Histor y 
of Spanish Monopolistic Trade (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard 
U. P., 1934) 
Jones, C. (ed) Party and Management in Parliament, 1660-1784 
(Leicester, Leicester U. P., 1984) 
Jones, C. (ed) Britain in the First Age of Party 1680-1750 (London, 
Hambledon, 1987) 
Jones, C. (ed) A Pillar of the Constitution. The House of Lords in British 
Politics, 1640-1784 (London, Hambledon, 1989) 
Kelch, R. A. Newcastle. A Duke without Money. Thomas Pelham-Holles, 
1693-1768 (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974) 
Lambert, S. Bills & Acts. Legislative Procedure in Eighteenth-Century 
England (Cambridge, Cambridge U. P., 1971) 
Langford, P. (ed) Walpole and the Robinocracy (Cambridge, Chadwyck- 
295 
Healey, 1986) 
Laprade, W. T. Public Opinion and Politics in Eighteenth Century England 
(New York, Macmillan, 1936) 
Liss, P. K. Atlantic Empires: the Network of Trade and Revolution, 
1713-1826 (Baltimore, Marlyand U. P., 1983) 
Lynch, J. Bourbon Spain 1700-1808 (Oxford, Blackwell, 1989) 
McKay, D. & Scott, The Rise of the Great Powers 1648-1815 (London, 
H. M. Macmillan, 1983) 
McKendrick, N. Historical Perspectives: Studies in English Thought and 
(ed) Society in Honour of JH. Plumb (London, 1974) 
McLachlan, J. O. Trade and Peace with Old Spain, 1667-1750: a Study of the 
Influence of Commerce on Anglo-Spanish Diplomacy in the 
First Half of the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, 
Cambridge U. P., 1940) 
Marsden, P. The Officers of the Commons, 1363-1978 (London, HMSO, 
1979) 
Merino Navarro, La Armada F. spaýiola en el Siglo XVIII (Madrid, Fundacion 
J. P. Universitaria Espanola, 1981) 
Miller, J. (ed) Religion in the Popular Prints 1600-1832 (Cambridge, 
Chadwyck-Healey, 1986) 
Monod, P. K. Jacobitism and the English People, 1688-1788 (Cambridge, 
Cambridge U. P., 1989) 
Morales Padrön, F. Rebeliön contra la CompaIiia de Caracas (Seville, U. de 
Sevilla, 1955) 
Morineau, M. Incroyables gazettes et fabuleux metaux. Les retours des 
tresors americains d'apres les gazelles hollandaises (XVT - 
XVIIP siecles (Cambridge, Cambridge U. P., 1985) 
Owen, J. B. The Rise of the Pelhams (London, Methuen, 1957) 
Palacio Atard, V. La Espana del Siglo XVIII . El Siglo de las Reformas (Madrid, Universidad Nacional de Education a Distancia, 
1978) 
Pares, R. War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739-1763 (Cambridge, 
Cambridge U. P., 1936) 
Pares, R. Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, 1739-1763 
(Cambridge, Cambridge U. P., 1938) 
Reed, M. & Wells, Class, Conflict and Protest in the English Countryside, 
R. A. E. (eds) 1700-1800 (London, Frank Cass, 1990) 
Richmond, H. W. The Navy in the War of 1739-48 (3 Vols., Cambridge, 
Cambridge U. P., 1920) 
Rogers, N. Whigs and Cities. Popular Politics in the Age of Walpole 
296 
and Pitt (Oxford, Oxford U. P., 1989) 
Roosen, W. J. The Age of Louis XIV The Rise of Modem Diplomacy 
(Cambridge, Mass., Schenkman, 1976) 
Sainty, J. C. (ed) Officials of the Secretaries of State, 1660-1782 (London, 
Athlone Press, 1973) 
Sedgwick, R. (ed) History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1715-1754 
(2 Vols, London, HMSO, 1970) 
Southey, Capt. T. Chronological History of the West Indies (3 Vols, London, 
Frank Cass, 1968 reprint of 1827 ed. ) 
Stevens, D. H. Party Politics and English Journalism, 1702-1742 (New 
York, Russell & Russell reprint 1967 of 1916 ed. ) 
Stevenson, J. (ed) London in the Age of Reform (Oxford, Clarendon, 1977) 
Stone, L. (ed) An Imperial State at War. Britain from 1689 to 1815 
(London, Routledge, 1994) 
Stradling, RA. Europe and the Decline of Spain. A Study of the Spanish 
System, 1580-1720 (London, Allen & Unwin, 1981) 
Tedde, P. La economia espaF ola al final del Antiguo Regimen, II, 
Manufacturas (Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1982) 
Thomas, P. D. G. The House of Commons in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 
Clarendon, 1971) 
Thomson, M. A. The Secretaries of State, 1681-1782 (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1932) 
Ultee, M. (ed) Adapting to Conditions. War and Society in the Eighteenth 
Century (Alabama, U. Alabama Press, 1986) 
Vaucher, P. Robert Walpole et la Politique de Fleury (1731-1742) 
(Paris, Pion, 1924) 
Walker, G. J. Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade 1700-1789 (London, 
Macmillan, 1979) 
West, J. Gunpowder, Government and War in the Mid-Eighteenth 
Century (Woodbridge, Suffolk, Royal Historical Society, 
1991) 
Whiteman, A., Statesmen, Scholars and Merchants. Essays in Eighteenth 
Bromley, J. S. & Century History Presented to Dame Lucy Sutherland 
Dickson, P. G. M. (Oxford, Clarendon, 1973) 
(eds) 
Wiggin, L. M. The Faction of Cousins. A Political Account of the 
Grenvilles, 1733-1763 (New Haven, Yale U. P., 1958) 
Wilkes, J. W. A Whig in Power: the Political Career of Henry Pelham 
(Chicago, 111, Northwestern U. P., 1964) 
Wilson, A. McC. French Foreign Policy During the Administration of 
297 
Cardinal Fleruy 1726-1743. A Study in Diplomacy and 
Commercial Development (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard 
U. P., 1936) 
Yorke, P. C. The Life and Correspondence of Philip Yorke, Earl of 
Hardwicke, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain (3 Vols, 
Chicago, Ill., U. Chicago Press, 1913) 
Articles 
Alton, A. S. `The Asiento Treaty as Reflected in the Papers of Lord 
Shelbourne', Hispanic American Historical Review, 8, 
1928,167-77 
Avery, E. L. & `The Opposition to Sir Robert Walpole, 1737-1739, 
Scouten, A. H. English Historical Review, LXXXII, 1968,331-6 
Batchelor, L. `The South Sea Company and the Assiento', Bulletin of the 
Institute of Historical Research, 3,1926,128-30 
Black, J. M. `The Challenge of Autocracy: The British Press in the 
1730s', Studi Settecenteschi, 3-4,1982-3,107-18 
Black, J. M. `The Theory of the Balance of Power in the First Half of the 
Eighteenth Century', Review of International Studies, 9, 
1983,55-61 
Black, J. M. `An "Ignoramus" in European Affairs? ', British Journal for 
Eighteenth Century Studies, 1983,55-65 
Black, J. M. `The Catholic Threat and the British Press in the 1720s and 
1730s', Journal of Religious History, 12,1983,364-8 
Black, J. M. `British Foreign Policy and the War of Austrian Succession, 
1740-48: A Research Priority', Canadian Journal of 
History, =, 1986,313-31 
Black, J. M. `Archives and the Problems of Diplomatic Research', 
Journal of the Society of Archivists, 1986,104-10 
Black, J. M. `British Intelligence and the Mid-Eighteenth Century Crisis', 
Intelligence and National Security, 2,1987,209-29 
Black, J. M. `French Foreign Policy in the Age of Fleury Reassessed', 
English Historical Review, CIII, 407,1988,359-84 
Black, J. M. `The British State and Foreign Policy in the Eighteenth 
Century', Trivium, 23,1988,127-48 
Black, J. M. `Jacobitism and British Foreign Policy under the First Two 
Georges 1714-1760', Royal Stuart Papers, XXXII, 1988,1- 
16 
J. M. Black `Anglo-French Relations in the Mid-Eighteenth Century', , Francia, 17,2,1990,45-79 
298 
Black, J. M. `Anglo-Spanish Naval Relations in the Eighteenth Century', 
Mariner's Mirror, 77,3,1991,235-258 
Black, J. M. `From Alliance to Confrontation: Anglo-French Relations 
1731-1740', Francia, 19,2,1992,23-45 
Black, J. M. `Britain and the Continent 1688-1815. Convergence or 
Divergence? ', British Journal for Eighteenth-Century 
Studies, 15,2,1992,145-9 
Castillo, A. `Coyuntura y Crecimiento de la Economia Espanola en el 
Siglo XVIII', Hispania, 117, It (1971), 31-54 
Clark, J. C. D. `The Politics of the Excluded: Tories, Jacobites and Whig 
Patriots 1715-1760', Parliamentary History, 2,1983,209- 
222 
Colley, L. `The Politics of Eighteenth Century British History', 
Journal of British Studies, 25,4,1986,359-79 
Collyer, C. `The Yorkshire Election of 1741'. Proceedings of the Leeds 
Philosophical Society (Literary and Historical Section), 
VII, 2,1953,137-52 
Cranfield, G. A. `The London Evening Post, 1727-1744: a Study in the 
Development of the Political Press', Historical Journal, VI, 
1,1963,20-37 
Darwin, M. A. `John Aislabie (1670-1742). A Study in Augustan Politics 
and Hanoverian Finance', Yorkshire Archaeological 
Journal, XXXVII, 3,147,1950,262-324 
Donnan, E. `The Early Days of the South Sea Company, 1711-1718', 
Journal of Economic and Business History, 2,1930,444-47 
Fayle, C. E. `Economic Pressure in the War of 1739-48', Journal of the 
Royal United Service Institution, LXIII, 1923,434-46 
Fritz, P. S. `Anti-Jacobite Intelligence Systems, 1715-1745', Historical 
Journal, XVI, 2,1973,265-90 
Gibbs, G. C. `Newspapers, Parliament, and Foreign Policy in the Age of 
Stanhope and Walpole', in Melanges Offerts d G. 
Jacquemyns (Brussels, 1968), 293-318 
Gilbert, A. N. `Law and Honour among Eighteenth Century British Army 
Officers', Historical Journal, 19,1,1976,75-87 
Gilbert, F. `The "New Diplomacy" of the Eighteenth Century', World 
Politics, 4,1951,1-38 
Goldsmith, M. A. `Faction Detected: Ideological Consequences of Robert 
Walpole's Decline and Fall', History, 64,210,1979,1-19 
Harding, R. `Sir Robert Walpole's Ministry and the Conduct of the War 
with Spain, 1739-41, Historical Research, 60,143,1987, 
299-320 
299 
Harris, M. `The Management of the London Newspaper Press During 
the Eighteenth Century', Publishing History, 4,1978,95- 
110 
Hayes, J. `The Royal House of Hanover and the British Army 1714- 
60', Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, 40,1957-8,328- 
57 
Hayes, J. `The Purchase of Colonelcies in the Army, 1714-63', 
Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 39, 
1961,3-11 
Hildner, E. G. `The Röte of the South Sea Company in the Diplomacy 
leading to the War of Jenkins' Ear, 1729-1739', Hispanic 
American Historical Review, 18,1938,322-41 
Hirschberg, D. R. `The Government and Church Patronage in England, 1660- 
1760', Journal of British Studies, XX, 1,1980,109-39 
Horn, D. B. `Rank and Enrolment in the British Diplomatic Service, 
1689-1789', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5 
series, 9,1959,19-50 
Jenkins, P. `Midland Toryism in the Eighteenth Century: a New 
Source', Journal of Regional and Local Studies, 6,2,1985, 
1-12 
Jordan, G. & `Admirals as Heroes: Patriotism and Liberty in Hanoverian 
Rogers, N. England', Journal of British Studies, 28,3,1989,201-24 
Laughton, J. K. `Jenkins's Ear', Notes and Documents, English Historical 
Review, 4, October 1889,741-749 
Lockwood, T. F. `Henry Fielding and the History of Our Own Times (1741)', 
Journal of Newspaper and Periodical History, III, 3,1987, 
2-11 
Lodge, Sir R. `Sir Benjamin Keene, K. B. A Study in Anglo-Spanish 
Relations in the Earlier Part of the Eighteenth Century', 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4 series, XV, 
1932,1-43 
Marini, A. J. 'Parliament and the Marine Regiments, 1739', Mariner's 
Mirror, 62,1976,55-66 
McLynn, F. `The Regional Distribution of Jacobite Support in England 
before 1745, Journal of Regional and Local Studies, 3,2, 
1983,14-27 
Meriono, J. `L'Arsenal de Carthagene au XVIII", Neptunia, 155,1984, 
21-32 
Molas Ribalta, P. `La Historia Social de le Administracion, Balance y 
Perspectivas para el Siglo XVIII Esparfol', Cuadernos de 
Investigacion Historica, 6,1982,151-68 
300 
Mowell, C. E. `The Defence of Cartagena', Hispanic American Historical 
Review, XLII, 1962,479-501 
Nelson, G. H. `Contraband Trade under the Asiento 1730-1739', 
American Historical Review, 51,1945-6,55-67 
Nettels, C. 'England and the Spanish American Trade 1680-1715', 
Journal of Modern History, 3,1,1931,1-32 
Oglesby, J. C. M. `The British and Panama, 1742', Caribbean Studies, 3,2, 
1963,71-9 
Oglesby, J. C. M. `Spain's Havana Squadron and the Preservation of the 
Balance of Power in the Caribbean, 1740-8', Hispanic 
American Historical Review, XLIX, 1969,473-88 
Oglesby, J. C. M. `England vs. Spain in America, 1739-1748: The Spanish 
Side of the Hill', Canadian Historical Association, 
Historical Papers, 1970,147-57 
Ozanam, D. `La Diplomacia de los Primeros Borbones (1714-1759)', 
Cuadernos de Investigaciön Histdrica, 6,1982,169-94 
Pares, R. `The Manning of the Navy in the West Indies, 1702-63', 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, XX, 1937,31- 
60 
Pares, R. `American versus Continental Warfare, 1739-63', English 
Historical Review, LI, 1936,429-465 
Parrön Salas, C. `Comercio Maritimo y Comerciantes de Cartagena en el 
Siglo XVIII', Revista de Historia Naval, 29,1990,23-61 
Ranft, B. McL. `Labour Relations in the Royal Dockyards, 1739, 
Mariner's Mirror, 47,1961,281-91 
Sanchez Marcos, F. `Los Oficiales Generales de Felipe V', Cuadernos de 
Investigaciön Historica, 6,1982,241-6 
Sedgwick, R. R. `The Inner Cabinet from 1739 to 1741, English Historical 
Review, XXXIV, 1919,290-3 02 
Seeley, J. R. `The House of Bourbon', English Historical Review, 1, 
January 1886,86-104 
Sheridan, R. B. 'The Molasses Act and the Market Strategy of the British 
Sugar Planters', Journal of Economic History, XVII, 1957, 
62-83 
Shoemaker, R. B. `The London "Mob" in the Early Eighteenth Century', 
Journal of British Studies, 26,3,1987,273-3 04 
Suarez de Lezo, L. `Los Flecos de la Historia: Las Medallas del Almirante 
Vernon', Revista de Historia Naval, 29,1990 99-124 , 
Suarez de Lezo, L. `Los Flecos de la Historia: Guardia en Linea baja', Revista de 
Historia Naval, 24,1984,23-31 
301 
Swanson, C. E. `The Profitability of Privateering: Reflections on British 
Colonial Privateers During the War of 1739-1748', 
American Neptune, XLII, 1982,36-56 
Temperley, H. W. V. `The Causes of the War of Jenkins' Ear, 1739', 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 3 series, III, 
1909,197-236 
Wilson, K. `Empire, Trade and Popular Politics in Mid-Hanoverian 
Britain: the Case of Admiral Vernon', Past & Present, 121, 
1988,74-109 
Woodfine, P. L. `Government Harassment of the Press in the Late 1730s', 
Journal of Newspaper & Periodical History, V, 2, Spring 
1989,20-34 
Woodfine, P. L. `The War of Jenkins' Ear: A New Voice in the Wentworth- 
Vernon Debate', Journal of the Society for Army Historical 
Research, LXV, 262,1987,67-91 
Woodfine, P. L. "`A Friend to the General": Extracts from the Journal of 
Major George Lestanquet September 14th. 1741 to April 
14th. 1742', Journal of the Society for Army Historical 
Research, LXXI, 285,1993,26-41; LXXI, 286,1993,127- 
132; LXXXI, 288,253-65 
Woodfine, P. L. `Horace Walpole and British Relations with Spain, 1738', in 
Royal Historical Society, Camden Miscellany, )OOUI, 
1994,277-311 
Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertations 
Campbell, P. R. `The Conduct of Politics in France in the Time of Cardinal 
Fleury, 1723-1743', Queen Mary College, University of 
London, 1985 
Crewe, D. G. `British Naval Administration in the West Indies 1739-48', 
Liverpool, 1978 
Dann, U. `Hanover and Great Britain 1740-1760', Oxford, 1980 
Dunthorne, H. L. A. `The Alliance of the Maritime Powers, 1721-1740', London, 
1978 
Gerrard, C. H. 'The Patriot Opposition to Sir Robert Walpole: A Study of 
Politics and Poetry, 1725-1742', Oxford, 1986 
Harding, R. H. "`A GOLDEN ADVENTURE": Combined Operations in 
the Caribbean, 1740-2. A Re-examination of the Walpole 
Ministry's Response to War with Spain', Birkbeck, London, 
1985 
Harris, M. `The London Newspaper Press c. 1725-1746', London, 1973 
302 
Manning, F. J. `The Duke of Newcastle and the West Indies. A Study in the 
Colonial and Diplomatic Policies of the Secretary of State 
for the Southern Department', Yale, 1925 
Morgan, G. W. `The Impact of War on the Administration of the Army, 
Navy and Ordnance in Britain 1739-1754', Leicester, 1977 
Pettit, A. `A Various Opposition: History and Rhetoric in the War on 
Walpole', Washington, 1991 
Quinn, J. F. `The Parliamentary Constituencies of Yorkshire from the 
Accession of Queen Anne to the Fall of Walpole', M. Litt, 
Lancaster, 1979 
Starkey, D. J. `British Privateering, 1702-1783, with particular reference 
to London', Exeter, 1985 
Stevens, D. H. `Party Politics and English Journalism, 1702-1742', 
Chicago, 1916 
Targett, S. `Sir Robert Walpole's Newspapers 1722-1742: propaganda 
and politics in the age of whig supremacy', Cambridge, 1991 
Varey, S. `The Craftsman, 1726-1752. An Historical and Critical 
Account', Cambridge, 1977 
303 
PAG E/PAGES 
EXCLUDED 
UNDER 
INSTRUCTION 
FROM 
UNIVERSITY 
